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THE PERSON OF CHRIST IN MODERN THOUGHT

THE FIRST SERIES OF DONNELLAN LECTURES FOR THE YEAR 1911-1912

BY

E. DIGGES LA TOUCHE, M.A., Litt.D.

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Grant me Thy mighty grace
That all my commonplace
By Thy great leading may be render'd high,
So through low leaves of thought
Blue sky may be inwrought,
My commonplace become Thine opportunity.

ARCHBISHOP ALEXANDER
Lord Primate of All Ireland, 1897-1911

THESE

DONNELLAN LECTURES

DELIVERED IN THE CHAPEL OF OUR COMMON ALMA MATER

ARE

DEDICATED

BY PERMISSION

TO

MY COUSIN

SIR JAMES DIGGES LA TOUCHE, K.C.S.I.

Hon. LL.D. (Dubl.)

SOMETIME LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR

OF THE

UNITED PROVINCES OF AGRA AND OUDH

AS A VERY SLIGHT ACKNOWLEDGMENT

OF HIS UNVARYING KINDNESS

THROUGHOUT THE YEARS

PREFACE

THE present volume contains the First Series of Donnellan Lectures for the year 1911-1912. The Second Series on "The Work of Christ in Modern Thought" will, it is hoped, be submitted to the public in a year's time.

The Reformed Churches are now in a very similar position to the mediæval Churches at the beginning of the Sixteenth Century. The new learning and the discovery of America had opened up whole vistas of knowledge, the very existence of which had never entered into the minds of the creative theologians of mediæval times, and the difference between the Renaissance and the theological worldviews was painfully apparent. Only the experimental exposure of the moral impotence of secularism enabled the advocates of Christian faith to get a hearing. Even then, the restatement in terms of the new thought and learning of the truth as it is in Jesus by the great creative theologians of the Sixteenth Century alone could regain for Christianity its legitimate dominance over the intellects as well as the hearts of men.

The advance of empirical science during the last century and, above all, the formulation of the evolutionary hypothesis have had a similar effect upon the modern mind. Its unfriendliness to Christian theology and faith will not be assuaged by ill-judged compromises and concessions on the part of those whose duty it is to "contend earnestly for the faith once for all delivered to the saints." Such a procedure only results in a sterile hybrid, which is equally a travesty of Modernism and of

Christian theology. As the chief lessons to be learned from the mediating theology of a century are its utter impotence to win those without the camp and its efficacy in familiarizing those within with the the methods and tenets of negative criticism, the present writer believes that if the great truths of the Gospel are to be preserved for the present generation, if a vague sentimentality is not to take the place of reasoned Christian faith, it can only be by a frank recognition of the essential truth of modernity on the one hand and of Christianity on the other, together with an equally frank recognition that the time has not yet come for a successful and final reconstruction of Christian Faith in terms of Modern Thought.

At the same time, things are pointing that way. The moral and spiritual impotence of the negative theologies is now a matter of daily experience, and the scientific effeteness of the negative reconstructions of the Christian origins is the one assured result of the controversy between the Liberals and Eschatologists. Signs are not wanting that the modern mind, nauseated with the negations of Liberal and eschatological theologies, is beginning to occupy itself with the problems of theological and, above all, Christological reconstruction.

Before this is possible, much "spade work" must be done and, while waiting upon God for the great intellectual and spiritual genius who alone can do for the Twentieth Century what Luther, Zwingli and Calvin did for the Sixteenth Century, the Christian scholar should be content to affirm the truth which he knows himself to possess as far as possible in terms of Modern Thought and, recognizing that the theology of his fathers is not final and that Modern Thought has by no means as yet found its true level, refuse to huckster a single iota of the truth so as to win those

who have adopted or seem likely to adopt the modern worldview.

It is historically inconceivable that the Christological structure whose foundations were well and truly laid by the theologians of the Primitive Churches and confirmed by the labours of the great spiritual and intellectual giants of the Sixteenth Century, which has withstood the assaults of the great negative critics of the Nineteenth Century, should be seriously shaken by the somewhat meticulous criticism of the present day. It is hoped that this enquiry into the labours of the second great Christological epoch of the Christian Churches will not only prove a convenient handbook to the Christological speculation of the Modern Period, but that it will commend the older and truer, though less fashionable, standpoint of the confessional Christology. Represented by such men as Theodor Zahn in Germany, Abraham Kuyper in Holland, B. B. Warfield in America, J. Orr in Scotland, and, last but by no means least, by Bishop H. C. G. Moule and Dean Wace in the Anglican communion, it commands the adherence of a scholarship and a critical acumen quite as profound as, and of a creative genius which far surpasses, any that has as yet been found in the negative camp.

My thanks are due to many friends and teachers, especially to the Rev. T. C. Hammond, M.A., Rector of St Kevin's Parish, Dublin, for the valuable and exhaustive note upon "Consciousness and the Sub-conscious," printed in the Appendix, and for much help in the revision of Lecture IV.; to Canon Robertson, D.D., formerly Vicar of Bradford, to whose scholarship and critical acumen almost every page of the first three lectures is indebted; to Herren Schill and Meyer who are responsible for the translations from foreign divines; to the latter, for the many hours of patient and understanding work

which he has devoted to my manuscripts; and to my cousin, Miss Christabel Godfrey, B.A., Scholar and Large Gold Medallist, T.C.D., for her kindness in revising the said translations.

It should, perhaps, be mentioned that, whenever possible, the translations from foreign divines have been taken from the authorized translations and that the list of authorities attached to the different sections of the lectures only contain the titles of those treatises which have actually been consulted in the preparation of these lectures.

Above all, I must tender my thanks to the Provost and Board of Trinity College for the honour done me in my appointment, and especially for the kindness and consideration shown me in the remission of some of the duties attaching to the Lectureship on account of ill-health; to the Provost for permitting me to exchange with the Rev. J. A. F. Gregg, B.D., Archbishop King's Professor of Divinity; and to the latter for his courtesy and kindness in allowing me to occupy, for the purpose of delivering my lectures, the University pulpit on dates previously assigned to him.

I humbly trust that every line of the treatise now submitted to the public has been written at the foot of the Cross, and that He who is now exalted far above all heavens may deign to pardon its imperfections and so provide that, despite its manifold defects, it may be of some service as a reassertion of the fundamental principles of " the glorious Gospel of the blessed God."

EVERARD DIGGES LA TOUCHE.

Trinity College, Dublin,
January 29th, 1912.

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APPENDIX

"Consciousness and the Sub-conscious"

BY THE

REV. THOMAS CHATTERTON HAMMOND, M.A.,

Rector of St. Kevin's Parish, Dublin

Lecture I

Christianity and the Modern Worldview

(Sunday, October 29th, 1911).

"IF ANY MAN WILL DO HIS WILL, HE SHALL KNOW OF THE DOCTRINE WHETHER IT BE OF GOD OR WHETHER I SPEAK OF MYSELF."—JOHN VII. 17.

"Foi, représentation d'un idéal, enthousiasme, telles sont les trois conditions de l'action humaine. Mais ne sont-ce pas, précisément, les trois moments du développement de l'esprit religieux? Ces trois mots n'expriment-ils pas fidélement la forme que prennent, sous l'influence religieuse, la volonté, l'intelligence et le sentiment?"—ÉMILE BOUTROUX.

"Philologie und Philosophie sind ja selbstverständlich auch Wissenschaft; aber eine Theologie, welche nur mit philologischen und philosophischen Methoden zu arbeiten weiss, ist als Theologie unwissenschaftlich. Es fehlt ihr das, was ihr überhaupt erst das Recht gibt, sich Theologie zu nennen, nämlich das Bewusstsein eines eigentümlichen Arbeitszeiles und der Besitz eigentümlicher Mittel, dies Ziel zu erreichen."—CARL STANGE.

"It is still our sins and nothing else that separate us from God. Philosophy and science, to those who seek not to talk of them but to know their power, do but render His clearness more clear, and the freedom of His service a more perfect freedom."

THOMAS HILL GREEN.

LECTURE I

Christianity and the Modern Worldview[1]

It is among the bitterest ironies of human life that the defects of a man or a system make a greater and more lasting impression than the excellences, and theology has not escaped this injustice of popular appraisement. The many benefits which have resulted from her sway as queen of the sciences are forgotten and her abuses remain an evergreen popular remembrance. If to this is added the further fact that the mass of men do not think out their agreements or oppositions, but are guided therein by the Spirit of the Age, by the Zeitgeist,[2] the real matter for surprise is that she is accorded a hearing at all.

[1] *AUTHORITIES* :—E. Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Kant;* J. Caird, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion;* R. Eucken, *The Life of the Spirit;* T. H. Green, *Philosophical Works, Prolegommena to Ethics;* H. Höffding, *Philosophy of Religion;* A. Kuyper, *Calvinism, Encyclopædia of Sacred Theology;* W. E. H. Lecky, *Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe;* R. W. Macran, *English Apologetic Theology;* J. Martineau, *The Seat of Authority in Religion;* J. Oman, *The Problem of Faith and Freedom;* J. Orr, *The Christian View of God and the World;* R. Seeberg, *The Fundamental Truths of the Christian Religion;* C. Stange, *Moderne Probleme des Christlichen Glaubens.*

[2] "The general intellectual tendencies pervading the literature of a century profoundly modify the character of the public mind. They form a new tone and habit of thought. They alter the measure of probability. They create new attractions and new antipathies, and they eventually cause as absolute a rejection of certain old opinions as could be produced by the most definite and cogent arguments." Lecky, *Rationalism in Europe*, I., p. 10.

"Movements emerge, seize upon men's minds, and carry them irresistibly away. Men perceive only the results of their movements, their progress, their general directions; they do not see their limitations, their pre-suppositions, the problems and, may be, the contradictions which emerge on a closer view. Hence they are proof against all attack, and no demonstration of their deficiencies and faults can affect them."—R. Eucken, *The Life of the Spirit*, p. 159.

In view of the great change in the character of science since mediæval times, the disasters of theological science were necessary and beneficial. They were necessary because theology must conform herself to the type of her sister sciences and because her methods needed renewal by the baptism of the spirit of the age.[1] This was imperative if theology was to meet the needs of modern men, and, therefore, the disasters which are forcing her votaries to assimilate the new aspects of truth revealed by the modern spirit are really beneficial to her life.

The science of mediæval times was contemplative, it was deductive in character in contradistinction to the experimental and inductive character of modern science. The former accorded well with the then prevailing Zeitgeist and worldview which, recognizing the irremediable character of the world's disease, sought to stay itself upon the eternal truth of Christianity and to withdraw itself from the world. Hence there arose, not unnaturally, a tendency on the part of the mediæval thinker to assume that the best of human thought lay in the past and for science to be merely contemplative in character. Its work was the reconciliation of authorities—not the discovery and co-ordination of new facts.

In such circumstances it is not surprising that theology sowed the whirlwind. In comparison with the gravity of her subject, all other sciences were

[1] "Though it is a custom to isolate theology as an ecclesiastical science whether by its friends or its opponents, there is nevertheless a close connection between the work of theology and the actual condition of general science. This is outwardly shown by the fact that theology also, like the other disciplines of science, tends to adapt itself to the prevailing methods of science. While man in the Middle Ages regarded theology as a particular kind of logic, in the age of the Renaissance he discovered that theology was only a peculiar type of philology; and while he in the time of orthodoxy interpreted theology *more geometrico*, *i.e.*, in the style of mathematics, in the age of the Aufklärung he strove to solve his task by means of historical and philosophical criticism."—C. Stange, *Moderne Probleme des Christlichen Glaubens*, p. 226.

comparatively insignificant and the claim of theology to scientific sovereignty was eagerly advanced and contentedly admitted. When, however, the great renewal of human activity which began with the Renaissance and Reformation took place, the nature of science was changed, we might almost say that science was born again, and, before it was directly assailed, the sovereignty of theological science suffered a rude shock. The boasted sovereign of the sciences was declared by the most virile nations of Europe to have misled her votaries, the results of her labours were severely scrutinized and her chief mediæval developments branded as "blasphemous fables and dangerous deceits."[1]

Theology, then, had to re-establish herself as a science and as the queen of the sciences, to adapt herself to the new conditions of life by a change in her general outlook upon phenomena and by the full recognition of the equally sacred character of other sciences. If her object was the assimilation and explanation of the facts of God's Self-revelation in nature and in man on the religious side, the object of the secular or profane sciences was the assimilation and explanation on the purely phenomenal side of the same Self-revelation. Content with the eternal truths that she knew herself to possess, she was loath to recognize the new facts; she was inclined to look askance at the discoveries of her sister sciences and to try to veto their facts when they clashed, or even seemed likely to clash, with her own deposit of fact and theoretical structures. In this she was untrue to herself and very unbelieving. Quite forgetting that it is in the highest degree impossible that God's word in nature and in revelation should ever really clash, she dreaded the knowledge and speculation that might challenge her sway. The

[1] Article XXXI.

refusal to listen to the voice of God in empirical science (which, to do her justice, was very temporary) brought its own reward; and to-day the Spirit of the Age denies the very name of science to Christian theology.

I.—Materialistic Character of Modern Thought[1]

There is no task more difficult than to appraise correctly the character of the thought of one's own time. It is so vast from our standpoint that it seems to fill the whole horizon and yet the next age will probably consider the mountain of our glory a very small molehill. Yet the task must be attempted; since a rough estimate of the prevailing tendencies of the modern mind is necessary to the discussion of its relation to the faith of the Gospel.

There can be little doubt of the fact that the modern outlook is much wider than that of any previous era. Just as the re-discovery of classical learning and wisdom, and the discovery of America, destroyed the mediæval outlook and created the Renaissance world-view, so the almost unthinkable discoveries of astronomy and other applied sciences, especially biology and history, have entirely destroyed the Renaissance world-view, and given us an incalculably wider field of vision.

While this widened outlook has undoubtedly tended to reduce the relative value of man in his own eyes by disclosing his quantitative insignificance, it has also revealed his qualitative worth by opening up the vista of his capacities. What is lost in one way is more than gained in another. On the one hand, every advance of knowledge, every new fact assimilated by

[1] "Evolution in its Darwinian form—the only form ever heard of by many—has been used as the foundation of a materialism which does not, like the old law of gravitation, require even the Great Mathematician. It manages everything by the ingenious process of spreading sufficiently small changes over sufficiently long time. This way of begging the cause piecemeal of so vast and wonderful a phenomenon as the world grows less and less convincing, especially as it cannot move a step without admitting a goal and regarding every detail as directed towards it."—Oman, *The Problem of Faith and Freedom*, pp. 199, 200.

the thought of the age seems to make belief in Revelation more difficult. The question continually recurs —Why should the Almighty take a special interest in the fate of a puny race upon a tiny and short-lived planet? On the other hand, the balance of actual fact is more than restored by the continual revelation of human capacity. After all, eternal significance is not determined by mere gross weight or measurement and the lowest savage is of infinitely greater significance than the whole of the brute creation. Thus, the consciousness of ever-growing knowledge tends to restore the balance and to reveal man's qualitative greatness. Nevertheless, owing to our pre-occupation with facts and the disuse of that contemplative faculty which alone can reveal the true meaning of any fact, this great counteractant has not exercised as beneficent an influence upon the modern attitude towards religious truth as might have been expected. While it has rightly emphasized the quantitative insignificance of man in comparison with the phenomenal universe and has been influenced by that fact in its religious attitude, it has with a strange perversity refused to recognize the qualitative greatness of man as conditioning the possibility of revelation.

The rise of modern empirical science has, therefore, most profoundly affected all modern thought. Its methods are so entirely different from those of the older science that it has created a different thought-world for us.[1] Everywhere man sees the blessings which have

[1] "It is necessary to insist upon the change which our times have produced in the truly scientific attitude. Science, until these last times, was, or desired to be, dogmatic. In its most exact parts, it regarded itself as a definite thing; in its others, it aspired to the same perfection. It sought, in everything, to present itself in the form of a system which deduced the explanation of particular things from universal principles. Scholasticism was its ideal as it was its form. But no science to-day, not even mathematics, would consent to be scholastic. Science, whatever form it assumes for convenience of exposition or teaching, is and continues essentially an induction indefinitely perfectible. The problem is to know how to make this induction."—Émile Boutroux, *Science et Religion*, pp. 234-235.

come to us from the mastery over Nature gained by empirical science. We actually live quicker and we live more comfortably as a result of its triumphs. The railway, the steamer, the telegraph are facts which are continually exhibiting to us the wonders of empirical science. Hence we are all more or less affected by the prevalent empirical tendency.[1] It has had the most excellent effect of compelling men to verify their facts in every department of life and has thus carried the work of the Reformation a stage further by creating a distrust of authority as such.

Its essential nature, which is radically different from that of the older science, involved this. The older science was really contemplative in character. The new is essentially investigatory. The principal question of the old was—What does this mean? That of the new—What is it? The older science started from authority and sought to reconcile the various authorities. The new science tends to distrust authority as such, and aims at the direct examination of phenomena.[2]

When, therefore, we sum up its tendencies, it is undeniable that modern thought upon the whole is distinctly hostile to Christian Faith and Belief. Nor

[1] Thus the late Professor Flint speaks of "the comparatively critical temper and scientific spirit of the age. Let us not exaggerate its influence. Our age is not nearly so critical or so scientific as we are apt to suppose. Only a relatively small number among us are either critical or scientific . . . Freeman and Stubbs were doubtless critical historians, but even their readers are generally no more critical students of history than were the first generations of readers of Livy, Gregory of Tours, or Bede. Scientific opinion is widely diffused through contemporary society, but were all who participated in it to be subjected to an examination on the elements of science, it would probably be found that a very small proportion of them could be credited with scientific knowledge."—*Agnosticism*, p. 381, ff.

[2] "The older science consisted chiefly in a general survey of the multiplicity of things, in which they were regarded as forming parts of a great structure. Modern science, however, breaks up the initial impression which we experience of a totality and seeks to get down to the the ultimate elements and the smallest forces, to ascertain their laws and by their help to reconstruct the world. This tracing of particular lines of construction gives not only a clearer insight into reality, but also an incomparably greater control over things."—R. Eucken, pp. 68-69.

is this surprising. The great impression which it has received from the researches of empirical science is that of the mechanical uniformity of nature, and there is an element in Christianity which is quite irreconcilable with such a onesided conception. If "the uniformity of nature" means the wooden uniformity of a rigid mechanical action, Christian Faith cannot be reconciled with the modern world-view and we are constrained to make our choice. The conflict is deeper than any conflict of detail; it extends to the fundamental conceptions of the rival world-views. These are radically different. The one regards the whole as primarily ethical and spiritual and interprets it in terms of the highest elements it can perceive; the other, starting from empirical premises, asks the question—What are the facts? and fails to see the wood for the trees. The one, starting from the world as a whole, asks the question—To what end? The other, unconsciously basing itself upon the same conception but starting from the investigation of particular facts, only asks—What is it?

Hence there is a strongly agnostic tinge in the latter. Nor is this to be deplored; so long as intellectual agnosticism (extending equally to the world, the self, and God) does not degenerate into the mere prejudice against religious knowledge which now usurps the name. The ideal spirit of all science, theological as well as secular, is agnostic—if by that is meant freedom from presuppositions; for the work of empirical science is simply to discover and complete the chain of phenomenal causes, and it has nothing whatsoever to do with ultimates.[1] Nevertheless, empiricism constantly comes into collision with Christianity over the fact of miracle, or the manifestation of the Supernatural in the sphere of

[1] See Höffding's *Philosophy of Religion* for a valuable discussion of the conflicting conceptions of cause held by religion and empirical science.

experience; for the human mind naturally tends to exalt its working theory into an ultimate presupposition of thought and it is not a very far cry from the assertion that empirical science is only concerned with phenomenal causes to the assertion of their ultimate character.

We live, therefore, in an age which, through the greater division of labour and ever-increasing specialization of its energies and the much more exact and beneficial demarcation of the field of empirical science, has created a "psychological atmosphere"—to use Mr. Balfour's happy phrase—which is anything but sympathetic to Christian Faith.

Besides this, "the religious conception of the world not only never grows directly out of a scientific and general study of things, but it can never be brought into absolute congruence with it. There are endless tracts and domains of the world, in nature and in history, which we cannot bring under the religious consideration at all, because they admit of no interpretation from the higher or more general points of view; they lie before us as everlasting unrelated mysteries, uncomprehended as to their import and purpose."[1] Hence the religious conception, which is only concerned with the destiny of man, has a scientific frontier which is always liable to be convulsed with open hostilities. This is much more the case with a historical religion such as Christianity, because it necessarily exposes a definite series of historical facts, partly of a peculiar and provocative nature, to the criticism of empirical science. Since these facts enter into the phenomenal world, they belong to the realm of empirical science as well as to that of theological science and, since they do not always apparently conform to the laws which empirical science has observed to obtain in its realm and, therefore, threaten

[1] R. Otto, *Naturalism and Religion*, p. 14.

the universality of its conclusions, the empirical criticism tends to be intensely hostile. There must, therefore, always be the liability to misunderstanding between the two states; but this liability need not mean war and it can, I think, be shown that the conflict between empirical and religious science is by no means necessary.

II.—Weakening of the Materialistic Tendency of Modern Thought

It is impossible to say this of the modern world-view. It is definitely naturalistic; and with Naturalism intelligent Christianity must wage unceasing war. Not that the modern world-view is that of a consistent Naturalism; for pure Naturalism has been so ruthlessly assailed by Idealism that all the prestige of its apparently empirical character has failed to win it general acceptance. The pitiless onslaughts of Professors Ward[1] and Frazer,[2] and Dr. Hutchinson Stirling[3]—not to speak of Canon Kennedy's great Donnellan Lecture[4]—form an indictment of Naturalism in all its forms which, simply because it cannot be, has never been answered. The consequence is that the supposed scientific Naturalism is being ever more and more relegated to the poorly educated, and ceasing to obtain among men of wide culture.[5]

Much of the dominant Naturalism of modern thought is based upon the Darwinian theory—"the inestimable value" of which, according to Haeckel, is that it enables the formation of a purely mechanical theory

[1] *Naturalism and Agnosticism.* [2] *Philosophy of Theism.*

[3] *Philosophy and Theology.*

[4] *Natural Theology and Modern Thought.* The following should also be mentioned, A. J. Balfour, *The Foundations of Belief;* E. Boutroux, *Science et Religion;* Bp. C. F. D'Arcy, *Idealism and Theology;* R. Flint, *Agnosticism;* Sir O. Lodge, *Man and the Universe, Life and Matter, Reason and Revelation;* J. Martineau, *A Study of Religion.*

[5] Thus, Eucken speaks of Materialism as tending to become "prescientific."—*Ibid*, p. 187.

of life.[1] Although it afforded much temporary relief to the hard pressed negative controversialists of the middle of the last century and obtained enormous and widespread popularity, its day in the upper reaches of thought seems to be drawing to a close.

Mendelism and other experiments and discoveries have done much to shake this particular theory of evolution, and such an onslaught as Otto's is not to be disregarded.[2] There cannot be the slightest doubt that, if the present tendency continues to develop, there will be a most profound modification of the character of Modern Thought.[3]

Of one thing we may be certain. Naturalism will continue to hold the field until it is opposed by a higher reason, until an open and reasoned Christian faith is opposed to it ; for, until we have something better to put in its place, we can never overthrow a system. The Renaissance is an excellent example of this. Its criticism of the Papacy and the mediæval Church was pitiless and acute ; but the threatened man would have been living to-day, had it not been for the richer, fuller, purer life and faith called into being by the Reformation. As then, so now. We may criticize Naturalism to our heart's content ; we may expose its inconsistencies and denounce its moral impotence ; but it will flourish like the green bay tree, unless, in the Providence of God, a form of faith which in life and doctrine corresponds to modern thought, which satisfies the legitimate intellectual demands of the age, which is not afraid to submit itself to the same

[1] Haeckel does not stand alone among ardent Darwinians in his hatred of Christianity. See the Cambridge Essays and Speeches in honour of Darwin's Centenary. His *Riddle of the Universe* and *Confession of Faith of a Man of Science* may be consulted in this connection.

[2] *Op. cit.* See also Orr's *God's Image in Man.*

[3] Personally I do not think that the truth or untruth of the Darwinian theory of Evolution affects the Christian problem to an appreciable extent; but the establishment of its untruth would do much to remove the popular prejudice against Christianity.

tests as would be applied to similar phenomena in other fields, and which makes no illegitimate appeal to authority, be provided. Hence the supreme question for Christians is not whether Christianity is true or false—they know from their personal experience that the Son of God has come—but whether it can be so stated in terms of the thought of the age as to win men intellectually as well as morally.

There is another and cogent fact to be considered. Empirical science is bound in the very nature of the case to take cognizance of religious phenomena and to offer an adequate explanation of them, to relate these facts to the other ascertained facts concerning man and his destiny. Science, unless it takes cognizance of the many and varied facts of man's religious experience, abdicates its functions. Hence we find a science of religions developing. It is concerned primarily with the phenomena of revelation rather than the Eternal Verities and must work with the imperfect tools of psychology and history. It can, therefore, only provide the materials with which the specifically Christian theologian may build the temple of revealed truth.

Its work is not unimportant on that account, nor is it to be viewed with suspicion. No doubt, it is often very painful to one who realizes the Godward aspect of religion to find the wonderful work of God in his own soul and in the souls of others analysed and dissected and tabulated—often in none too sympathetic a manner—by the hands of a merely empirical scientist. The perusal of Starbuck's queer but indispensable book [1] gives a grievous shock to many a devout soul; but the facts enter into human experience, and, if we do not use every means of ascertaining the truth about them, we are unfaithful to the God-given light of reason.

[1] *The Psychology of Conversion*: E. Caird's *Evolution of Religion*, W. James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* and *Pragmatism* should also be consulted for the relations of Christianity and the Science of Religions.

Indeed, we cannot afford to do without their conclusions. Supposing they show, as they do, that the phenomena of conversion and the sin-sick soul are usually related to the age of adolescence and that they are found in every age and in every land, they establish the existence of the very needs which religion proposes to satisfy. Thus, they provide a scientifically ascertained phenomenal basis from which to start and supply many of the materials for the construction of our intellectual edifice. There is little doubt, therefore, but that the development of the Science of Religions—and especially of Comparative Religion—forms a rich tribute which empirical science, too often beginning in hostility but compelled by its fundamental principles, is laying in ever increasing volume at the foot of the Cross.

The need of loyal adherence to the scientific spirit in its love of objectivity and its distrust of insufficiently supported theory must be continuously kept in mind, else we will soon be lost in a veritable Serbonian bog of hypotheses. "To wander with the seven league boots of possibility through the ocean of the possible affords but uncertain prospect of landing on the shore of reality."[1] Hence we find, as a result of the age of criticism and negation which is just ending, a strong constructive tendency developing. Negative theologians are beginning to build up with the tools of scientific research the very edifice which they have just pulled down with their hands.

One thing is certain, and is only confirmed by every advance of the science of religions—"the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned."[2] The votary of the science of religions may articulate the intellectual bones of religious faith into a skeleton; but he cannot

[1] R. Seeberg, *Fundamental Truths*, p. 7. [2] 1 Cor. i. 14.

and never will be able to give them life. The question, "Son of Man, can these bones live?" only admits of Ezekiel's answer, "O Lord God, Thou knowest."[1] To point this out, is not to depreciate the great importance of truly scientific work in the field of religious experience: for it is certainly not unimportant either for a physician to have some knowledge of anatomy or for those who have experienced the change of heart by the operation of God, the Holy Ghost, and to whom is, therefore, committed the ministry of reconciliation, the work of a physician of souls, to understand the intellectual character of religious experience.[2]

III.—Theology as an Empirical Science[3]

When we look around us, we find that we live in a world of very widely differing phenomena, which nevertheless gives the impression of being a unity: for the mere fact that the whole together makes a world is sufficient proof that rational unity underlies all the apparently conflicting phenomena. Now, the aim of all intellectual enquiry is to attain to a knowledge of the cause of that unity, whether by the discovery of its First Cause (theology and philosophy), or by the discovery and unravelling of the chain of secondary causes (the natural sciences) by which the phenomenal universe has come to its present state of development.[4]

[1] Ez. xxxvii. 3.

[2] "The quickening of life comes not from men: it is the prerogative of God, and it is due to His sovereign will alone, whether or not the tide of religious life rise high in one century, and run to a low ebb in the next. . . . But you remember the Æolian harp, which men were wont to place outside their casements, that the breeze might wake its music into life. Until the wind blew, the harp remained silent, while, again, even though the wind arose, if the harp did not lie in readiness, a rustling of the breeze might be heard, but not a note of ethereal music delighted the ear."—Kuyper, *Calvinism.*

[3] See E. Boutroux, *Science et Religion;* A. Gretillat, *Méthodologie;* M. Pattison Muir, *Can Theology Become Scientific? Hibbert Journal,* April, 1911.

[4] "The work of science is to find law, order and reason in what seems at first accidental, capricious, and meaningless, and the arduousness of that work grows with the complexity and the intricacy of the phenomena to be examined."—E. Caird, *Evolution of Religion,* I. p. 1.

What, then, is empirical science? We may define it as the observation of phenomena, the classification of the facts observed and their reduction under general laws. It is primarily and definitely objective in character and, seeking to reduce its activity within the narrowest possible bounds, is distinctly unsympathetic to the subjective.[1]

While the aim and purpose of science is to reduce all phenomena under (ideally) a single law, it has only advanced in its pursuit of truth by parcelling out the field of its activities into sections, each of which forms the whole world of an individual science. The field is too vast for any single method to be successful—or, rather, the phenomena are too varied to respond to a single method—and we find, therefore, many sciences all working on the same assumptions but using very different methods according to the requirements of their respective subjects.

1. *Intellectual Assumptions Identical*

Now, an enquiry into the presuppositions of the natural sciences reveals the somewhat surprising fact that their presuppositions are precisely those of the Reformation, but not of the mediæval type of Christian theology. They make the same assumptions: and Christianity has used, and can still use, the very methods of work which are most dear to the heart of the modern empiricist.

There is nothing more absurd than the popular assumption—often made in practice, though rejected in theory, by educated and thoughtful men—that science is objective knowledge, while theology is subjective faith. All human knowledge, in the last analysis, rests upon faith. When any man begins the

[1] "The modern period has made vigorous attempts to free human action from all subjectivity, and to connect it closely with its objects: it forms great complexes of work, recognizes in them their peculiar laws and motives, and lets these latter control human action."—R. Eucken, p. 230.

journey towards the goal of knowledge, vast and undemonstrable assumptions form his equipment. In fact, they are axiomatic for all human thought and activity. Our scientist, who is inclined to reject the Christian faith as a mere matter of unverifiable belief, must begin his own work by the acceptance of a Creed of undemonstrable propositions containing quite as many and as difficult articles as the Athanasian. Among its articles would be his own existence, the general trustworthiness of the human mind, the existence of other selves, of the universe, and the essential rationality of the latter. No doubt this Creed will be verified to a very high degree of probability by the experience of life ; but we begin with it and proceed from it. It can never be definitely proved in the old sense of demonstration and no other fact or reasoning whatsoever can ever attain a higher certainty. When, therefore, anyone admits the rationality of belief in his own existence and in that of his neighbours and persists in denying the *à priori* rationality of faith in the Divine existence, he involves himself in a tissue of absurdities and contradictions.

Another article of our agnostic creed—the essential rationality of the phenomenal world—is an equally good friend to the natural and to the theological scientist. " In and for itself it is a justifiable procedure to start from the hypothesis that existence must be comprehensible. Were we to abandon this altogether, our knowledge would have no ground on which to make a single step ; no event, no change, however great, within or without us, would set our thought in motion. We should state no problems, ask no questions, make no experiments. But there is a difference between an hypothesis and an eternal verity. The actual knowledge that we have arrived at in no way justifies us in assuming the absolute rationality of the

universe."[1] A better statement of this necessary faith in a universal order than this pronouncement of Professor Höffding's could not well be imagined. The latter clause of the statement no more affects the theologian than the naturalistic thinker. If the fundamental assumption, the absolute rationality of the universe, is untrue, all knowledge becomes a delusion and theology only falls with the rest. She is not concerned to demonstrate the finality of human knowledge. If that is to be done, it is the work of philosophy. Her task is to show the intellectual validity of her faith and she can only be foiled in this by the impeachment of all knowledge. When, therefore, the theologian has shown that the knowledge of God is as well founded as the very best empirical knowledge, he has completed his epistemological task. He is not concerned to prove the demonstrable certainty of God's existence any more than of his own. Such knowledge would be too high for man who, at the best, can only attain to a very high degree of moral certainty in any department of human knowledge.

But the negative scientist has, in the assumption of the ultimate rationality of the universe, entirely given away his case against the theologian ; for this fundamental axiom of his work and reasoning is the experimental proof of the theologian's primary proposition. He cannot have it both ways. He cannot say that the world is absolutely rational and, at the same time, deny the absolute finality of thought. If he assumes this primary axiom of empirical science, he must be prepared to join the ranks of the much abused theologians and make the legitimate deduction of an ordering Mind.

2. *Moral Assumptions Identical*

There are many other presuppositions which it would be well to discuss ; but, the subject of these

[1] Höffding, *Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 36-37.

lectures being what it is, we are only concerned to show the legitimate character of our methodology before proceeding to its application. Hence I must content myself with drawing your attention to the fact that the moral requisites of successful empirical research are identical with those of theological enquiry.

We are constantly told that only the man who is an honest seeker after truth can expect to find God; but it is equally true that only the honest seeker can expect to attain to a truly scientific knowledge of phenomena. Knowledge, in the last resort, is dependent upon moral conditions. Sir William Ramsay has laid just emphasis upon "the moral element which is a necessary part of high intellectual power"[1]; but I doubt whether he does not go too far in allowing to mere cleverness the poor adequacy of winning a class prize. Apart from the recognition of the sacredness of truth and from the consciousness of the grave responsibility attaching to such intellectual powers as God has given you, you will never do your best intellectual work or develop your powers to even an approximation to their fulness. Nothing is more common than for men to come to the University with considerable reputations for ability and, because they will not work, fail to justify their reputations. They leave the University with weakened powers—powers atrophied through disuse—because they had not sufficient moral stamina to enable them to use their talents. This is even more apparent after men have left college. They have no ideals, no determination to continue the scholastic discipline which can develop their powers and enable them to contribute in some small degree to the thought of their

[1] "*Luke the Physician*, p. 250. He also says: "It is a truth which one often has to impress on students at college that mere cleverness is a poor and even a dangerous part of a scholar's equipment, adequate by itself only for the winning of entrance scholarships and class prizes, but having no staying power in the race of life." See also Illingworth's *Bampton Lecture V.*: "Moral Affinity Needful for the Knowledge of a Person".

age. Besides this, a very large part of the work that is done is fundamentally vitiated by unworthy motives—or by that moral slackness which prevents men straining every nerve in the elimination of mental and moral prejudices. It is not an unknown thing for personal prejudices to lead to bitter and unworthy literary controversies and much time and energy, of which a better use might well have been made, has thus been wasted. Perhaps we might define the most necessary moral requisites of all truly scientific works as candour and thoroughness. Certain it is that no man who lacks these qualities will ever do much first-class work in the scientific field; and no man, who refuses to use the means at his disposal to prosecute the inquiry, will ever attain to the knowledge of God, or, for that matter, of plant life.

When the object of knowledge is personal, the moral elements become more or less prominent in proportion to the moral excellence of the individual. The proverb "How can two walk together except they be agreed?"[1] is of wide application. The fact that one man is a friend of another presupposes a moral similarity between them. Where there is essential moral divergence, no friendship will long continue. The world found the Cross the simplest solution of its relationship with Sinless Manhood.

Similarly, in relation to religious truth, the moral elements are of incalculable significance. The object of theology is the knowledge of God and in this, in the character of its subject, it differs from all other sciences. They seek the knowledge of the non-moral (*e.g.*, the natural sciences), or the partially moral (the mental, moral and social sciences). Theology strives for the knowledge of the perfectly moral. Since God is absolute Truth, Holiness and Love, He will not be found of those who mind earthly things, whose

[1] Amos iii. 3.

glory is in their shame. Hence the moral conditions are of much greater importance in it than in any other branch of science. Ritschl[1] is surely right in emphasizing membership of the redeemed community (if by that he means the saving relationship of the soul to Christ) as an indispensable prerequisite of any real knowledge of God; for it is only personal contact, involving some degree of moral likeness, that enables us to know any personality. Of course, nobody would or could deny that there is a sense in which we can possess a stunted knowledge of God before regeneration and the acceptance of the moral conditions, just as a man who is colour-blind can know that there is such an art as oil-painting, or as the average English peasant at the beginning of the last century knew Napoleon the Great; but the moral requisites of a true knowledge of God are not peculiarly theological any more than they are peculiarly anatomical or botanical. Although their prominence varies in accordance with the moral character of the subject of the science, they are absolutely indispensable prerequisites to the acquisition of any true knowledge whatsoever.

3. *Identity of Method*

Now that we have seen the identical character of the presuppositions of empirical and theological science, we are in a position to discuss the extent to which the latter science can use the method of empirical science

[1] "We should pay no special attention to this purpose of Jesus, nor should we seek to discover its value and its meaning, did we not reckon ourselves part of the religious community which first attested, through the writers of the New Testament, for forgiveness of sins as effected by Christ. . . . Authentic and complete knowledge of Jesus' religious significance—His significance, that is as a founder of religion—depends, then upon one's reckoning oneself part of the community which He founded, and this precisely in so far as it believes itself to have received the forgiveness of sins as His peculiar gift. . . . We can discover the full compass of His historical actuality solely from the faith of the Christian community."—*Justification and Reconciliation*, pp. 2-3.

and in this way conform to the general type of modern sciences. "To be always inquiring what things are coming to be, scientific method uses hypotheses and theories; it uses these as means for bringing intellectual order into certain facts selected from the past heap of experiences which nature pours out before the observer."[1] Scientific hypothesis and theory, then, form a sort of makeshift, a scaffolding to help in the building of the intellectual temple, to be replaced by others when they have done their work.[2] Hence there is a distinction (which we must never forget) between scientific fact and scientific theory.[3] The former, once established, may in the end lose its relative but never its intrinsic importance. The latter may be entirely overthrown by the relevance of a single adequate fact and is always in process of revision.

There could scarcely be a much better definition of theological science as it is and should be. Like the natural sciences, its first work is that of investigation; its next problem is the formulation of approximately true hypotheses or doctrines; its facts once established, though they may lose their relative importance, can never change, and its theories, in strict analogy, are liable to continual revision. Indeed, as Professor Scott Holland has very justly said, this was the Churchly method in the primitive Christological controversies.[4] If this is the method of theology, it

[1] M. M. Pattison Muir, *Hibbert Journal*, IX., p. 471.

[2] "The thoroughly well established facts of the natural sciences remain unchanged. . . . The intellectual schemes, called theories, are never quite complete; they are always becoming."—*Ibid.* p. 474.

[3] Professor Gwatkin's discussion of evolution in his *Gifford Lecture*, I. pp. 52 ff., affords an excellent example of the true character o scientific theory. He says (p. 56): "We may frankly accept evolution, not as a cause, nor as a final theory, but as a theory which gives a general though largely metaphorical account of the processes by which organisms have come into their present form."

[4] "They looked for God to manifest Himself, not in ideas, but in acts. God was revealed by what He did. . . And if so, then facts are everything. They are not symbols of an idea, which can be

is hard to see what cause of complaint empirical science can urge against it.

What, then, about its doctrines? Are they not absolutely binding? If we see fit to become members of a community which accepts them, the definitions are binding on us; but they are not necessarily binding on us as Christians. The facts, however, bind us equally as Christians and thinkers. If we come into collision with them, so much the worse for us. But as Christians and scientific theologians, we are morally bound to use all the means available for the investigation of all relevant experiences and to formulate any hypothesis that may be required by the facts. In other words, doctrines are only very rough statements about facts, bypaths to enable us to find our way about the rich intellectual content of the Christian experience and revelation of God and are subject to revision and modification as the facts demand. Even the most striking of credal statements about the Person of our Lord—"God of God, Light of Light, Very God of very God, Begotten not made, Being of one substance with the Father"—is only an exceedingly rough intellectual approximation of the believing soul's experience of Christ. It is utterly inadequate to the intellectual and moral richness of the fact, and only stands in view of the helpless inadequacy of human

dropped when once the idea is apprehended. They are the real material in which the thing was done. They are the actual embodiment of the will. The will only comes to itself in and by the acts in which it is realized. The love of God is only to be known and felt in the sacrifices that it has actually once for all made. These are its pledges, its proofs, its sacraments, itself. Love is what it does. . . . Every impulse that leads you to trust and adore the Divine Will, heightens the worth and intensifies the significance of the facts through which the will has found expression. These were the presuppositions which underlay all Hebrew thought; and on these the Church fell back, under the challenge of Docetism, in her effort to recapture and to preserve the memories of the previous and preparatory career which, perhaps, for a time seemed to the believers themselves to be swallowed up in the absorbing revelation of the glory which followed it."—*Jesus or Christ?* p. 130-1.

language as regards the expression of eternal and transcendental truth.[1]

Most assuredly, doctrines exercise a regulative influence upon us in our selection of the relevant facts in religious experience, but that is the very *raison d'être* of scientific theory.[2] They are, however, abused when they are exalted into infallible standards which must not be revised. Even the Creed of Chalcedon, if facts so demand, is subject to revision. Christological enquiry, however, has as yet shown no single reason for its modification in the negative direction ; and it would be monstrous to suggest that we should give up either the Nicene theory of our Lord's Person, or the Copernican system of astronomy, simply because they happen to be old !

At the same time, it is very necessary to lay continual stress upon the temporary character of the doctrinal statements to which the Christian consciousness has come. Only the poverty of that consciousness has prevented their supersession, long ago, by richer and fuller Christological formulæ. As it is, it is a most serious question whether the Creed of Nicæa will not, in the interests of the faith of Nicæa, soon have to be superseded. Men who in no sense of the term hold the Nicæan faith feel themselves able, in virtue of a certain doctrine of immanence, to accept the Creeds and, having the form of godliness but denying the power thereof, are corrupting the Gospel faith.

[1] " We are collecting facts, no fact in Nature or in Scripture is unwelcome ; then we cast about for good working hypotheses, although in matters theological we call the hypotheses doctrines ; and then we verify these in experience or by experiment."—R. McCheyne Edgar, *The Genius of Protestantism*, p. 70.

[2] " In every branch of natural science there is a constant animated intercourse between conceptual and perceptual experiences. Without the facts, theories have not a shred of reality. Without the order bringing theory, the facts lie ' confusedly insubordinate.' The theory helps the investigator to make selections from the heap of facts ; it helps him to spot the likely facts, and to test their usefulness for his purpose, which is to find intellectual orderliness in the multifarious data of sensible experience."—M. M. P. Muir, *Ibid.*

4. *Their Subjects Different*

The principal difference between theology and the natural sciences is, therefore, similar to the principal difference between botany and anatomy—to the difference in the character of their subjects.[1] The revelation of God in Christ—not the aggregate of religious experiences—is the proper subject of Christian theology. The latter is really the subject of a special branch of psychology and only in so far as it forms the medium of revelation is it of importance to the theological scientist.[2]

There is, therefore, no reasonable objection to Christianity using empirical methods, supplemented by the method of hypothesis. On the contrary, the objective character of its subject renders it particularly responsive to inductive methods. It is the method which we hope to apply to the great vital facts of

[1] This is the fundamental error of Mr. Pattison Muir's interesting discussion. He seems also to think that the primary object of theology is the religious experience of men, not the Self-manifestations of God. Thus, he says: "If theology were to use the scientific method, theologians would be primarily investigators. Theology would constantly be trying to adjust its hypotheses and theories to the religious facts; it would get into a habit of judging the truth of its doctrines by their helpfulness in systematising and explaining religious experiences; it would cease to regard doctrines as ultimate realities, and to determine the reality of religious facts by their adaptability to doctrines."—*Ibid*, p. 475-476.

[2] There are two objections to this conception of theology as science, which may be mentioned here. They are (1) that theology is bound to the contents of revelation and (2) that its results are predetermined. As regards (1), theology is only bound to the contents of revelation in the the same sense as natural science is bound to the contents of the universe. As Kuyper says, "He will certainly reckon with that revelation, but in no other way than that in which the naturalist is bound to and must reckon with the existing cosmos."—*Encyclopædia of Sacred Theology*, p. 171. As regards (2), its results are only predetermined in the same sense as those of any natural science—in the sense that they are involved in the subject-matter. "The actual nature of the cosmos conditions the results of all investigation, and so far as there is question of knowledge which we obtain by thinking, our thinking can never be aught than the after thinking of what has been before thought by the Creator of all relations; even to such an extent that all our thinking, to the extent that it aims to be and is original, can never be anything but pure hallucination."—*Ibid*, p. 175. See the whole discussion in this indispensable volume. Compare also Gretillat's *Méthodologie*.

Christian faith and experience. Beside the problem of the Person and Work of the Lord Jesus Christ, all other religious problems and facts are insignificant; and we may feel assured that, in our application of the methods of modern science and ancient theology to these great central facts, we are not far from the heart of Christianity considered as an intellectual problem. Here, if anywhere, the scientific method can be employed with good hopes of success; for the facts (which belong to the realm of natural science *qua* phenomena as well as to Christian theology *qua* Christian experiences) are to our hands in rich abundance and the work of other sciences than Christian theology, notably of historical science, is the necessary preliminary to the study of certain aspects of the supreme subject of all theological science.

Reconciliation, the Problem of our Era

This is the work which is most insistent in our time and of which, so far as the Anglican Church is concerned, there is but little promise of accomplishment. If the work of the present generation is to be done, if the needs of men—and they were never more insistent—are to be met, it must be by the coming generation to which, brother students of T.C.D., we belong, addressing itself without coward fear of consequences and with earnest faith in the God who "was in Christ Jesus reconciling the world unto Himself" [1] to an arduous and at times a distressing task.

From the great Universities of a nation come its intellectual and largely its spiritual impulses. From Cambridge came the admirable scholarly movement which vanquished Tübingen and, what is still more creditable, the great revival of missionary enthusiasm which forms the brightest jewel in the crown of Nineteenth Century Christianity. From Oxford came

[1] 2 Cor. v. 19.

the Evangelical Revival which regenerated every phase of our national and religious life ; from the same University came the mediævalist movement of the early Nineteenth Century and also the Broad Church and Liberal movements. From the Silent Sister came the great Seventeenth Century movement which, in the providence and mercy of God, has stamped its distinctly evangelical character upon the Church of Ireland and within these historic walls was born the Irish Nationalism of the eighteenth century.

Is it a wild dream that from the University of Ussher and Molyneux, Toplady, Berkeley and Burke, Magee and Salmon, will come a living and spiritual movement which will restore to a generation sorely needing it the Gospel of our gracious Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ, on a legitimate intellectual basis ? If her sons, strong in the spirit of faith and standing fast in the liberty wherewith Christ has made them free, bend their best energies to this task, then, indeed, Trinity College will take her rightful place amid the Universities of the world and continue to be that centre of piety and sound learning which she has hitherto been.

This is a high ideal of service, of service which will most certainly have but a miserable reward as the world counts reward—but which in peace and joy and contentment is sure of incalculable reward both here and hereafter ; an ideal of service strenuous to attain and of immeasurable usefulness to others ; for it is only by each of us working in his own restricted sphere honestly and unhesitatingly as in the sight of God that we can do our part in the work of reconstruction and restatement which, in the providence of God, must precede another mighty outpouring of the Divine Spirit.

This is no appeal to a crude sentimentality, no invitation to go and to do some great thing before the astonished eyes of a wondering world ; but a call

to the deepest and best within us ; to the intellectual and spiritual fibre of our being ; to the courage which can labour amid and triumph over discouragements, which can surmount difficulties, which can do without earthly success ; because confident that when the shades of even close in and our work is done, when the call comes to us to lay aside the instruments of our warfare, when, probably unknown to the world but loved and honoured by the little circle of our dear ones and by those whom we have brought to a saving knowledge of Christ Jesus our Saviour, the angel of death lays his hand upon us, our "sweet Master Christ,"[1] who has sojourned with us and sustained us throughout the burden and heat of the day, will then be with us and our eyes, so often strained by our labours for His dear sake, as all things earthly fade for ever from their view, "shall see the King in His beauty."[2]

[1] Sir Philip Sidney. [2] Is. xxxiii. 17.

Lecture II

The Person of Christ and the Negative Criticism of the Modern Age

(Sunday, November 5th, 1911.)

"BUT THE NATURAL MAN RECEIVETH NOT THE THINGS OF THE SPIRIT OF GOD; FOR THEY ARE FOOLISHNESS UNTO HIM; NEITHER CAN HE KNOW THEM, BECAUSE THEY ARE SPIRITUALLY DISCERNED."
1 COR. ii. 14.

"How it came to pass that, under the empire of Tiberius, in an obscure corner of the earth, there was lived a life which, as represented in tradition, became the absolute form of human life for all time, so that in it the world has ever since been becoming new, is a question not lightly to be answered."—T. H. GREEN.

"L'Évangile est essentiellement une Personne: la Personne de Jésus Christ. Oui, l'Évangile, tout l'Évangile, l'Évangile comme fait historique, l'Évangile comme idéal éternal, l'Évangile qui est hors de nous, parce qu'il est devant nous, l'Évangile se ramasse, se condense, se résume en une Personne et, par cette Personne, nous devient actuel, accessible, intérieur."
GASTON FROMMEL.

"Jedes Bild hat etwas von dem wahren Christus und doch sind sie weit von einander verschieden. Das kommt meiner Ueberzeugung nach daher; Die Person Jesu ist so gross und überragt das gewöhnliche menschliche Mass in dem Grade, dass kein Zeitalter und keine Auffassung unfassend genug ist, und seine ganze Bedeutung für die Weltgeschichte zu erschöpfen."
OTTO SCHMIEDEL.

LECTURE II

The Person of Christ and the Negative Criticism of the Modern Age

Christological Significance of the Period[1]

The Modern Period is the second great Christological epoch in the history of the Christian Churches. After the Athanasian and cognate settlements, the Christian consciousness devoted itself to the most necessary examination and articulation of the work of the Redeemer, and to the application of the benefits of that work to the penitent and believing soul. Just as the Roman controversy is now a side issue in the minds of modern men, the Christological problem was for fourteen centuries a mere side issue and only, at most, formed the subject of a few interesting academic speculations. Perhaps the nearest approach to a real contribution during the whole of that long period is to be found in the Christological controversy between Lutheran and Reformed divines and it was only an incident of the sacramental controversy. This explains the Christological barrenness of the long period of ecclesiastical predominance; for the great contributions to the elucidation of any problem are only made when it occupies the mind of the age.

[1] *AUTHORITIES:* A. M. Fairbairn, *Christ in Modern Theology;* Hagenbach, *German Rationalism;* Jordan, *Jesus und die Modernen Jesusbilder;* W. Sanday, *The Life of Christ in Recent Research, Christologies Ancient and Modern;* A. Schweitzer, *The Quest for the Historical Jesus;* O. Schmiedel, *Die Hauptprobleme des Lebens-Jesu-Forschung;* H. H. Weinel, *Jesus im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert.*

This could not well be otherwise ; for the moralization of dogma by bringing it into relation with the great facts of human experience was an imperative necessity. Not until the appearance of the greatest of all theological works—" The Institutes " of John Calvin—in Reformation times, was the moralization of dogma even speculatively achieved. Before this was possible, much in the way of interpretation of facts had to be done—especially as the " Christianization " of the Roman Empire (which has been described, with some show of truth, as the paganization of the Church), coincided with the great Christological controversy of the early centuries and helped to concentrate attention upon the metaphysical rather than the moral and spiritual aspects of Christian faith.

But the Reformation, with its stress upon the freedom of the individual and the right of private judgment, its just concentration of all true Christianity into the formula—" Christianity is fellowship with Christ "—its absolute preoccupation with the Christ of God, its exaltation of the Saviour instead of the Church, was bound to re-open the whole Christological controversy. The Christological formulæ of the Fathers were stated in terms of ancient thought ; they were no longer guarded as sacrosanct by the infallible Church ; and the object of negative criticism was soon to be Christ Himself. Hence every Christological contribution of much note has come either from the Lutheran or the Reformed Churches. Rome and the Holy Eastern Church have been sterile. Indeed, it is not too much to say that, if you want good Christology, you must go to the Lutheran and Reformed divines ; for the contributions of our own Church have been very slight. The few and small contributions of the *Lux Mundi* school are very little more than *rechauffés* of the German and French Lutherans and Calvinists, and

are quite outclassed, even in these islands, by the works of such authors as Professors Bruce,[1] Denney[2] and Forsyth[3], and still more by the great books of Drs. Fairbairn[4] and Orr[5].

Deistic Criticism not Modern Criticism

The criticism of the school of Voltaire which derived its inspiration from the English Deists, although the dominant influence in cultivated circles at the beginning of our period and in popular circles until it was half over, really belongs to the transition period of the Seventeenth Century. Indeed, the character of that criticism renders it impossible for us to criticize it very seriously in the present day. Voltaire "was in one word the representative of Deism at the beginning of the Eighteenth Century";[6] and his mind, brilliant but superficial, and trained in the school of Jesuits, was incapable of a really profound treatment of the Person of Christ. His message and that of his school was solely a message for its own age. It concentrated attention upon the concept of miracle. This it assailed with all the resources of ridicule and buffoonery. It gave very little attention to the Person of Christ; for it was not sufficiently historical in character to perceive that the Person of the Redeemer constitutes the central, the significant fact in Christian faith and experience. It was conditioned throughout by the narrow unspiritual conceptions of Latitudinarianism and of the old high and dry orthodoxy which degraded faith to the mere acceptance of a code of beliefs and to the exact perform-

[1] *The Humiliation of Christ, The Training of the Twelve, The Kingdom of God, St. Paul's Conception of Christianity*, etc.

[2] *Jesus and the Gospel.*

[3] *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ.*

[4] *Christ in Modern Theology, Philosophy of the Christian Religion, Studies in the Life of Christ*, etc.

[5] *The Christian View of God and the World, The Progress of Dogma*, etc.

[6] Hagenbach *German Rationalism* (E.T.), p. 45.

ance of prescribed duties. Hence its onslaught was directed against the miracles which orthodox Christianity cited as authenticating its claims. Deistic criticism is, therefore, only of interest to us as the preparation for the far more searching criticism of the Modern Period; for which it prepared the way by subjecting the whole problem of the miraculous to severe criticism and by training the forces of belief for the work of the forthcoming defence of Christianity by engaging them in a long series of skirmishes.

I.—The Enlightenment[1]

The Enlightenment "signifies a phase of historical evolution in Europe which may be characterized as marking the beginning of the modern period of secular culture, in contrast to the theological spirit that constituted the regulating principle of society in the preceding epoch."[2] The new knowledge and the new habits of mind, inaugurated by Bacon and the founders of modern astronomy, changed "the whole aspect of the world."[3] The many tyrannies and other defacements of the Christian Churches had led to an inevitable conflict between Christian faith and the world-spirit. From ecclesiasticism of every kind the world had turned in revolt and the better elements in the struggle now looked to the historical Carpenter of Nazareth in the search for an ally against the dominant ecclesiasticism. The question of the truth or falsehood of religion became the question of the truth or falsehood of the Person of Christ.

The first stage in the history of modern Christological research may be described as that of Rationalism. Its characteristics are those of the Enlightenment—an

[1] This section is dependent upon the authorities already mentioned, and the articles in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (eleventh edition) and the *New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopædia of Religious Knowledge*.

[2] E. Troeltsch Art. "Enlightenment" in *The New Schaff-Herzog Religious Encyclopædia*, iv. 141.

[3] *Ibid.*

absolute trust in what it was pleased to designate Reason, finding the sanction of truth in the mind of the individual and being in consequence arbitrary and subjective.[1] Not that it was irreligious. No worthy or serious movement of the human mind is ever irreligious and the Rationalism of the Eighteenth Century is no exception to the rule. Reimarus and Paulus stood just as firmly as Butler or Paley for the basic truths of all religion—God, Freedom and Immortality—and, upon the whole, the men of the Enlightenment were earnest moralists ; but their most typical representatives (with some exceptions) hated Christianity in its organized form ; and, in the providence of God, this hatred was the inspiring motive of the enquiries which have forced us to realize the almost forgotten truth of the real and essential humanity of our Lord Jesus Christ.[2]

The great problem with which the Rationalism of the Enlightenment set itself to deal was that of the Supernatural in the life and Person of the Lord. At this point the conflict between the faith and the new thought became acute ; for the fundamental principles of the Enlightenment, thanks to its narrow restriction of truth to the measure of man's mind, were absolutely hostile to the very idea of transcendental truth. Hence, while they rivalled the orthodox in their ascriptions of honour and praise to Christ as a Moral Teacher, the theologians of the Enlightenment were determined to exclude the operation of God from the realm of human experience. " The essential substance of Christianity must undergo a change. Redemption must give place to an ideal philosophy leaning upon the moral law."[3]

[1] *Ibid.*

[2] " It was not so much hate of the person of Jesus as of the supernatural nimbus with which it was so easy to surround Him, and with which He had in fact been surrounded."—Schweitzer, p. 4.

[3] O. Kirn in the *New Schaff-Herzog*, IX., 396.

1. *Reimarus*

The theory by which Reimarus and his followers attempted to explain the supernatural elements in the life of the Lord Jesus Christ may be described as that of "fraud." This does not necessarily mean that the Lord and His apostles were bad men in that they looked to their own personal advantage and deceived for their own ends. The inventors of the theory lived in an age when it was seriously debated (and generally affirmed) as to whether the rulers of a state were not justified in deceiving their subjects for their own good. Thus, they applied the morality of their own time to the Lord and His apostles, creating for themselves (as, indeed, we all do) an image of Christ in their own likeness and, after the analogy of the order of the Illuminati, making the Lord the tool of a secret order. Reimarus considered that it was impossible for a sensible man to believe all the "nonsense" about angels and demons and, therefore, held that the Lord simply accommodated Himself to these views and utilized the superstitions of the people for their own good. The disciples pretended, for selfish reasons, that the Master had risen from the dead and, to give colour to the tale, stole the body of the Lord. The Lord Jesus Christ is to him the most perfect "Teacher of virtue and of that natural religion"[1] in which he believed.

It is hard for us to understand how any man endowed with either a moral or a historical sense could even for a moment regard this as true. The explanation seems to be that Reimarus's mind was purely critical and absolutely lacking in the power of historical synthesis. He could marshal with a skill, which, perhaps, has never been surpassed, the difficulties in the sacred records; but he was utterly helpless when confronted with a problem of historical construction.

[1] Weinel, p. 14.

In this he is typical of the period. In criticism the Enlightenment was very brilliant; but it was so defective in construction that Weinel can say of the movement which gave birth to historical science that "The Enlightenment is wholly unhistorical."[1]

2. *Paulus*

Dr. Paulus, of Heidelberg, represents a distinct advance upon the criticism of the great forerunner of modern criticism of the Person and life of the Lord Jesus Christ. "He saw what a contradiction it is to regard Jesus as the noblest and most perfect Moral Teacher and withal to make Him a crafty Political Deceiver."[2] But Paulus had no more love for the supernatural than Reimarus, the last representative "of the dying Deism,"[3] and he was equally determined to eliminate it at all costs. His method was to explain every detail of the supernatural tales in terms of "natural" experience. Thus, the walking on the sea becomes a walking by the seashore, the heavenly messenger of the Annunciation becomes a discreet person sent by Elizabeth to the Blessed Virgin and the miraculous conception a seduction. In spite of the grotesqueness of these methods which are almost incompatible, one would think, with the existence of either a sense of humour or morality in the critic, Dr. Paulus is an earnest admirer of the Lord Jesus Christ and of "natural" Christianity. He emphasizes the inadequacy of miracles, or any other merely external kind of evidence, as a proof of the truth of Christianity; and he lays just stress upon the fact that Christianity must depend upon its internal evidence in the last resort. "The wonderful thing," he says, "about Jesus is Himself—His pure, cheerful and holy mind, truly

[1] *Ibid*, p. 15.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 16.

[3] A. M. Fairbairn, *Christ in Modern Theology*.

holy in its fitness for human imitation and emulation, His certainty that only by uprightness of mind you could attain salvation, *i.e.*, a true welfare of the spirits of men before and after their separation from this temporal body, His perseverance in influencing the exterior common life without the use of force or trickery, His self-sacrificing trust in a Divine, although very gradual, education of mankind, His practice of these views at the risk of life, and His extension by the sacrifice of His youthful life of the resolution for a similar uprightness of spirit and sublimity in susceptible minds." [1]

How was it that one who so justly appreciated the character of our Lord's Person on Its human side, showed so little moral discernment as not to see the moral absurdity and repulsiveness of his own conclusions? All that ingenuity—even when carried to the point at which it becomes grotesque—could do, has been done by Paulus in his attempt to explain on natural grounds the occurrences in the Gospels. The result is that the impossibility of such a course is firmly established. He brings the problem, therefore, to what it really is—a question of standpoint and *à priori* assumptions.[2] If we are prepared to accept the possibility of the miraculous upon evidence, an historical treatment of our Lord's life is feasible. If, however, we deny this possibility, the possibility of a truly historical treatment of the problem, even upon naturalistic grounds, goes with our denial; for, in the effort to eliminate the supernatural from the sources, it is impossible to escape the wildest subjectivity and caprice.

II.—Strauss and Mythicism

His First "Life of Jesus"

The intellectual giant who was to make the next step in advance and to pose the questions which should

[1] Quoted by Weinel, p. 18. [2] Strauss's *Second Life*, I. 19.

occupy the attention of the next hundred years,[1] was under no illusions as to the feasibility of "natural" explanations of the miraculous elements in the Gospel narratives. In his criticism of Paulus, prefixed to his Second Life of Jesus, he lays stress upon this point: "for if the Gospels are really and truly historical, it is possible to exclude miracles from the Life of Jesus; if on the other hand, miracles are incompatible with history, then the Gospels are not really historical records."[2] The aim he set before him was to show that "the attempt to conceal or to explain away the supernatural in the Gospel details was vain, and that consequently they were not to be claimed as strictly historical."[3] This he proposed to do by the thoroughgoing application of the mythical method to the whole life of Jesus Christ our Lord. Others had made spasmodic attempts in this direction, but he was the first to carry the method consistently into effect. He thus describes his method: "Where not merely the particular nature and manner of an occurrence is critically suspicious, its external circumstances represented as miraculous and the like; but where likewise the essential substance and groundwork is either inconceivable in itself, or is in striking harmony with some Messianic idea of the Jews of that age, then not the particular alleged course and mode of the transaction only, but the entire occurrence must be regarded as unhistorical. Where, on the contrary, the form only, and not the general contents of the narration, exhibits the characteristics of the unhistorical, it is at least possible to suppose a kernel of historical fact; although we can never confidently decide whether this kernel of fact actually exists, or in what it consists; unless, indeed, it be discoverable from other sources."[4]

[1] Schweitzer formulates them as (1) the Miraculous; (2) the Relation of the Christ of Faith to the Jesus of History; (3) the Relation of St. John to the Synoptics.

[2] *Second Life*, I. 19. [3] *Second Life*, I. 34. [4] *First Life*, I. 94.

Such a canon of criticism is certainly sufficiently wide and can only be of a negative effect. It can give us no clear and defined construction such as the life of the Lord Jesus, which is to be rationally conceivable, requires. Hence Strauss's work, although relieved by occasional flashes of brilliant insight, is almost purely negative in character.

Opinions differ widely as to the historical value of the book. Principal A. M. Fairbairn, than whom no believing theologian is better qualified to speak, assures us that "the man was a speculative, constructive thinker, blind to probabilities, forcing history to become the vehicle of an *à priori* system. The criticism never becomes scientific; realities are nothing, idealities everything. The critic has no historical sense; seeks to abolish, not to construct or restore."[1] Weinel, on the other hand, declares that "people often thought to destroy Strauss by reproaching him with writing his book from Hegel's standpoint. That is quite false, if intended to refer to the essentials of the book. Hegel's influence is only felt in the quite short final section. The two voluminous volumes are, on the contrary, as regards their chief contents, the model of a calm and effective work by a scholar."[2]

These positions to some extent can be reconciled. Both writers lay stress upon the negative results of Strauss's treatment of the "Life;" both recognize the fact that at this time Strauss was sincere in the belief that he was doing a service to Christianity by his elimination of the historical element. We may add that the whole of the two large volumes (three in the English translation) were written with reference to the brief dogmatic dissertation at the end. In it Strauss avowedly strives to restore dogmatically that which he has critically destroyed—the Christ of Faith—by

[1] *Christ in Modern Theology*, p. 235-236.

[2] pp. 42-43.

substituting an incarnation of God in the race for the Incarnation in the individual. Of course, the attempt is foredoomed to failure. The Christ men want is a Fact, not an Idea; a concrete Personality who has lived and triumphed in human conditions, not the perfection of the race by the gradual incarnation in it of a scarcely personal Deity.

Under the pencil of Strauss, the Divine Lord becomes shadowy, mythical, remote; but He is, at the same time, vast as vague. Hence the entirely negative character of the historical portraiture is not realized in the interest of Strauss's brilliant style, until the question is asked: What is offered in the stead of the Divine Lord who has rescued in the temptations of manhood, and sustained in the hour of death?

The slight importance of the historical Lord Jesus to Strauss is evident from his neglect, although he considers most of the speeches recorded in the Synoptic Gospels to be authentic, to sketch therefrom the portrait of the Master. This goes far to justify Dr. Fairbairn's criticism. It certainly shows that Strauss had not a really historical mind. If he had, he would never have left the problem in the confusion to which he brought it. Neither is it possible to agree with Weinel's view as to the objectivity of Strauss's work. The author avowedly starts from rigid principles, held *à priori*. Miracle is assumed to be impossible. Divine Incarnation, in any real sense of the term, is also pronounced impossible. Both these assumptions are far-reaching and neither of them is historical in character. They are philosophical assumptions and, just in so far as they lead to a prejudgment of an historical assertion, they render our author's labour subjective.

How little Strauss thought that he was doing a disservice to Christianity by resolving the historical Christ into a myth-laden figure, is shown by his own judgment in his concluding dissertation on the Dogmatic

Import of the Life of Jesus: "The boundless store of truth and life, which for eighteen centuries has been the aliment of humanity, seems irretrievably dissipated, the most sublime levelled with the dust, God divested of His grace, man of his dignity, and the tie between heaven and earth broken."[1] But Strauss, so far from realizing that this has actually taken place, comforts us with the assurance that the true incarnation is the incarnation of God from all eternity, not an incarnation at a given moment; the true unity of God and man has the race as its realization, not an individual.[2] Perhaps, in the last analysis, the following judgment may stand: "the picture of Jesus drawn by Strauss in virtue of this criticism is neither an historical nor an entirely mythical picture of Jesus, but a speculative."[3]

III.—F. C. Baur and Tubingen[4]

It is unnecessary to say that the excitement was immense. At first, it rendered reasoned criticism

[1] *First Life*, III. p. 396.

[2] "In an individual, a God man, the properties and functions which the Church ascribes to Christ contradict themselves; in the idea of the race, they perfectly agree. Humanity is the union of the two natures—God become man, the infinite manifesting itself in the finite, and the finite spirit remembering its infinitude; it is the child of the visible Mother and the invisible Father, Nature and Spirit: it is the worker of miracles, in so far as in the course of human history the spirit more and more completely subjugates nature, both within and around man, until it lies before him as the inert matter on which he exercises his active power; it is the sinless existence, for the course of its development is a blameless one, pollution cleaves to the individual only, and does not touch the race or history. It is humanity that dies, rises and ascends to heaven, for from the negation of its phenomenal life there ever proceeds a higher and spiritual life; from the suppression of its mortality as a personal, national and terrestrial spirit, arises its union with the infinite spirit of the heavens. By faith in this Christ, especially in His death and resurrection, man is justified before God; that is, by the kindling within him of the idea of humanity, the individual man participates in the divinely human life of the species. Now the main element of that idea is that the negation of the merely natural and sensual life, which is itself the negation of the spirit (the negation of negation, therefore), is the sole way to true spiritual life." —*First Life*, III. 437-438.

[3] Jordan, *Jesus und die modernen Jesusbilder*, p. 25.

[4] Authorities:—F. C. Baur, *St. Paul, Church History of the First Three Centuries.*

impossible. From every side replies and counter-replies were published. Germany resounded from north to south and from east to west with the noise of battle. Its echoes were heard in France and England. No quarter was asked or given; and what both sides lacked in historical sense, they made up in abuse. Nevertheless, Tholuck and Ullmann scored several occasional triumphs and the brilliant work of Neander has proved a permanent addition to believing theology. The death blow to Straussian mythicism came, however, from the camp of unbelief.

Ferdinand Christian Baur—Strauss's old Professor—saw the impossibility of the great scholar's positions, so long, at all events, as there was no adequate criticism of the Gospels. Here he laid his hand upon the vital objection, which Strauss's adversaries had vaguely felt and in vain striven to formulate. It was absurd to admit the traditional literary positions and yet to try to resolve the history into myth. Baur saw the *impasse* and strove to obviate it. He started from the standpoint of the Hegelian philosophy and was in substantial agreement with Strauss in the matter of Christology; but he differed from his pupil in assigning a positive place to the Person of Christ. In Him, he considered, the fact of the unity of the Godhead and humanity first came to light, and he lays just stress upon the fact that the historical basis of Christianity is the Person of Christ. "The great historical interest of the life of Jesus is that we see there the consciousness of the idea of Christianity, and of its principle which He first expressed and exemplified by the entire devotion of His whole being; this is the great result of the evangelical history. But when we proceed from the evangelical history to that of the time of the Apostles, it is the practical realization of that idea which becomes the object of historical research."[1] "That Christianity

[1] *Paul*, p. 3.

in the universal historical importance which it achieved was the work of the Apostle Paul is undeniably a matter of historical fact; but in what manner he brought this about . . . still requires a more thorough and searching enquiry."[1] Two more sentences, taken from his "Church History," will give us, sufficiently for our purpose, the elements of the problem as they presented themselves to him. "A firm centre was required, around which the circle of the disciples might rally, so as to grow into a fellowship which should be able to win dominion over the world. When we consider the way in which Christianity grew up, it is plain that it could have no place or significance in history but for the Person of its Founder."[2]

Thus, the Person of Christ could never be resolved by him, as by Strauss, into a nebulous immensity. It must always remain a vital historical fact, necessary for the explanation of the universal phenomenon of Christianity and the historical consciousness of the union between man and God.

Baur, however, was as hostile as Strauss had been to the idea of the miraculous. If, therefore, his view of the character and origin of Christianity was to be historically tenable, he must show the origin of the orthodox Church beliefs and their gradual development in the documents at his disposal. For this he required a historically certain starting-point. He found it in the writings of St. Paul whose historical importance he justly perceived but over-emphasized. After a sufficiently arbitrary critical examination, he concluded that the four great Epistles alone were the work of the Apostle. On the strength of the tendency (he supposed he found) in the other New Testament writings to reconcile the conflicting attitude of the Apostle of the Gentiles and the elder Apostolate, he assigned them to different periods of development in

[1] *Ibid*, pp. 3-4. [2] p. 38.

accordance with his reconstruction of the course of events.

That he over-estimated the significance of the tendencies and grievously underestimated the force of personality as is evident to any reader of his works, that his work in almost all its actual conclusions has not (it is true) stood the test of time, must not blind us to the real greatness of the man and his method. Inadequate as was his appreciation of the fact of personality, it was, nevertheless, an immense advance upon that of Strauss; arbitrary and predoomed to failure as was his application of his method, it still remains pre-eminent in its field of enquiry. As Pfleiderer says, the principle of development which he introduced into theology holds its place by the incontestable right of truth, though the details of his application are entirely exploded and the weapon he forged against the orthodox position is now wielded by its defenders.[1] To Baur we owe the now universal recognition of the fact that the historical circumstances of the early days of Christian history must be given their due weight in the interpretation of Christianity.

The controversy he excited was more lasting than that aroused by Strauss. His treatment, being positive, was more profound and fertile; and he soon gathered a band of admirers around him. Such men as Zeller, the historian of the Stoics and Epicureans, Ritschl, who was fated to give Tübingen its death-blow, and Hilgenfeld, who alone to-day defends (though in a form so modified that his master would not recognize them) his conclusions, sat at his feet and made very definite, if temporary, contributions to the criticism of the New Testament. But the character of his work was too arbitrary, the *à priori* assumptions which underlay it too obvious, the prejudice against the supernatural too legible, the weight of scholarship turned against him by

[1] *Primitive Christianity*, I., Preface.

orthodox divines too overwhelming, for men to be permanently satisfied with his conclusions. Such scholars as Westcott, Lightfoot and Hort of Cambridge, and—the greatest of the quartet—George Salmon of Dublin, while assimilating the new and true principles which their opponents elucidated, vindicated with a scholarship not less brilliant and much more objective, and, therefore, more scientific, and with the resources of a learning second to those of no school of criticism, the essential validity of the impugned conclusions of the older orthodox scholarship.

IV.—The Older Liberalism[1]

Upon the whole, the older Liberalism builded upon the conclusions of the Tübingen school, although each author introduced such modifications as he saw fit. Among others, Strauss, Renan, Keim, Schenkel, and the indefatigable Hase, whose labours of half a century form a commentary in themselves upon the disintegrating influence of anti-supernaturalistic criticism, made contributions of more or less note. Sir John Seeley might be added to the list; but the character of "Ecce Homo" is such as to give it an abiding apologetic value, and the scope of this lecture does not permit even the incidental mention of the contributions of the more or less orthodox enquirers. Hence the labours of such men as the eloquent Farrar, the learned and sober Geikie, the profound Edersheim and the venerable Dr. Bernard Weiss, must be passed over without remark. As examples of the older Liberalism we may take the three most significant works—those of Strauss, Renan, and Keim—which represent the most earnest and the most brilliant work of the Old Liberal School, and (with the exception of Strauss's "Second Life of Jesus," which might, perhaps, be omitted if its

[1] Authorities:—T. Keim, *Jesus of Nazara*; O. Pfleiderer, *Paulinism*; E. Renan, *Life of Jesus*; *The Apostles*; D. F. Strauss, *New Life of Jesus*, *Can the New Faith live with the Old?*

author were other than the great scholar who posed the problems of modern critical theology), have had an abiding influence upon the minds of men.

1. *Renan*

The first of these lives to see the light was that of the brilliant Frenchman. It was conceived, he tells us, upon the hillsides of Galilee and is the direct product of an enthusiastic but over-vivid imagination, quite unchecked by respect for truth or real depth of moral feeling. The essential agreement of men of such different schools and temperaments as Primate Alexander, Luthardt, Weinel, Fairbairn, Stapfer and Schweitzer in their estimate of the book, shows the glaring character of its defects.

To Renan, the Lord was "more beloved than loving." [1] When His work began, His voice "suddenly acquired an extraordinary sweetness. An infinite charm was exhaled from His person, and those who had seen Him up to that time no longer recognized Him." [2] His amiable character was "accompanied doubtless by one of those lovely faces which sometimes appear in the Jewish race." [3] "His gentle gaiety found expression in lively ideas and amiable pleasantries. . . . He thus traversed Galilee in the midst of a continual feast. He rode on a mule. In the East this is a good and safe mode of travelling; the large black eyes of the animal, shaded by long eyelashes, give it an expression of gentleness." [4] "We will admit without hesitation that acts which would now be considered as acts of illusion or folly, held a large place in the life of Jesus." [5] "Perhaps also the ardent desire of silencing those who violently denied the divine mission of Jesus, carried His enthusiastic friends beyond all bounds. It may be that Lazarus, still pallid with disease, caused himself to be wrapped in bandages, as if dead,

[1] p. 80. [2] p. 84. [3] p. 85. [4] pp. 148-149. [5] p. 195.

and shut up in the tomb of his family. . . . Such a reappearance would naturally be regarded by everyone as a resurrection." [1] "Rest now in Thy glory, noble Initiator. Thy work is completed. Thy divinity established. Fear no more to see the edifice of Thy efforts crumble through a flaw. Henceforth, beyond the reach of frailty Thou shalt be present from the heights of Thy divine peace, in the infinite consequence of Thy acts." [2] If we add to these extracts—taken almost at random—the fact that Renan conceives the Lord as a gentle Prophet who, thanks to the evil influence of John the Baptist, gives Himself out to be the Messiah and, in defiance of His better instincts, behaves as such, we can proceed to estimate the historical and moral value of the work.

It is not too much to say that Renan conceives the Lord in terms of a Frenchman of the baser sort. The portraiture, inspired by intense enthusiasm, is surcharged with every defect of the Gallic temperament. Theatrical, insincere, not too scrupulous in the use of means, the Christ of Renan is One who deserves no abiding place in the world's history and who is utterly unworthy of the funeral oration which the author pronounces over His corpse. There is too much truth in Lachenmann's declaration, although one might hesitate to accept it as an entirely adequate account of an epoch-making book, that to Renan "Jesus was a gentle Galilean, the Darling of women, and an exquisite Preacher of morality, dreaming of no other than the Paradise of fraternal fellowship of the children of God upon earth; yet filled with ambition, vanity, sensual love, and undisguised deceit."[3]

The book is essentially a product of ecclesiastical art of a debased type[4] and—thanks to the author's lack of

[1] p. 251. [2] p. 291. [3] *New Schaff Herzog*, IX. p. 484.

[4] "There is scarcely any other work on the subject which so abounds in lapses of taste—and those of the most distressing kind—as Renan's

spiritual sympathy with his subject or, for that matter, with deep-rooted morality in any sense of the term—the whole treatment is upon the lines of a decadent artistic interpretation.[1]

It has created the "gentle Jesus," whose influence is eating the heart out of the old-fashioned piety, nurtured upon the virility of the God-man, which finds no satisfaction in the mawkish sentimentality with which the brilliant Frenchman has clothed his interpretation of the Lord Jesus Christ.

But the book has some eminent qualities and marks a distinct advance in the history of the subject. For one thing, Renan shares with Keim the honour of being the first to attempt the most difficult task of tracing the development of the evangelic events. He is the first to free himself from the influence of the Hegelian school; and to give due recognition to the fact that Christianity cannot be explained through an idea, but that its norm is its creative Personality. In these respects—and also in his perception of the fact that the Lord was a Prophet rather than a moral Reformer—Renan marks an immense advance upon Strauss. He is the first of the Liberals to recognize the fact that the Lord conceived His mission to be primarily religious (and only moral in a secondary sense), and that an historical treatment must accept the fact and interpret Him and His work in terms of a great religious Personality. Yet in spite

Vie de Jésus. It is Christian art in the worst sense of the term—the art of the wax image. The gentle Jesus, the beautiful Mary, the fair Galileans who form the retinue of the 'amiable Carpenter,' might have been taken over in a body from the shop window of an ecclesiastical art emporium in the Place St. Sulpice."—Schweitzer, p. 182.

[1] Stapfer has really gone very near the heart of the matter when he points out that the single word "charm," expressed Renan's interpretation of the Most Glorious of earth's sons. "For Renan, Jesus is explained by a single word: charm. This word, he thinks, resolves the enigma of His life. He charmed the crowds, His disciples, the women, the poor, the sick, and He ended by charming Himself. The pious and gentle Rabbi was before everything also a Charmer, and everything becomes clear when one penetrates well into what this word 'charm' encloses."—*Jésus-Christ avant son Ministère*, p. 5.

of the brilliance of the service rendered to science in these respects, the general tone of the book is so evil and its influence is so bad, owing to its insincerity and debased morality, its sentimentality and its lack of moral insight, that orthodox critic and Liberal critic alike speak of the book with a dislike and a bitterness which they scarcely manifest towards any other work on the subject. The general verdict of those of Renan's contemporaries who were best fitted to judge and of practically all subsequent critics—whether believing or unbelieving—find noble expression in the verses of the poet-Primate :

> In the season's fulness
> Out a certain volume came—
> Flash and fineness, serpents' flame,
> Tints that glitter and enthrall,
> Lit it with the rich surprise
> Of the art rhetorical.
> Fire it had and epigram,
> Many a plausible "perhaps";
> Finite scales for infinite maps;
> Perfect hatred's perfect coolness;
> Poetry sometimes, never dulness;
> Pictured words which coloured lies
> Cast fantastic fallacies
> Through those painted panes, the eyes;
> That one sinless and august
> Figure of the perfect Just,
> Crowned in half admiring scorn
> With a fresh acanthus thorn,
> Patronized with knowing nods
> Of a connoisseur of Gods;
> Doubts well scattered if a known
> And real God had any throne!
> Lofty words for low surmises,
> Mean in beautiful disguises.[1]

2. *Strauss's Second "Life"*

Meanwhile the veteran Dr. Strauss was engaged upon his "Life of Jesus for the German People" (1864). A ruined career, public obloquy and domestic strife had soured and embittered him, and he came to the task with warped and failing powers. The resiliency and

[1] *The Finding of the Book*, pp. 17-18.

suggestiveness of his youth were gone and he could only replace the work of genius of his youth by the dry-as-dust treatise of a talented scholar. Religion itself, which in the richness of his youth he had thought to serve, was now an "idiotic idea in his eyes" [1] and he no longer desired to restore dogmatically what he destroyed critically. Hence, there is no concluding Dissertation on the Dogmatic Import of the Life of Christ.

The passage of time had only served to harden his prejudices and the whole work is marred by the violent and arbitrary application of his dogmatic presuppositions as canons of historical science. He rules out the possibility of the Lord having professed to remember His pre-existence as the profession of a "madman." [2] The Lord could not have foretold His return, because that was the idea of "an arrant enthusiast." [3] His alleged expectation of a change in connection with His own Person must also go as "an unallowable presumption." [4] Neither could He have claimed any special consciousness of unity with the Godhead; for no truly religious man would think of making such a claim.[5] He could not be sinless because that would be incompatible with the normal character of His humanity.[6]

Nevertheless, Strauss had a profounder insight than his brilliant French contemporary. Renan, strong in the absolute lack of a moral sense and in the overmastering grasp of a vivid imagination, had in defiance of all the facts conceived the Lord's inner life as a divided Self. Strauss, lacking the vivid imagination which would have enabled him to write a really popular life of the Lord and endowed with the definite moral sense of his Protestant heredity, could not but perceive the unique absence of struggle in the Self-consciousness of Christ.

[1] Quoted by Weinel, p. 131.

[2] I. p. 323. [3] I. p. 323. [4] I. p. 274. [5] I. p. 331. [6] I. p. 44.

"Jesus appears as a beautiful nature from the first which had only to develop Itself out of Itself, to become more clearly conscious of Itself, ever firmer in Itself, but not to change and begin a new life; a condition which naturally does not exclude individual uncertainties and errors, the necessity of a constant serious effort to overcome self and deny self, as Jesus acknowledged by disclaiming, as has been stated above, the predicate of 'good' attributed to Him." [1]

Yet the conception of the Lord Jesus Christ in the "Second Life" is scarcely more true to the historical facts than the imaginings of the brilliant Frenchman. The shadowy vagueness of the portraiture of the "First Life"—so full of suggestive hints—is replaced by a clear and definite conception of the Lord as a moral and religious Reformer; [2] and it must be admitted that, if Renan had conceived the Master in terms of a Frenchman of the baser sort, Strauss interpreted Him as a well-meaning and not too intelligent German academic Reformer.[3]

If Strauss's interpretation were right, it would be a matter for the deepest regret that the genius of St. Paul had been wasted upon the exaltation of such a Nonentity to the highest throne of human history. The fact that Strauss regrets—the little that we know of the Lord Jesus of history[4]—would be an inevitable

[1] I. p. 283-284.

[2] "It cannot be supposed that He had expected, in the short week of the Passion, to attain His final object—the reform of the whole system of the national religion."—I. p. 385.

[3] "Jesus is less a Galilean Peasant than a Student, consciously eclectic, receiving into Himself from various sources material to be built into unity through the action of His own consciousness."—A. M. Fairbairn, *The Place of Christ in Modern Theology*, p. 281.

[4] "After removing the mass of mythical parasites of different kinds that have clustered round the tree, we see that what we before considered branches, foliage, colour, and form of the tree itself belonged for the most part to those parasitic creepers; and instead of the removal of them having restored the tree to us in its true condition and appearance, we find, on the contrary, that they have swept away

necessity; for there would have been nothing of serious import to record. The Lord would be merely one of a class of men, the saints, from which He seriously differed in one respect only—His freedom from the divided self and should, therefore, be numbered among that fortunately large class of men who, after they have served God and their generation, fall on sleep.

Unlike the First, the "Second Life" is not a mere process of disintegration relieved by occasional constructive hints, but a positive construction by a man whose Pantheism does not appreciate the importance of the personal support in history.[1] He had really learned nothing from the work of a generation, and had nothing to add to his previous and epoch-making pronouncement. The book was born dead and the furious conflicts waged over it in the sixties and seventies were the merest Homeric battles for the possession of the dead.[2] The Napoleon of an earlier age had led forth his forces against the battalions of a later generation, only to find that the Brown Besses and smoothbores, which in an earlier epoch had won his genius an undying name, could not prevail against the Minié rifle and modern artillery.

3. *Keim*

There were, however, other and worthier "Liberal" lives of the Lord Jesus than those of Strauss and Renan. Of these the noblest was the "Jesus of Nazara" (1867-1872), of Karl Theodor Keim. In three large volumes (six in the English translation) the author gives a most elaborate and complete review

its proper foliage, sucked out the sap, crippled the shoots and branches, and consequently that its original figure has entirely disappeared."—I. p. 430.

[1] "The personal support is wanting here, as it is universally in the Pantheistic systems."—Hagenbach on the "First Life" in his *German Rationalism*, p. 271.

[2] Schweitzer.

of the sources and of the results relating to the life of the Lord Jesus Christ. Much more profound in his historical and theological insight than Strauss, endowed with an acute moral sense and sympathy, and a profoundly religious man, he was better equipped than either of his greater predecessors.[1] He suffered from the same prejudice against the supernatural; but he was too clear sighted and too candid a man to be blind to the impossibility of entirely excluding a special Divine activity from the history of his Subject. Hence his work is marred by the introduction of the Supernatural, excluded entirely from the physical sphere, into the psychical; and his "telegram" theory of the Resurrection has justly been criticized as inadequate, whether considered as rationalism or supernaturalism.

It is, no doubt, impossible to trace the development of our Lord's character and purposes, or even that of His life, in the detail that Keim attempts. It certainly cannot be done without grave violence to the sources. Nevertheless, Keim is here upon the right track; and, however much we may criticize him in detail, his fundamental principle must be admitted. The fact of the development is there, and "nothing deeper or more beautiful has since been written about the development of Jesus."[2]

It is doubtful whether any writer has ever had a deeper and more historical sympathy with the humanity of our Lord than Keim has shown in his great work. He rightly sees that the human perfection of the Master is not the negative perfection of a colourless nature. He perceives, with Renan, the intensity of the Lord's nature; but, unlike that author, he recognizes the perfect poise of nature resulting from the balancing of

[1] "Keim's work shows rare scientific solidity and deep penetration, and holds a place in the literature of the life of Jesus which cannot be neglected even by those who do not share his rationalizing standpoint." —H. Ziegler, *New Schaff-Herzog*, VI. p. 306.

[2] Schweitzer, p. 214.

stresses. Thus, he does justice to the truths emphasized respectively by Strauss and Renan; and—recognizing that the problem is dynamic, not static (or, to change the metaphor, biological, not anatomical)—he is able to carry the conclusions of both scholars to a deeper truth and thus to reveal their essential unity.

The Lord was dependent upon the circumstances of His age and life for His opportunities of development. His capacities and perfection were developed by external stimulus.[1] He had His spring tides of joyous Self-confidence and realization of His work and fellowship with the Father; and He had His ebb-tides when the realization of these things receded from the shores of His consciousness.[2] The question as to the character of His struggles with temptation is left open; but "in certain crises of this life we stand under the humbling impression of a never-quite-vanquished dualism of Divine and human will."[3]

Nevertheless, there is no doubt in Keim's mind as to the absolute sinlessness of the Lord. "He rose to that exalted point of moral Self-consciousness, where, despite the anguish of the individual conflicts, no paralysing dread of failure in His moral task and no pang of sin any longer hindered and obscured His fellowship with God."[4] Such appearances of defect as there are, are due not to His moral failure or imperfection but "to the constitution of man's nature as created by God."[5] "It was virtue herself that trod this earth in Him."[6]

Keim also gives its due to the Personality of the Lord. "His Personality was always much greater than anything He said or did,"[7] and "He became the New Man, because He was the Person that He was."[8]

How, then, does Keim conceive our Lord's view of His Person and work? "His Messiahship consists

[1] IV. p. 48. [2] IV. p. 25. [3] VI. p. 410. [4] VI. p. 419.
[5] VI. p. 417. [6] VI. p. 416. [7] III. p. 335. [8] II. p. 167.

in His world-historical spiritual achievement, in the communication to mankind of the highest knowledge of God and the perfect and blessed life in God." [1] He knows Himself to be Master.[2] "His right, His privilege, His peculiarity, lies chiefly in the knowledge of the Father for the first time perfected through Him, in His being known through the Father, and in His becoming known through the men whom the Father gives to Him by giving to them the knowledge of the Son." [3] He and the Father are "exclusively related to Each Other, Each being to the Other a holy unveiled Secret." [4] Yet He "did not lack consciousness of a permanent distinction between man and God;" [5] and He renounces "not merely the capability of creating good in other men, but also the penetrating force of His own natural goodness and moral ability." [6] "He would certainly explain His Sonship, not at all in the sense of the Messianic, but entirely in the sense of the spiritual Sonship which He ascribed to the pious, as a divine relationship in knowledge and love of the Highest." [7]

What then is the achievement of Keim's "Lord"? [8] "It is beyond all question that the leading features of His religion are the most precious and most enduring acquisitions of the human mind." [9] But the Lord's achievement is not to be summed up as a teaching of religion or anything else. He Himself is His real achievement. He is "the New Man," [10] whose "infinite achievement . . . within human limits, factually and personally placed before the eyes of men what was veritably perfect." [11] Hence, "with reference to religion Jesus remains to us the Highest we know and are able to conceive. In the domain of the inner relation of the Godhead and humanity, He has reached the extreme and unsurpassable stage of union." [12]

[1] IV. p. 62. [2] VI. p. 389. [3] IV. p. 59. [4] IV. p. 60.
[5] VI. p. 403. [6] VI. p. 409. [7] IV. p. 68. [8] III. p. 10.
[9] VI. p. 390. [10] *ut sup.* [11] VI. p. 435. [12] VI. p. 426.

" He is at once the Repose and the Motive Power of history,[1] " the Person of Jesus is not only one Work among many works of God, it is the peculiar Work, the specific Revelation of God ; yet not a Work of pulling down, but of building up and completing the God-appointed order of the world." [2]

Keim, therefore, ascribes an importance and a place to our Lord in relation to man as high and as profound as the most enthusiastic believer could desire ; for the note of unconscious worship which is heard in every line of the six volumes belies the author's naturalistic interpretation. His fine historical treatment has proved the impossibility of confining the Lord Jesus of history within the " natural " order and the most scientific treatise of the older Liberalism really (though unconsciously) reveals the Lord as a worthy Object of adoration.

What, then, must be our judgment of the work of the older Liberalism ? With a few distinguished exceptions (such as Keim on the negative side, and Bernhard Weiss on the positive), its representatives are lacking in historical imagination and in the power of appreciating personality. Brilliant and painstaking in criticism, it is painfully defective in construction and its fundamental prejudice against the Supernatural has vitiated most of its results. Nevertheless, its contribution has been very great. It has given the deathblow to rationalistic criticism and has fully recognized the fact that the criticism required is historical and psychological. It has laid down the lines upon which the enquiries of the generation following it have proceeded ; and, in many respects, it has provided the method which all enquirers (whether believers, modern Liberals or eschatologists) regard as an indispensable part of their equipment for the knowledge of Christ Jesus the Lord as He was in the days of His humiliation.

[1] VI. p. 436. [2] VI. p. 436.

V.—The Later Liberalism

We have not, however, yet heard the last word which Liberal scholarship has to say upon the Person and Life of our Lord Jesus Christ. Renan, Strauss and Keim were only the pioneers of a great army of patient enquirers which, during the seventies and eighties of the last century, ruled with undisputed sway and even now holds the field.[1] During that period, a long series of large scale "Lives" of the Lord Jesus Christ, which have enjoyed "an immortality of revised editions," [2] were issued from the press. Since then, with the exception of Oskar Holtzmann's attempt of 1901, no very important production of the kind has seen the light; for there has been an increasing recognition of the fact that, on the prevalent critical hypothesis, we have scarcely got the materials for such an undertaking. Hence the conviction has gained ground that the Gospels only give us a portrait of the Lord "in flat relief," [3] and the more modern work has taken the form of studies in relation to the general Christian history and popular presentations.

The value of these attempts cannot be over-estimated. They are fresh brilliant studies of the Central Figure of human history by men who in most respects are sympathetic and who offer Him a worship which, utterly insufficient if addressed to the Eternal Son, is yet far too great to be ascribed to a Being who is less than Divine in the confessional sense of the term.

The school is brilliant and representative, and has rightly exercised a profound influence upon the thought of the age. Originating in the centre of European thought, it has influenced it as a whole. All nations have given of their best to this enquiry and their

[1] "As the Nineteenth Century passed over into the Twentieth the dominant influence in regard to the conception of the Life of Christ may be said to have been that of modern critical Liberalism."—Sanday, *The Life of Christ in Recent Research*, p. 90.

[2] Schweitzer.

[3] Bousset, *Jesus*.

characteristic excellences and defects are to be seen in the contributions of their distinguished sons. The patient enthusiasm and scientific ardour of the Germans, the grace and delicate sympathy of French historical criticism, the English reverence for fact, have all contributed their quota to the elucidation of this supreme problem.

The difficulty is to choose the truly representative men from the enormous mass of literature on the subject. If, however, we select the contributions of Professor Pfleiderer of Berlin, Jülicher of Marburg, Wernle of Basel, Weinel of Jena and Oskar Holtzmann of Giessen from the German "expert" literature, and the writings of Professors Harnack and von Soden of Berlin and Bousset of Göttingen, from those written for the popular eye, we shall have enough material to enable us to form a just estimate of the contribution of German Liberalism. Among French Liberals we must consult Professors Sabatier, Stapfer and A. Réville, of Paris; while the contributions of Professors T. H. Green and Percy Gardner of Oxford, and Dr. Warschauer, may be taken as typically representative of English Liberal Theology.

A. The German Liberal Criticism[1]

1. *Pfleiderer of Berlin*

There can be no doubt as to which of the above-mentioned German scholars forms the historical link between the Old Liberalism and the New. Professor

[1] Authorities:—W. Bousset, *Jesus*, *Jesu Predigt im Gegensatz zum Judenthum*, *Die Religion des Judenthums*, *Unser Gottesglaube*; A. Jülicher, Art. "Jesus" in *Kultur der Gegenwart*; A. Harnack, *What is Christianity? History of Dogma*; W. Herrmann, Art. in *Kultur der Gegenwart*; O. Holtzmann, *Life of Jesus*, *War Jesus Ekstatiker?*; *Das Messiasbewusstsein Jesus*; A. Neumann, *Jesus*; O. Pfleiderer, *Christian Origins*, *Early Christian Conception of Christ*, *The Rise of Christianity*, *Primitive Christianity*; P. W. Schmiedel, *Jesus and Modern Criticism*, Art. "Gospels" in *Encyc. Bibl.*; E. von Schrenk, *Jesus and His Teaching*; Freiherr von Soden, *Die wichstigsten Fragen im Leben Jesu*; C. Weizsäcker, *The Apostolic Age*; P. Wernle, *The Beginnings of Christianity*, *Die Quellen des Lebens Jesu*.

Otto Pfleiderer of Berlin—" one of the most learned and vigorous defenders of the non-miraculous origin of Christianity " [1]—was educated at Tübingen (1857-1861) and became one of Baur's most brilliant adherents. His literary activities were manifold and soon won for him a place in the front rank of German theological writers.

He rightly emphasizes the fact that the preaching of the Lord was primarily " the promise of an approaching eschatological good which was to be brought about by a miraculous intervention of Divine power." [2] Though the Lord in matters of detail simply continued the Jewish tradition, He profoundly altered the character of the idea of the Kingdom. " In contrast to the usual Jewish hopes of a national triumph, we have, as the principal point, the moral responsibility of individuals." [3] The judgment which is inseparably connected in Jewish thought with the inauguration of the Messianic Kingdom is no longer " an exercise of God's power against the heathen, but the moral value of each individual life which shall be made manifest." [4]

The Lord conceived Himself as the Messiah in the sense of " His being destined to be the future Messiah or theocratic Head of the renewed people of God." [5] He conceived the Messianic office in a transcendental sense, in the sense which the Book of Enoch gives to the " Son of man." [6]

What, then, is the new thing in the Lord's preaching of the Kingdom? " The answer can only be that it was not any kind of new content, but the new character of the preaching and the Preacher." [7] Thus, in the

[1] *New Schaff-Herzog.* [2] *Primitive Christianity*, II. p. 407.

[3] II. p. 413. [4] II. p. 414. [5] II. p. 466.

[6] " All sayings with which the use of the title Son of Man as a Messianic Self-designation is inseparably connected are not derived from Jesus Himself, since this Self-designation cannot possibly be supposed to have been used by Him."—II. p. 482.

[7] II. p. 423.

last analysis, the secret of the Lord is His Personality, which was the source of His Divine, but not Supernatural revelation of the Fatherly and pardoning love of God.[1]

How does Pfleiderer account for the historical portraiture of One who, on his own showing, only transcended the prophets of the Old Testament "in teaching us to find an example and stimulus for our striving after true righteousness in God's fatherly love towards us?"[2] Everything is to be explained by the reading back of later conceptions. The disciples, utterly unnerved by the death of their Messiah, fled to Galilee, where they thought they saw Him. They reflected back their illusions as to His resurrection glory on His earthly life which we see through the dazzling brightness of Easter. "In the Church's visions of the Risen Lord lay the seed of the whole Church dogma of Christ's Person."[3] Under this influence they transmuted the whole conception of the Kingdom of God. "Imaginative hopes were here transformed into practical acts, the dream of the apocalyptic Kingdom of the Messiah here became the reality of a brotherhood of the children of God. It was the grandest and at the same time the boldest and purest scheme for the regeneration of the world which was here entered on by a narrow circle of quiet and simple people."[4]

It is very seldom that a transitional rendering pleases anybody except its author; and Pfleiderer, despite all his learning and academic ingenuity—so remote from a sense of reality, cannot escape the inevitable fate of such attempts. He perceives the radical change in the emphasis which the Lord placed

[1] "His own heart, which for all its purity and separateness from sin felt itself drawn out in tender pity and the saving energy of love towards the misery of sinners, was for Him the guarantee that this holy and saving love was also supreme in God."—II. p. 434.

[2] II. p. 431. [3] I. p. 24. [4] I. p. 31.

upon the constituents of the apocalyptic hope—notably the stress laid upon the moral elements of the idea of the Kingdom—and rightly perceives that the Lord's promises of the eschatological good largely explain the enthusiasm which He aroused; but falls back on the Old Liberal conception of the Lord as a Prophet.

Thus, Pfleiderer never succeeded in shaking off the shackles of mid-century thought. His voice may be the voice of the nineties, but the thought is the thought of Tübingen. This is manifested, *inter alia*, by his ever-present nervousness with regard to the miraculous. It is his abomination and he never ceases to gird at it. His use of "myth" is reminiscent of Strauss. Equally rigid in his *à priori* assumptions, he is a modern and positive Strauss *plus* Comparative Religion; and a comparison of his "Primitive Christianity" with his earlier works gives the impression that, while he has learned many new things from the studies of a generation, he has assimilated nothing whatever of the new, broader and more intelligent spirit of the last days of the century.

2. *Jülicher of Marburg*

When we turn to the writings of Dr. Jülicher, we are immediately conscious of a much freer atmosphere; for the Marburg Professor is much more sympathetic with the subject. Like Pfleiderer and, in fact, all modern writers, he perceives that "the germ-cell of His Gospel is, it is true, the sure expectation of the nearness of the Kingdom of God."[1] The Kingdom must be interpreted through His Messianic Self-consciousness. "The full understanding depends here upon clearness with regard to the connection which Jesus has constructed between His Person and the Kingdom, *i.e.*, with regard to His Self-consciousness."[2]

"Jesus conceives Himself not only as a Prophet, who

[1] *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, p. 54. [2] p. 56.

announces the new world, but as One who enjoys it already in full measure, and not as One among many another, but as the First, the Highest among all, in brief as the Bringer of God's Kingdom."[1] "In other words, Jesus has ascribed the most important *rôle*—next to God's—in the Kingdom, to Himself."[2] He assigns to Himself, in subordination however to the Father, the rôle of the Judge of the world.[3]

Jülicher recognizes that the Lord did not leave the conceptions of the eschatological Kingdom as He found them and that He infused a new content into them. "Under the creative hand of Jesus the old conceptions, which a pious Jew could not give up, although they had long ceased to be morally fruitful, were entirely filled with new meaning." He transformed the Judaistic piety—indeed, the universal ideas of religion—by destroying the "credit and debit" conception of God's dealing with men and establishing the conviction that the motives of the heart are what really signify. Thus, he moralizes the whole of religion and at the same time sanctifies the whole of the common life by bringing every action and thought of the heart into definite relationship with the Almighty—"So Jesus thinks to define the ideal of a pious man, of a child of God, as the imitation of the Heavenly Father."[4] But this would be a totally inadequate description of the Lord's place in religious life. His contribution was more than any mere alteration of a system of piety. "It is still more true that He formed His idea of God from what he experienced in the most pious man known to Him, in Himself; we again feel His Personality to be the measure of His importance for the history of religion."[5]

How, then, did He conceive His Personality? "As against God He always feels Himself One with other

[1] p. 56. [2] p. 56. [3] p. 57. [4] pp. 63-68.
[5] p. 68.

men."[1] He even ranges Himself with them in penitence; for He prays—"Forgive us our trespasses." Thus, sinlessness formed no part of His Self-consciousness. Nor does He lay any claim to a peculiar filial relationship to God. "Jesus never ascribed Himself a metaphysical Divine Sonship, a singular filial relationship to God, which none else could reach," for Matt. xi. 27 must be rejected as a Paulinism.

Nevertheless, the Lord was conscious that He was not as other men. He speaks with "sovereign surety."[2] "He is honest enough to confess openly a peculiar greatness solely belonging to Himself, something incomparable which He feels."[3] But the remarkable thing is that "this consciousness of His majesty neither produced in Him tyrannic desires, nor did it excite Him to jealousy against God; in His deeply moral instinct it became a motive-power of the highest degree: He revealed the Super-human only in duties and tasks."[4]

It is surely not surprising that such a One gave to all who knew Him, even to His greatest intimates, the impression that there was "something divinely strange"[5] in Him; but it is surprising that an observer, capable of appreciating so much should tell us that "Fortune has denied the Jesus of history the attainment of full harmony;"[6] and should speak of "the scars which sometimes disfigure the Warrior, but do not dishonour Him."[7]

What, then, are we in the Twentieth Century to think of the Lord Jesus? Jülicher has no uncertain answer to this question. "He who is in earnest has only the choice as regards Jesus of Nazareth between the admission of a new Spirit, full of new power, which naturally also claimed the future for itself, or a mad self-exaltation, excusable by no eschatological enthusiasm, a blind misunderstanding of His time

[1] p. 57 [2] pp. 58-59. [3] pp. 58-59. [4] pp. 58-59.
[5] pp. 58-59. [6] p. 60. [7] p. 61.

which in no instance permits of confidence in the judgment of One so greatly deceived." [1]

This is a much profounder and more satisfying view than Pfleiderer's of the supreme Personality of history. There are other interpretations which, as we shall see, give the impression of greater brilliancy, but none which can compare with Jülicher's treatment for solidity. One feels that every statement is the expression of the sober and restrained thought of years, of a conscientious thinker who fully appreciates the responsibility of his task. It forms, in fact, the high water mark of Liberal criticism in this department, fairly representing the scrupulous honesty and patient, scientific acumen of the best type of German scholarship.

Nevertheless, one cannot help feeling that unwarrantable assumptions are made. Is it genuine criticism, for example, to repudiate Matt. xi. 27 as a Paulinism; because it does not permit of a naturalistic interpretation of the Lord's Self-consciousness? Is there not—to say the least—a straining of the facts of the case when Jülicher describes our Lord as praying "Forgive us our trespasses"? If the Evangelists are to be believed, He did nothing of the sort. He never, with the exception of His submission to the Baptism of John, either did or said anything which can fairly be construed as having even the appearance of penitence. So far from using the Lord's Prayer, He gives it to the disciples as a prayer suitable for them; and it is extremely doubtful whether He ever joined Himself to His disciples in prayer. [2]

Thus, there is a recognition of fact in Jülicher's treatment which makes it exceedingly difficult for us to stop where he cries Halt! He conceives the Lord, in a word, as One who has given the permanent

[1] p. 60.

[2] See Forrest, *The Authority of Christ.*

direction to the piety of mankind; whose precepts, though cast in the mould of His own time, are yet suitable for all ages; as One who claimed such a Divine office, as that of the Judge of all the earth; whose Self-consciousness, though not perfectly sinless, was yet Super-human; and who—thanks to the overwhelming impression which His Personality makes on us after the lapse of nineteen centuries—confronts us with the dilemma of the admission of a new Spirit or, else, the recognition of a mad Self-exaltation.

There are two other things about Jülicher's treatment which are of the greatest significance. He says, without the slightest consciousness that it is a surprising thing to say, that the Lord was not jealous of the Almighty; and seems to regard the stupenduous claims of our Lord as quite the natural thing in the circumstances. Could there be more impressive testimony than this to the essential verity of the accounts? Here is a scholar who has devoted his whole life to the study of the Christian documents, himself an unbeliever, and he actually commends One whom he regards as his fellow-creature because, being what He was, He was not jealous of the Creator of heaven and earth—because He did not attempt to dispute the sovereignty of the eternal and ever-living God! Is not Jülicher's whole treatment a stupenduous, though unconscious, testimony to the Deity of "our great God and Saviour Jesus Christ"? [1]

3. *Weinel of Jena*

Our next type of German Liberal thought is to be found in the work of Professor Weinel of Jena, aptly called the Dean Farrar of Germany. His evangelic fervour, like that of the English scholar, is indubitable, and he may be trusted to give a clear and narrow presentation of current views. "He is not much

[1] Tit. ii. 13.

troubled by misgivings. He has his solution for most things in heaven and earth, and he regards it as his mission to preach these solutions far and wide."[1] His purpose is not merely historical, but practical; and " his beautiful book," [2] contains a valuable *resumé* of the criticism of a century-and-a-half, and is an earnest effort to utilize the resulting portraiture of the Lord for religious purposes. It is not so profound as Jülicher's noble article in the " Kultur der Gegenwart," nor as narrow as the transitional labours of Pfleiderer. Hence it is more fairly representative of the general current of truly religious Liberal opinion in Germany than either.

In Weinel's view, the Lord " Jesus was no Christian, but a Jew; He proclaimed no new faith, but taught the fulfilment of God's will. According to Mark, His teaching is almost entirely devoted to polemics against the scribes and Pharisees." [3] He proclaims the near approach of the Kingdom of God, and urges repentance on that ground. Although He awaits the coming of the Kingdom within the lifetime of His own generation, He is no apocalyptic Dreamer, and attempts no details of the Kingdom to come.[4] It is impossible that the Lord could have held His own views on man and the Fatherly love of God, and yet have accepted the eschatological conceptions without definitively altering their contents. " For Him who knows nothing on earth higher than the love of God and man, the principal thing in the glory to come will also be the sight of God and peace, not eating and drinking." [5]

But the Lord's religion and His influence are not to be measured by His teaching. Both find their truest expression in His Person. " It lies not only in His teaching on the public stage, but also in His being and

[1] Sanday, *Life of Jesus in Recent Research*, p. 43.
[2] P. W. Schmiedel, *Jesus and Modern Criticism*, p. 10.
[3] *Jesus im XIX. Jahrhundert*, p. 74.
[4] p. 95. [5] p. 95.

behaviour at every hour, at home and abroad, in that which was uttered and not expressed by Him, which He consciously and unconsciously did, in His manner of eating, drinking, rejoicing and suffering. His Person, whose daily companionship they were permitted to enjoy, had much more influence with His disciples than His teaching." [1] And this is the real source of His present influence upon the hearts and lives of men.[2]

Thus, Weinel does some justice to the character and historical significance of our Lord's Personality; but, unfortunately, he is not as adequate in his analysis of the Self-consciousness of Christ. While he is unwilling to affirm the Lord's sinlessness in the dogmatic sense of the term, he tells us that "it is sure that He has not developed by a great breach with a sinful past; He is no man of conversion, like Paul and Luther, and He, still to-day as it had been in His own time, gives the impression of a purity of heart and a moral exaltation which is overwhelming." [3] We are assured that "without doubt He conceived this title (Son of God) out of and filled it with the whole ardour of His love, if He used it at all. . . . It is, moreover, remarkable that the Gospels carefully avoid letting Jesus speak with reference to men of 'our Father'—the 'our Father' is a model prayer for the disciples—they rather prefer to say, 'My Father and your Father,' and they never allow a single disciple to say 'My Father,' if we except one passage." [4]

What, then, does Weinel regard as the Lord's actual achievement? He sees clearly that He is in no sense of the term a Reformer of religion and morals, or else He would have advocated a definite programme of reforms.[5] He is a Prophet and a Saint. "The Prophet and Saint united in a true human life, not a Reformer with laws and ordinances, having a pure doctrine of God, man, Church and State, that is the Jesus of

[1] p. 74. [2] p. 86. [3] p. 101. [4] p. 111. [5] p. 153.

historical enquiry." [1] He is also the most perfectly developed Individuality of history.[2] Weinel would, however, bring us into still closer touch with the Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ; for he points out that the disciples "experienced their salvation in Him a real salvation. Their hearts, tortured by guilt, dared to believe in God's forgiveness; if they looked into His eyes, their longing was calmed, their fear and distrust of the goodness of God vanished, their moral strength was steeled in the fire of enthusiasm cast into their souls by Jesus."[3] He also describes Him as "the Saviour and Leader of mankind to God." [4]

It is difficult to deny that the book leaves behind "a number of questions to which it gives no sufficient answer." [5] Is it possible to admit the substantial sinlessness of Christ and yet deny His essential sinlessness? Is it reasonable to say of any mere Man that we experience salvation in Him? Is this Self-consciousness which never associates others with Itself in the presence of the Divine to be construed as a merely human consciousness? Such questions as these seem to bring out the inherent contradictions in what we may call devout religious Liberalism.

4. *Wernle of Basel*

If Weinel has given us the most typical Liberal study of the Person and Life of the Lord Jesus Christ, it must be admitted that Professor Wernle of Basel, has given us the most brilliant and suggestive. He does not, perhaps, give the same impression of solidity and ripeness as Dr. Jülicher; but his work abounds in solid qualities and is quite the most attractive of technical studies on the subject.

Like the latter he sees that the determining factor in our interpretation of the Messianic conceptions of the

[1] p. 158. [2] p. 310. [3] p. 100.

[4] *Hibbert Journal Supplement*, "Jesus or Christ," p. 42.

[5] Sanday, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

Lord must be His Messianic consciousness; and he starts from the sound historical position that the source of our Lord's power is to be found in His Person. "It was only His Person that gave these new values and these new thoughts that victorious power which transformed the world." [1]

His Self-consciousness, we are told, was "more than prophetic." [2] "A Self-consciousness which is more than merely human speaks from His words,[3] while scarcely less wonderful is the "clear feeling of His limitations." He "knew Himself to be God's Final Messenger after whom none higher can come." [4] Hence He must regard Himself as the Messiah, and required belief in Himself as such. "The Supernatural Self-consciousness of Jesus, which knows nothing higher than Itself save God, and can expect none other, could find satisfactory expression in no other form but that of the Messianic idea." [5] Its finality appealed to Him. Thus, He stands altogether on the side of men over against God; but nevertheless "uses the Messianic title (Son of God) as the expression of closest intimacy with Him." [6]

But the Messianic ideal, as held by the people of His time and, indeed, essentially, was by no means in accord with His conceptions. It was political. He was non-political. It was national, and not morally adequate. He had no share in the nationalistic ideals of the apocalyptists and regarded the moral elements as the most important. (Hence the struggle which is described in the Temptation story, consequent on the awakening of His Messianic consciousness under the stimulus of John the Baptist's preaching.) He was, therefore, confronted with the necessity of transmuting the Messianic idea, and we consequently find a progressive purification of the imaginings of the apocalyp-

[1] *The Beginnings of Christianity*, I. p. 37.

[2] I. p. 37. [3] I. p. 39. [4] I. p. 45. [5] I. p. 45. [6] I. p. 53.

tists ; for " the acceptation of Jewish eschatology by Jesus is tantamount to its purification." [1]

How, then, does he conceive the Messianic Kingdom ? " The only thing that is new in Jesus' point of view is that He regarded His own work not as a preparation, but as a beginning (after all, the difference between the two is very slight), and recognized the dawn of the new age in His deeds." [2] But He lived and died in the hope of His speedy return in glory. " That which is inadequate in the Messianic ideal here wins its first and last victory over Jesus." [3]

But the Lord did not leave the Messianic idea substantially as He found it. He made a vital change by the addition of a hitherto unknown conception of great importance. " No Jew before Jesus applied Isaiah liii. to the dying Messiah." [4] " All the great redemptive activity of Jesus had no place in the Jewish conception of the Messiah ; or, in other words, that which is great in Jesus from the point of view of the history of the world, is not a consequence of the idea of the Messiah, but is an original addition of His own." [5] " Herein, in one word, consists Jesus's greatness. He introduces the tragic element where others joyfully revelled in material Utopias." [6] He redeemed His people from bodily ills[7] by his " mysterious power of working miracles," [8] from the theologians[9] and from the Jewish Church.[10]

Thus, " hope has become an assured certainty; "[11] man's power to do good has been immeasurably strengthened and his final defeat is rendered inconceivable ;[12] for " His calling was to bring God so near to the men of His time—and not to them alone—by His whole manner of life and Personality, to bind them so firmly to God in the presence of eternity, that they should

[1] I. p. 58. [2] I. p. 66. [3] I. p. 51. [4] I. p. 49.
[5] I. p. 49. [6] I. p. 49. [7] I. p. 97. [8] I. p. 42.
[9] I. p. 99. [10] I. p. 101. [11] I. p. 106. [12] I. p. 107.

never more be able to part from Him. Herein He succeeded so entirely that the thought never occurred to His first disciples that He was setting Himself by the side of God, or was taking God's place as the Central Object of man's devotion." [1]

Thus, the Lord, on Wernle's interpretation, is a mass of contradictions. He is Superhuman, but not Divine; the Redeemer, but not the Redeemer of history; His Person the Centre of Christianity, and yet, in the last analysis, He is merely a Teacher. He cannot have risen from the dead, and yet the Resurrection phenomena were "the real projections of Jesus into this world of sense by means of a vision." [2]

Wernle, while working on rationalistic assumptions, is therefore forced to admit the existence of a supernatural element in our Lord's Person and Life—countersigned by the extraordinary phenomena of the Resurrection. His attempt to eliminate the intervention of the Deity in the physical sphere by transposing it to the psychical sphere does not relieve matters much, nor restore consistency to a work which is fundamentally vitiated from every point of view by the inherent contradictions between a devout and candid heart and *à priori* rationalistic assumptions.

One result of this is that Wernle has allowed himself to make statements which will not bear examination. Is it a fair account of the facts to say merely that the disciples never conceived of the Lord taking God's place as the "Central Object of man's devotion"? Is it not certain that, from the day of Pentecost, the disciples offered prayer in His name and associated Him with the Father as the Object of adoration and intercession? In any case, is One who brings God close to men to be regarded as mere man? Is it wonderful that any mere creature should be "clearly conscious of his limitations?" Is it true of any, save God, that

[1] I. p. 113. [2] I. p. 115.

none higher can come after him? Can a Being, of whom these things can be said, be less than the Christ of the Creeds? It is difficult for a serious Monotheist to stop short of ascribing Deity to One who claimed Divine Sonship and drew His knowledge of the things of God from the depths of His Superhuman Self-consciousness.

There is a sentence in one of Wernle's minor works which explains much. "Faith in Jesus founded the Church. But for us to-day that stands only in the second place, comes into consideration last of all; we, filled with Christology unto nausea, are longing for God."[1] Is not Wernle's determined refusal to exalt the Christ as Lord of all, the cause of an enquirer, so filled with candour, spiritual sympathy and historical perception, still thirsting for the living God?

5. *Oskar Holtzmann of Giessen*

The character of Professor Holtzmann's work is very different from that of the last three writers. No flashes of historical intuition lighten the plodding enquiry of his pages. Nevertheless, they are the work of a careful and candid scholar, versed in the technique of historical criticism, whose patient industry goes far towards counterbalancing the lack of more brilliant qualities. There is apparent, however, such a lack of spiritual sympathy and, therefore, of understanding of the subject as reminds one of the labours of the older Liberals. Hence Holtzmann follows so closely in the footsteps of Pfleiderer that he might, without grave injustice, be described as occupying much the same standpoint.

Nevertheless, his understanding of the problem is more satisfying than Pfleiderer's. In his "Life of Jesus," which is a model of painstaking industry, he follows the accepted Liberal criticism and carefully works over all the available material. He sees clearly "that even

[1] *Die Quellen des Lebens Jesu*, p. 86.

in the circles which specially preserved the historical memory of His life, the image of Jesus early outgrew all human measure; and that can only have been due to the impression which Jesus originally made." [1] The Lord erroneously expected the coming of the Messianic Kingdom within the lifetime of His own generation, but "the power of salvation brought by Him is of eternal value." [2] Thus, the Kingdom which is to come in the immediate future is, at the same time, already present for those who have responded to the moral conditions enjoined. "The man who is thus endowed lives already, in Jesus's conception, in the Kingdom of God." [3] The addition the Lord made to the conception of the Messianic Kingdom was the conception of His sufferings as the necessary prelude to His glory.[4]

What, then, was the source of our Lord's influence? and what is His abiding achievement? Two sentences afford the answer. "Jesus's influence, being due to the character of His Personality viewed as a whole, has unquestionably continued to grow richer and stronger from the moment of His first public appearance down to the present day." [5] "Religion offers to man in the Person of Jesus quite the sublimest gift it is within its nature to offer. . . . He who proclaimed this faith, not merely by preaching it, but by showing it forth in the first instance in His own Person, and realizing it in His own life, necessarily seems, to the man who is gladdened by His Gospel, to have moved into immediate proximity to God, and to be exalted beyond comparison high above all other men." [6]

These quotations are sufficient to show Dr. Holtzmann's conclusions in his most considerable work; but they might have been passed over without comment, had it not been for his later tract—"War Jesus Ekstatiker?"—in which he advances the most extraordinary theory of modern times. Those things in

[1] p. 77. [2] p. 248. [3] p. 257. [4] p. 337. [5] p. 493. [6] p. 529.

the Master's life which are transcendental, Holtzmann ascribes to the ecstatic Lord ; and those which commend themselves to the modern world of course belong to the sober and Self-restrained side of His character. Thus, the Baptism, the Temptation, His conception of the nearness of the Kingdom of God, His preaching of penitence, His prophecies of His suffering and death, are all to be ascribed to His ecstatic constitution ; while such elements in His teaching as His conception of God are the product of the calm and Self-restrained side of His nature.

Holtzmann thinks that this theory is sufficient to explain the charm of Christ's Personality. "It is just the contradictory and oppositional elements which are attractive in this Personality. The opposition of clarity of soul and ecstasy in Jesus, is what probably won hearts, and the secret of the first great success lay in the combination of these seemingly contradictory qualities." [1]

It is not the easiest thing to determine precisely what Holtzmann means by an "ecstatic." Ecstasy usually means a state of inward excitement so intense as to render the subject almost, if not quite, impervious to external impressions. (The intense happiness which prevented the Huguenot, Blanche Gamond, feeling the pain of the scourging borne for the sake of Christ, affords an excellent example of ecstasy.)[2] But it must be remembered that esctasy is an abnormal state, and that, while all are liable to it, its frequent recurrence tends to weaken judgment and mental balance.

Now, Holtzmann uses the word in an entirely different sense. He means the "constant condition of the highest (mental) tension of Jesus in the consciousness of the nearness of the Kingdom of God, whose coming He, as the Messiah, has to prepare." [3]

[1] p. 139. [2] See James, *Varieties of Religious Experience.*
[3] O. Schmiedel, *Die Hauptprobleme der Leben-Jesu-Forschung*, p. 74.

This is a theory which should not be advanced lightly about any great historical character ; for it is not very far from a theory of weak-mindedness. Holtzmann fails to distinguish between occasional ecstatic conditions and a semi-permanent state of degraded mentality ;[1] for it is nothing to the point to say that there seem to have been moments of ecstasy in our Lord's experience. Such there are in the lives of most highly organized men ; but that fact does not invalidate their mental equipoise.

Such a theory destroys all possibility of trust in, or dependence upon, the Saviour. He becomes a miserable unbalanced Dreamer, meriting our pitiful sympathy but absolutely inconceivable as the Founder of a world-religion. Indeed, it is quite inconceivable why He was not restrained as a demoniac, and thereby driven insane, before His public ministry began; or how, assuming the possibility of such an escape, He was allowed to carry on His public ministry. If we look to the records of His life, we find that His public life was lived in the midst of enemies, and that it was only by His perfect balance and great astuteness that He was enabled to choose the time of His death. But, on this theory, He went up and down the country in a state of the wildest and most uncontrollable excitement, with a few lucid intervals, liable at any moment to go into an ecstasy, and, therefore, in constant peril owing to His lack of Self-control. " What sort of an idea then do we get of the Saviour ! We get the idea of Jesus generally in a state of the intensest excitement, like a volcano belching forth, after a momentary quiescence, stones, larva, mud and fire ? Try and imagine such a conception ! His career would have been at an end in less than a couple of months ! " [2]

[1] An excellent example of the ecstatic in this sense is afforded by the Blessed Margaret Mary Alacoque. The wretched creature could not be trusted to hold a plate !

[2] O. Schmiedel.

Now, there is no theory so wild that it does not contain an element of truth, and Holtzmann's is no exception to the rule. The element of truth in it is that perceived by Keim—that the Lord's Manhood was no negative thing whose excellence consisted in absences, but that it was an intensely virile (and therefore highly strung) type, whose perfection consisted in the perfect balance of the various forces in human nature. Thus, a real historical fact of the first importance has been emphasized by Holtzmann; and we should not allow the grotesque character of the theory which he has founded upon it to blind us to the magnitude of the service which he has rendered to historical and theological science.

6. *Harnack of Berlin*

In the Christological section of his famous lectures on "What is Christianity?" Professor Harnack thus states the problem: "What position did Jesus Himself take up towards the Gospel while He was proclaiming it, and how did He wish Himself to be accepted?" [1] His answer is that "the Gospel as Jesus proclaimed it has to do with the Father only, and not with the Son." [2] Nevertheless, the Lord conceived Himself as holding a special relation to the Father in point of knowledge; for Matthew xi. 27 shows that "Jesus is convinced that He knows God in a way in which no one ever knew Him before, and He knows that it is His vocation to communicate this knowledge of God to others by word and by deed—and with it the knowledge that men are God's children. In this consciousness He knows Himself to be the Son, called and instituted of God to be the Son of God, and hence He can say: My God and My Father, and into this invocation He puts something which belongs to no one but Himself." [3]

How, then, does Harnack solve the problem of the

[1] p. 127. [2] p. 147. [3] p. 130.

Lord's relation to His Gospel? "It is not as a Mere Factor that He is connected with the Gospel; He was its personal Realization and its Strength, and that He is felt to be still." "He is the Way to the Father, and as He is the Appointed of the Father, so He is the Judge as well."[1]

There seems to be some slight weakening in the famous Lectures of the position which Harnack took up in his great "History of Dogma." In it he gives a fuller recognition to the character of the Lord's place in relation to the Christian Faith. According to it, the Lord "claims a unique and permanent importance as Redeemer and Judge."[2] "It is the Person, it is the fact of His life that is new and creates the new."[3] "He Himself, therefore, is Christianity, for the impression of His Person convinced the disciples of the facts of forgiveness of sins and the second birth, and gave them courage to believe in and to lead a new life."[4] "He has proved Himself able to awaken in His followers the real conviction that He lives, and is Lord and Judge of the living and the dead."[5]

The boldness with which Harnack shifted the centre of Christianity from Christology to the Divine Fatherhood, certainly the most indefensible characteristic of the book from the point of view of historical criticism, caused a storm of protest in every theological and philosophical camp in Germany. In fact, Harnack is obliged to abandon it in practice. Such statements as that which describes the Lord as "the Personal Realization and Strength" of the Gospel, "He Himself is Christianity," are not really consistent with the refusal to regard Him as the centre of the circle of faith.

Nor does Harnack's interpretation allow us to stop at the point at which he halts. He goes either too far or not far enough. If it is true that the Lord is

[1] p. 148. [2] I., p. 60. [3] p. 73. [4] pp. 70-71, [5] p. 60.

" Christianity," " Redeemer and Judge," and that He is the Son of God in a sense that no other man is, it is impossible to regard Him as mere Man. He is *ipso facto* something more. How are we to regard Him on such premises? He is not the Divine Son of God; but, nevertheless, He is uniquely the Son of God. Are we to conceive Him as an Intermediate Being? If so, we do not eliminate the Supernatural from the history—we only transfer it to a form outgrown and superseded fifteen centuries ago.

This is on the acceptation of Dr. Harnack's treatment of the documents and allowing his exegesis and presuppositions to be adequate and fair. Are we, however, justified in isolating the Self-witness of the Lord to such remnants of tradition as the prevalent critical hypothesis allows? Is it sound historical criticism to ignore entirely the character of the conditions of our Lord's Self-witness? Would it not be more scientific to take our Lord's Self-witness in its historical context—the faith of the early Church—and to ask whether it is congruent with the later developments than to limit rigorously the boundaries of Christological belief by the testimony of a tradition which has been whittled down to the narrowest possible limits? Harnack himself sees this when he tells us that it is impossible to understand the Person of Christ apart from His historical environment.[1]

There is another, and, perhaps, a graver objection to Harnack's treatment. Despite all his enthusiasm for religion and his admiration for the Lord, the great divine constantly gives the impression of straining the facts and of ignoring facts in the interests of his rejection of the Deity of the Lord Jesus Christ. His treatment of the passage upon which he founds his whole case in " What is Christianity? " forms a good example of this. Is it sober exegesis to treat the words—" No man

[1] *History of Dogma*, Vol. I.

knoweth the Father but the Son, and no man knoweth the Son but the Father, and he to whom the Son will reveal Him"—as designating the character of the Lord's Sonship? Is it not obvious that to the Speaker the knowledge is dependent upon the Sonship, not the Sonship upon the knowledge? Indeed, the transcendental character of the claim is so clearly perceived by Jülicher that he rejects the passage as a Paulinism, while Pfleiderer bitterly attacks its authenticity as utterly inconsistent with a merely human consciousness on the Lord's part.[1]

Even allowing Harnack's interpretation, we might justly challenge the possibility of regarding the Lord as thereby asserting less than His Deity. What is implied by perfect knowledge of God? The power to comprehend the Infinite. What does the sole right of revealing the Father involve? The knowledge of all hearts. Such knowledge is too high for a man, and it is inconceivable that the Creator of heaven and earth should ever delegate such power to a mere creature. It would be the abdication of His moral sovereignty. Hence, if the words are to stand, they must assuredly bear a deeper meaning than Harnack is willing to allow—a meaning which will justify his statement that "the peculiar character of the Christian religion is conditioned by the fact that every reference to God is at the same time a reference to Jesus Christ and *vice versa*."[2]

7. *Bousset of Göttingen*

The work of Professor Wilhelm Bousset, of Göttingen, is in many respects different from that of the other Liberal scholars, whose views have been examined.

[1] "We ought not, at least, to refuse to recognize that the words of this hymn, if they are allowed to mean what they say without arbitrary softening down, really imply a Superhuman Personality, such as the Christ of the Church is."—*Primitive Christianity*, II. p. 472.

[2] *History of Dogma*, I. pp. 71-72.

Like them he emphasizes the opposition between the Lord and late Judaism, but he agrees with the eschatologists in the fuller recognition of the eschatological character of the Redeemer's thought.

This is clearly seen in his treatment of our Lord's view of the Kingdom. "The Kingdom of God as Jesus preached it, lay principally in the domain of the future and wholly in the domain of the miraculous. It was God's kingdom pure and simple, to be established by the omnipotent God." [1]

Thus, the Lord used the title "Son of Man," which "represents a perfectly definite conception of the Messiah. This Messianic Man is no longer the earthly King of the line of David, as popular imagination painted Him; He is a supernatural Figure, He comes down from Heaven, He was with God from the beginning of the world, He appears in the splendour of His Divine glory, and He is actually the Judge of the world, thus displacing God Himself from that position." [2]

Did our Lord, then, take over the Messianic conceptions of the Jews without addition or subtraction? By no means. His treatment of the whole apocalyptic material is such as to impress us with "His serene greatness, moral and religious," [3] for He "succeeded in altering and purifying them at the critical point, and in breaking through the limits which hemmed them in." [4]

How does Bousset conceive the Self-consciousness of our Lord? Of course, "He never overstepped the limits of the purely human. The Almighty God remained before His eyes a sublime and lofty presence; He did not presume to place Himself at His side." [5] Still, "He felt that He stood in such closeness of communion with God the Father as belonged to none other before or after Him. He was conscious of speaking the last and decisive word; He felt that what He did was final and that no one would come after

[1] *Jesus*, pp. 80-81. [2] p. 123. [3] p. 187. [4] pp. 84-85. [5] p. 202.

Him. . . . We cannot eliminate from His Personality, without destroying It, the trait of super-prophetic consciousness, the consciousness of the Accomplisher to whose Person the flight of the ages and the whole destiny of His followers is linked." [1]

What was our Lord's distinctive achievement? How is He to be regarded? "It was His own characteristic achievement that at every moment of His life He could address as Father the terrible God who filled His soul with a sense of His unspeakable majesty and who surrounded His whole Being with impenetrable darkness and mystery." [2] Thus, in the last analysis, the Lord is essentially a Prophet who brought a supreme message of religious truth to the hearts of men; [3] and the promise of better things, given by Bousset's intermediate position, is voided by his reversion to the usual Liberal conception.

We may point out that Bousset's historical treatment involves him in precisely the same difficulty as besets most of the representatives of modern Liberalism. We cannot say of One who knew His message to be absolutely final, who realized that He stood in a definite and permanent relation to the religious life of all future ages, that His consciousness is that of a mere man. He may be, as indeed He is, "the Leader of the ages and nations to God;" [4] but that He must be something more and that the Lord conceived Himself to be something more, is evident even from Bousset's analysis of His Self-consciousness.

How Bousset's sensitive historical conscience and genuine religious earnestness war with his prejudices and *à priori* assumptions! Take his treatment of the judicial functions claimed by our Lord and of the Self-designation—Son of Man. "Above all He did not lay claim to the judgeship of the world, although that conception was, strictly speaking, included in that of

[1] pp. 178-719. [2] pp. 114-115. [3] p. 21. [4] p. 209.

the Son of Man. It is true that in the narratives of our Gospels the opposite seems to be the case. But it is inconceivable that Jesus, who stamped the fear of that Almighty God who had power to damn body and soul together upon the hearts of His disciples with such a marvellous energy, and who could speak of that fear because He shared it to the bottom of His soul, should now have arrogated to Himself the judgeship of the world in the place of God." [1] "He did not adopt its (the Son of Man's) full content, including the ideas of pre-existence, and of His own judgeship of the world; to Him the idea of the Son of Man meant only one thing —His return in glory." [2]

How does Bousset know all this? Where is his special source of information? The available evidence nowhere gives the slightest encouragement to the idea that the Lord rejected the conception either of His pre-existence, or of His judicial office. On the contrary, as regards the last, there is ample documentary evidence, as Bousset himself admits, that He did accept His judgeship—evidence which Bousset calmly repudiates because, forsooth! it is not consistent in his eyes with the Lord's general character! Possibly it is not the Gospels which are at fault, but the cast-iron *à priori* assumptions which necessitate such an arbitrary treatment of the evidence.

8. *Freiherr von Soden, of Berlin*

Not the least interesting of the German Liberal conceptions of the Person of Christ is that of Freiherr von Soden, Professor at Berlin. His Vacation Lectures on "Die wichstigsten Fragen im Leben Jesu," are remarkable for their independence and sobriety of thought. In these respects they are to the popular literature what Jülicher's article is to the technical.

Freiherr von Soden rightly sees that the Personality

[1] p. 203. [2] p. 194.

of the Lord is the vital problem and that all other problems radiate from it. " His disciples are under the spell of His Personality, from which issues a palpable power, which dissipates all troubles and pours a new life full of unknown harmony into their hearts." [1] It is " an attested integral fact of the history of the world, and the miracle of miracles of this miracle-rich history," [2] and " all problems of the Life of Jesus are at last concentrated in His Personality." [3]

How, then, does von Soden conceive the Messianic ideals and the Self-consciousness of the Lord ? " The Life of Jesus, on the assumption that He knew Himself as the Messiah, is a unity, coherent, comprehensible. He remains an Enigma if we delete this consciousness." [4] Hence, He knew Himself from the first to be the Messiah ; for His consciousness of the fact blazed up in His baptismal experience." [5]

The able character of the book and the finely balanced historical judgment of the Professor is very evident in his treatment of the idea of the Kingdom. This thought (*i.e.*, " the thought of the world of the living reaching its unity and perfection in God,")[6] " was the centre of the thought world of Jesus." [7] It was to Him an exclusively future greatness, but its form is only a side issue in His mind.[8] Here is His contribution to the thought of the Kingdom ; " the Kingdom does not come in outward sensuous events, not suddenly, not violently, but imperceptibly, by degrees, quietly, like the growth of the mustard-seed, the action of the leaven." [9]

The Messianic consciousness involved a unique element in the consciousness of the Lord, for it involved the idea of separateness from others. Hence He indubitably calls Himself the Son. " It is surely not the influence of the Evangelist's conception of His

[1] p. 69. [2] p. 115. [3] p. 111. [4] p. 85. [5] p. 73.
[6] p. 86. [7] p. 86. [8] p. 79. [9] p. 80.

singular Filial relationship to God that Jesus in the evangelic traditions never includes Himself and men in the same relation to the Father, but either utters it of them or of Himself. He has also felt Himself above men in other respects: to Him they are all sinners; He has no guilty conscience; they need penitence, salvation, but not He. Many a sentence, in which He puts Himself with God on the one side and man on the other can only be the consequence of His Messianic consciousness. The existence of the last would be psychologically impossible, if He had not previously felt Himself different from the rest of mankind, for which the lives of all the truly great offer analogies." [1] "Not that He knew Himself to be God . . . . He is not conscious of guilt in His development, no dark blot clouds His memories." [2]

Freiherr von Soden's treatment is certainly the most satisfying of the popular studies, and is not marred (as even Wernle's presentation is) by the ostentatious parade of arbitrary presuppositions; but, still, it is impossible not to feel that they are lurking somewhere in the background. Otherwise, the inference from the facts which he allows seems inevitable. Here is One who is sinless, separate from sinners, who ranks Himself with the Creator as against His fellow-creatures, who claims such offices as Judge of all the earth and Redeemer, who sets Himself to prepare for the miraculous Kingdom of God and makes profound changes of its conception—changes of such a kind that it is possible to say that the idea of the Kingdom was incidental to His thought—and we are told to classify Him as mere man! To be able to do so conscientiously is to achieve a miracle—one of those moral miracles of unbelief which certainly transcend the power of the mere historian.

There are many other treatises on the Person and

[1] p. 94. [2] p. 95.

Life of the Lord Jesus Christ by German Liberal theologians which would well repay study, but considerations of space make any further "spade work" in this field impossible. The "Die Hauptprobleme der Leben-Jesu-Forschung" of Professor Otto Schmiedel of Eisenach is distinguished by its concise but critical survey of the work of other German Liberals and its independent treatment of the problem. It would not be right to omit all mention of two scholarly popular works by Herren Neumann and Erich von Schrenk, good examples of a class of literature of which we have far too little in this country: and it is impossible to avoid all allusion to the many contributions of that severe rationalist Professor P. W. Schmiedel of Zurich, whose treatment of the Person of the Lord is the lowest compatible with the admission of His real historical existence.[1] Each and all of them bring their contribution, like Hiram of old, to the construction of the Temple of God, although the sound of their hammers may not be heard in the holy place. Their contributions, where not defaced by their violent prejudices, against the manifestations of the Supernatural in the sphere of human experience, are distinguished by candour and scientific acumen of the highest degree, and their religious earnestness is so sincere that it is impossible not to marvel at their failure to perceive the Truth in the Person of our Redeemer.

B. French Liberal Criticism[2]

1. *A. Réville of Paris*

Professor Albert Réville's "Jésus de Nazareth" is in many ways German rather than French in character:

[1] See his technical articles in the *Encyclopædia Biblica* and his popular essays; especially his article "Jesus or Christ," *Hibbert Journal Supplement* (pp. 59-80), *Jesus in Modern Criticism* and his long and valuable Preface to Dr. Arno Neumann's *Jesus*.

[2] Authorities: G. Frommel, *Études* (4 vols.); M. Lepin, *Jésus, Messie et Fils de Dieu;* E. Ménégoz, *Publications Diverses sur le Fidéisme;* E. Michaud, *Les Enseignements Essentiels de Jésus;*

for it lacks that quickness and delicacy of appreciation which form the distinctive marks of the French historian and are admirably exemplified in the works of his Parisian colleagues, Professors Stapfer and Sabatier. It gives much the same impression as Oskar Holtzmann's Life of Jesus—the impression of solid scholarship combined with a lack of historical imagination. Hence, the two learned and cautious volumes have a special interest as revealing the extent of German influence upon French Protestant thought.

Réville takes up a more extreme Liberal position than almost any other modern Liberal and allows very little play to the thought of the Kingdom. In this respect he reminds one of the old Liberalism—especially of Keim. The Supernatural Kingdom and Kingship are to him a necessary but inconvenient method of expression which lay to our Lord's hand. "But in any case it must be recognized that Jesus, like all reformers, like all prophets, assigned the fact of the new state of affairs a nearness which reality could not confirm. One of His favourite conceptions was that the great change would not be suddenly achieved, like a *coup de théâtre*. The Kingdom of God ought first to establish itself in hearts and in an invisible way. But this did not prevent Him from believing that the transformation would be quick." [1] This marks the extent of his appreciation of the supernatural character of the Kingdom of God as conceived by our Lord!

What, then, are we to take as our Lord's basic conception? "We know well that which constituted the basis of the religious consciousness of Jesus—God

J. Orr, *Ritschlianism*: *Essays Expository and Critical*; C. Piepenbring, *Jésus Historique*; Réville, A. *Jésus de Nazareth*; J. Réville, *Liberal Christianity*; A. Sabatier, *Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion d'aprés la Psychologie et l'Histoire*, *The Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit*, *The Atonement and Modern Culture*; E. Stapfer, *Jésus Christ avant son Ministère*, *Jésus Christ pendant son Ministère*, *Jésus Christ, son Mort et Resurrection*.

[1] II. p. 27.

felt to be Father." [1] "In recalling essential religion to a general effect of dispositions of an exclusively moral order towards God, the Prophet of Nazareth freed men from all those sacerdotal, ritual, ascetic, irrational, morally valueless slaveries, and in this sense made religion infinitely sweeter and, as they say, easier . . . There is the eternal Gospel, the abiding Good News. God is always the Sovereign Moral Law, but also the Grace which attracts and the pardon which never wearies." [2]

Thus, Réville reverts to the Old Liberal conception of the Person of Christ and merely regards Him as a Prophet and Reformer. Hence the thought of the Lord's essential Deity has gone by the board. If the Lord is merely the first Christian, a naturalistic interpretation of His Person goes by default; but here the transcendental character of the Lord's Personality is felt by Réville. It is true that he offers no sympathy to the thought of the Lord's absolute holiness in the sense that God is holy, but he allows a relative holiness. "The legend of His miraculous birth is homage given to a holiness which appeared extraordinary, which is so in fact, but it was not the place to dispute about His absolute holiness." [3] "That is an idea which is concealed on reflection, because it is inapplicable to a human being temptable and tempted." [4] But this is not all. The Divine Father is manifested in some sense through the Self-consciousness of the Lord Jesus Christ. "In the consciousness of Jesus, the incomprehensible Power which defies all our definitions, which we are nevertheless forced to recognize as the Cause of causes, Law of laws, Basis, Centre and End of things, is affirmed in terms of the 'Heavenly Father.'" [5]

Two more sentences will give Réville's conception of our Lord's real achievement and of His personal

[1] pp. 44-45. [2] pp. 54-55. [3] p. 450. [4] p. 450. [5] p. 442.

relation to the Christian faith. "His work properly so called, His incontestable work, is that He introduced into the human consciousness an ideal of faith and higher morality, of faith and morality combined; an ideal of longing, trusting in the Divine intention, of tenderness, of active pity, of religious sincerity, of resolute fidelity to duty, an ideal to which the terrifying Nebulosity, to which reason in its own counsel alone must give the name of God, resolves Itself for the heart which It attracts with the rays of an infinite love; an ideal which has lent itself—still lends itself—with a ductility too little appreciated, to the evolution and successive needs of human communities."[1] "The power throughout the centuries of placing on the highest plane this great Figure, or rather this type of Christian realized in the historic Person of Christ is a great and incomparable strength to the Christian Churches. Definitively Christ was the first of Christians. The abstract Gospel thus received the stamp of life, of concrete reality, and with these, that communicative force which reality, which actual life, alone are in a position to employ."[2]

Thus, the very high significance which, despite his attempt to confine Him within the narrow categories of a Reformer and a Prophet, Professor Réville allows to the Lord's Personality leaves him open to the same charges of inconsistency and inadequacy which, as we have seen, lie against practically all the German Liberals. We may remark in passing that the distinction which he draws between the relativity of Christ's holiness and the absolute character of God's does not affect the real problem—whether the Redeemer was free from the stain of guilt. Few will be concerned to deny the relative character of the holiness of the Saviour—a fact amply attested in the sacred Scriptures; but it is a different matter as to whether

[1] p. 439. [2] p. 450.

the Lord was sinless or sinful. Hence the negative word *sinlessness* is less likely to mislead than the positive word *holiness*. The latter admits of gradation; the former does not. It is a matter of some doubt as to whether Dr. Réville admits the sinlessness of Christ, or not. His admission of the fact would be quite consistent with his insistence upon the relativity of Christ's holiness, which latter is recognized by most believing divines.

There is another point on which the Professor is open to challenge. Can you say of One who has interpreted the terrifying Nebulosity, which to the uninstructed reason God appears to be as the Heavenly Father, the rays of whose love draw men unto Himself, that He is a mere Man? Does He stand in a merely human and creaturely relationship to the Creator? Whence, in that event, did He get His knowledge of the things of the Eternal? The impotence of Réville, in common with all the Liberal critics, to answer these and cognate questions in a satisfying manner is sufficient proof of an inherent and irremediable weakness.

It must be admitted that, on the whole, Professor Réville does not add largely to the Liberal interpretation of the Person of Christ or to the appreciation of His work. His careful volumes have, therefore, no abiding significance. They are really a careful and scholarly statement of the results of German Liberal criticism in a French dress and as such do not lack value; but the author's failure to advance beyond the German in sympathetic understanding prevents them having a very high value for foreign readers; especially as he gives the impression of representing a type of thought which long ago saw its best days.

2. *A. Sabatier of Paris*

A certain sadness attends the examination of the latest views of this brilliant French writer; for he

began his literary career as an avowed defender of the Evangelical verities. It was a matter of regret, although not unexpected, when his well known "Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion d'aprês la Psychologie et l'Histoire" repudiated the positions of his youth and set forth an uncompromising "Liberal" position as the term of his mental and spiritual evolution. His views, as expressed in it, are supplemented by his other treatises, "Modern Culture" and "The Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit."

He rightly perceives that the real significance of the Lord Jesus Christ is to be found in His person, and that the character of the Lord's teaching is entirely different from that of any other religious leader. "Jesus' method of teaching is then the opposite of that of the scribes, that is, the method of authority. It is rather a sort of divine maieutic, tending to give birth to a new life in the heart, to create the spiritual man in the carnal and animal man."[1] The heart of His teaching is to be found in paternal Theism—"the best theoretical expression of the doctrine brought to life by the influence of Jesus" but if that had been the object of His preaching, He would have been "a scribe more enlightened than the others and nothing more. . . His unique and persistent purpose was to create a new religious life in the souls of His disciples, to animate them with His own faith. . . If Jesus taught no new doctrine, but simply proposed to give to weary and burdened souls that which He had in Himself, what else could He do than point them to His own Person. . . . If He did not do this, Jesus did nothing and could do nothing, since He taught us no new religious doctrine."[2] Thus "His Person is the Incarnation, the

[1] *Religions of Authority*, p. 287.

[2] "In the figure of the God of Jesus, justice preserves its inviolable majesty, garbing it with mercy; and love preserves its sweetness under the same attributes of holiness. The one shows itself just, no longer in vengeance and punishment, but in communicating life, in making

living Expression of the Gospel. From His Person the Gospel receives its creative virtue; it enters the world as a historic potency, a leaven of renovation and life."[1] "Christ was not only the Prophet of the religion of the Spirit, He introduced it into the world and forever remains its Master."[2] He "is far more than the highest Authority in Christianity; He is Christianity itself."[3]

Of what kind, then, is the Lord's authority? and how did He conceive Himself? "His authority is not that of any letter whatsoever; it arises from the outshining of the inner consciousness of Jesus, a radiation of holiness, of love, of the presence of God within Him. The mysterious power which in His consciousness and by His word subjugates our souls and makes them His, is the authority of God Himself, it is the spirit of truth, of love, and of holiness. . . This consciousness of Jesus realizes and includes for us the spiritual and moral bond between the human soul and God, their absolute union, so that when this consciousness becomes ours we feel ourselves to be in the perfect religion, in normal and eternal relations with God."[4] Yet "Jesusolatry, that is, the separate worship of the Man Jesus, is, so far as the Christian religion is concerned, as truly an idolatry as the adoration of the Virgin and the Saints."[5] He never claimed adoration for Himself.[6]

"In the concrete humanity the true character of His Divinity has shone forth with added lustre. We

live and justifying the sinner, and the other reveals its clemency, not in tolerating and strengthening evil, but in softening the guilty soul even to repentance and saving it. Thus, according to the word of the prophet, justice and mercy, hitherto separated and hostile in the conscience of man and in that of God, have embraced and are reconciled for ever on the Cross, become the pathetic symbol of their unity. —*Esquisse*, p. 203.

[1] *Religions of Authority*, p. 333.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 300. [3] *Ibid*, p. 294. [4] *Ibid*, p. 293. [5] *Ibid*, p. 294.

[6] *Ibid*, p. 330.

have at last renounced our carnal ideas of greatness and glory, and we have learned to recognize the dignity of the Son of Man in His abasement, His glory in His humiliation, and His divine character in His perfect and sinless humanity."[1]

It is quite unnecessary to remark upon the extremely interesting character of Sabatier's conception of Christianity even in the abbreviated form in which it is sketched; nor is it surprising that his colleague, Professor Ménégoz, should have described the publication of the "Esquisse" as an event of the first importance in the theological world.[2] Yet neither the book in question—distinguished as it is by "the true French grace and liveliness of style"[3]—nor the author's views in general are really satisfying. It cannot be felt that he really goes to the heart of the matter, although the extraordinary sincerity of the author, added to his eloquent style, prevents the immediate perception of his defects.

Indeed, in many respects, Professor Sabatier's writings are of the kind that on the first reading give the impression of being great works of genius; but, on a second reading, prove exceedingly disappointing. Hence the judgment of Ménégoz who says "without any hesitation that since the Institutes of Calvin no dogmatic writing of the value of M. Sabatier's 'Esquisse' has appeared in the French language,"[4] is, to say the least, exaggerated. At the same time the book, while it lacks all elements of permanence, forms a definite contribution to contemporary thought and, with the author's cognate writings, gives, as we have seen, a very interesting reconstruction of Christianity.

[1] *Modern Culture*, p. 223.

[2] *Publications Diverses*, I., pp. 227-238.

[3] Orr, *Ritschlianism, Essays Expository and Critical*, p. 153; Ménégoz, I., p. 153.

[4] p. 234.

We may remark that there is an extraordinary failure on the part of M. Sabatier (in common with almost all the Liberal theologians) to comprehend the elements of the problem. It is in nowise to the point to say that the Redeemer did not present Himself as an Object of worship to His disciples in the days of His humiliation. To have done so would have rendered a rational human life impossible and would have frustrated the purpose of the Incarnation. It is a curious thing that the complaint of the negative critics of the Incarnation should be that it was not on the same lines as the incarnation fables of polytheism.

There is another point (to which Principal Forsyth has given forcible expression) which is quietly ignored by M. Sabatier and his allies: What right have we to assume that our Lord's teaching expressed all that He had to give to the world? Indeed, even on M. Sabatier's own showing, this assumption cannot hold. He recognizes that the Lord's Person, not His teaching, is the supreme thing in Christianity, that the revelation of God is in the Person and not only in the words of the Redeemer. How, then, can we assume that the Lord expressed all that He had to say in the limited circumstances of His earthly life? Is it right to assume that the much-abused records, which prove too much for the Liberal conceptions, contain all the teaching of our Lord, and that none of it found expression in the apostolic writings and teaching? This is not the proper place to discuss such problems as these, but their indication will serve to show the arbitrary and unsatisfactory character of much of M. Sabatier's treatment of the problem.

3. *Stapfer of Paris*

In common with most of the later Liberals, Stapfer lays just emphasis upon the importance of the Messianic conceptions of our Lord. According to him, the

Baptism is important as marking the awakening of His Messianic consciousness ;[1] and the temptation is primarily Messianic in character.[2] He did not reject the national Messianic conceptions,[3] but His main conceptions were really those of a prophet. He interpreted the Messiahship in terms of a prophet. " To conquer Satan, to overturn his throne, that is His work as Messiah."[4] " He corrects, by the help of the prophets, that which He found erroneous in the Apocalypses of His time and in the theology of the Pharisees. The bond between present and future will be formed by His preaching, His invitation to repentance, to change of heart and life."[5] " Jesus then conceives His task as Messiah in an entirely new way. It consists in saving His people, that is to say in preparing them to enter the Kingdom. He will prepare them and will save them, by making them a people, humble-minded, repentant, poor, regenerate."[6] In His early conceptions " His work will be the sublime coronation of prophetism ; He will be the Hero of the Jewish Apocalypses, whose study nourished His youth."[7]

Wherein, then, consisted the unique character of His preaching ? It is to be found in the fact that He preached Himself. " It is wrong, then, to classify systematically the several points of the teaching of Jesus, and to find a system of doctrines in His words ; to say, for example, He taught this about God, that about man ; it is to misunderstand entirely the unique and essential character of the teaching of Jesus, which is to preach His own proper Person."[8]

[1] *Jésus Christ avant son Ministère*, p. 152.
[2] *Ibid*, p. 171.
[3] *Jésus Christ pendant son Ministère*, p. 153.
[4] *Ibid*, p. 117. [5] *Ibid*, pp. 118-119. [6] *Ibid*, p. 120.
[7] *Jésus Christ avant son Ministère*, pp. 175-176.
[8] *Jésus Christ pendant son Ministère*, p. 91.

In accordance with this, He makes the most remarkable claims,[1] and "His first aim is to communicate to men the sentiment of Divine Sonship which He Himself fully possessed; He would create it in souls."[2] Yet He never associates others with Himself in relation to God." "He is Son of God in a special sense; for He says my Father, your Father, but never our Father in common with His disciples. He separates Himself from the rest of humanity; but it is only in appearance, for His aim is to raise humanity to Himself, to create between men and within them the normal relationship to God which sin had destroyed."[3] "Jesus is the Son of God, but He seems never to have harboured the idea that He could be an Incarnation of God."[4]

But, as the time went on, a change came in His conceptions. The people did not respond to His invitations to repentance, and the priests and leaders led a strenuous opposition to Him. Hence the narrowness and nationalism of His early views began to disappear, and a new and broader universalism became dominant in His thoughts.[5] His Messianic consciousness (the depths of which we shall never sound)[6] was remodelled under the influence of Isaiah liii., which He was the first to apply to the Messiah.[7] It was in this confidence which was certainly supernatural[8] that He went up to Jerusalem to die—a necessity, if Judaism was to continue to exist, for the dilemma which presented itself to the leaders of the people was "Jesus or Judaism?"[9] Stapfer also describes Him as a Legislator and Reformer[10] and as "the Saviour of the World."[11]

[1] *Jésus Christ avant son Ministère*, p. 195.
[2] *Jésus Christ pendant son Ministère*, p. 169.
[3] *Ibid*, p. 316. [4] *Ibid*, p. 314-315. [5] *Ibid*, p. 243.
[6] *Ibid*, p. 223. [7] *Ibid*, p. 274. [8] *Ibid*, p. 285.
[9] *Ibid*, p. 285. [10] *Ibid*, p. 163.
[11] *Jésus Christ, son Mort et son Resurrection*, p. x.

It is not surprising that the French Roman Catholic scholar M. Lepin describes some of Stapfer's admissions in relation to the Deity of the Lord Jesus Christ, as "very remarkable declarations;"[1] for the Protestant Professor certainly involves himself in a whole series of contradictory positions. How are we to think of One who had supernatural confidence, regarded His life as a ransom for many, conceived Himself in some sense as a Substitute for sinners in relation to the justice of God, as holding (in reality as well as in His own conceptions) a unique relationship to God, who knew Himself to be such a One that humanity required to be raised by Him to His own level, and yet cannot even be definitely described as sinless and holy?[2] Thus, Stapfer, in common with many other Liberal divines, admits the facts which constitute the great dilemma—*aut deus aut non bonus*—but obstinately refuses to allow the possibility of the only answer consistent with the indubitable historical fact of the great goodness of Christ.

At the same time the imperfections of the work must not blind us to its great merits. It is the noblest contribution of that nation whose literature and scholarship is most distinguished by historical sympathy and grace. Not so popular in character as the "Vie de Jésus," it is a far worthier representative of French scholarship. Unlike the more famous treatise, Stapfer's volumes, while by no means deficient in criticism, are marked by a spiritual earnestness and moral insight worthy of the nation of Blaise Pascal: for, despite the author's historically illegitimate assumption that miracles do not happen,[3] it is not as deficient in historical insight. There are few works of the kind

[1] *Jesus, Messie et Fils de Dieu*, p. 235.

[2] *Jésus Christ pendant son Ministére*, p. 349.

[3] *Ibid*, p. 142.

which leave a deeper impression of calm and objective historical criticism.

There are many other French Liberal studies of the Life and Person of the Redeemer which would well repay study, but considerations of time and space compel us to pass on to another branch of our subject. We must, however, mention in passing the treatise of Professor J. Réville—"Liberal Christianity"—which states very beautifully and with great moral earnestness the attitude of French Liberal Protestantism, and the scattered references in the occasional articles and unfinished works of M. Gaston Frommel, whose lamented death has robbed France of the most brilliant of her younger Liberal theologians. No one can read his unfinished remains without profit and stimulation; but it would be most unfair to discuss his treatment of the Person of our Lord on the basis of a few scattered references culled from posthumous republications of magazine articles. Fortunately the divines whose treatment we have examined give us sufficient materials to enable us to form a fairly just estimate of the contribution of French Liberalism which, marked by a peerless sympathetic grace, but not so distinguished as the German for originality and depth, gives a more clearly cut impression than the German contribution.

C. English Liberal Criticism[1]

1. *T. H. Green, of Oxford*

It is a curious and not insignificant fact that the true protagonist of English Liberalism in theology

[1] Authorities: P. Gardner, *Exploratio Evangelica, The Growth of Christianity, A Historic View of the New Testament*; T. H. Green, *Miscellaneous Works;* Bishop J. B. Lightfoot, *Essays on Supernatural Religion;* C. G. Montefiore (Jewish View), *Jesus and His Teaching, The Synoptic Gospels,* Vols. I. and II.; H. Rashdall, *Doctrine and Development;* P. Vivian, *The Churches and Modern Thought, Hibbert Journal Supplement, Jesus or Christ?*; J. Warschauer, *Anti-Nunquam, The New Evangel, Problems of Immanence, Jesus: Seven Questions, Jesus or Christ? Supernatural Religion.*

was a Professor of Philosophy, and not a professional theologian. No purer or nobler soul than the late Professor T. H. Green, of Oxford, has graced the stage of British University life; and there are few in the annals of his University who have exercised a profounder and healthier influence on behalf of the spiritual interpretation of life. It is true, as Dr. Sanday says, that he took his criticism at second hand from a now discredited school;[1] and it is also true that he approached the subject from the side which has the least attraction for the English mind—that of philosophy—but he brought such gifts of personality, intellect and character to the task that he has given an impetus to English thought which promises to be of long continuance.

As might be expected, Green approaches the subject purely from the side of philosophy and of thoroughgoing Hegelian philosophy to boot. In intense sympathy with many of the moral ideas of Christianity, he laid little stress on dogma and did not adequately appreciate the historical character of Christian faith. Hence if Christianity is essentially a system of ideas, Dr. Sanday is right when he calls Green a "sincere Christian;"[2] but, if it is based on the great fact of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity becoming incarnate for the redemption of mankind from the curse of sin, Green has assuredly no claim to the title.[3]

[1] *Christologies Ancient and Modern*, p. 66. [2] *Ibid*, p. 65.

[3] In the Memoir prefixed to Vol. III. Mr. Nettleship has very fairly stated how matters stand: "If it means to believe that every man has God in him, that religion is the continual death of a lower and coming of life to a higher self, and that these truths were more vividly realized in thought and life by Jesus of Nazareth and some of His followers than by any other known men, then without doubt he was a Christian. If it means to believe that the above truth depends upon the fact that Jesus was born and died under conditions impossible to other human beings, then equally without doubt he was not a Christian. . . . To him the Incarnation and Resurrection could only mean that the divine spirit, whose activity is an eternal death into life and life out of death, is perpetually being manifested, in various degrees and under various forms, in all that is good in human experience."—pp. c.-cii.

Green rightly perceives the historical significance and the absolute originality of the life of the Lord Jesus. "The life of Jesus Himself was, if the expression may be allowed, an absolutely original one. If we know anything of Him, we know that it was no derived or secondary mission that He asserted. Whether Son of God or Son of Man, He was so by a direct title of His own, not, as His followers were, by a mediated heritage."[1] "It is doubtless true that the system of practical ideas, or of life resting on ideas, which we call Christianity, though its roots are as old as mankind, would not exist but for definite past events and actions and personal influences, and that among these some far outweigh all others in importance. There came One who spake as never man spake, yet proclaimed Himself the Son of man, and was conscious, in the very meanness of human life, in its final shame of death, of the communication of God to Himself, and through Him to mankind."[2] "Thus, the religious imagination of God as Christ has to become the imagination of Him as a 'glorified' Christ; a Christ such as Jesus of Nazareth was potentially, not actually; a Christ 'put to death in the flesh,' but alive and giving life in the spirit. In other words, though the religious imagination may require, as historically it did require (whether it does is not so certain), (a) a belief in the manifestation of God under the ordinary conditions of an individual human life as its starting point, it equally requires that this belief should pass into (b) a belief in a Person now spiritually present to and in us."[3]

If we may state the results of our enquiry in a few words—difficult as this is, owing to Professor Green's habit of using Biblical language in a sense of his own—he treated the whole subject on an almost, if not quite, pantheistic basis, and held that the Incarnation of God

[1] *Works*, III. p. 167. [2] *Ibid*, p. 241. [3] *Ibid*, pp. 219-220.

in Christ only differed in degree from the incarnation of God in any other earthly existence. Such a Christology may be Hegelian; it certainly is not Christian in any sense known to history; and it is misleading to call it by a name which has a definite historical connotation.

While Green is undoubtedly right in the emphasis which he lays upon the fact that the real Christ must be a glorified Christ—One who has achieved and entered into a final relation with God and man—the historical Lord Jesus is to him the Originator of that form of experience of the Divine which we call Christian and there His importance ends. He is not the Incarnation of the eternal and living God, to whom we must go because He alone has the words of eternal life. He cannot, therefore, satisfy our spiritual needs; and we must solace ourselves with the poor substitute of the idea for the loss of the precious and objective historical reality of the Incarnate Lord.

2. *Gardner of Oxford*

When we turn from the philosophical Liberalism of Professor Green to that of the present leader of Oxford Liberalism, we find ourselves in an entirely different atmosphere. Professor Percy Gardner's treatment, although dominated by his Pragmatist presuppositions, is historical rather than philosophical.

He recognizes that "the whole of early Christianity was steeped in the Personality of Jesus,"[1] that "almost all thinkers are agreed that Jesus was a unique religious Genius,"[2] and that the Messianic office was the inevitable category of our Lord's Self-interpretation. "The nature of His inspiration forbade Him to regard the Messianic office in the narrow and national manner of those about Him. Turning from what was outward to what was inward, as He always did, He saw

[1] *Exploratio Evangelica*, p. 177. [2] p. 179.

that the function of the true Messiah must be, not to overthrow the Roman dominion and establish a new empire in its place, but to turn the heart of Israel to God, to bring in a state of society in which the will of God should be done in earth as in Heaven."[1] It was towards the end of His career that the Lord perceived that His goal was to be achieved through suffering and death.[2] He " raised to another level even the highest Jewish idea of God."[3] His exalted claims as Son of Man to be the Lord of the Sabbath and to forgive sins must not be taken as proofs of His Deity, " for it is not as the Embodiment of God, but as the Representative of of man, that Jesus in these cases claims authority."[4] According to the Synoptists " He never directly applies to Himself the title Son of God. At the same time He does in a less direct manner claim the title by continually speaking of God as His Father. And it is notable, as the commentators point out, that in speaking to His disciples He never refers to God as our Father, but either as My Father or your Father."[5] " It is the teaching of Jesus which judges those who hear and respect it or fail to appreciate it . . . Thus there appears to me to be grave doubt whether we are justified in saying that Jesus foretold His own second coming for judgment."[6] If history " is determined to set aside the hypothesis of divine inspiration, it is altogether overmatched by facts."[7]

It is obvious that Professor Gardner's work is conditioned by a higher conception of the Divine activities than that of most Liberal theologians, and we cannot but be thankful for his recognition of the fact that Divine inspiration is the only sufficient cause of historical Christianity. Nevertheless, his work is defaced by the most marked defects of Liberal criticism. His criticism is arbitrary and subjective ; he neglects

[1] p. 182. [2] p. 182. [3] p. 185. [4] p. 188.
[5] p. 190. [6] p. 283. [7] p. 289.

to draw the inevitable conclusions from the facts which he has admitted and he finally involves himself in an impossibly inconsistent position by his admission of the necessity of Divine intervention. Is it true to say that our Lord forgave sins as the Representative of humanity? If He did, He cannot be acquitted of moral guilt; for He implicitly accepted the premiss of the Pharisees that "none can forgive sins but God alone" when He vindicated the power, not of man but of the Son of Man, to forgive sins by curing the sick of the palsy. Is there, we may also ask, any other ground, save the incompatibility of such a claim with a merely human consciousness on our Lord's part, for doubting that our Lord conceived Himself as the Judge of the world?

We also remark the hopeless inconsistency of his final conclusions. Divine inspiration is a necessity to account for the facts of the case. Nevertheless the historical form which that inspiration has taken must be repudiated. Why? Because Divine inspiration does not take that form! The intellectual difficulty of Divine intervention in human affairs remains unimpaired; for it is no real relief, while allowing it in the innermost of man, to disallow it in his environment.

What sort of an idea does this conception give us of the holiness and righteousness of God? He is One who inspires men to carry out a high and holy will by means of a tissue of delusions as to fact. Not to speak of the fact that in history the influence of Christianity has depended upon the error of belief in the Deity of the Lord Christ, the Resurrection-errors form the historical basis of the Christian community. If visions are admitted as giving a factual basis to the apostolic witness, the moral impossibility is intensified, for it is absurd to say that the Almighty did not know that they would mislead their recipients. Did He, therefore, see fit to achieve His ends by deliberately misleading

His instruments? To say so, is not merely intellectually and morally grotesque; it is also dishonouring to God.

3. *Warschauer of Bradford*

There can, however, be little doubt that the most interesting of British Liberal writers on the Person and Life of the Lord Jesus Christ is the one popular writer of English Liberalism whose treatises can bear comparison with the popular tractates of the leading German theologians. Dr. Warschauer expresses more accurately than any other English Liberal theologian the point of view of the myriads of thoughtful men who are now out of sympathy with orthodox and ecclesiastical Christianity and, unlike the productions of the more notorious Rev. R. J. Campbell of the City Temple, his writings are marked by deliberate and careful thought, and are the product of a well-stored and well-balanced mind.

The personality and history of Dr. Warschauer are very interesting. Born in Germany and of Jewish race, he abandoned his ancestral religion at an early age, and for a while became an agnostic, if not a positive atheist. To the Unitarians of Leeds belongs the honour of discovering him and inducing him to go to Oxford with a view to entering their ministry. After graduating at Exeter College and pursuing his theological studies at Manchester College, Oxford (during the Principalship of that brilliant scholar, Dr. Drummond), he took the degree of Ph.D. at Jena, where he was one of Eucken's students. Thus equipped, he entered the Unitarian ministry, but his mental and spiritual development soon required a wider mental environment and (after making the principal contribution—his "Anti-Nunquam"—to the Blatchford controversy) he began to feel that intellectual honesty required him to find another ecclesiastical home. This he found in the Congregationalist communion, and he is at present

minister of the principal Congregationalist Church in Bradford. He has taken an active part in the "New Theology" controversy, being, indeed, the premier theologian and thinker of the movement, and is well known in Liberal circles. His present position may be described as that of extreme criticism; but is too inconsistent to be permanent in the case of so thorough going, though sometimes unsatisfactory, a thinker. His works include the "Anti-Nunquam," "The New Evangel," "Problems of Immanence" and "Jesus: Seven Questions." Of these the last is the most relevant to our present purpose and gives us ample materials for the formulation and criticism of this remarkable man's Christology. The Seven Questions are:—Son of Man or Son of God? Was He sinless? Did He work miracles? Had He power to forgive sins? Is belief in Him necessary to salvation? Did He rise from the dead? Did He die for us? His answer to the first is that the Lord is Son of God in so far as Perfect Man can be the Recipient of the Divine nature; to the second, that the Lord is absolutely sinless; to the third that the Lord worked cures but no other miracles; to the fourth, that "He was the Power, if we will test it, to cause our sins to be forgiven, by awakening in us the spirit of repentance;"[1] to the fifth, that He is the direct and easy way of salvation and that all others involve difficulty; to the sixth, that, though the Syrian stars look down upon His dust, yet He conquered death and after death manifested Himself in visions to His disciples; and to the seventh, that in the death of the Lord "the Divine Love takes a shape so compelling, pleads in a voice so poignant, as to break down the stronghold of sin in the heart which yields itself to the influence that streams from the Cross."[2]

The epigrammatic sentence—"The Incarnate Son is the supreme and crowning instance of the

[1] p. 205. [2] p. 300.

Divine Immanence "[1]—contains the gist of Dr. Warschauer's theory of the Person of Christ.[2] His fear of weakening the moral value of the Sinless Life largely influences his attitude towards the admission of the essential Deity of the Lord Jesus Christ: for he almost adequately recognizes the fact that the Lord was conscious of a unique relation between Himself and God.[3] "Now that which enables Jesus thus to 'know' God completely, to interpret Godhead as Fatherhood, is the fact that He Himself is the Son; it was His own perfect filial disposition which gave to Him this particular and final knowledge of God in such a manner that He not only saw the Father, but perfectly showed Him forth."[4] "And because it is Christ's Sonship that has made ours possible, because by His great radiance our smaller lights are kindled to responsive brightness, He is the unique Son, and we become brothers and sisters to Him if we do the will of His Father."[5] "The pathway of the soul to the innermost of God lies inevitably through the heart of Christ."[6]

There can be no doubt as to the moral earnestness of the thinker who thus conceives the Person of our Lord; but the moral earnestness of a conception is not

[1] p. 95.

[2] It is only fair to Dr. Warschauer to supplement this statement by the following extract from his *Problems of Immanence*: "If the Incarnation of God in Christ is in one sense the highest example of Divine Immanence—just as man represents the highest form of animal life—yet in another sense it transcends mere immanence just as truly as humanity transcends the animal creation. We leave this as a suggestion which the reader may develop for himself. So much is certain, that in Christ alone does the edifice of faith reach its culminating point—in Him our questionings receive their complete and final answer, because what we see in Him is not a stray hint or broken gleam, but the pure and quenchless light of God's own Presence." If by this Dr. Warschauer means that the Divine Being lived a human life in Galilee nineteen centuries ago, there is little difference between his view and that of historic Christianity. If, on the other hand, he means that there is simply a difference of degree between the Incarnation of God in Christ and the wider "incarnation" in humanity, there is but little advance on pure Unitarianism.

[3] p. 300. [4] p. 104. [5] p. 106. [6] p. 107.

intellectual adequacy, and we may legitimately doubt whether the hypothesis of Dr Warschauer is more satisfying intellectually than those of his liberal *confrères*. Is it a legitimate use of the language to describe the immanence of God in any man—albeit immanence carried to the highest point—as Incarnation? From the historical point of view it is certainly misleading, and such an immanent presence of the Divine in our Lord is certainly inadequate to the Scriptural conception of the Incarnation of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity. Such a One as Dr. Warschauer depicts is simply man at his best and can scarcely mediate to us a true knowledge of the Divine. Owing to His constitution He can give us no absolute finality; since, for aught we know, a higher manifestation of the Divine may be hidden in the womb of time. He is, despite His moral perfection, of the earth earthy and the need of mankind is the Lord from Heaven.

Again, we may legitimately doubt whether the Lord, as conceived by Dr. Warschauer, is adequate to the strain He has to bear. While He is denied the transcendental nature alone competent to bear the strain, He is weighted with some of the heaviest tasks of the Christian Christ. Can One whose being is less than Godhead know God so perfectly as to reveal Him authoritatively?[1] How can One whose nature is, after all, only that of man at his best, so reveal the love of God by His Self-denial and death as to constitute God's most poignant appeal to guilty sinners to turn unto Him? It is surely difficult to conceive the highest and final appeal of God to sinful man being the self-

[1] This is well exemplified in Dr. Warschauer's latest contribution to the subject. In his valuable little volume *Jesus or Christ?* a marked advance towards Christian Faith is discernible. Thus he points out that our Lord's human limitations "are not in the least incompatible with His being, in the sense of the original text, 'very God of very God,' the express Image of the Father's substance," pp. 122-123. The main current of Dr. Warschauer's thought is assuredly in the direction of Nicæan and Apostolic Faith.

sacrifice of a creature. Such a view robs us of the distinctive Christian doctrine of God as One whose nature, historically manifested on the Cross of Calvary, is Self-sacrificing love.

The truth of the matter is that Dr. Warschauer, whose Christology really amounts to the admission of the impossibility of confining the Lord within merely human limits, attempts the impossible—the construction of a Christ whose religious significance is that of the Athanasian Christ and whose Personality, nevertheless, can be construed in terms of the dominant Naturalism. His religious experience of Christ is that which the believer seeks and experiences in the glorified and eternal Saviour; but he sternly refuses to conceive a Christ intellectually adequate to what the soul finds Him to be. Such a position cannot possibly be permanent. Neither the intellect nor the soul can finally rest in it, and the same religious experience which vanquished Arianism must in the end prove fatal to this materially, though not formally, intermediate doctrine of the Person of Christ. Either the Church which accepts Dr. Warschauer's interpretation of Christ will go forward to the full Athanasian position, or it is bound to relapse into the cold and barren wastes of Unitarianism.

There are several other Liberal theologians whose conceptions deserve close attention. The veteran Cambridge scholar, Dr. Edwin Abbott, has in the course of his long and brilliant career made many contributions of the highest value. Almost everything which has come from his pen is noteworthy; but his last and monumental work, "The Son of Man," will long remain an indispensable part of every theological library and will teach even those who hold a higher and truer view of our Lord's Person much as regards that spirit of reverence, candour and godly fear which is the indispensable prerequisite of all truly scholarly

work in the field of Christian theology. It is also a temptation to comment on the position of Dr. Hastings Rashdall who seems, if we may trust a recent sermon, to have definitely committed himself to the doctrine that our Lord's Incarnation was merely the highest expression of the immanence of God ;[1] and it is hard to pass by the little volume of the Reverend J. M. Thompson of Magdalen College, Oxford, which is creating such a stir in Anglican circles. It is really only an endorsement of the results of the Liberal school, and owes its importance solely to the facts that its author is an English clergyman and that, owing to the stagnation of Christological thought resulting from the Oxford Movement, the English Church has hitherto not been seriously affected by modern theological movements.

Despite the real and independent value of the enquiries of these and other English speaking Liberal scholars there are sufficient materials in the works of the three representative scholars whose views have been examined to enable us to estimate the excellence and defects of the British contribution to the Liberal estimate of the Person of Christ. Not so profound in its philosophical aspects, nor so ingenious in its historical criticism, as the German, and yet profounder and more satisfying than the French, it possesses the excellences and defects of the English character. It is marked by a greater reverence for fact than the work of either of our great compeers, but it suffers at the same time from a lack of scientific imagination.

There is a spiritual sympathy, an Evangelical earnestness, pervading their contributions—especially noticeable in Dr. Warschauer's writings—which differentiates their work from that of their Continental allies and, indeed, gives their work any independent value it may possess ; for it is impossible to deny that in

[1] Preached in Belfast and published in the *Church of Ireland Gazette*.

these fields British scholarship reaps what it has not sown and harvests the crops of other men, or to claim for it a very profound originality of conception.

D. Summary and Criticism

1. Thus, the later Liberalism finally takes much the same general position as the old. Both lay the supreme stress upon our Lord's prophetic office; but the former more adequately recognizes the presence of other factors in the problem. It elaborates the proofs of the teaching function of our Lord and emphasizes, if not verbally yet in reality, His significance as a Teacher to the exclusion of other aspects of His Person and Work. Indeed, its recognition of the real significance of His Personality rather than His teaching is little more than an exaltation of pedagogy by example over pedagogy by precept.

In this emphasis on pedagogy it is in full agreement with the older Liberalism. Yet, there is a distinct advance to be observed—especially in the direction of a much greater appreciation of the true character of a prophet—as a comparison of Keim's interpretation of the Lord with that of any typical later Liberal will show. To Keim the Lord was primarily a Teacher and the secret of His influence lay in the character of His teaching; to the modern Liberal the secret of the Lord's power is to be found in His Person. Or—to put it somewhat differently—to the old Liberals the Lord's Person derived its significance from His teaching; but to the New Liberalism the teaching owes its virtue to the Personality. Thus, there has been an enormous advance in the direction of the appreciation of our Lord's Personality as the Sun and Centre of His Gospel and also of His religious significance.

In another respect, the later Liberalism is a great advance upon the old—in its recognition of the historical fact that there actually were transcendental

elements in our Lord's conceptions of Himself and of His work. The tendency among the modern Liberals is undoubtedly to recognize the fact that the Messiahship as conceived by our Lord—however much He may have modified it in detail and especially in the recognition of the prophetic office of the Messiah and in His synthesis of the priestly office with the generally recognized functions of the Messiah—is essentially a transcendental conception which, had He regarded Himself as standing in the ordinary human relationship to the Most High, He would scarcely have ascribed to Himself.

These entirely unassimilable elements on any purely humanistic hypothesis paralyse the last attempts of Liberalism to form a coherent and rational account of the Personality of the Lord. Hence it is forced to regard them as the tribute which every great man must pay to the thought of his time, and to deny them any abiding significance. Thus, Wernle describes the apocalyptic element in our Lord's teaching as the sole victory which the ideas of the age obtained over Him. Jülicher laments the inconsistencies in which these erroneous and unassimilable elements in His teaching involved the Lord. Bousset, who recognizes the existence of these elements more fully than any other Liberal thinker, laments over them as the temporal shell which contains the eternal gospel and deplores the difficulty of inducing men to recognize the merely incidental character of the form of the Saviour's teaching.

Thus, the Liberal school know no other interpretation of Christ Jesus the Lord than the prophetic,[1] and

[1] It is only fair both to ourselves and to the Liberal critics to give a formal summary of their position by one of their number. No more representative man can be found than Professor Jean Réville of Paris, who, in his *Liberal Christianity*, thus states the case: "They venerate Jesus as the Greatest of all prophets, the purest and holiest Consciousness whose memory has been preserved by history, as the One in whom moral truth was most completely manifested in a human soul, the One

no other Gospel than that of the Fatherhood of God.[1] "His proper importance lies in this—He has performed the ordinary moral religion of mankind, *i.e.* faith in God and immortality, and the practice of virtue in an especially strong, even in a singular, manner in His Soul and Personality."[2]

2. Such an interpretation is, it is scarcely necessary to remark, open to a whole series of grave criticisms. In the first place, it is exceedingly arbitrary and subjective in its criticism; for it necessitates, as we have just seen, the repudiation as non-essential of a whole multitude of conceptions which were of the very first importance to our Lord and His disciples. It is no question of a great man being wrong or inconsistent in point of detail—it is rather a question of His fundamental presuppositions and belief being utterly misleading. It is no question of an adaption to the thought of His time, of the sacrificing of a pawn to secure checkmate; for no one can read the Gospels without seeing that the Messiahship was of the very first importance to the Lord Himself. The acceptation of His Messiahship, not of His prophetic office, was the test of membership of His community both in His own time and in the Apostolic age. It is, indeed, difficult to repudiate the Supernatural Messiahship, to reject the indubitable form in which our Lord's Self-consciousness clothed Itself and in which It won Its earliest recognition, and yet to retain our respect and reverence for His spiritual and moral judgment.

who, throughout His ministry as Messianic Reformer—in so far as we can gather—was the living Commentary of His Gospel, and who crowned His work by a sacrifice of such perfect moral sublimity that it has become the type and inspiration of countless sacrifices, proceeding from the same obedience to moral truth" (p. 114).

[1] "The true substance of Christ's Gospel is . . . God, as the Heavenly Father, whatever the philosophical description of the Divine Being; men, as the sons of God, and therefore all brethren, whatever the philosophical notion of man's nature; that is what the Gospel has long since taught us to regard as its essence."—*Ibid*, p. 71.

[2] R. H. Grützmacher: *Ist das liberale Jesusbild modern?* p. 21.

The Negative Criticism of the Age

The second grave criticism to which the Liberal interpretation of our Lord's Person is open, is its essentially unhistorical and modern character. It may be—it certainly is—true that the Modernists and eschatologists generally cannot be absolved from the charge of arbitrary criticism; but the retort—"Physician, heal thyself"—is no answer to their brilliant and destructive criticism of the Liberal position and does not neutralize their pitiless exposure of the essentially modern and non-historical character of its reconstruction of the historical Lord.[1] In a word, the Christ of the Liberal critic is a benevolent and morally earnest University Professor who stands for the bare minimum of fact and belief consistent with the existence of a moralized religion, with a spiritual interpretation of life. He is little more than the T. H. Green or, better still, the Rudolf Eucken of the First Century.[2]

Nor can it be said that the resulting portraiture, despite all the love and care which has been lavished upon it, despite the marvellous technique and genius which have been employed in its construction, is morally or intellectually convincing. There is nothing especially virile or great in it. He is good and earnest but hopelessly mistaken in His outlook. Instead of being the Embodiment of what Professor James calls the strong type of sainthood,[3] He is the Incarnation of

[1] "They wanted to bring Jesus into the Nineteenth Century as the Incarnation of its ideal of Divine Righteousness, *i.e.*, of all the highest principles and aspirations that ensure the healthy progress of civilization. . . With eyes thus preoccupied they could only find the German in the Jew; a Moralist in a Visionary; a Professor in a Prophet; the Nineteenth Century in the First; the Natural in the Supernatural."—Tyrrell, *Christianity at the Cross Roads*, pp. 41-42.

"The Christ of Herr Harnack not only differs as a matter of fact from the Christ of tradition, but also from any image that the historian can derive from a criticism of the Gospels alone."—Loisy, *The Gospel and the Church*, p. 88.

[2] "We have, therefore, as the result of the modern judgment, that what is asserted to be historical in the Liberal conception of Jesus is for the most part a creation of present ideals and conceptions."—R. H. Grützmacher, *Ist das liberale Jesusbild modern?* p. 33.

[3] *Varieties of Religious Experience.*

weak saintliness ; and His very goodness is, therefore, sufficiently repellent to explain Nietzsche's abhorrence. Such a " Jesus," as a matter of fact, did not win the world, and assuredly. (if we may judge by the ever increasing disregard of Him in modern Liberal circles) will not keep the world.

3. Besides this, the Liberal interpretation is vitiated by the fact that it entirely shifts the centre of gravity of the Gospel, whether we regard it from the point of view of the Man who walked the streets of Nazareth, of the Apostolic community, or of the centuries of Christian history. The torrent of indignant protest at Harnack's brilliant attempt to shift the centre of Christianity from Christology to the Divine Fatherhood precludes the sneer that only an interested orthodoxy would dispute the fact. As von Hartmann says, " the essence of Christianity is in Christology or nowhere at all : he who rejects Christology repudiates with it the essence of Christianity "[1]—and this is true from whatever point of view we regard it.

(*a*) If we take it from the point of view of the Lord Jesus of history, we find that the Messianic office was the norm of His thought and its ascription to Him the basis of membership of His community. Nor was the Messiahship in which He believed the husk of a great prophetic conception. On the contrary, it was an eternal spiritual reality by which He was constituted the Viceregent and Final Messenger of God and endowed with some of the principal Divine functions such as those of Redeemer and Judge. If one may use the expression, the Lord's Person, to His own mind, is the positive pole of His Gospel ; the Fatherhood of God is, at best, the negative.

(*b*) Nor is the case any better from the point of view of the Apostolic Church. Its Gospel accord-

[1] Quoted by R. H. Grützmacher, *Moderne-positive Vorträge*, p. 92.

ing to the earliest witnesses had its centre in the Person of the crucified Redeemer whom "God had made both Lord and Christ."[1] The Gospel which St. Paul preached was a Gospel which exalted Jesus as Lord and worshipped "our great God and Saviour Jesus Christ."[2] We are not here concerned with the fact that it was to a great extent the Gospel of the Messiah of Israel. What is of importance for us to observe is that it was a Gospel centring in the Person of the Lord Jesus Christ; a Gospel to which the supreme, the vital thing differentiating it from Judaism and forming the norm of its religious life was its Christology.

(*c*) Nor when we pass down the Christian ages do we find a material alteration of the facts. No doubt, the Messianic office of the Lord in its contemporary connotation has tended to recede into the background and its place has been filled by the great underlying truth of which it is the historical garb—the essential Deity of the Saviour: but the Roman world, convulsed (as Gibbon says) over an iota, is a sufficient proof as to the place of Christology in the Church of the early centuries. The uniform confession of the post-Nicene Church continues the testimony. The joy in Christ, not in the Fatherhood of God as at present understood, of the saints and martyrs of mediæval and Reformation times gives the lie to the historical character of the Liberal Gospel. The awakening of philanthropic and missionary zeal through the Evangelical Revival which knew "no God but Christ,"[3] when added to the spiritual sterility and stagnation of Liberal circles, completes the cycle of historical witness to the Christological centre of historical Christianity.

4. Is it true, is it not a dishonour to the Divine Lord, to describe such a caricature of the Christianity of history as a "reduced Christianity"?[4] Even if it

[1] Acts ii. 36. [2] Titus ii. 13. [3] Zinzendorf. [4] Sanday, *Christologies*, p. 97.

were true that " the more pronounced Liberals . . . would deliberately put it (Godhead of Christ) on one side "[1] rather than definitely repudiate it, such a verdict of " Not Proven " is not the verdict of a Christian man. Indeed, it is utterly inconsistent with the admission of the vital centrality of the Lord Jesus Christ in His Gospel. If Christianity is essentially belief in the Fatherhood of God and the Deity of the Saviour is a mere accident of the Gospel, Dr. Sanday's position is intelligible. If, on the other hand, the Deity of the Lord is of the essence of Christianity then it would be just as true to describe Buddhism or Mohammedanism as a " reduced " form of Christianity.[2]

The language of the New Testament assuredly gives us no warrant for such a description of those who repudiate the Deity of our gracious Lord. On the contrary, the attitude of the Apostle of love towards those who in his day tampered with the faith of the Gospel was uncompromising. If any denied that Jesus Christ was come in the flesh, he was a deceiver and an anti-Christ, not to be received in one's house nor even

[1] Sanday, *Christologies*, p. 103: It is a daring thing to challenge the accuracy of Dr. Sanday's statements of fact in the domain which, among Anglican theologians, is peculiarly his own; and yet I venture to doubt the fact of the German theologians really leaving the question of the Lord's Deity on one side. So far as my reading extends, they seem to take a positive pleasure in emphasizing every trivial detail of the Gospel history which seems to them inconsistent with His transcendental claims. They lay the whole stress on His Manhood; they repudiate most things that directly imply His essential Deity, and they twist and torture what they do admit so as to escape the conclusion that He is indeed Lord and God.

[2] Nor is it either a true or a satisfactory description of the state of affairs to say that, while believers occupy " debatable ground where the question may be raised whether particular views are consistent with science or not " (*ibid.* p. 99); " the whole of the ground maintained (by the Liberal critics) has the positive support of science " (p. 99); and that it therefore has the " immense advantage " of being " strictly scientific " (p. 98). If the essence of Christianity be what we have seen the essence of the Christianity of Christ, of the apostolic age and of the historical communities to have been, it is ominous to learn that, while we occupy debatable ground, the strictly scientific position is in the hands of the enemy.

to be bidden Godspeed. Such language does not leave us much in doubt as to what would have been the Johannine characterization of those who deny the Deity of our Blessed Lord; and a more careful use of the Christian name by the leaders of Christian thought might lead other men to think more seriously before they rejected the faith of their fathers and cast in their lot with those who deny the faith.

5. The positive results of the Liberal criticism involve, however, a great deal more than the negative theologians are willing to allow. In fact, as our survey of their results has shown, their leading representatives have, almost without exception, made admissions which are quite inconsistent with any humanistic theory of Christ's Person, and provide ample materials for the reconstruction of the faith in the Deity of the Saviour in so far as it is based upon historical grounds.

There is now a practical consensus of opinion as to what parts of the Gospel histories may be used with reasonable certainty. A comparison of the critical results of Jülicher,[1] Wernle,[2] von Soden,[3] A. Réville[4] O. Holtzmann,[5] Harnack,[6] Wellhausen,[7] and Stapfer,[8] with the critical results of Sir John Hawkins,[9] Sir William Ramsay,[10] Drs. Salmon,[11] Wright,[12] Rushbrooke,[13] and Moffatt,[14] and with the relevant essays in the Cambridge Biblical and Theological

[1] *Einleitung in das Neue Testament.*

[2] *Die Quellen des Lebens Jesu.* [3] *Op. cit.* [4] *Op. cit.*

[5] *Life of Jesus.* [6] *Luke the Physician, Sayings of Jesus, etc.*

[7] *Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien. Das Evangelium Matthaei; Marci; Lucæ; Johannis. Erweiterungen und Änderungen im vierten Evangelium.*

[8] *Op. cit.* [9] *Horæ Synopticæ.* [10] *Luke the Physician.*

[11] *Introduction to the New Testament, The Human Element in the Gospels* (shows signs of failing powers).

[12] *Synopsis of the Gospels in Greek.* [13] *Synopticon.*

[14] *Historical Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament.*

Essays and the "Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problem" will show that there is a practical agreement among scholars as to the most trustworthy parts of the historical tradition. While refusing to commit ourselves to the assumption, so often silently made, as to the unhistorical character of the remaining parts of the tradition,[1] we may accept these with a good conscience as a valuable starting point for our enquiry.

We have, then, in the Synoptic Gospels two main underlying sources—the narrative portion which forms the substance of St. Mark's Gospel and has been substantially embodied in St. Luke and St. Matthew, and the Speech source common to the last mentioned Gospels. Both these are of the highest historical value, some scholars assigning the greater value to the one, some to the other ; while it is generally admitted that the material peculiar to one or other of the three Gospels contains elements of considerable historical value. There is even beginning to be a consensus of opinion as to the apostolic authorship of the two main sources, but, although we are, I feel convinced, perfectly safe in using the Synoptic Gospels substantially as we have them in constructive and dogmatic theology, we should not as yet build on this in controversy.

As regards the Fourth Gospel, however, we are still far from an agreement. The believing critics, reinforced by some of the most brilliant negative critics such as Dr. Drummond, incline to accept its authenticity with, however, important reservations, and the unbelieving critics, reinforced by some very able believers, are inclined to reject it. Nothing, perhaps, shows its real value as a historical source more than the fact of which Schweitzer so bitterly complains —the great, though often unconscious, extent to which

[1] The trend of criticism which is at present in the direction of confirming the substance of the traditional positions, certainly justifies this reservation.

even those who formally reject it are influenced by it. When we are reviewing the apostolic testimony to the Deity of our Lord Jesus Christ, we shall have occasion to remark on the significance of the admission of the negative critics that the Lord of the Synoptists is of the same eternal order as the Lord of the Fourth Gospel.

When we turn to the portraiture of the Lord as given by the Liberal critics, although, as Grützmacher says, their portraits of Christ are innumerable and are superficially so divergent that we should not know them to be of the same Being were it not for their labels,[1] we find a consensus as to the main features which underlie their varying conceptions. The facts that our Lord claimed to be the Messiah, the Final Messenger and Viceregent of the Most High, and that Christianity is, therefore, the outcome of His Personality, are now almost universally conceded. There is practically a consensus of opinion as to the fact of His unique Holiness, not to say sinlessness—opinion being divided on this latter point; and, though of course it is vital to the humanistic theories to deny that its peculiarity was in kind, there is an ever increasing recognition of the fact that our Lord regarded His relationship to the Father as unique in some sense. Most of the scholars whose views we have examined assert that the uniqueness of our Lord's relation to the Father consisted in His knowledge; and the more profoundly religious among them use, as we have seen, exceedingly strong language as to the character of our Lord Self-consciousness. Wernle for example describes It as "Superhuman." There is, therefore, a distinct tendency among these critics to admit an actual Divine intervention in the realm of psychology, and to allow the existence of an actual inspiration in the case of our Lord and His apostles.

As regards the supreme test case between ration-

[1] *Jesusbild*, p. 4.

alism and Christianity—the Resurrection—the Liberal treatment has the same characteristics.

It is practically admitted by every Liberal critic that the history of Christianity is only accountable on the admission of the Resurrection-faith, which is very generally explained by the hypothesis of visions.[1] This admission is of itself important, and is of supreme importance when the visions are stated to have been objective in character.[2]

Now every admission of objectivity in our Lord's conception of Himself and in the apostolic perception of Him after His death is another nail in the coffin of the humanistic theories; for it necessitates Divine intervention in human affairs, albeit not in the form in which it has been hitherto supposed to have taken place; and this difference of form involves the most appalling difficulties as to the character of the Being whose intervention deliberately misled the world for nineteen centuries.

We are, therefore, surely justified in saying that the results of the Liberal criticism upon the whole carry us much further towards the recognition and adoration of the Lord as God than their finders are willing to admit. It would scarcely be too much to say that, if the Gospels were destroyed, we could reconstruct from the mutilated presentations in the Liberal theologians the picture of the Lord Jesus of history, mighty to save to the uttermost.

6. Hence it is not surprising to find that both within

[1] *e.g.* by Strauss, Pfleiderer, the Schmiedels, the Holtzmanns, etc. Thus Weizsäcker says: "One thing only is firmly established, that a momentary experience convinced the disciples that Jesus lived and was in their midst. This fact, a fact of their faith, is all that history has to tell us. And the circumstance that three of these Christophanies were witnessed at once by a large body of men, first by twelve, then five hundred and finally by an infinite number, only proves that this spiritual vision like other effects of a great religious impulse, could occur to a community, and might under certain conditions pass from one individual to another."—*Apostolic Age*, I., p. 13.

[2] *e.g.*, by Keim, Wernle, Gardner, and Warschauer.

and without Liberal circles there is a widespread discontent with the Liberal conclusions, and a feeling that there is no finality in them. This is evidenced in Liberal circles by a dual movement, an upward and a downward movement, in relation to the nature of the Lord Jesus Christ, and without them by a dual movement which, save that both aspects are positively unbelieving, are very similar in their main outlines to the domestic troubles of Liberal Theology.

(*a*) a. The widespread discontent in the Liberal circles, due to the spiritual inadequacy of the conclusions and to the incompatibility of their conclusions and the admitted facts of the case, has led inevitably to a definite reaction towards the fuller recognition of the transcendental character of our Lord's personality.[1] This has found expression in the Modern-Positive School.[2] Its leaders are Professors Reinhold Seeberg of Berlin, Beth of Vienna and Grützmacher of Rostock, and also Dr. Theodor Kaftan. Their adherents form, with them, a compact body of men who for intellectual brilliancy and scholarly attainments are equal to the best that even German scholarship can marshal against them. They are inspired by the intensest religious earnestness and have directed a brilliant destructive attack on popular Liberalism by means of a most remarkable series of tracts "Biblische Zeit-und Streitfragen." They pride themselves upon their

[1] "At the present time and during the last two or three years there has been a rather vigorous reaction in Germany on lines parallel to, though not identical with, those which prevail among ourselves. I refer to the movement which goes by the name of 'Modern Positive,' with Reinhold Seeberg of Berlin at its head and with no lack of energetic supporters."—Sanday, *Christologies*, p. 102. "It is a more affirmative form of Liberalism, Liberalism of the right, or conservative Liberalism." —*Life of Christ in Recent Research*, p. 175.

[2] AUTHORITIES: K. Beth, *Die Moderne und die Prinzipien der Theologie;* R. H. Grützmacher, *Moderne-positive Vorträge, Ist das liberale Jesusbild modern? Die Dreinige Gott, Die Jungfrauengebürt;* J. Kaftan, *Jesus und Paulus*, etc.; R. Seeberg, *Fundamental Truths of the Christian Religion, Aus Religion und Geschichte, Zur Systematischen Theologie, Von Christus und dem Christentum.*

modernity to an extent which has caused them to miss some of the most precious lessons of the past ; but they have applied a severer scientific method than the Liberals themselves to the materials and they have established by the most severely scientific tests the inevitability of the admission of the Deity of the Lord Jesus Christ by those whose *à priori* assumptions do not render them deaf to historical evidence. The character of their method may be learned from Grützmacher's brilliant reply to Harnack, and every historian must perforce admit its severely scientific character: "To score miracle out of Christianity because we have not experienced any miracle would be as reasonable as to rob the cedars of their tops because ere this we had only seen firs and the former could not be the taller . . . It is therefore only the ordinary scientific method, specially applied to Christianity, if we attempt to understand from the united analysis of Christianity as a historical and as a living greatness what its essence is."[1]

It must not, however, be thought that the Modern Positive School gives by any means a perfectly satisfactory interpretation of Christianity. It is bound in its interpretation in two respects—by its desire to find points of contact with modern and Teutonic ideas, and by its reading of the Deity of the Saviour from below upwards instead of recognizing it to be from above downwards. Thus, it distinctly repudiates any really adequate exposition of the Scriptural idea of Atonement which it only regards in its effects on man, and even Seeberg himself is by no means satisfactory in his exposition of the Personality of the Saviour. His interesting course of lectures, which constituted a very serious onslaught on the dominant Liberalism of the Berlin faculty of theology, has been translated into English under the title of "The Fundamental

[1] *Moderne-positive Vorträge.*

Truths of the Christian Religion," and seems, when checked by his occasional writings[1], to give a fairly satisfactory explanation and exposition of his views.

He resolves the distinction between the Persons of the Blessed Trinity into unreality; for He only allows them a real existence in so far as the triple functions of the Divine activity are, unlike ours, co-existent and conscious. "God is Personal Spirit or rational operative Will. God wills that the world exist and develop; God wills a history that shall lead mankind to salvation, or the rise and growth of a Church; and God wills that a multitude of particular souls should be His."[2] "So in the eternal God those three volitional acts, together with their realization, are eternally co-existent. In each the whole Divine Person goes forth, and each of them differentiates itself in virtue of its particular intention and operation from the others, however much the effects of their operation coincide and are related one to another. It is the one God whom Christendom knows, one Person, who reveals Himself as the threefold Person."[3]

This necessarily involves an unsatisfactory account of the Personality of the Lord even while emphasizing His essential Deity. "The Divine Person entered so into Jesus as to become one spiritual personal life with Him. He worked in the human life of Jesus not from outside inwards, not by leaps and bounds and interruptedly as in us, but from inside outwards, revealing Himself in Him and giving His thoughts, words, and actions their content and goal."[4] "The Divine Person in Him was a special volition in relation to the volition of the Father."[5] Such an interpretation seems to have two serious defects. Instead of regarding the Personality in the Athanasian sense as "One; not by

[1] *Aus Religion und Geschichte, Von Christus und dem Christentum, Zur Systematischen Theologie.*

[2] p. 234. [3] pp. 234-235. [4] p. 224. [5] p. 225.

conversion of the Godhead into flesh : but by taking of the Manhood into God," it tends to regard the Deity of Christ as merely a Special Form of the Divine Immanence and as Something superadded to His Humanity. Hence it loses sight of the reality of the three hypostases in the Divine Being which has always been the faith of Christendom and it is inadequate to the emphasis which the Holy Scripture places on the distinctive Personalities of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Such a doctrine must inevitably relapse into Unitarianism and lose the great truth of the Deity of Christ which has been acquired at such pains by the earnest and saintly German scholar ; but it is not fair to expect the interpretation of a transitional and reactionary movement to be perfectly satisfactory and the direction in which the Modern Positive School is moving goes far towards obviating this danger.

β. The other Movement within the bounds of Liberalism is in precisely the opposite and downward direction. It finds its exponent in the well-known Dr. Paul Schmeidel, of Zürich University, who assures us: " My inmost religious convictions would suffer no harm, even if I now felt obliged to conclude that Jesus never lived. It would of course be a loss to me, if I could no longer look back and up to Him as a real historical Person ; but I should feel assured that the measure of piety which had long ago become part of my nature could not be lost because I no longer derive it from Him."[1]

Such an attitude of mind is logical and the inevitable result of a humanistic conception of the Lord's Person. Why should we feel dependent upon One who is merely bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh ? He can only mediate between us and God in the same sense as our next door neighbour and His influence can only be that of a great Leader of the past. As a living force,

[1] *Jesus in Modern Criticism*, p. 85.

He can be but a memory; and our interest in maintaining His historical existence can have but an elegiac voice. This movement, although passionately repudiated by the leaders, is steadily gaining ground among the rank and file of the Liberal following, as the steady ebb of the tide of Liberal activity from the shores of Christology and religious interest and its inflow towards the shores of humanistic and philanthropic endeavour clearly prove.

(*b*) *a*. Closely related to this tendency of Liberal criticism is the external downward movement, against which Dr. Schmiedel has done yeoman service on behalf of his school. The impossibility of accepting the finality of the Lord, as a religious type on the Liberal interpretation gives no option save to advance or to retreat.

It is impossible to stand still. Hence a remarkable and significant movement in the direction of eliminating the Person of Christ entirely from the pages of history has made its appearance both in England and Germany.[1] The English representative is Mr. John M. Robertson, M.P., who has published a series of works remarkable for their violent animus and uncritical spirit. They have made but little impression owing to the weakness of Liberalism in our midst,[2] and such a theory (especially as advocated by Mr. Robertson) can, of necessity, exert but little influence in a community unaccustomed to the vagaries of Liberal criticism.

[1] AUTHORITIES: A. Drews, *Christ Myth;* A. Kalthoff, *The Rise of Christianity, Das Christus-Problem;* J. M. Robertson, *Pagan Christs.*

[2] How hard this movement hits the Liberal theology even in this country may be seen from the intense gratitude shown by the Unitarians to Schmiedel for his demonstration of the Lord's historical existence; I was surprised to find that Schmiedel's tract *Jesus and Modern Criticism* was sold at their itinerating vans, and to find the evidently very high estimate of his services in this respect by highly cultured men who, one would think, would have too much historical sense not to perceive the imbecility from the point of view of historical science of any theory which denied the historical Personality of the Founder of Christianity.

In Germany, however, things are different. There the Liberals have been in possession for forty years, and the public ear is accustomed to hearing the wildest theorizings of the exponents of the left set forth as indubitable truth. Hence the publication by a Bremen pastor of a series of works in which he denies with some learning and considerable controversial acuteness the historical existence of the Lord Jesus Christ and the later publication of Professor A. Drews' "The Christ Myth" created a *furore* in Germany which is not yet allayed. The controversy has been most bitter and determined—as, indeed, it well might be—for Liberalism is fighting for its life. Bousset, Jeremias, Paul Schmiedel and many others have entered the fray and scored more than an occasional success. Nevertheless, the movement promises to grow in strength. Indeed the arbitrary and unhistorical character of the criticism of the Liberals seems to involve this; for Kalthoff is on assured ground when he tells us that "the real question of the historicity of Jesus is not merely whether there ever was a Jesus among the numerous claimants of a Messiahship in Judæa, but whether we are to recognize the historical character of this Jesus in the Gospels, and whether He is to be regarded as the Founder of Christianity."[1]

The following passage gives Kalthoff's main idea:—"We can only regard it as a relic of the old theories of natural right and the Rousseau idea of perfection in the earliest stages of life—doctrines long ago expelled from the rest of science—when we find theologians seeking a primitive personality or a primitive principle of the Christian system, so as to place at the beginnings of its history the ideals that really arise only in the course of its further development. Why should not the historical elements that have co-operated with

[1] *The Rise of Christianity*, p. 28.

this historical Jesus in creating historical Christianity be appreciated just as fully as those that are connected with the Person of Jesus? Why should we say that the streams that flowed from Rome and Greece into the broad bed of Christian culture were impure, and that only the stream issuing from Jerusalem was pure? The far-seeing Zwingli pointed out long ago that we must not venture to confine the Holy Spirit to Palestine. How came a theology, calling itself critical and scientific, to insist that a certain Jew must in all circumstances be regarded as the Creator of the Christian spiritual life? Historical research cannot possibly tolerate this prominence of one single constituent of the Christian religion at the expense of all the others. The elements that have made their appearance in the history of the Church are as essential parts of Christianity as that which the Liberal theologians now regard as the only vital one."[1]

Kalthoff and his allies, of course, explain the rise of Christianity by the social needs and developments of the early days of the Roman Empire. It is undeniable that these men have directed a pungent criticism against the Liberal Christ which it is difficult to refute; but at the same time they are themselves handicapped by two very serious defects. They have no historical sense whatsoever and they are also lacking in the stern scholarly discipline which is the necessary equipment for the task they attempt. Not that they are *dilettantes;* they are (as Loisy says of Drews)[2] men of considerable and wide reading; but they are lacking

[1] *Ibid*, pp. 8-9.

[2] "M. Drews has been treated as a *dilettante* by the principal savants of his country. He is, perhaps, not so much a *dilettante* as we would be inclined to say. He has not treated the subject as an historian possessed of an exact method, but neither has he treated it as a superficial amateur. His book is not very solidly constructed, but it is not void of ideas or facts: it contains many things which theologians are unaccustomed to consider. The author himself, it is true, seems to have a smattering rather than a profound knowledge of these things. . ." *A propos d'histoire des Religions*, pp. 39-40.

in depth of scientific attainment and in the fundamental grasp of historical principle which would enable them to gather a fruitful harvest of their industry.

Nothing shows this more clearly than their wholly defective appreciation of the fact of personality. It is indubitably true that the proper environment is essential to the achievement of a great movement; but it is also true that it is only in a great personality that such a movement crystallizes and comes to a head. In other words, the effectiveness of such movements depends upon the appearance of great personalities. The whole difference between the French Revolution and the Indian Mutiny is to be found in the fact that the French Revolution threw up a Napoleon while the Indian Mutiny only produced a monster of cruelty in the person of Nana Sahib. Similarly we are free to admit that the Lord Jesus Christ, born in 100 B.C. or 100 A.D., could never have achieved what He actually did and that in such a case He must inevitably have failed: but that is a very different thing from the assumption that a world religion could ever have been founded apart from the existence of a great creative personality. Hence the recognition of Kalthoff's element of truth does not conflict with the deeper and profounder truth that advance comes solely through the great creative personalities of history, embodying, expressing and giving effect to the instincts and tendencies of their time.

β. The external and negative upward movement which is the other form taken by the general external dissatisatisfaction with the Liberal theories is the extremely important eschatological and modernist movement; but, marking as it does, a distinct stadium in the course of the modern Christological movement, it is too important to be treated merely as a particular form of the general dissatisfaction with the Liberal interpretation of the Person and Life of Christ.

VI.—Eschatology and Modernism

The over-emphasis which Liberalism laid upon the prophetic character of our Lord's mission and its attempt to explain Him almost exclusively in terms of contrast with the thought of His age, added to the unsatisfactory character of its interpretation of His Person and Life, was bound to lead to a reaction. Indeed, it is a great tribute to the power of the Liberal theology that, not until the studies of more than a decade had shown that the work was at a standstill and that some higher category than that of Liberalism was needed, did the reaction come.

Meanwhile a great advance had been made in our knowledge of historical conditions of our Lord's time. The labours of such men as Schürer and Stapfer among the Liberal theologians and Dr. Edersheim among believers had resulted in the accumulation and application of a great deal of knowledge about the Palestine of the First Century of our era. Above all, the considerable Jewish apocalyptic literature which had hitherto been a sealed book to the New Testament scholar had begun to attract attention and was made accessible to the German world largely through the labours of Hilgenfeld. Of course it took a considerable time, even in Germany, for the importance of this literature to be fully recognized; and, although tentative efforts at relating it to the New Testament conceptions had been made by Colani of Strassburg in 1864 and by Volkmar and Weiffenbach during the next two decades, it was not until Baldensperger published the first edition of his "Das Selbstbewusstsein Jesu im Lichte der messianischen Hoffnungen seiner Zeit" that the theological world really became aware of the existence of a problem in this direction.

When, however, Johannes Weiss published the first edition of his famous "Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes" in 1892 and, going to an extreme, attempted

to interpret the Lord's work and Person solely in terms of the contemporary Apocalyptic, it was felt by everybody that a fresh step in advance had been taken and that, whether Weiss was right or whether he was wrong, he had made a definite and in many ways an epoch-making contribution to the subject. Bousset's brilliant rejoinder, "Jesu Predigt im Gegensatz zum Judentum," while justly emphasizing the elements of contrast ignored by Weiss, failed to turn the tide. Hence the conflict of the last twenty years has been between the eschatologists, led by Johannes Weiss, and the Liberals, led by Bousset and Erich Haupt of Halle. The conflict has been long and severe and the advantage has been by no means altogether to one side or the other—for each emphasized a truth which cannot be synthesised on a naturalistic hypothesis; but upon the whole, the estchatologists have the advantage. Their interpretation has proved most attractive, with its one-sided emphasis upon the transcendental character of our Lord's claims, to the anti-dogmatic movement in Roman Catholic circles and has been adopted not only by several younger German scholars—most brilliant is the well-known Schweitzer—but also by the brilliant Frenchman, Loisy, the Continental Modernists generally and by such representative British Modernists as the late Father Tyrrell and Mr. Scott Palmer. It will be best to examine the results of the eschatologists in detail; and then discuss separately the character and value of the modernist conclusions.

A. The German Eschatologists[1]

It would be difficult, although the first to indicate the importance of apocalyptic for the study of the

[1] Authorities: W. Baldensperger, *Das Selbstbewusstsein Jesu im Lichte der messianischen Hoffnungen seiner Zeit;* R. H. Charles, *Eschatology, Hebrew, Jewish and Christian; Editions of Enoch, Secrets of Enoch, Ascension of Isaiah, Apocalypse of Baruch, Book of Jubilees, Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, The Assumption of Moses;*

thought of our Lord Jesus Christ was the Frenchman Colani, to refuse to recognize the fact that the real originative and fruitful contributions have had a German origin. Of those who have declared themselves as convinced eschatologists the most brilliant are Johannes Weiss the founder of the school, and the brilliant author of "The Quest for the Historical Jesus." The ablest of the avowed enemies of the school are Wellhausen, the coryphæus of Old Testament Criticism, the veteran Dr. Emil Schürer (whose monumental labours on "The History of the New Testament Times" will long be indispensable to all truly scientific students), Bousset, Haupt, the Holtzmanns and Baldensperger of Geissen. Their criticism has made a considerable impression on Johannes Weiss, as (according to Schweitzer) the second and greatly enlarged edition of his famous tract shows: but he remains a thorough-going eschatologist and an examination of his views and those of Schweitzer will give us quite sufficient materials to enable us to form a fairly accurate opinion of the position of the German eschatologists and of the value of their contribution to our knowledge of the Person and Work of the Redeemer.

1. *Johannes Weiss of Heidelberg*

As Johannes Weiss is the protagonist of the eschatological school and even Schweitzer himself has mainly builded upon his foundations, a somewhat extended exposition and criticism of his position may be

E. von Dobschütz, *Eschatology of the Gospels;* A. Edersheim, *Life of Jesus;* C. W. Emmet, *The Eschatological Question in the Gospels;* E. Haupt, *Die eschatalogischen Aussagen Jesu;* J. Maldwyn Hughes, *The Ethics of Jewish Apocryphal Literature;* W. O. E. Oesterley, *The Doctrine of the Last Things;* E. Riehm, *Messianic Prophecy;* E. Schürer, *History of the Jewish People in the time of Jesu Cnrist, Das messianischen Bewusstsein;* P. Schwartzkoff, *The Prophecies of Jesus Christ;* A. Schweitzer, *The Quest for the Historical Jesus;* E. F. Scott, *The Kingdom and the Messiah;* J. Weiss, *Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes;* Bishop H. E. Ryle, and W. R. James, *Psalms of Solomon.*

useful. He begins his remarkable treatise with a review of the conception of the Kingdom of God as found in the Old Testament and the various Apocalyptic writers. The historical value of the New Testament sources is then estimated; and, Wellhausen being taken as its representative, a pungent and searching criticism of the Liberal interpretation follows, "That which we read here with Wellhausen is a wonderful appreciation of the eternal, superhistorical importance, conceived in Goethe's sense and described with Goethe's art. The humanizing tendencies of the *Aufklärung* find in this characterization their best and completest expression . . . He states that which seems to him to be the most precious thing in it, and he lays no stress on the historical conditions of the Person . . . His treatment is eclectic."[1] Weiss, then, discusses the evidence for the transcendental and apocalyptic view of the Kingdom of God which he ascribes to our Lord, and closes with a suggestive chapter on the Messianic consciousness.

It is needless to say that, while placing their realization entirely in the future, he appreciates the importance of the Messianic Kingdom and the Messiahship in our Lord's thoughts. "The essential thing in the proclamation of Jesus is not the greater or less nearness of the crisis, but the thought that the Kingdom of God comes now absolutely certainly." "Not only with regard to the quantity are the future statements entirely in the foreground, they are also qualitatively so. The basal character of the preaching of Jesus is hope, in truth the hope which is certain of its object, but, nevertheless, invariably hope."[2] It is impossible that this note of hope could have predominated, had the Lord thought from the beginning that His death was inevitable or even possible: [3] but the failure of the people to respond to the high and spiritual

[1] pp. 55-56. [2] p. 71. [3] pp. 99-100.

conditions, to the deep and intense repentance which He regarded as the necessary preliminary to the establishment of the kingdom by the Father required time and, therefore, He who was to be the Messiah gave His life a ransom for many.[1]

What, then, is the Kingdom? To the Jew of our Lord's time, "the Kingdom of God was the summarized expression for the Messianic salvation, and all that they expected from this lay enclosed for the audience in this expression. From this it again results that Jesus could not have understood the phrase in a meaning alien to His contemporaries."[2] "The Kingdom of God is the state of things in which God really takes and exercises the sovereignty in the full sense, or, as Paul says, in which God is all in all. He is the highest Authority in all things and for all personal spirits . . . Where God's will has unlimited sway, there the βασιλεια του Θεου is realized."[3] But the Kingdom is by no means to be brought about by any effort of Himself or His followers. It is entirely transcendental (albeit there is a territorial element in it[4]), and can only be brought in by God Himself. "In contrast to the hidden and imperceptible way in which God's rule begins already in the present to win a footing, the definite establishment of the Kingdom will not take place somewhere in a corner, or creep in gradually or secretly, but, as the lightning flashes across the whole sky, so intensely and so openly will the crisis come."[5]

If such was our Lord's conception of the Kingdom, it follows that His conception of the Messianic Kingship was also futurist. The Messianic consciousness was a sudden inspiration[6], which, although doubts might and did arise as to its exact nature, abode with Him throughout His ministry. "No exact scholar who respects tradition will, then, dare to doubt the continuous

[1] p. 105. [2] p. 115. [3] p. 116.
[4] p. 121. [5] p. 106. [6] p. 155.

Messianic consciousness of Jesus,"[1] in view of His distinct and repeated avowals of His Messianic dignity. But " it is absolutely inconceivable that Jesus in His present state as a simple Rabbi, a carpenter's son from Nazareth, without influence and success, called Himself the Anointed of the Lord . . . This thought is far from Him and also from the oldest believing congregation."[2] " The turning point only comes with the Resurrection and Ascension of Jesus. Only then God made Jesus, the man whom the Jews had crucified, Lord and Messiah."[3]

It is true that he used the title " Son of Man " which was no Messianic title in the eyes of the Jews of His time.[4] The transcendental character of the Son of Man as portrayed in Daniel makes it " natural that Messiah the Son of Man in the Danielic sense was not yet present, but that He could only become it." In all the passages relating to the future " the phrase is no Self-designation, but is always an allusion to the transcendental Messianic conception, created by Daniel."[5]

Such a conception of His destiny involved the consciousness of an unique relationship to the Father. " Between Him and His Father there is a relation of mutual intimacy and exchange of thought which He Himself feels to be unique. He has the feeling: nobody else could be as blessed as He. We understand that with such religious experiences His missionary and filial consciousness could not be confused even by the most contradictory external appearances and the greatest disappointments. It is in this purely religious form that the source of all His religious activity, the kernel of His being, is."[6]

What explanation are we to give of these things? " The religious enquirer stands before this peculiar

[1] p. 157. [2] p. 158. [3] p. 159.
[4] p. 161. [5] p. 175. [6] p. 158.

religious consciousness of Jesus as before something postulated which he must accept."[1] "The subsequent religious estimate of the value of an historical appearance is one thing; the historical investigation of their life views, their intentions, their self-judgment is another. . . . He becomes not smaller for us but greater according to the scale given to us by Him, when we recognize that in His humility He did not expect the perfection to result from His own achievements, but only from the interference of His heavenly Father."[2]

Weiss rightly sees that the greatest objection to this interpretation of the Lord's Messianic beliefs is to be found in the great body of moral teaching which occupies so large a part of the record of His sayings. His solution of this difficulty is that the Lord's moral teaching constituted a sort of temporary prescription for behaviour in the period remaining before the Parousia and had not reference to the Kingdom as such. This *Interimsethik* is to be regarded as merely a sort of excrescence upon the general body of our Lord's teaching. "In the Kingdom of God no commands and no obedience are any longer necessary; for God's Will rules there without meeting the least resistance from any of His children. Jesus proclaims that which God asks of those who wish some day to have a share in the Kingdom of God. The new morality which He preaches is conceived as the condition for the entrance into the Kingdom of God. His claims are not derived, therefore, from an ideal of a perfect human community nor from ordinarily applicable moral laws, but are founded on the terrible seriousness of the present moment."[3] "Finally, we cannot expect a systematic ethical legislation which might order the life of a moral community in every detail; for the continuance of such a commonwealth would not be thinkable in the

[1] p. 176. [2] p. 178. [3] p. 138.

nearness of the end of the world. As in war exceptional laws come into force, which cannot be carried out in peace, so also this part of the ethical proclamation of Jesus bears a special character. He asks great, almost super-human things ; He asks things which in ordinary circumstances would simply be impossible."[1]

The crisis demanded " an entire repudiation of all which men esteem. Where your treasure is, there shall your heart be also."[2] " Among things which can hinder men from entering the Kingdom of God, Jesus also counted the bonds of family life. We here find the roughest and the most alien utterances. Even the sayings to the son who wishes to bury his father sound to us hard and almost loveless. . . . Still more general and therefore harsher are the words of Luke xiv. 26, ' If any man come to me, and hate not his father and mother, and wife and children and brethren and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple.' The peculiar thing is that Jesus presupposes without further ceremony from the crowds of people who go with Him, that this condition applies to them all and tells them so to their faces. For them all their family life is their ruin. While they remain in their accustomed human relationships they will never succeed in acquiring the sobriety and the discipline which are required to await the Judgment with confident courage, and so they all fall under the command of separation from their people."[3]

The Beatitudes " are nothing less than veiled exhortations . . . They are phrases of heavenly consolation and blessing which must have fallen, when Jesus uttered them, like a refreshing dew upon many a crippled and depressed heart ; invitations and calls to salvation to those who, until then, had not thought that they would have a share in the blessings of the Messianic time. Their point lies, not in something

[1] p. 139. [2] p. 140. [3] pp. 142-143.

special and peculiar or what is mentioned in the prophecy but in the choice of the people to whom the blessing is addressed."[1] "Still the opinion has never died out that εστιν in the first and last Beatitudes proves that Jesus here speaks of the Kingdom as a now present possession of the just and poor. This pressing of the Greek present is entirely wrong. For we by no means know whether Jesus has here used the future perfect or a verb at all; we have only the opinion of a translator before us. The connection shows what is the meaning of the framing Beatitude. The inter-mixed prophecies in detail illustrate beyond doubt what the Kingdom will be and will bring to the just and therefore the sentence ἀυτων εστιν ἡ βασιλεια των ὀυρανιων is also to be explained as a prophecy. . . . Just these blessings show again very clearly that the Kingdom is for a time something entirely transcendental, a treasure in heaven, which can at first be reached only in longing and hope."[2]

Weiss, however, finds considerable difficulty in the explanation of the sayings of our Lord which refer to the Kingdom as present. His exegesis in relation to these is even more ingenious and remarkable than the example we have already cited. The famous saying that the least in the Kingdom of heaven is greater than John the Baptist is simply "a special case of the common conception of Jesus that, in the Messianic Kingdom all relations of rank and greatness will in comparison with those in this world be changed."[3]

The logical subject of the parable of the Sower is the sower who can do nothing to make the seed fructify. "As the cultivator after finishing sowing must wait and leave the development of the corn to itself until the ripeness of the fruit shows the time of harvest; as he knows nothing of the process of growth

[1] pp. 127-128. [2] pp. 72-73. [3] p. 81.

and cannot influence it in any way, so nobody, not even Jesus, can establish the coming of the Kingdom of God by a self-sufficient activity." [1]

His treatment of the famous saying—" for the kingdom of heaven is among you "—is equally ingenious. The Pharisees were tempting the Lord to give them definite signs and seasons in the apocalyptic sense. This He refused to do and "quotes the fact which the Pharisees have failed to observe, despite their calculations and combinations, that already the decided beginnings of God's ruling are existing. The significance of the word is, therefore, that God's rule has begun unperceived so that it hid itself from the watchful eyes of the opponents. . . . It cannot therefore be, *e.g.*, the gathering of a circle of adherents or a clearly recognizable new morality. The question is of occurrences or events which remain hidden from the dull eye of the opponents while clearly visible to the eye of faith." [2] This is the sense in which the disciples even at present can share the Messianic wedding festivities. Not only that they should see what many prophets and kings longed to see in vain, but above all that they may seriously think that they belong to the elect. . . . But their share in the kingdom of God does not consist in their now present and practised righteousness, not in their faith in the Messiahship of Jesus, but in this, that their Lord and Master had won them from the powers hostile to God." [3] Thus the present utterances " do not characterize the fundamental principle of Jesus but represent the climaxes of emotion, the highest point of conception." [4]

Similarly, Weiss finds considerable difficulty in explaining the non-Messianic " Son of Man" passages, and those in which the term seems to be used as a Self-designation. Although the Lord, when arraigned before the High Priest, declares Himself to be the Messiah of

[1] pp. 84-85. [2] p. 88. [3] p. 95. [4] p. 95.

Israel, "He adds—'and ye shall see the Son of Man—not only myself as Son of Man—sitting at the right hand of Power and coming on the clouds of heaven.'"[1] The form of the question which led to the great confession—"Whom do men say that the Son of Man is?"—"anticipates the essence of the answer and can only be explained on the ground that Matthew thought the Son of Man a mere Self-designation."[2] The prophecy of the suffering of the Son of Man which immediately follows is not to be accepted. "This pointed unification may be ascribed to the Paulinist Mark."[3] "The foxes have holes and the birds of the air have nests, but the Son of Man hath not where to lay His head", is even an extraordinarily significant expression in which Jesus illumines the contrast between the Messianic ideal in which He believes and His present state."[4] If, however, the expression must be read as a synonym for "I," Weiss would "rather use the radical method of ascribing it to the account of the Evangelist."[5] Thus, "He may be all other things, Teacher, Prophet Ambassador of God, the Elect of God, Son of David, even Son of God, but He is not yet the Son of Man, as yet He can only become it."[6]

2. *Schweitzer of Strassburg*

Schweitzer, while accepting the conclusions of Weiss almost without exception, regards the problem from a different point of view. Weiss's book was a monograph upon our Lord's idea of the Kingdom and, therefore, gave comparatively little offence. Schweitzer's treatise, on the other hand, is an attempt to read the Personality and Life of our Lord in the light of Weiss's conclusions pushed to their logical extremes.

[1] p. 168. [2] p. 171. [3] p. 172.
[4] p. 175. [5] p. 174. [6] p. 175.

The author describes his position as thoroughgoing eschatology, and certainly there is no hint of compromise or even that he ever sees that there is another side to the question, in his suggestive, albeit partizan, review of the German criticism of the life of Christ during the Modern Period. His book (which, quite apart from its eschatological importance, will long be quite indispensable as the best compendium of the problem) is thus marred by a lack of balanced judgment and also by a regrettable coarseness of statement. It cannot be said that the brilliant intellect is the crown of a refined nature.

"Eschatology," according to Schweitzer, "is simply dogmatic history—history as moulded by theological beliefs—which breaks in upon the natural course of history and abrogates it."[1] "Historically regarded, the Baptist, Jesus and Paul are simply the culminating manifestations of Jewish apocalyptic thought."[2] "The period offers no events calculated to give an impulse to eschatological enthusiasm. They themselves set the times in motion by acting, by creating eschatological facts. It is this mighty creative force which constitutes the difficulty in grasping historically the eschatology of Jesus and the Baptist. Instead of literary artifice speaking out of a distant imaginary past, there now enter into the field of eschatology men, living, acting men. It was the only time when that ever happened in Jewish eschatology."[3]

"Jesus's purpose is to set in motion the eschatological development of history, to let loose the final woes, the confusion and strife, from which shall issue the Parousia, and so to introduce the supramundane phase of the eschatological drama."[4] "What is really remarkable about this wave of apocalyptic enthusiasm is the fact that it was called forth not by external

[1] p. 349. [2] p. 366. [3] p. 368. [4] p. 369.

events, but solely by the appearance of two great personalities, and subsides with their disappearance without leaving among the people generally any trace except a feeling of hatred towards the new sect."[1] "It is quite evident that for Jesus the necessity of His death is grounded in dogma, not in external historical facts;"[2] for "the time of trouble had not come; therefore God in His mercy and His omnipotence had eliminated it from the series of eschatological events, and instead appointed to Him whose commission had been to bring it about, to accomplish it in His own Person."[3] Similarly, the entry into Jesusalem was Messianic to the Lord Himself, but not to the people of Israel.[4] "Except Jesus and the disciples, therefore, no one knew the secret of His Messiahship even in those days at Jerusalem. But the High Priest suddenly showed himself in possession of it. How? Through the betrayal of Judas."[5]

3. *Criticism of Weiss and Schweitzer*

There can be little doubt, despite all the ingenuity of Weiss and Schweitzer and their adherents, but that the principal objections to the eschatological theory still remain unimpaired. The attempt to resolve the teaching of the Lord into pure eschatology, to interpret His Messianic conceptions as purely futurist, and to resolve His ethical teaching into a mere stopgap morality must be pronounced an utter failure.

There are, therefore, four main points in respect of which this theory is open to vital criticism—the doctrine of the *Interimsethik*, the Messianic Kingdom, the future Messiahship and also its presentation of the character of our Lord's Personality. It will be best to consider the fourth of these after we have reviewed the Modernist position and to confine ourselves at present to the first three counts of the indictment.

[1] p. 368. [2] p. 390. [3] p. 387. [4] p. 391. [5] p. 394.

There are three main objections to the doctrine of the *Interimsethik*. It necessitates much unsatisfactory exegesis ; it fails to account for all the elements in our Lord's teaching, and, finally, it is impossible to reconcile it with the verdict of history.

(*a*) Can we legitimately acquiesce in the manipulation of our Lord's sayings necessary to give them an ascetic and abnormal character ? Is it, for example, even an accurate representation of the facts to describe the Lord's retort to the procrastinator who would evade the duty of following Him by the plea (customary in the East to this day), " Let me first go and bury my father," as " a hard and almost loveless saying " to the " son who wishes to bury his father ? "

The same objection lies against the attempt to show that the Lord was hostile to the institution of the family. When the passage[1] is read as a whole and each part is given its due weight, we get a very different impression. In it the Lord simply teaches us that the love of all things earthly—even of the family—must be subordinated to the moral and religious claims of God : but this is as true for Europeans in the Twentieth Century as for Asiatics in the First. Further than this, Weiss ignores the crucial words—" yea, and his own life also." The fact that their own lives are included in the catena of things which must be " hated " by those who would be Christ's disciples, gives us the key to the interpretation of the passage. It would be as sensible to argue that He was inimical to the individual life as to the family. Yet the two things stand or fall together. If hatred of the family means hostility to the existence of family life among His followers, hatred of one's own life must equally mean hostility to its continued existence.

Again, is it so sure that the Beatitudes can bear Weiss's interpretation ? They are not, *prima facie*,

[1] Luke xiv. 26.

exclusively future blessings. Of the nine, the first, eighth and ninth are explicitly present and the seventh, " Blessed are the peacemakers : for they shall be called the children of God," was—in the Speaker's conception —pre-eminently a blessing to be enjoyed in this life. Besides this, it may be remarked that the other blessings are all blessings incidental to the Kingdom. They follow from the Kingdom—not the Kingdom from them. They are dependent in all apocalyptic literature upon the membership of the Kingdom—not the Kingdom upon their possession. Thus, Weiss proposes to take the consequential blessings in the catena of benediction and to interpret the primary blessing, from which they flow, in their terms. Nor is it legitimate for Weiss to argue from a supposed error in the translation from a hypothetical Aramaic original. Whatever were the merits or demerits of the translator, in comparison with Weiss he had at least two great advantages—he had the original Aramaic before him and it was his natal tongue. In any case, he proved himself quite competent to translate the intermediate Beatitudes to the satisfaction of Weiss ; and the presumption is—unless positive evidence to the contrary can be produced—in favour of his general accuracy.

Even allowing the satisfactory character of the eschatological treatment of the evidence as given by Weiss, it still remains a fact that there is an irreducible minimum of moral sayings of the Lord which are clearly non-eschatological in origin. Thus, Weiss himself speaks of " those small speeches full of purest, deepest wisdom, which betray nothing of eschatological excitement, but simply and calmly utter that which His pure, clear and near-to-God mind feels to be natural."[1] He also sees that it is not the case, as the eschatological theory requires, that the Lord regarded this world

[1] p. 135.

as absolutely worthless and irremediable: for "it is a sign of His sound energetic nature that He does not simply leave this mouldered and rotten world to its certain ruin, but seeks by frank criticism to improve and help as though it could yet hope for a longer existence."[1] Schweitzer also admits the existence of such elements.

There is also the grave practical objection to this eschatological-ascetic interpretation of our Lord's moral teaching that it has taken the world nearly nineteen centuries to find it out; and that, during the period, so far from men being hampered and hindered in their daily lives by this stopgap ethic, they have found in it the source of regeneration for their moral ideals and owe to it all that distinguishes the moral life of the modern world from that of the ancient. In other words, "if Jesus had foreseen what He did not foresee that after Him a Christian Church would develop throughout many centuries, that it would need directions for protection against the worst errors, He could not have offered a better thing than what He offered to the congregation of disciples, the majority of whom, He affirmed, would not see death till they had seen the heavenly kingdom come in power. Therein is the best proof how little His thinking is dominated by eschatological enthusiasm. The principles which He proclaims are not only proper for extraordinary times; they are sufficient to guide mankind upwards in every age."[2]

What is really at the basis of this strained interpretation of our Lord's teaching? Nothing more or less than a just revulsion from the old Rationalist idea that the Lord came as a great moral Teacher, to give a series of rules and prescriptions for the governance of human life. Such a course would inevitably have meant disaster. Every attempt to influence per-

[1] p. 137. [2] Jülicher, *Kultur der Gegenwart*, p. 62.

manently the life of humanity by the prescription of a regular code of laws has been fraught with disaster; for a code of laws, suitable for the Palestine of the First Century, must have been repudiated by the England of the Twentieth Century. It is to the very fact that the Lord did not come as a moral Teacher that He owes His historic influence upon the morality of mankind.[1] If He had belonged to His own time, in respect of even a perfect moral code, He must have lost His moral sovereignty long ago; but, belonging to no age in particular, His supremacy as the Moral Example and Inspiration of history is unwillingly acknowledged by every age in turn. In other words, instead of founding a moral and, perhaps, ascetic community, and enacting specific laws and regulations for the direction of its members, He taught men the fundamental principles and basis of morality and, inspiring them with His own spirit, demanded of them that, by the application of the fundamental principles of morality to the circumstances in which they found themselves, they should develop their moral natures without let or hindrance.

(*b*) The eschatological interpretation of the Kingdom of God is equally unsatisfactory. Here again large parts of the tradition are deleted and still larger portions subjected to unnatural interpretations; for Weiss, despite all his ingenuity, makes but little of the "present" utterances. It is scarcely natural to take the difficult saying—"Among them that are born of women there hath not arisen a greater than John the

[1] "But in reality that which is eternal in the words of Jesus is due to the very fact that they are based on an eschatological world-view and contain the expression of a Mind for which the contemporary world with its historical and social circumstances no longer had any existence. They are appropriate, therefore, to any world, for in every world they raise the man who dares to meet their challenge, and does not turn and twist them into meaninglessness, above his world and his time, making him inwardly free, so that he is fitted to be, in his own world and in his own time, a simple channel of the power of Jesus."—Schweitzer, p. 400.

Baptist; yet he that is least in the Kingdom of Heaven is greater than he"—as "a special case of the common conception that all relations of rank and greatness will be changed in the coming kingdom." Indeed, it would be scarcely applicable to the priest's son, imprisoned and imperilled for his bold stand for righteousness' sake, who had never tasted of this world's greatness nor enjoyed its rank. The context gives a very different and much more natural meaning to the saying. John had been the first to proclaim the coming Messianic Kingdom. He was its Elias, the Lord's forerunner, not His follower. He belonged to the old *régime*, not to the new. He was the last of the prophets of the Old Covenant and stood in the same relation to the New as the Isaiahs, the Zechariahs and the Daniels of the Old Testament. He was of those who looked for the coming of the kingdom. Albeit the greatest, he was among those born of women; but his questioning showed that, as yet, he had not joined himself to the children of the Kingdom. He stood in an entirely different relation from that of the followers of the Lord and, therefore, lacked the privileges which they possessed.

Weiss and his opponents alike seem to miss the entire point of the parable of the Sower. Jülicher, and the Liberals generally, take its principal point as being the long time that must elapse before the seed fructifies. Weiss and the eschatologists take it as the helplessness of the sower to advance the fruition of the seed by his own activity. Anyone, however, who reads the parable, will surely see that the real point of the parable is, as Mr. Lithgow has shown in *The Expository Times*, the different character of the soils.

It cannot be said that the eschatological treatment of the famous phrase—"The Kingdom of Heaven is among you"—is much more satisfactory. Weiss may be right—he seems to be right—when he says that

the Lord is not here referring to a moral community which would, of course, be clearly visible to the Pharisees, and that His meaning was—" God's rule has begun unperceived so that it hid itself from the watchful eyes of opponents : "[1] but that is not to say that the Kingdom is entirely future. Our Lord's statement distinctly shows that He contemplates a present spiritual reality.[2] Here, once again, even where Weiss gains a distinct victory as against his Liberal opponents, his eschatology leads to a perversion of our Lord's obvious meaning.

Nor is the rendering that the disciples at present share in the wedding festivities of the Messiah because " they may seriously think that they belong to the elect " either a natural or a satisfactory interpretation. Certainly, present and practised righteousness and faith in the Messiahship of the Lord do not constitute a share in the Kingdom of God ; but, still, we cannot accept the further statement, " that their Lord and Master had won the victory from the powers hostile to God," as an adequate account of the passage—much less of our Lord's thought. The fact that Weiss himself has most justly emphasized—that δικαιοσυνη has a forensic-religious meaning in our Lord's usage—precludes such an interpretation. Righteousness is a prerequisite, not a consequence, of the membership of the Kingdom : but that does not make it true to say that their share consists in the fact that the Lord has " won the victory from the powers hostile to God." This again is a prerequisite not merely of their membership of the kingdom but of the very existence of

[1] p. 88.

[2] " Joh. Weiss tries to get rid of this notion by taking 'is in the midst of you " in the sense of ' will then be in the midst of you suddenly, without being announced by outward visible preparations.' But in order to express ' in the midst of you ' Luke would have used ἐμμεσῳ ; the rather uncommon expression ἐντὸς ὑμων he can have chosen only with the aim of giving to ' in ' the peculiar colouring of inwardness."—von Dobschütz, *The Eschatology of the Gospels*, p. 130.

the Kingdom itself. Hence the Kingdom is present because the conditions of its establishment have been fulfilled in the triumph of our Lord; and its membership is open to those who, called of God, fulfil the conditions of membership by the exercise of repentance and faith.

It cannot, therefore, be said that the cogency of the "present" utterances of our Lord in relation to the Kingdom have been affected by the eschatological criticism. Instead of representing climaxes of our Lord's feeling, they form an integral portion of His teaching and, constituting an insuperable objection to the eschatological interpretation of the Kingdom of heaven, must be given due weight by any lasting and satisfactory interpretation of the facts.

(*c*) Nor can it be said that the attempt to prove the future Messiahship is much more satisfactory. Would anyone who reads the account of the trial before Caiaphas take any other meaning from it than that the Lord asserted that He was the Son of Man? If He did not, a more senseless and misleading utterance never passed the lips of any of earth's great ones. It could serve no conceivable end. It was simply a gratuitous provocation to the High Priest and quite inconsistent with all that we know of our Lord's character.

Again, is it likely that, if the Lord's Messianic ideas were really as futurist as this theory demands, the "Paulinist Mark," writing within forty years of His death, would either have felt the necessity or dared to unify our Lord's claims as Son of Man and His prophecies of His personal sufferings? Considering the fact that the Messianic expectation was then at its very height and that, on this hypothesis, eschatology exhausted the earliest gospel, there is a strong element of improbability in the assumption. Nor is it legitimate historical criticism to ascribe the predictions of the

sufferings of the Son of Man to an editor simply because they are inconsistent with a given theory.

Surely, it is a straining of the decencies of exegesis to say that the beautiful and pregnant saying, "The foxes have holes and the birds of air have nests, but the Son of Man hath not where to lay His head," was designed to illumine the contrast between the Son of Man who was to be and the Master in the days of His humiliation, and, if we reject this interpretation, to inform us that the passage must be the invention of the Evangelist. To do the scribe justice, his style of address (Rabbi) shows that he did not regard the Lord as aught else than a distinguished Member of his own craft. Judge then of his surprise when he is invited to imagine the futurist Messianic Son of Man without a place to lay His head! If, on the other hand, the passage is taken as a description of the Lord's present position, simply as a plain statement that He, the Son of Man, has no place to which He can take the scribe for purposes of instruction, it is a pathetic and beautiful statement of the humility of Him who for our sakes became poor.

There is also a whole series of sayings which clearly shows that our Lord regarded "the Son of Man" as a present Self-designation—albeit some of them involve the superhuman character of the Speaker and ascribe Him Divine attributes, such as the forgiveness of sins and the Lordship of the Sabbath day, upon which He immediately acts—which eschatology can only explain by repudiating them.

Thus, quite apart from the masses of evidence which can be cited against it, it must be admitted that the eschatological interpretation, even when judged exclusively by the writings of its ablest advocates, fails to establish a really convincing case in respect of any one of its three main positions.

B. Modernism [1]

It is not surprising that the many Roman Catholics who had become dissatisfied with the scholastic apologetic and the ever increasing divergence between their Church and the Zeitgeist, were attracted by Eschatology rather than by Liberalism. The latter, by its intense emphasis upon the immanence of God and its practical neglect of the Divine transcendence, overemphasized the very religious truth of the nearness and the presence of God which it had been the especial glory of the Reformation to restore to the world. It was a characteristically Protestant development and, therefore, unlikely to commend itself to men taught from their cradles to regard the Almighty as far removed from the fellowship of men and only approachable through a whole series of intermediatories.

When, however, Eschatology became a force to be reckoned with, the religious and intellectual unrest, so widely diffused throughout Romanist circles, found an acceptable means of expression. Its immense stress upon the transcendentalism of our Lord's thought seemed to preserve the religious interests most dear to Romanism, and yet to afford relief to intellects no longer able to acquiesce in the old statements of truth and unprepared for one reason or another to think out Christianity again from first principles.[2]

In contrast with Liberalism, Modernism makes the religious organism its first interest. The Liberals,

[1] Authorities: Frémont, *Lettres à l'Abbé Loisy*; W. R. Inge, *Faith and its Psychology*; Leclére, *Pragmatisme, Modernisme, Protestantisme*; E. Leroy, *Dogme et Critique*; A. L. Lilley, *Modernism: a Record and a Review*; A. Loisy, *Les Évangiles Synoptiques, Jésus et la Tradition Évangelique, Quelques Lettres, Apropos d'histoire des Religions, Quelques Lettres, The Gospel and the Church*; G. Tyrrell, *Mediævalism, Lex Credendi, Scylla and Charybdis, Christianity at the Cross Roads.*

[2] "By a Modernist, I mean a Churchman, of any sort, who believes in the possibility of a synthesis between the essential truth of his religion and the essential truth of modernity." Tyrrell, *Christianity at the Cross Roads*; p. 5. According to this definition everybody, except, possibly, a scholastic divine, is a Modernist!

while by no means irreligious, lay the stress upon the sanctity of reason and are, therefore, true to the Reformation exaltation of the right of private judgment. The Modernists, on the contrary, are inclined to regard religion in its social rather than its individual aspects, and to agree with Catholicism in its exaltation of the collective experience over the individual. In other words, Liberalism and orthodox Protestantism accept the individual experience as normative, while Modernism and the mediæval Churches subordinate it to the collective.

It would not be easy to overemphasize the loyalty of these men to their fundamental principle. Neither the excommunications of their Church—and, it must be admitted, these were necessary if it was to preserve its identity as a historic community—nor the seductive invitations of Protestant sympathizers have alienated their desperate and rejected adherence to the Church of their baptism. If the Church has cast them out, they have chosen to abide by her decrees and to do without those last rites which are so precious to the pious Romanist rather than seek another ecclesiastical home.

How is it possible for serious-minded men who reject the essential truth of the Incarnation, the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection, who accept the extremest results of negative critics and vie with the wildest of these critics in the formulation of extreme hypotheses, to claim a foothold not merely within one of the more loosely organized Christian communities but within the very community which has formulated and enforced under penalty of eternal damnation the most elaborate and rigid system of drill sergeant theology known to the annals of religious history? The answer is to be found in the fact that Modernism is not a purely critical movement. Its distinctive character is derived from its fusion of the critical results of

eschatology with the debased but prevalent philosophical system known as Pragmatism. In its peculiar tenets the Liberal Romanists found, or thought they found, a means of preserving the religious values of the various doctrines of historic Romanism. The only function left to the intellect is to ask whether any given religious development is verifiable in our experience: and the very suggestion of an abiding element of truth, of an eternal reality underlying authoritative statements of doctrine, is repudiated and contemned by Modernism and Pragmatism alike.

1.—*Leroy and Philosophical Modernism*

M. Leroy, who shares with M. Laberthonière the philosophic leadership of the movement and whose pronouncements have received the *imprimatur* of M. Loisy himself,[1] affords us an excellent example of this whole-hearted acceptance of Pragmatism.[2] In his conception Christian dogma is only negative in character and is only to be accepted in so far as it is verifiable in experience. "Christianity in effect, it cannot be too often repeated, is not a system of speculative philosophy, but a source and a rule of life, a discipline of moral and religious activity, in brief, a combination of practical methods to win salvation."[3] "A dogma has at first, if I am not mistaken, a negative sense. It rather excludes and condemns certain errors than positively determines the truth."[4] "Let us take in effect our examples. Let it be the dogma: 'God is personal.' I in no wise see there a definition of Divine Personality. It teaches me nothing about this Personality, it does not reveal its nature, it does not give me any explicit idea. But I see very well that it says

[1] *Quelques Lettres.*

[2] "According to M. Leroy theology would greatly profit by taking, at least to a great extent, the form of an entirely pragmatic apologetic." —Leclére, *Pragmatisme, Modernisme, Protestantisme*, p. 153.

[3] *Dogme et Critique*, p. 26. [4] p. 19.

to me, 'God is not impersonal,' that is to say, God is not a simple law, a formal category, an ideal principle, an abstract entity, not only a universal substance from which I know not what cosmic force diffuses itself through everything. In brief, the dogma 'God is personal' brings me no new positive idea and it does not, therefore, assure me of the truth of a particular system among those which the history of philosophy shows to have been successively proposed, but it warns me that such and such forms of pantheism are false and should be rejected."[1] If this is the sole intellectual value of dogma, what, if any, is its practical utility? "'God is personal' would say 'Behave in your relations with God as in your relations with a human person.' Similarly, 'Jesus is risen' would say, 'Be in touch with Him as you would have been before His death, as if you were face to face with a Contemporary.'"[2] Thus, "a doctrine of the primacy of action allows . . . of the solution of the problem without abandoning anything either of the rights of reason or of the demands of dogma."[3]

(*a*) A comparison of these statements with James's definitions of Pragmatism shows how intimate is the connection between the bastard philosophy now in vogue and Modernism. It would not really make very much difference to the candour of our exposition of M. Leroy's position, if we were to substitute the following sentences from William James in the place of our last quotation—"If theological ideas prove to have a value for concrete life, they will be true. . . in the sense of being good for so much. For how much more they are true will depend entirely on their relations to the other truths that also have to be acknowledged."[4]

(*b*) It is scarcely necessary to remark upon the deep-rooted scepticism of such theories, which are based

[1] pp. 19-20. [2] pp. 25-26. [3] pp. 34. [4] *Pragmatism*, p. 73.

upon the assertion of the relativity of all truth and the denial, for all practical purposes, of the cognoscibility of absolute truth. They obviously depose the intellect from its seat of honour and award it only a secondary place in the economy of human life. Instead of being the captain of our fate, it becomes at best only the pilot of our ship. It really means the exaltation of psychology into the place of philosophy and, in religion, of a psychology of religious experience into the place of apologetics and dogmatics. Thus, Pragmatism means that psychology, instead of being the handmaid of philosophy, has become its mistress, and in religion the disciple is exalted above his Master.

(*c*) Our citations show how M. Leroy strives to interpret Christian doctrine in terms of Pragmatism and incidentally reveal the principal causes of his failure. There is of course a certain element of truth in his statement that Christianity is a rule of life, not a speculative philosophy : but, in the sense that it is true, it is a mere platitude. It is also doubtful whether, even among the mediæval scholastics, anyone ever held a doctrine of faith so intellectualist that he would feel M. Leroy's statement to be a serious attack upon his position ; but that is not to say that any Christian thinker would accept it as a whole statement of the truth.

M. Leroy fails to distinguish between Christianity and its intellectual presentment. He fails to perceive that the whole question of the truth or falsehood of doctrine depends upon our answer to the question whether realities, corresponding to the supposed facts which have created and inspire the Christian experience actually do exist. Indeed, he tries to avoid the necessity of postulating such a reality as the basis of the truth of any given dogma by allowing dogma merely a negative significance. Here he is at variance both with history and with experience. It is indubitably true that the

occasions which led to the formulation of dogmas were the pressing dangers arising from the prevalence of some error, but these were met, not by a mere policy of negation, but by the affirmation of the positive truth called in question. It may be that the dogma 'God is personal' gives me no new idea—no more for that matter does the statement, 'M. Leroy is personal,' —but it is not the function of dogma to give a new idea. Its function is rather to state in intellectual formulæ the truths of experience which are imperilled by erroneous theories. Similarly, it is a definite assertion that the Supreme Being is not less than Personal, that He is not less than Self-conscious, than moral, than rational. A whole affirmative philosophy is bound up in the statement.

Can we even feel assured that the practical value of dogma is preserved by M. Leroy's dialectic? Is it true that the above mentioned doctrine is simply an instruction to the believer, 'Behave in your relations to God as though He were Personal?' that the Resurrection merely means that we are to treat the Lord as though He were our Contemporary? Most assuredly, such a conception of dogma is as devoid of religious value as of intellectual.[1] Imagine a man worshipping a Being in whose existence he did not believe! Imagine him solacing a broken heart beside an open grave with the words—"Now is Christ risen from the dead"—when both firmly believed Christ was holden of death as other men! A ghastly insincerity, which must soon become downright hypocrisy in the individual life, would be the dominant

[1] "If it does not matter whether the Incarnation was a fact or a legend; if Faith can create dogmas with the same freedom which Plato's Socrates claims in inventing his myths; if things exist only as instruments for the will, and all events are plastic under the hand of the religious imagination; we are transported into a world where there is no difference between fact and fiction, and where it is difficult to suppose that human conduct can matter much." Inge, *Faith and its Psychology*, p. 174.

note of all religious ministrations in a Modernist Church.

(*d*) What then is the fundamental defect of such theories ? It lies in this—they try to save religious truths and doctrines by denying their scientific validity. If religion isolates itself on heights which science never can and never will scale, it is certain that science in none of its forms can affect religion ; and it is certainly indisputable that, on the assumption that theology and religion have nothing to do with the facts of history or the objective realities to which religious experience testifies, a very satisfactory apologetic—an apologetic which is armed at all points against the attacks of science—can be constructed. The only difficulty is that such apologetics have precisely the same military value as the wooden guns upon the walls of Pekin ! They will not hold back the enemy for a single day—much less dislodge him from our hearts. It means that the assumption which must underlie all our reasoning is that most cynical of all ideas—Whatsoever is, is right—and this, being equally available for the other side, is quite inconclusive.

(*e*) Will it be said that this is a man of straw? If so, it will be better to quote Loisy's own words: " The Church became, at important moments, what it had to become in order not to decline and perish, dragging the gospel down with it. . . The Church can fairly say that, in order to be at all times what Jesus desired the society of His friends to be, it had to become what it has become, for it has become what it had to be to save the gospel by saving itself." [1] Certain it is that if the Churches had acted on these principles throughout their history, they would have held a less estimable place in history than they do. This is neither more nor less than shameless opportunism. It is simply a polite way of saying that expediency should be

[1] *The Gospel and the Church*, pp. 149-150.

the rule in the Christian life and that the excellence or failure of religious endeavour is to be judged not by its loyalty to essential principle, but by its success in adapting itself to its environment. Thus, in the last analysis, Modernism seeks to defend the faith once for all delivered to the saints by an appeal to the baldest expediency—to an opportunism which inevitably means the repudiation of a moral purpose in the history of Christianity.

The whole question is resolved into the problem of the will to believe. The intelligence is put on one side as absolutely as it is possible to put it. The only function left to it now that it is forbidden to deal with the relation of doctrine to reality, is that of the observation and tabulation of the various religious experiences. What the causes of those experiences are, it may not enquire: nor may it attempt to formulate reasons for belief. To do so, would be to bring the ark of the covenant into the battle and would imperil the august authority of dogma. Such a defence is not only worse than a defeat. It is cowardice in the face of the enemy. It is the surrender of the fortalice before a single shot has been fired.

What an assumption underlies it! that God, if there be a God,—a fact which we cannot know—has deliberately cut Himself off from all appeal and all fellowship with His creatures so far as their noblest faculties are concerned! The sole way of approach to us which He has left open to Himself is by means of the heart! M. Leclére may well ask, "Should not one allow that God speaks also to the heart by way of the intellect and not only to the intellect by the channel of the heart?"[1]

(*f*) Even then Modernism does not give us a sure basis for our faith—not even after it has robbed us of all intellectual justification for the venture of faith,

[1] p. 160.

can it give us any assurance that the miserable remnant of experience left us are dependable. There are only two kinds of experience—the experience of facts and the experience of the value of facts. In other words, experiences are either objective or subjective; they are either fact or theory. But the latter are only of relative value; they are not equally cogent for all and cannot be regarded as of universal validity. To these the religious experiences which are allowed by the theory under examination belong. They are personal. They are incommunicable to others. They are not of universal validity. "Like all the rest they prove nothing concerning the transcendent and the supernatural; but here, moreover, verification is subjective to a degree in some sense infinite, the balance sheet of the personal state of the individual who experiments being of a limitless complexity and nothing, externally, offering a fixed point to assure the positive character of the experience. The most vain of all experience is, then, religious experience. It only gives, moreover, contradictory results, as valuable and as valueless in every religion. That is why mystics are as a rule suspect even in the Church, which always suspects them of being deluded. Good faith proves so little that very frequently the mystics themselves doubt the reality of their own experiences."[1]

(*g*) We should also remark that Modernism, true to the mediæval instinct, deifies the Church in the place of Christ. As the religious experience of the community is the norm of religious truth by which all individual experiences must be judged, it follows of necessity that the religious authority of the Redeemer Himself is of but secondary consequence, Hence it is possible for a devout Modernist to contemplate with equanimity the critical onslaught on the Gospel

[1] *Leclère*, p. 145.

records. Even if nothing of it were left, the norm of his religious life would not be directly affected. To him the Church is all, as Christ is to the believer. An English clergyman, who has distinguished himself by his active sympathy with the movement, describes the Modernist attitude as follows: "To the Church which would drive them out with execrations as its most formidable enemies, they turn with the words of unhesitating faith, '*Ad quem ibimus? Verba vitæ æternæ habes.*' We, too, if the like circumstances should arise for us, must be able to say the same words to the Church of our baptism. For we adhere each of us to his special communion, not because of its temporary theological or ecclesiastical system, but because it has the words of eternal life, and because it has created in us a habit of the soul by which it can best mediate them to us."[1]

Such an attitude of mind is very far removed from the attitude of a Paul to whom the Cross was the centre of his glorying, and of the first disciples when they were asked if they would also go away. To them, it was the Lord who had the words of eternal life. He was their All and in all; and it is a matter for sadness that men who are of a marked religious earnestness and who desire to call themselves by the Christian name should have so far forgotten the pre-eminence of Christ that they could venture to apply to any earthly institution the words which the first generation of disciples only addressed to the Redeemer Himself. Before they could do so, before they could take the very attitude towards the Church of their day that the unbelieving Jews took towards the Church of the Old Covenant and thereby rejected the Messiah of Israel, they must have fallen into the same error and substituted religion (θρησκεια) for the faith (πιστις) of Christ.

[1] Lilley, *Modernism: a Record and a Review*, p. 4.

2.—*Loisy and Critical Modernism*

In the main, there is a close agreement between M. Loisy's views and those of Johannes Weiss and Schweitzer. He has considerably more taste than the latter and his presentation is not so repellent. Yet he is quite as deficient in the moral sense which counts for so much in the appraisement of religious facts; and his work is marred by a complete lack of respect and reverence for the historic records of early Christianity. It is surprising that any man, calling himself a literary critic, could show such a lack of appreciation as to apply freely such terms as *banal enfantin*, to the exquisite and artless grace of the Gospel stories or permit himself to describe the incidents of the trial before Pilate as " traits which accord better with legendary romance than with history, and which rather resemble a theatrical effect, in a melodrama or a juvenile piece, than reality."[1] If such a statement stood alone, it might be justly cited as being an evidence not only of the worst possible taste, but also of weakness of historical and literary judgment. Unfortunately similar language is freely used by our author throughout his elaborate commentary.

Although we are only concerned with Loisy's conception of the Person of our Lord Jesus Christ, it will be advisable to give a brief summary of his view of our Lord's conception of the Kingdom of God as forming the context of the ablest presentation of the Modernist conception.

According to Loisy, " Jesus did not present Himself as the Founder of a new religion, or even, properly speaking, as the Reformer of the traditional religion. He came for the achievement of a great hope, of the Israelitish hope, and does not seem to have had the thought of expanding this hope to where it did not

[1] *Évangiles Synoptiques*, II. p. 644.

exist, *i.e.*, to the heathen."[1] Hence He "pursued a work, not the advancement of a belief; He did not explain theoretically the Kingdom of Heaven, He prepared its approach, by exhorting men to repent."[2] He did not conceive the Kingdom as "something subjective and individualistic, but as a state of society where people are happy in common, where the happiness of all makes that of each, and the happiness of each is that of all."[3] "It is a gift of God to all those who come to Him sincerely."[4] "Above all, He has developed, aggrandized, purified the moral conception of the Kingdom, but He also adopted the eschatological element, and it is this last element which dominates the evangelic preaching, as it determined even the vocation of Christ."[5]

What, then, is the morality of the Gospel? "To break every earthly bond, to free oneself from the moral inconveniences and from the hindrances which the care of material interests creates; to have no anxiety about even the common necessities of nature, clothes, drink and eatables; to depend for everything upon the providence of God, after having abandoned everything; to live as freely as the birds of heaven, with the love of God and men, patience amid all difficulties, trials and death, in the hope of the great event; that is, properly speaking, the whole morality of the Gospel."[6]

"It is precisely this absolute and, one may add, chimerical character of the hope which explains the entirely absolute, ideal and practicable character of the evangelic morality, if one takes it as a whole and in the original meaning of its precepts."[7] How, then, are we to account for such beneficent moral effects of Christianity as family life? "The Christian family is then a fruit

[1] *Jésus et la Tradition Évangélique*, p. 129.
[2] p. 117. [3] pp. 177-178. [4] p. 181.
[5] pp. 128-129. [6] p. 141. [7] p. 146.

of the Gospel as amended by St. Paul and by those who have after him organized the discipline of the Church; but Jesus did not trace the law of its institution."[1]

How did the Lord regard Himself? He regarded Himself as the Messiah who was to reign as the Intermediatory between God and man in the coming of Messianic Kingdom, but He was not the Son of Man at present, only the Agent of the coming Kingdom. "The Christ is there presented as the Agent of the coming Kingdom, the Preacher of the great hope, the Sower who will be the Reaper. He is not the Revealer of a single and unique truth which, perceived by the conscience of each individual, would give him the fulness of the heavenly Kingdom, but He is the Interpreter of all that is contained in the hope of the Kingdom, the Inaugurator of the society of believers, the future Chief of the Society of the Elect. His function is social, since the hope of the Kingdom is collective. His action ought not to be purely inward, but it will be exercised in the visible, marvellous and lasting reality of the approaching Kingdom; and it is in the splendid future that His quality as Messiah will appear, conformably to the eschatological character of the heavenly Kingdom."[2]

What, then, was the Lord's relation to the Father? It was simply that of other men intensified by the consciousness of His special destiny as the Messianic King. "The double feeling of filiation, of the intimacy which exists between Jesus the man and God, the Father of all men, and the intimacy which exists between Jesus the Messiah and God the supreme King of Israel, feeling of filial trust in the common Father, feeling of intimate union with the Invisible Chief of the Elect People, is rather a general characteristic of this idea than the peculiar and

[1] p. 143. [2] p. 191.

direct form."[1] "It is not rash to think that Christ never called Himself the Son *par excellence*."[2]

Is the Lord divine in any sense? "Let us keep to what is firmest in the Synoptic tradition, and we find that Jesus says 'Son of God' in the sense in which this name is a synonym of the Messianic King. That it should connote an Incarnation of a Divine Person, and that He had the consciousness of being God made man, can not only not be shown to be true, but it can be shown to be false, as much by what is known of His teaching as by what is known of His thoughts."[3] "It seems to me then that the doctrine of the Divinity of Jesus Christ has always been and still is only a more or less perfect symbol, destined to indicate the intimacy which unites humanity as personified in Jesus to God."[4]

It is surely scarcely necessary to remark that such a doctrine of the Person of the Lord Jesus Christ is as "Unitarian" as Mr. Montefiore justly describes the German Liberal theologians' "Christianity" to be.

Its recognition as such should prevent a great deal of misplaced denunciation against the Church of Rome when she strives to maintain by ecclesiastical discipline the purity of her witness to the Deity of our gracious Lord and Saviour. At the same time, there are better and quite sufficient ways of meeting the error than by ecclesiastical discipline. It is open to us to point out, as Professor Lepin has pointed out, the arbitrary and subjective character of M. Loisy's criticism: for the repudiation of the important Synoptic references relating to "the Son" is too simple a proof of our Lord's lack of the consciousness of His Deity to be satisfactory to anybody whose mind is not obsessed by an *à priori* theory, and the attempt to preserve the Lord's historical and present importance as the Source of Spiritual life and sustenance is too inconsistent with the facts not to force the rejection either of

[1] p. 161. [2] p. 167. [3] Loisy, *Quelques Lettres*, p. 148. [4] p. 149.

the Modernist presentment or of the abiding historical importance of the Redeemer of the world.

C. Summary and Criticism

1. Although there is a wide difference between Apocalyptic and Prophecy, the former carried on the traditional work of the latter by pointing to the glorious future as the consolation for the inglorious present. Prophecy looked to the consolation of the people of Israel in temporary reverse or chastisement for national sins and gave very little attention to the problems of the individual. It was essentially optimistic and moral in character, and looked to an early reversal of the national disasters. Apocalyptic now that the attempt to isolate the fortunes of Israel from those of the ancient world had been discredited by the similarity of the fate of Israel to those of the other small Semitic peoples, was forced to think in terms of the world rather than of the nation and to reconcile, as best it could, the national promises of prophecy with the actual historical conditions.

It strove to satisfy the demands of the religious life by showing the Divine purpose in human history considered as a whole, and subordinating the latter to the national hopes of the Chosen People of God. It could only do this by entirely forsaking the prophetic tone. The latter, even in the darkest hours of national disaster, was profoundly optimistic. It never lost sight of the fact that the immediate Ruler of the world was the Covenant-keeping God of Israel whose compassions fail not and whose arm is not shortened that it cannot save.

Apocalyptic, on the other hand, quite lost sight of this important fact. To it the faithfulness of God, the assured certainty of the fulfilment of His promises, were as inevitable as they were to the prophets: but the continued triumph of the wicked, the tyranny of

the Gentiles, had led to the loss of the faith in a God who immediately ruled over His universe: and to the unworthy conception that He exercised His sway by means of revolted deputies and intermediaries who, for some inscrutable reason, were permitted to persecute the people of God until the coming of the great day of the Lord, when He should (either personally or, more often, through the Messiah as Intermediary) resume the governance of the world, reward His faithful people and punish the wicked with everlasting destruction. Thus, prophecy comforted the people as a nation by pointing to the blessing which would follow their obedience to the commands of an immediately ruling Sovereign of the universe; while apocalyptic comforted the people and gradually the individual by pointing to the future when God would resume His holy governance of the universe.[1]

There was also an important difference in their forms. Prophecy was originally spoken. Apocalyptic was almost always given to the world in the form of a pseudepigraph. Prophecy, with a few important exceptions, was direct speech. Such images as it used were illustrations of the prophets' meaning. Apocalyptic, on the contrary, always uses the strangest and most fantastic imagery. "The peculiarity of this latter 'apocalyptic' medium as distinguished from the older genuine prophecy is this, that it imparts its revelations not in clear and plain language, but in a mysterious enigmatical form."[2]

It must not, however, be thought that apocalyptic

[1] "Apocalyptic literature, therefore, strove to show that, in respect alike of the nation and of the individual, the righteousness of God would be fully vindicated; and, in order to justify its contention, it sketched in outline the history of the world and of mankind, the origin of evil and its course, and the final consummation of all things; and thus, in fact, it presented a Semitic philosophy of religion." R. H. Charles, Art. "Apocalyptic," *Enc. Bibl.* I. 214. "The principal stress is laid not on what the people have to do, but on what they have to expect." E. Schürer, *Jewish People*, II. iii. p. 48.

[2] Schürer, pp. 46-47.

really became less national than prophecy had been. It was rather a degradation of, than an advance on, the prophetic teaching in this regard. Whereas prophecy regarded Israel as the chosen of the Lord by whom He would rule the nations with equity and reprove with justice the meek of the earth—in other words as the agent of the blessing of God for the whole earth: apocalyptic regarded Israel as the elect of an Oriental Ruler who would wreak vengeance upon the persecutors of His favourite and whose governance of the universe, when effected, would be for the benefit of the favoured people. "The temper of apocalyptic was thoroughly particularistic and narrowly national."[1] It prepared the way for the national perversion of prophetic promise and hope which ultimately led to the overthrow of the Jewish state.[2] It is not unnatural, therefore, that apocalyptic flourished in times of national stress and suffering, and languished in happier times. In our Lord's time, for example, when the people were in some degree quiescent under the Roman yoke, the output of apocalyptic literature was small; but the previous era was remarkable for its apocalyptic fertility and the close of the apocalyptic literature practically coincided with the great Barcochba rising, the last effort of Israel to maintain her national position.

How, then, are we to regard the essential nature of apocalyptic? Are we to say with Baldensperger that it formed a spiritualization of the national hopes, or must we accept Schweitzer's assertion of its essentially earthly character? Does apocalyptic represent "the

[1] W. Bousset in the *New Schaff-Herzog*, I. p. 209.

[2] "If we find that, from the date of the tax imposed by Quirinus, whereby Judæa was placed directly under Roman administration, revolutionary tendencies among the people grew stronger and stronger year by year till they at last led to the great insurrection of the year 66, then there cannot be a doubt that this process was essentially promoted, if not exclusively caused by the apocalyptic literature." E. Schürer, *Jewish People*, II. iii. p. 48.

intermediate position between the old earthly Messianism and the religion of inwardness, or the first step towards Jesus' spiritual proclamation of the Kingdom of God"?[1] or is Schweitzer right when he tells us that "the apocalyptic conception is so far from being a spiritualization of the future expectations, that it represents, on the contrary, the last desperate effort of a strongly eudæmonistic popular religion to raise to heaven the earthly goods from which it cannot make up its mind to part"?[2]

It seems to me that both scholars are right and that both are wrong. There certainly was no weakening of the national element in apocalyptic thought and in this respect there was a distinct retrogression from the advanced position of the prophets. The overwhelming disasters brought by it upon the Jewish nation is sufficient proof of Schweitzer's contention; but the almost universal appreciation in Jewish circles of the impossibility of realizing the merely earthly Messianic Kingdom, as the very existence of this kind of literature shows, was in itself a spiritualization of the national desires in so far as it removed them from the plane of earthly activities and led of necessity to a progressive spiritualization of the aspirations of the faithful. Indeed, we have a proof of this in the universalisms which are studded over the literature.

We must be content to accept the statements of both scholars as containing partial truths and to look for a unifying truth. If we recognize the facts that there is a strongly national and earthly element in apocalyptic and yet that the very nature of the subject involves a much greater spiritualization than the apocalyptists ever dreamed of, we are simply doing justice to the facts; and, if we cannot see the unifying truth, we must be content to abide by the scientific procedure of giving due attention to each series of facts,

[1] Baldensperger, p. 229. [2] Schweitzer, p. 246.

and to abstain from the attempt to force them into an unnatural conformity.

2. It is scarcely necessary to remark that there are several grave divergencies in our Lord's teaching from the general scheme of Jewish apocalyptic. There is a considerable amount of justice in the attempt made by Bousset and others to infer our Lord's substantial rejection of the apocalyptic standpoint: for it is undeniable, even if we accept the theory under discussion, that the Lord did so modify the apocalyptic conceptions as to make it possible to say that He remodelled them.

Now, it is freely admitted by all schools of thought that there is nothing in Jewish apocalyptic which could have led to our Lord's conception of His own Person.[1] There is no manner of doubt in the minds of the eschatologists—indeed, their theory depends upon it—as to the fact of our Lord conceiving Himself as the Messianic King; and Schweitzer justly remarks upon the fact that for the only time in its history apocalyptic found expression through two great personalities—the Lord and John the Baptist.[2] But here we have two radical modifications of the whole apocalyptic conception and conditions. Hitherto apocalyptic had been a thing of the unofficial schools, much as the study of unfulfilled prophecy is to day, and had been entirely anonymous in origin. It was now embodied in a great Personality whom it influenced in many respects.

Such a change in the conditions of its origin was bound to lead to profound modifications—it almost amounted to a change in the character of its subject: but it was entirely insignificant in comparison with the far-reaching character of our Lord's Personal claims. If He had been a mere Follower of the apocalyptists,

[1] "The contemporary 'Messianic hopes' can only explain the hopes of Jesus so far as they correspond thereto, not His view of His own Person, in which He is absolutely original." Schweitzer, p. 365.

[2] p. 368.

it is quite inconceivable that He should have claimed to be the Messiah, the Standard of all ethical action, the Viceregent of God. He might have spoken of the Kingdom to come; He might have claimed to be the Prophet of the coming Kingdom; but He could not have conceived Himself to be the Messianic King, the transcendental Son of Man. Thus, the conceptions of the past received a concrete embodiment and took a form which, even if it stood alone, must inevitably have led to the recasting of the prevalent apocalyptic thought.

(*a*) Thus the Redeemer purified and profoundly deepened the prevalent apocalyptic conceptions in their intellectual and moral regards to such a degree that it is only just to admit that He entirely changed the whole apocalyptic world of view.

(*a*) Let us first look for a moment at the intellectual purification which He effected. The very *raison d'être* of apocalyptic was to spy out the signs of the coming of the Kingdom, to comfort the hearts of the oppressed people of God by the proof that its advent would not be long delayed, and to restore the faith of the waverers by showing how it was that the long expected fulfilment of the promises of God had not already come to pass. To achieve this end, the apocalyptists, like modern students of unfulfilled prophecy, endeavoured by elaborate and fantastic calculations to assign the hour and the minute to the coming of the Kingdom of the Lord, and to explain in this manner the most cruel of all religious mysteries—that of the silent heaven. Hence it is that the remnants of the once vast and influential apocalyptic literature still remaining give such an impression of childishness and triviality to the modern reader that it is almost, if not quite, impossible really to enter into its spirit and to perceive the very noble faith and spiritual earnestness which gave rise to it.

What is there that is fantastic or trivial in the teaching of our Lord? All the quaint schemes and fantastic images which were the delight of the apocalyptists are absent from His sayings—and this, despite the fact that they have passed through a medium which was simply charged with current apocalyptic conceptions. Such images as He has taken over from the apocalyptic writers are those derived from nature and are pre-eminently suitable for the awakening of a profound moral and religious revival in the hearts of men of every age. He consistently refuses to give signs of the coming Kingdom on the ground that the day or the hour is known to the Father alone. Thus, firmly as He believes in the immediacy of the Kingdom, He is never tempted to identify Himself with the prevalent notions as to its coming. [1]

Nor does Schweitzer's explanation of our Lord's abstinence in this respect, ingenious as it is, carry conviction. He tells us that it was because the Lord conceived the end to be so close that He did not give signs and seasons. "Men feel themselves so close to the coming events that they only see what lies nearest to them; the imaginative development of detail entirely ceases."[2]

Such an inference is diametrically opposed to all that we know of human nature. The closer the event is felt to be, the more does imagination run riot. Indeed, one of the greatest difficulties of all reformers is to induce people to realize that the old period is coming to a close; but once this is done, popular imagination begins to work upon the little known materials supplied by

[1] "The fancy of apocalyptic writers of late Judaism had here a fine scope for the elaborate description of every detail, for the calculation of the indications (of its approach); their genius was devoted to the discovering the reasons why God again and again hesitated about its realization."—Jülicher, p. 54. Compare J. Weiss, "Jesus was far from transposing His great faith in the nearness of the heavenly kingdom into the small coin of the calculating apocalyptic learning." (p. 87.)

[2] p. 366.

the future hope or the future dread. When, to take an example from modern times, Mr. J. B. Dimbleby came to the conclusion on the basis of mathematical calculations that the end of the world was coming in the year 1898¼, there was considerable excitement among a section of the religious public. Was there a marked abstinence, as the fateful hour drew near, from imaginative calculations, from fanciful picturings of the joys of heaven? Not at all. Up to the very day on which the universe must infallibly stop, new pamphlets, each containing wilder calculations than the preceding, were issued from the press, and the attention of his adherents was concentrated more than ever on the things of the future.

Such facts as these, and the records of religious history supply very many, go to prove that the imaginations of men are only occupied with such things as the end of the world when they feel them to be imminent. Since this is the case, the unswerving abstinence of our Lord from all such imaginings and calculations, besides showing the powerful independence of His mind, goes very far towards proving His essential independence of the current apocalyptic.

Besides this, the fact that His followers as a rule were content with the consciousness of the immediacy of their Lord's return, and do not seem to have given themselves over to the calculations of apocalyptic, leads to the conclusion that either our Lord's example and precept had given a new turn to the apocalyptic hopes of His followers and diverted their minds from the current Jewish notions, or else (what we know not to be the case) His followers transformed His apocalyptic and eschatological conceptions so that it is difficult to recognize them—or to allow that He really had any greater responsibility for the character of the Christian thought than the figurehead has for the seaworthiness of the craft it adorns.

(β) The moral character of the Gospel apocalyptic is also much more profound than that of the Jewish. The latter is really concerned with legal righteousness and depended upon signs and eschatological sacraments as assurances of salvation. It, on the contrary, knows nothing of either signs or sacraments and consistently lays the stress upon the moral character of the preparation for the kingdom. The moral fervour of the Jewish apocalyptic was declining[1] at the beginning of the Christian era, the stress was laid more and more exclusively upon legal and ceremonial righteousness, and the weightier matters of the law were being left undone. When, however, the great personal eschatological movement of our Lord's time found expression in Him and John the Baptist, a moral renovation of the eschatological conceptions of the people was inevitable. Apocalyptic was no longer the sole concern of the scholar, far removed from reality, but was the expression of the deepest experience of great moral heroes. Such men instinctively endeavoured to raise the popular ideals to a more exalted moral level. The advice given by St. John the Baptist to those who came to him had but little to do with sealings and signs, but rather with the fulfilment of the moral duties of daily life. The soldiers were told to be content with their wages, the publicans not to exact more than that which was appointed them, the penitents of every class were baptized with water, ceremonially washed in anticipation of the spiritual baptism which the Messiah alone could give, and sent back to their daily duties to await the coming day of the Lord.

Similarly, the duties enforced by our Lord were the simple moral duties which lie to every man's hand to do

[1] "There is little of the spirit of inwardness in the literature of this period in its interpretation of moral evil. As we have seen, in general it consists in unfaithfulness to the ordinances of Judaism."—Maldwyn Hughes, *The Ethics of Jewish Apocryphal Literature*, p. 212.

and upon the fulfilment of which the maintenance of the social life depends. Such duties as the forgiveness of injuries, meekness, humility, love, may be emphasized by their association with eschatological preaching; but they neither derive their usefulness nor their moral obligation from so specialized a source. We have already remarked how Johannes Weiss has admitted the existence of a well-balanced non-eschatological element in our Lord's moral teaching; and even Loisy, who, like Renan, seems to lack moral sensibility, recognises that when all is said and done, when every passage which can be twisted in a particularistic direction has been strained, when every definitely anti-eschatological passage has been eliminated and ascribed to that whipping boy of all negative critics—the early Christian community, the strongly spiritual and moral character of our Lord's conception of the Kingdom goes very far towards counteracting the narrowly national conception of the Kingdom which he assigns to our gracious Lord.[1]

This impression is deepened when we observe the character of our Lord's use of apocalyptic. It is nearly always, as Jülicher says, for purposes of moral and religious exhortation, to awaken men to a sense of the immediacy of the Divine Rule and to induce them to respond to the Divine love. Thus, "the bond between the present and the future will be formed by His preaching, His invitation to repentance, to a change of heart and life."[2]

(*b*) Such changes as these are scarcely consistent with the full acceptance of the Jewish apocalyptic world-view. It would be quite impossible that the

[1] "Yet the nationalism of the conception finds itself partly corrected by the essential importance given to its moral aspect, be it as regards the means of realization, or be it as regards the requisite conditions for admission into the Kingdom."—*Jésus et la Tradition Évangélique*, p. 131.

[2] Stapfer, *Jésus Christ*, p. 119.

remoteness of the Divine Being from the world, the deep pessimism resulting from the conception of the essentially diabolic character of the world governance which underlay all apocalyptic, should have given rise to such radical moral and intellectual purification as our Lord achieved. Indeed, it is quite inconsistent with it and, *pace* Schweitzer, there can be no reasonable doubt of the fact that our Lord regarded the world, even if it were in a state of revolt, as God's world in a real and present sense; nor can it legitimately be denied that despite His strong eschatological views, our Lord's world-view was essentially healthy and world-accepting.[1]

At the same time it must not be thought that our gracious Lord blindly accepted the world as the best possible world. Far from it, He regarded it (as the eschatologists justly emphasize) as needing entire renovation; but, unlike the apocalyptists, His conception was healthy. They regarded the world as so hopeless that nothing less than its destruction was possible or efficient. He conceived it as the world of God which would be renewed in God's good time. Thus, He transformed the apocalyptic world-view, while doing

[1] "In Jesus's preaching there is nothing to be felt of that frightened uncertainty, the anxious doubt, His hope is nowhere founded upon the apocalyptic arts of calculation. This has not its reason in the temporal nearness in which the future was expected, Jesus, like the Apocalyptic, expected the happy future in the immediate future. But for Jesus the immense distance, the tension between the present and the magnificent future has vanished, He already heard the rustling of the new age, He lived in it. . ." p. 61. "Because for Jesus this world was no longer Satan's but God the heavenly Father's, because for Him the present and the life in it had become a reality, no empty illusion, on that account the future was also sure and certain to Him. For Him there is no longer a gulf between present and future; present and future, ideal and reality, are married. . ." p. 62. "If we begin at the eschatological world-tired side of the piety of Jesus, if we take the entire sure hope that in a short time the world will vanish and a world of complete happiness, of pure fellowship with God, would appear as the principal feature of His piety, the faith of God the Father is still an absolute puzzle. . . And how the sure hope of the unavoidable near ruin of this wicked world should have led to that freshness and joyfulness of earthly life and to the full strong conception of its tasks remains entirely obscure. . ." p. 57: Bousset, *Jesu Predigt.*

full justice to the element of truth contained in it, by subjecting it to the alchemy of a thoroughly pure and healthy moral nature.

No man who reads the Gospel can fail to be struck with the immense difference between its tone and that of Judaistic apocalyptic. The latter has the note of extreme old age; the former that of youth. The language may be, and in many respects is, the same; but there is all the difference in usage between the exhaustion of senility and the buoyancy of youth.[1]

Now, such a difference as this is the difference between life and death; and upon this change in the tone of the teaching depended its future influence. The old apocalyptic might sustain believers under trial for a limited period and might call forth heroic self-sacrifice; but it could never win the world.

Here again we feel the hand of a creative Personality whose strong buoyant optimism was sufficient to transmute the whole character of the dominant conceptions of His age and by doing so to give them a new life and a new power such as they never had before.

Thus, the form of our Lord's thought may be that of apocalyptic; but its spirit is the spirit of prophecy. Prophecy was hopeful, buoyant, self-reliant; because, despite the evil in the world, it had a vivid realization of the immediacy of Divine governance. In these respects, the Lord, who admittedly conceived Himself as the fulfilment of ancient prophetic hopes, has (as a comparison of the Apocalypse of St. John with any Judaistic apocalyptic forms will show) restored under eschatological and apocalyptic forms the prophetic outlook and the prophetic hopefulness to the world.[2]

[1] "The apocalyptists were to a great extent driven by despair of better things on earth to frame their eschatological ideas; on the other hand, the basis of the Gospel eschatology is hope."—W. O. E. Oesterley, *The Doctrine of the Last Things*, p. 201.

[2] "What has happened is nothing less than the remoulding, the elevation, of the Daniel-Enoch apocalyptic by the spirit and conceptions belonging to the ancient prophetic hope."—Schweitzer, p. 367.

(*c*) Such a radical revision of apocalyptic aspirations and characteristics surely entitles us to urge the unique character of our Lord's conceptions, and to deny the legitimacy of the attempt to explain Him in terms of apocalyptic alone. Neither as a Thinker, nor as a Moralist, nor as regards His character is He in close agreement with the apocalyptic of His time. He rather stands in contrast with it than in agreement with it. He refuses to utilize its characteristic means of expression, neglects its intellectual categories, repudiates its moral standards and rejects its world-view.

"Undoubtedly, He did not abolish a single one of His people's apocalyptic conceptions, but He accomplished, transformed and renewed them."[1] In these circumstances, it is only just to recognise that He stands in a class by Himself and that, before it is assumed to bear a verbally identical meaning with such similar expressions as are found in the contemporary apocalyptic writings, His use of apocalyptic language must be carefully scrutinized. The most we are justified in saying is that He used some of the language of apocalyptic and that much, very much, of His thought was given to the world in an apocalyptic dress.

3. It is, undoubtedly, a great excellence of the latest interpretation that it finds the point of connection between our Lord's teaching and the non-official religious life of His time. It is a distinct gain from the point of view of historical science that the non-official religious activities of the Jewish people should have been recognized and that, instead of the false and popular conception of a life and thought so intensely original as to be entirely remote from the common life of men, our Lord's life and thought should be shown to be closely connected with the life and thought of His time. Whether eschatology proves of abiding value or not,

[1] Stapfer, III., p. 72.

it has made an abiding contribution to scientific work in that it has for ever rendered impossible the neglect of the relations of our Lord's thought and life to contemporary conditions.

4. This great excellence is, however, counterbalanced by two serious defects. The eschatologists assign far too great a rigidity to contemporary Messianic conceptions and overemphasize their influence upon our Lord's thought.

(*a*) They seem to think that the Messianic conceptions of the people of Israel were as rigidly fixed and as definite and uniform in character as the general conception of the Person of our Lord of fifty years ago. Instead of such a crystallization having taken place, the current thought was fluidic and just beginning to crystallize in the forms of traditional Judaism. Rabbinic Judaism with its intense l gality was just establishing itself ; the somewhat mystic Alexandrian Judaism with its Gentile sympathies was at its height ; apocalyptic speculation exercised an enormous influence in Palestinian religious circles ; and a political Judaism, which strove before all things to maintain the *status quo*, was very influential.

It cannot be said, therefore, that there was a single absolutely definite and pre-eminent Messianic conception. No doubt, Messianism occupied the first place in the popular regard ; but, chameleon-like, it changed its colour according to its environment. The Messianism of Sadducean circles was very different from that of representive Pharasaism, and both were fundamentally different from the popular conceptions. Political Judaism, as Mr. Emmet[1] very justly says, never could and never did surrender the valuable asset of the Messianic Kingdom to the transcendentalists. Indeed, spurious Messiah followed spurious Messiah, and rebellion followed rebellion, under the inspiration

[1] *The Eschatological Question.*

of the Messianic hope and finally, as Schürer justly says,[1] the Messianic hope destroyed the national life of Israel: for, apart from some such hope, it would be difficult to conceive the vain and hopeless contest of the year 66 A.D. "People could only be approached by deceiving the national sentiment, by exciting patriotic passions, and also religious fanaticism, and it was in this way that Messianism destroyed the Jewish nation."[2] In such circumstances as these and with the knowledge that there is always a considerable interchange of thought and expression between the competing theories, it is wholly improper to assume that the Lord must necessarily have accepted even the main outlines of the apocalyptic form of the Messianic idea. It is far more probable that He regarded things from an independent point of view and, while taking such elements from each type of Messianism as suited His purpose, formed an entirely original conception by their combination and inspired it with His admittedly unique spirituality and great faith in God.

(*b*) The other great defect of the eschatological interpretation, from the historical point of view, is to be found in its attempt to interpret the Person and thought of the greatest and most creative Personality which the religious world has ever seen in terms of those narrower and more particularistic conceptions of contemporary thought which necessarily entered into His thinking. It is really an attempt, in defiance of all the laws of historical probability, to reduce the dominant Personality in human history, the one Being whose Personal influence has increased, not diminished, with the passage of time, to terms of a narrowly national and decadent religious conception. "I for my part cannot accept the essentially apocalyptico-

[1] *Op. cit.*

[2] Loisy, *Jésus et la Tradition Évangélique*, p. 158.

judaistic conception of the Person of Jesus of Baldensperger and his followers, which is now the fashion, because it puts the stress too much upon the contemporary narrowness and too little upon the broad humanity, the eternally significant, in the Person of Jesus."[1]

5. We find the same commingling of historical insight and incapacity, of truth and error, in the special conceptions of eschatology and Modernism, especially in their conception of the Kingdom of God. They are quite excellent in their appreciation of some of the elements entirely neglected in Liberal and even in many positive circles; but their excellence is marred by their failure to appreciate the elements which Liberalism over-emphasizes.

(*a*) It is difficult, for example, to understand how any one reading the Gospels can fail to perceive the transcendental and superhuman character of the Kingdom as expounded by our Lord and understood by His disciples. Eschatology perceives this and justly lays stress upon the fact that the Kingdom is not of man but of God, that entrance into it is not by human works nor deservings but of Divine grace, that it is to come and that its coming is imminent. Thus, the theory under review does justice to the transcendental character of the Kingdom, to its futurity and to its immediacy; but there it stops. It does not go on to recognize that in some sense this coming Kingdom is already present.

In other words, it refuses to do justice to elements which Liberalism has over-emphasized. This is a fatal defect and must ultimately lead to the rejection, on historical grounds, of this latest negative interpretation of our Lord's thought. Throughout the New Testament, membership of the Kingdom is conceived as a present possession, conditional upon repentance and

[1] Otto Schmiedel, p. 93.

faith in response to the call of God and not merely as the hope that in the days to come believers will be admitted to the membership and blessings of the Messianic Kingdom. At the same time, the eschatologists and Modernists are right when they lay stress upon the fact that the presence of the Kingdom is regarded as something to be spiritually discerned, as something revealed to the eye of faith and not as a moral and visible community. The justice of this emphasis is shown by the weakness of the Liberal attempts to prove the visible character of the Kingdom as an earthly community living in the knowledge of Divine sonship.

We have, then, two elements in our problem—each emphasized by a distinguished school of negative critics and each repudiated by a distinguished school—the fact that the Kingdom is transcendental, invisible and yet to come, and the fact that the Kingdom is already present in some sense. Must we, then, choose one of these series of facts and reject the other? There is no escape from the dilemma on any naturalistic hypothesis. We must make our choice and be done with it. If, however, our working hypothesis is that of Christians and Churchmen, we cannot reject either series of facts. The apparently parallel lines of teaching find a perfect unification in doctrine and experience. There is a Kingdom which is present and which is yet to come, which is still invisible to the natural eye and yet one of the most intense of all realities to the spiritual man—I mean the Church of God, the Body of Christ, the assembly of believers who are members of His Body, of His flesh and of His bones. In this highly advanced conception of the Reformed theology, we have the unification (and, surely, it is simple enough) of the apparently irreconcilable data. As so often happens, the believing hypothesis fits the facts and affords a satisfactory solution of the problems which

must for ever remain unsolved upon the humanistic hypothesis.

(*b*) The last respect in which it is necessary for us to criticize the theories under examination is in respect of their interpretation of the Person of our gracious Lord and Saviour. They very justly emphasize the transcendental character of His claims and render it impossible for any future school to deny that the Lord conceived Himself to be a Superhuman Personality.[1]

But here, again, the latest interpretation loses sight of many facts which Liberalism justly appreciated. Despite its recognition of the prophetic spirit of our Lord's apocalyptic teaching, it entirely fails to appreciate the prophetic character of our Lord's teaching. If Liberalism, absorbed in the enjoyment of the prophetic pastures, failed to appreciate the sublimity of the Messianic mountain, eschatology in its contemplation of the wonders of the mountain top entirely overlooks the rich and verdant pastures spread out at its feet. There is no real historical justification for such a course. The prophetic element in our Lord's teaching is not a treasure hidden in a field; it is rather the rich corn land which has made glad the heart of man for nineteen centuries. The fact that there is a treasure hidden in the field and that, so far as humanistic circles are concerned, the eschatologists have brought it to light is a poor excuse for the neglect to gather and preserve the life-sustaining corn. Yet this is what eschatology by its over-emphasis of, by its exclusive attention to, Messianism has done. The moral element is so subordinated to the Messianic that the historical proportion is lost; and the resulting conceptions in no wise correspond to the

[1] "Eschatology certainly emphasizes the fact, which is coming to be recognised more and more from other points of view, that even the Synoptists do not set before us a merely Human Teacher or Prophet, and that Christology is not a late and mistaken development. It ascribes to Jesus Himself the claim to be more than man."—*Emmet, ibid*, p. 73.

materials contained in the original sources. "For this Messianism is in reality very sober and is only frankly affirmed in the texts relating to the close of the ministry of Jesus. From the strictly historical point of view, it is consequently rash to assert that the work and thought of the Lord were entirely dominated by the Messianic idea."[1]

6. Even if we waived all that has already been said, the fact that the eschatological and Modernist conception of the Personality of our Lord is utterly inconceivable would still remain. "A village Workman, naïve and enthusiastic, who believes in the approaching end of the world, in the inauguration of the reign of justice, in the advent of God upon earth, and who, strong in this first illusion, attributes the chief *rôle* in the organization of the unrealizable city to Himself. His dream was frail and narrow as our knowledge is; it appears absurd to us, as our most cherished ideas will seem to our great-nephews."[2]

Such is the portrait as Loisy draws it! Is it conceivable that One—no matter how grand and pure His personal character may have been—who was Such, who was deluded in respect of all His fundamental conceptions, who lived in delusion and died in despair, could ever have impressed His contemporaries—much less succeeding generations—to such an extent that they should fall down and worship Him? It would certainly be among the grossest ironies of history, a mockery at which reason must stand appalled, if the delusions of an illiterate Galilean Artizan should have proved strong to accomplish that which the prophetic insight of an Isaiah and the profound wisdom of a Socrates failed to achieve—the establishment of a motive which should prove itself mighty to work upon the hearts of men in every age of the world's history

[1] Piepenbring, *Jésus historique*, p. 170-171.

[2] Loisy, *Les Évangiles Synoptiques*, I., p. 252.

and to transform thereby the character of human life. Do not such considerations as these confirm us in the conviction that the Christ of the eschatologist, quite apart from the sublimity of His portraiture in the sources on which we are all equally dependent, is a moral Impossibility and an historical Absurdity? Is not such a conception "a veritable caricature of Jesus"? [1]

In view of these facts, it must be admitted that, when all due allowance has been made for the historical circumstances of the eschatologists and Modernists, when every credit has been given to them for their valuable emphasis upon elements of our Lord's thought entirely ignored by the Liberal critics, their interpretation can never win a widespread acceptance among thoughtful men for historical reasons, and can only be regarded as an interesting and significant revulsion or reaction from the onesidedness of Liberal criticism.

VII.—Estimate of the Character and Results of Modern Criticism

1. When the really modern criticism of the Gospel history commenced and the Rationalism of the Aufklärung had passed into the background, the tide of the idealistic philosophy was flowing. The labours of Bishop Berkeley had prepared the way for the intellectual scepticism of Kant (scarcely redeemed by its emphatic insistence upon the moral imperative), and the latter had been succeeded by a brilliant series of philosophical teachers culminating in Hegel. This most brilliant and most unsettling of philosophers, who is responsible for the underlying philosophy of almost every distinctively modern movement, was at the very height of his fame. Hailed as the saviour of rational Christian faith and justly acclaimed as the greatest

[1] Piepenbring, p. 162.

vindicator of the supremacy of the spiritual in modern times, he nevertheless did much to weaken the appreciation of the Personality of God, the great excellence of the older type of philosophy[1] and, to a considerable extent, "saved" European thought from materialism by immersing it in Pantheism. Although there has been a great reaction of late years from Hegelianism, it is still the main current of modern thought and is far from being vanquished by such surface currents as Pragmatism which at present occupy the attention of the philosophically minded public and are of the nature of protests against its unsatisfactory character.

Hence it is not surprising that Hegelianism has given the impetus practically to the whole of the modern criticism of the Gospels. We must of course except from this general statement the labours of the Aufklärung. Strictly speaking, they are rather intermediate links between the thought of our age and that of the preceding period, and derive their philosophical inspiration from the speculation of the former. This is not the case, however, with Strauss and his successors. That great man, as we have already remarked, was an ardent Hegelian who defined that which his master had left undefined and applied it to determine the actual course of historic events.[2]

This Hegelianism of the left has influenced either directly or indirectly almost all who have made negative contributions to the criticism of our Lord's thought and

[1] "By the more radical wing of religious philosophy I mean the so-called transcendental idealism of the Anglo-Hegelian school, the philosophy of such men as Green, the Cairds, Bosanquet, and Royce. This philosophy has greatly influenced the more studious members of our Protestant ministry. It is pantheistic, and undoubtedly it has already blunted the edge of the traditional theism in Protestantism at large." —James, *Pragmatism*, p.17.

[2] "The speculative basis on which Strauss built was simply the Hegelian doctrine of the absolute, specifically developed and applied. The disciple narrowed ideas that the master had made large and indefinite. Hegel meant his philosophy to explain what had been and is; Strauss used it to determine what must be or have been." —Fairbairn, *Christ in Modern Theology*, p. 236-273.

Person. Baur, for example, shows the influence of his Hegelian training in every line he ever wrote and his whole interpretation of Christianity admittedly rests upon a Hegelian basis. Similarly, the basic conception of the Liberal critics of every school was a doctrine of Divine immanence which, however battered it may have become in its passage from one purse to another, was originally coined in the Hegelian mint. The underlying assumption of the more refined negative critics of later days as well as of the coarser criticism of Strauss is that the Divine Being is immanent in nature in a sense that precludes the possibility of Incarnation or of any other supersession of "natural law."

Hence, as the French scholastic divine Frémont justly says, the historical criticism of the Gospels (not to speak of the modern interpretation of the Personality of Christ) is most profoundly affected by philosophical considerations, and these are the decisive factors in such matters as the credibility of the Incarnation and the miracle stories of the Gospel history.[1]

To this philosophical background the destructive criticism of the Gospel records and the Personality of our Lord owes its two greatest defects: the intense arbitrariness and subjectivity which we have had so many occasions to remark, and the disregard of

[1] *Lettres à l'abbé Loisy.* The whole passage is well worth transcribing: "I made him (Renan) allow these two points: (1) that the Biblical texts, Hebrew or Greek, were the same for him as for us; (2) that the contradictory difference between our interpretations, in what concerned the texts, proceeded entirely from the difference of our philosophies. And then Renan said to me: 'If I believed, like you, that God is a Being distinct from the universe, an autonomous and infinite Being, I would explain the Bible in the same sense as you do. But God, said he, is the soul of the world; He is not distinct from the universe, it only makes one with Him. That is why God manifests Himself in each of us. He is only Self-conscious in man. Jesus, St. Paul, St. Francis of Assisi, St. Theresa, were higher manifestations of the universal soul: Jesus above all. Cause me not to be a Kantian in the domain of certitude, and not to be a Spinozist in the metaphysical domain, I also become a Christian again and explain the Biblical texts as you explain them.'" p. 148.

personality, fatal to it as historical criticism. This is not surprising: for the guiding principle being that the idea is everything and that the facts are of much inferior consequence, it follows that the conception in the mind of the enquirer naturally becomes normative and determines the selection of the significant facts, and also the probability or improbability of any given occurence.

(*a*) Strauss's First and Second Lives of the Lord Jesus afford abundant proof of the justice of this criticism. It also finds many confirmations in the arbitrary way in which most of the negative critics whose views we have examined—and especially the creative thinkers among them—have allowed themselves to deal with the evidence at their disposal by the selection and the rejection of facts for no other reason than their compatibility or incompatibility with the course of events.[1]

Some such cause is also necessary for the explanation of the extraordinarily arbitrary way in which such fine historical scholars as the late Otto Pfleiderer, Jülicher of Marburg and Johannes Weiss of Heidelberg allow themselves to deal with the inconvenient elements in the Gospel records. What would be said of a secular historian who rejected well attested facts on the ground that they did not coincide with what, in his opinion, might have been expected in the circumstances? Yet Pfleiderer rejects Matt. xi. 27 and Mark x. 46, simply because the claim to a unique knowledge of the Father and the substitutionary death of the Lord are inconsistent with his view of the Personality of our Lord. Jülicher, without a shred of historical evidence, asserts that our gracious Lord prayed for

[1] Strauss's conviction that the wholly destructive criticism of the *First Life* was a service to the cause of religion and Kalthoff's belief that the faith in the historicity of the Lord Jesus is an injury to the same cause can also be traced directly or indirectly back to the influence of these philosophical conceptions.

the forgiveness of His sins. Warschauer accepts Professor Kirsopp Lake's bizarre and utterly unfounded theory as to the empty tomb simply because it affords a way of escape from the admission of a physical resurrection; and Johannes Weiss (who sternly rebukes the Liberal theologians for their arbitrary and unscientific criticism!) selects precisely such passages as the magic touchstone of eschatology allows.[1]

(*b*) The failure to appreciate the significance of personality, which mars the work of almost all the negative, and many of the positive, critics also arises from the Hegelian presuppositions of Modern Thought. There is a tendency to make ideas and tendencies the normative category of historical research and to use them to determine the actual course of events, which is quite inconsistent with an adequate appreciation of the part played by personalities. Even in the history of modern times, when great personalities have played a considerably lesser part than in previous periods, it is undeniable that the great creative factors have been personalities rather than tendencies. Such men as Luther, Calvin and Knox, not to speak of Ignatius Loyola, in the Sixteenth; as Sully, Richlieu and Cromwell in the Seventeenth; as Kaunitz and, above all, Napoleon in the Eighteenth; and Cavour and Bismarck in the Nineteenth Centuries, were the real makers of history. No doubt, they responded to thoughts and necessities of their time. No doubt, they were influenced by the aspirations and thought-tendencies of their age; but they were very far from mere mouthpieces of these tendencies and aspirations. They were more necessary to their age than the circumstances of their age were to them. They were the creative organisms, and they

[1] It would be unjust to ascribe the arbitrariness of a single critic to the philosophic principles which underlie his thinking: but the universality of this phenomenon in negative circles points to a universal cause; and its consistence with the method and principles of the philosophy basic to modern thought justifies us in ascribing the defect in question to its influence.

triumphed quite as much over the tendencies of their age as because of them. Indeed, they transformed these tendencies, and gave them the direction and force without which they would have been ineffective and abortive.

Now, a survey of the work done during the last hundred years leads inevitably to the conclusion that there is a painful lack of understanding in this respect.

Kalthoff's thesis—that the general conditions of the First Century were such as to render inevitable the origin of Christianity by spontaneous combustion—is perhaps the extremest expression of this fatal defect; but it is really only the tradition bequeathed by the originators of the modern negative criticism carried to its logical conclusion. Thus, the eschatological school, while appreciating the necessity of a secondary personality, of a personality who should embody the tendencies of his age, equally fails to perceive the necessity of a profoundly original and creative personality. Similarly, nobody who appreciated the significance of personality would be much troubled by the "Jesus or Paul" controversy; for that theory really makes St. Paul the creative personality of Christianity and is quite inconsistent with the place which has always been ascribed to our gracious Lord in the faith and experience of believers. It may be and, undoubtedly, is true that St. Paul's influence was the greatest formative force in early Christian circles, and that he is largely responsible for the form of Christian faith and experience; but a Greater than he was required to live the life and inspire those creative experiences and thoughts which found their highest expression in the forms provided by the great apostle.[1]

[1] "If Jesus said that He was the Son of God, like unto His Father, it is still comprehensible that His apostles retained and repeated this affirmation at their peril. But if Jesus did not affirm His Divinity, it is radically impossible to understand how Jews, and St. Paul at their head, could have created the conception of His posthumous deification." —Frémont, p. 36.

2. Nevertheless, there has been an immense advance in the direction of improved methods and the appreciation of the significance of personality. The thinkers of the *Aufklärung* found the supreme religious and historical importance of Christianity in the moral teaching of our gracious Lord. Their problem, then, was to reconcile the denial of the Supernatural, their fundamental principle, with the assertion of the essential historicity of the documents. They thought to achieve this by the ascription of all miraculous elements in the Gospel history to misunderstanding on the part of the writers or to the frauds and illusions practised by the leaders of the early Christian community. This they could do, because the Personality of our Lord was of so small account in their eyes that they found no difficulty in conceiving Him in terms of the great men of their time—as an important Personage rather than a Personality[1]—and in regarding Him as condescending to their methods.

Strauss saw the impossibility of this assertion of the essential historicity of the documents combined with a denial of their essential thesis, and also the impossibility of the idea that fraud and deceit could have played any serious part in the early Christian history. His acute but scarcely historical mind saw a way of escape in the rejection of the essential historicity of the documents. Under the instigation of his Hegelian and pantheistic principles, he resolved their contents into mythical embodiments of great religious conceptions and virtually reduced our Lord's Personality to a vast shadow upon the background of Christian history.

It was impossible that a Being of merely negative importance could have given rise to a world-wide

[1] "A 'personage' is any person; a cobbler, a copyist, a philologian. A Personality, on the other hand, is not *le premier venu*. It is a person endowed with as yet unanalysable forces of persuasion and action. It is a person like Themistocles, Pericles, Cæsar, Jeanne d'Arc, Calvin, Cromwell, Chatham, Napoleon."—Reich, *The Failure of the Higher Criticism*, p. 58.

movement, and it is equally unthinkable that, within the short space of a generation, the mythopœic faculty could have so completely clothed the Personality of our Lord with its fancies. Baur and his followers perceived this and endeavoured to solve the problem by the recognition of the great historical importance of our Lord's Person as the creative Factor in Christianity, and by a drastic literary criticism of the Evangelic history.

Their work suffered from extreme subjectivity and arbitrariness, and has failed to supersede the traditionalist positions; but it formed the literary basis of the old Liberal interpretation of the Lord Jesus Christ. The latter was an attempt to interpret our Lord psychologically, to read Him in terms of the well-known prophetic type, and thus recognized that the heart of Christianity as an intellectual problem is to be found in the Person of its Founder.

The later Liberalism carried on this tradition, and continued to read our Lord in terms of a Prophet and in contrast to the general conceptions of His own time; but it recognised much more adequately the necessity of giving due attention to the transcendental elements in His thought. It also perceived more freely than the older Liberalism that our Lord's importance, while that of a Prophet, was in no wise to be regarded as identical in character with that of the great prophets of Israel. Their significance lay in their message. Their personalities were only of importance as the mouthpieces of their message. Our Lord's teaching, on the other hand, was comparatively unimportant. The significant thing about Him is His Person. It is much more than even the Embodiment of His teaching. It is the Source and the Standard of His influence.

Great as was this psychological reading of our Lord's Person and history, it was arbitrary and unsatisfying in many ways. Above all, it neglected the historical

conditions of His life and refused to recognize the importance of the transcendental elements of the Messianic hope for the interpretation of His thought. These were perceived and emphasized—to the exclusion of many important elements recognized by Liberalism—by the eschatological and Modernist schools. Whereas Liberalism at its best only recognised the centrality of our Lord's Person in Its historical significance, these latest phases of criticism do full justice to Its absolute centrality in His own conceptions.

Thus, there has been a steady advance both in method and in the appreciation of our Lord's Personality. Whereas in the first stadium, the Personality was left aside as a Thing of no account; in the second, It was given an actual, though a negative, importance; in the third, It was perceived to have a positive historical significance; in the fourth, the attempt was made to read Its importance as the Source of the noblest prophetic teaching of history; in the fifth, It was perceived to be the Embodiment and the Source of the importance of that teaching for the history of the world; and in the last, It is recognised as the dominant Category of Christian thought as conceived by its Founder as well as of the Christian experience of succeeding ages.

3. Yet the negative criticism of six generations has been entirely loyal to its starting assumption—the impossibility of the Supernatural. When one method of eliminating the supernatural element in the Gospel history has failed, it has turned to another with undiminished confidence in the scientific character of its principle. Even now it shows but few signs of hesitancy in this respect. Attempt after attempt to eliminate the Supernatural from the records has been made. All have decisively failed. Thus, Modern Thought, essentially naturalistic in character as it is, has definitely refused to put its *Imprimatur*

upon the truly scientific character of the naturalistic hypothesis and has virtually pronounced a verdict of "Not guilty" in respect of the alleged unscientific character of Christian scholarship. Hence the only legitimate attitude for the true scientific enquirer is to eliminate his prejudices against the Supernatural from his mind as far as possible before entering on the enquiry, and to recognize the fact that it is quite as unscientific to assume the impossibility of the manifestation of the supernatural in the sphere of human experience as it is to assume its probability.

We may also remark that the virtual admission of the Allness of our Lord in the experience of the earliest Christians as in that of His modern followers by the negative criticism, when taken together with the persistent refusal to admit the historicity of the miraculous elements, leaves us face to face with the dilemma: A Divine Lord or a Myth. On one horn or the other, Modern Thought must impale itself. If the Lord is, indeed, All in historical Christianity as conceived by Himself and His earliest followers—if it is, indeed, impossible to eliminate the Supernatural element from the history—the conclusion that He is the Eternal Son is inevitable. If, on the other hand, the Supernatural is an insuperable barrier to historical existence, it is the very height of absurdity to attempt to preserve the historicity of a Person whose whole influence and significance is in reality to be ascribed to the myths and delusions which have been embodied in His ideal presentment—the only conception known to, or derivable from, history.

4. The long Christological enquiry of the modern period has had some indirect results of incalculable ethical and religious value. (*a*) Great as were the excellences of the old theologians of all confessions and profound as was their thought, they were virtually

docetic in their emphasis upon the Lord's Deity to the practical exclusion of His Manhood. No doubt, this charge does not lie as obviously against the great originative theologians of the Sixteenth Century. They were too great to lose entirely the proportion of truth. It was in their successors, in the average academic theologians who succeeded them and especially in the average men who filled the pulpits of the pastoral ministry and who, then as now, decided the theological impressions of the majority of men, that the defects of their thinking became acute. A Seventeenth Century divine, whether Puritan or Laudian, may be filled with the intensest spiritual enthusiasm and love for Christ, his experience of the Personal fellowship of the Redeemer may be something so inexpressibly intimate and sacred that we feel as we read his expositions of the love of Christ that we are treading upon holy ground; but the conception of the Lord Jesus Christ the Man, tempted and tried in all points like as we are, seems never to have entered into his thinking. To such a divine—and the Seventeenth Century theologians were divines indeed—the Lord was so inexpressibly sacred, so infinitely far removed from man, that His Manhood was not a thing of practical experiential moment. It was simply the means by which He suffered and vindicated the holiness of God and so liberated the love of God for the forgiveness of sin.[1] There is the same lack of appreciation of the meaning of Christ's Manhood in the preaching and teaching of the Evangelical Fathers. They preached

[1] It can only be in the sense that the attention of the reformed theologians was concentrated upon the Redeeming work of Christ that Dr. Inge can have said: "During the two centuries after the Reformation the humanity of Christ was over-emphasized under the influence of forensic theories of the atonement." (*Contentio Veritatis*, p. 71). It would be quite impossible to say that they paid any attention to the Manhood of Christ as the Subject of development or as a Fact of religious experience. The Christ they knew was a Christ so exclusively Divine that His Humanity was practically void of all reality.

Christ crucified; but their thought was rather of the God who gave, than of the Man who suffered.[1]

(*b*) Similarly, the character of the old conception of the Godhead is shown by its resultant heresy. Deism exalted God to such an extent that it banished Him from the universe He had created and allowed Him no sphere of action within it. In this, it was the exaggeration of the profound emphasis which the precedent and concurrent orthodoxy had placed upon the transcendence of God. Thus, it intensified the neglect into which the corrective concept of the Divine Immanence had fallen. The God of early Nineteenth Century Christianity was conceived as a Being in opposition to man, not as in juxtaposition. The admitted points of contact were so very few and far between that the Incarnation of our gracious Lord really took the form of an arbitrary and unrelated intervention (just as miracles were arbitrary violations of natural law) instead of being conceived as the means of achieving the eternal purpose of God—the Divine Self-sacrifice of Calvary. The spirit of such very great works as Butler's "Analogy," Magee on Atonement and Sacrifice and the invaluable works of Thomas Chalmers is entirely remote even from those of us who hold the essential truths which they so nobly vindicated to the mind of their day. Much more is this the case with the smaller men. Indeed, it is not too much to say that their theological conception of God is largely unthinkable to the modern man.[2]

Now, the labours of the modern age have effectually changed all this. The immense stress laid upon the

[1] How far-reaching has been this influence is shown by the difficulty which most of us who know the Lord Jesus experience in admitting the reality of His human development.

[2] Of course, this is very far from true of their practical experience of the Divine fellowship, but there is always a harshening and, perhaps, a coarsening in attempts to formulate the experience in terms of the intellect—especially when men think (as we all do more or less) in terms which have a more or less conventional significance. In other words, the danger is that of a conventional scholasticism such as dominated post-Reformation thought.

Manhood of Christ by the negative critics and the forcing of believers to face the facts which has been one of the results of the free discussion of modern times have meant that we have been constantly brought into contact with the fact of the Manhood of the Lord Jesus Christ and that its various phenomena have become part of our daily thinking.

Similarly, the emphasis on the character of the Incarnation and on the moral relationship between man and God, and, not by any means least, the new revelation of the immanence of God which evolution has given to the world, have forced us to modify and correct the *doctrinaire* theological conceptions of the Divine Being formulated by our fathers.

There is, however, a great peril lest we should be carried away into extremes and forget the old truths in the new and so turn the latter into falsehood. The over-emphasis of the Westcottian school upon the Incarnation and its refusal to recognize that it was a subsidiary means to the great end of Atonement for sin by Divine Self-sacrifice would—if it stood alone—be sufficient proof that the present tendency is in that direction ; and there are ominous signs, as the clerical press bears witness, of a resulting weakening of our hold upon the eternal truth of the Incarnation and of the essential Deity of our gracious Lord and Saviour.

5. If we analyse the contents of the Gospel (not, however, the contents of the historic sources which they allow) as given to us by the negative critics, it would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that there is very little to choose between it and Judaism. The principal difference between them is rather a difference of emphasis than of substance ; for there is not a great deal in the Lord's teaching, apart from the alchemy of the Incarnation and Atonement, to which some parallel cannot be found in the ancient prophets of Israel or even in the writings of Rabbinism.

Of course, there is an entire elimination of the ceremonial law in the reverted Judaism of the negative critics. Judaism is, thereby, freed from some of the shackles which have impeded its diffusion. The particularistic exclusiveness of Judaism, which has been at once its preservation and its limitation, is thus eliminated. A much greater emphasis is laid upon the love of God and upon the Fatherhood of God than is to be found in any Jewish writing. The vitality of a religion does not depend, however, upon its ordinances and certainly not on its exclusiveness. These things only form a protective husk at the best and, at the worst, hinder its development. Nor does a change in emphasis from externals to internal realities constitute a change of religion or faith. All reformations and all spiritual movements within any religious institution are really a call to a higher spiritual experience and an emphasizing of some more or less forgotten aspect of truth.

Hence it is about as reasonable to contrast the Gospel of the negative critics with Judaism as it would be to contrast Methodism with Christianity, because it broke away from the stagnant ecclesiasticism of the Eighteenth Century. In neither case did a new religion come into being. In both cases, the only practical difference between the old organization and its younger rival from the doctrinal point of view was a difference of emphasis. The real difference is to be found rather in the spirit and in the methods of work.

If, therefore, the negative critics are right in their repudiation of the distinctly Christian doctrinal conceptions, it follows that the original Christianity, which they have recovered for us, is only a sublimated Judaism and that the Jews, not the adherents of the Cross, are the true followers of the Christ. "Possibly it may come to pass that in His teaching there may be found a reconciliation or meeting-point between a

reformed or Liberal Judaism and a frankly Unitarian Christianity of the distant future. *That* Judaism and *that* Christianity may find that they differ in name, in accent, and in memories rather than essentially or dogmatically. *That* Judaism and *that* Christianity may both claim Jesus as their own." [1]

6. It must, however, be admitted that the reversion to Judaism of the negative critics suffers from the same fundamental and practical defects as the older Judaism whose weakness is such that it can never hope to win the world save by coming to terms with the Saviour.[2] Judaism, despite its heroic endurance, its exalted ethical code and its intensely spiritual conception of the Deity, has never made much headway in the direction of the winning of the world. Such success as it had about the beginning of our era proved to be temporary and the fall of Jerusalem sounded the death-knell of imperial Judaism. After that event, Judaism retired into itself and, until comparatively modern times, did not recover its energy. Yet it is still as unattractive as ever to those outside its pale, and it shares this weakness with the historical

[1] C. G. Montefiore, *Synoptic Gospels*, I., p.ci. Mr. Montefiore is quite justified in his forcible and frank remarks as to the essentially Judaistic character of the negative movement: "And when the Liberal Protestant German theologians of to-day, who are practically Unitarians though they do not call themselves by that name, write about Rabbinism and Judaism with disdain and disapproval, they forget that what they directly depreciate and contemn, they indirectly justify and exalt. They abandon, as not originally or specifically Christian, all those doctrines against which, from the very birth of Christianity, the Jews rebelled and protested. They have come round to us; for surely, as regards their conception of God and His relation to the world, the orthodox Christian of every age would dub them Judaizers and heretics. If their conceptions of Christianity conquer and prevail, great is the victory of Judaism. The name matters nothing; the reality, the doctrine, is all."— II., p. 793.

[2] "Dogmatic Christianity in the course of centuries may disappear; Trinitarianism may be succeeded by Unitarianism; but the words of Jesus will still continue to move and cheer the heart of man. If Judaism does not, as it were, come to terms with the Gospels, it must always be, I am inclined to think, a creed in a corner, of little influence and with no expansive power."—*ibid.*, p. 906.

Unitarianism to which it is closely akin, and also with the sublimated Judaism of the negative critics.

The causes of failure are to be found in their lack of rational justification, and also in their moral and spiritual importance.

(*a*) They exist for the purpose of emphazising two great religious truths and seeking to realize them in experience—to wit, the Personality and the love of God—but simply because they are solely dependent for their proof upon the individual and subjective experience, it is quite impossible for them to vindicate the essential rationality of either truth even to a sympathetic enquirer.

(*a*) No doubt, the arguments for the existence of God are quite sufficient to silence mere controversy; but it is very doubtful whether teleology, cosmology or ontology ever made a fervent theist. The inspiration to a religious life has always come either from a personal experience of the fellowship of God, or from a personal experience of an alleged concrete revelation. This is true equally of Mohammedanism, Judaism, Unitarianism and Christianity. Even the negative critics base their sublimated Judaism upon the religious experience of the Redeemer of the world. A God who does not reveal Himself is unthinkable as an Object of worship. The Greek philosophers, for example, seem never to have even thought of worshipping God; for worship (involving, as it does, fellowship) is an unthinkable relationship with a God who does not reveal Himself. What objective rational basis can any faith, which does not exalt an incarnate Lord, submit to the enquirer? "If there has been no Incarnation, if no morally perfect Being, perfect even as our Father in heaven is perfect, has ever lived on earth, then there has been and is no revelation of God as a Person. The God of Nature is impersonal; and the voice of God within our hearts cannot always be distinguished from our own thoughts.

The 'human voice through the thunder' has never sounded except from the lips of Jesus Christ." [1]

(β) The other basic fact of all really significant religious life is that "God is Love." On this truth all forms of religious experience which have any appreciable following in the civilized world lay the greatest stress. The negative critics never cease to proclaim it as the centre of the Lord's teaching. Judaism in so far as it has come into contact with Christianity, preaches it and so does Unitarianism. The second in virtue of its promise of further revelation to come; the others without rhyme or reason. The God of Nature is a God of benevolence to those who keep His laws; to those who break them He is inexorable. Nature, though manifestly the outcome of benevolence, knows nothing of love; nor, save in the sense that any other machine is capable of reflecting the moral qualities of its maker, can it reveal the Divine character.

This is fully perceived by historical Christianity. It proclaims a God of love on one ground and one ground alone—the love manifested in the Self-humiliation and death of the Son of God for the sins of men. Redeeming love it knows, and none other; but you take away the personal support, the one authoritative manifestation of Divine Love, in the whole course of human experience, when you repudiate the atoning death of the Son of God.

How else is love manifested save by self-sacrifice? Is it not of the very essence of love to expend itself upon its object? What other proof of love, human or Divine, is possible? Good-nature or even benevolence may be manifested in other ways, but not love. Love is pre-eminently personal and intimate, and demands a personal sacrifice. Hence our Liberal theologies may reserve to themselves faith (on what grounds I know not) in a God who is Good-nature and who will give

[1] Inge, *Contentio Veritatis*, p. 97.

that which costs Him nothing to His children, but they can know nothing of a God of love. Indeed, they deny the highest moral attributes to God; and it is open to the meanest and weakest of earth's creatures who has ever sacrificed his own will for another's good to claim, and to claim justly, that he has produced a higher moral excellence than the Most High God, and that, in so far, he is of a higher moral order.

Is the good-nature which these liberal theologies ascribe to God more admirable morally than that which we ourselves show forth from day to day? Does it assure better results in the spiritual world than it does in mundane experience? Here it is one of the perils of life and leads to more crime and sorrow than, perhaps, any other quality in those who are the objects of crime. Will not a universe, swayed by Good-nature instead of Holy Love, be morally uncertain?

Experience has proved that no appeal is so potent to the hearts of men to turn them from their sin as the appeal of the Cross. Is it so certain that a gospel of Good-nature will be equally potent? If historical Christianity has had any power and any influence to turn the hearts of the disobedient unto the wisdom of the just, it is simply because it was based upon the supreme example of Divine Self-sacrifice and proclaimed One whose wrath against sin was manifested, and yet who "loved us and gave Himself for us?" The one and only rational basis of confidence in the Divine love finds its classic expression in the triumphant pæan: "He that spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all, how shall He not with Him also freely give us all things?"[1]

(*b*) Shall we appeal to the history of the ages to learn whether or no the Christianity of the Cross has been potent to save? Shall we ask for the verdict of experience upon the ethical and spiritual potency

[1] Romans viii.

of the Liberal theology ? Let us be content to abide by the judgment of Wilhelm Herrmann, himself a Liberal of the Liberals, to whom the orthodox dogmatic is anathema and its name as that of iniquity. "Its representatives are great as *virtuosi* of the after-appreciation of the piety of others, but the wish for personal piety seldom reaches the light of consciousness. They know how to show the way in which the prophets heard the voice of God and how the soul of an apostle is full of peace and struggle. They can dust from the words of Jesus the dirt of centuries, they can even describe with the greatest enthusiasm the incomparable spiritual method of Jesus. But there is scarcely a trace to show that they ever wish to remember what the fact means for themselves, that in its limpid fulness a victorious Personal Life approaches them from the sacred Scriptures. If they understood that, they would at least be silent when others honoured Him as Lord, who alone forced the complete submission of their souls."[1]

Morally, spiritually and intellectually bankrupt, the Liberal theologies leave suffering humanity as the citizen of the far country left the Prodigal Son—to perish with hunger.

7. Thus, the whole course of modern criticism has resolved itself into a negative vindication of the faith of the Gospel. More it could not do: for "the glorious Gospel of the Blessed God"[2] is neither a catena of beliefs nor an institution, but faith in and the personal realization of the fellowship of a Divine Person. Hence Modern Thought cannot establish Christian faith any more than it could establish personal trust and confidence in a political leader. In both cases, only personal intercourse, only the interaction of personality on personality, can produce that real trust which brings our knowledge of the

[1] Herrmann, *Kultur der Gegenwart*, p. 178. [2] 1 Tim. i. 11.

personality in question into the realm of those highest truths which are as irrefragable to us as the fact of our own existence.

Nevertheless, criticism has a very important function in relation to our trust in, or knowledge of, personality human and Divine. It may have to admit that personality is of the nature of an ultimate reality which transcends our thought, and it certainly cannot create the personal trust in the Christ of God which alone is Christian faith: but it can, and should, establish the reasonable character of such self-surrender by the removal of any objections which may impede it and by the vindication of the reality of the historical experiences which give rise to the desire for such personal fellowship.

Now, in both these respects the labours of Modern Thought have amply vindicated the faith of the ages. They have removed every legitimate objection to the moral and spiritual truths upon which the Christian faith is based. They have established the great historical phenomena which form the objective basis of belief in the Incarnation and Divine Self-sacrifice of the Son of God. What other line of objection to the essential historicity of the Gospel story can be conceived other than those which have been tried and found wanting by Modern Thought ? Mythicism has broken down. The attempt to ascribe late dates to the Gospel history has been an utter failure. The objections to the miraculous portions of the history have been shown to rest in reality upon *à priori* philosophic presuppositions. The attempts to place the secret of our Lord's historic influence in His teaching or elsewhere than in the character of His Person have failed and the cavils at His supremacy in holiness and essential sinlessness have been discredited.

More than this, Modern Thought, though utterly out of sympathy with the presuppositions of Christian

Faith, has provided ample materials for the reconstruction of the habitat of faith. What it has taken away with the right hand, it has restored with the left. To-day, it is possible for us to vindicate the character of the Lord Jesus Christ as sinless and holy by the testimonies of the negative critics; to assert, with none to challenge us, the perfect character of His moral teaching; to declare with the full approval of the leaders of the opposing forces that the strength and virtue of the faith is to be found not in teaching, nor even in example, not in doctrine nor in practice, but in the ineffable Personality of our most gracious Lord and Saviour.

Thus, the essential historicity of Christian Faith throughout the ages, of the faith which centres in the Person of the crucified Redeemer, is vindicated by the labours of those who abstain from worshipping Him. If any trust may be placed in the assured results of modern criticism, if the labours—often accomplished amid intensest personal suffering and mental agony—of the hundred and seventy years of Modern Thought, are of any scientific value, then the allness of Christ for Christian faith in the earliest days of the Christian era as in the present and, what is of even more importance, in His own Self-consciousness must be counted among the things which cannot be shaken.

Thus, all the essential things which come directly into human experience are of the nature of facts agreed upon by both parties. Modern Thought has awarded the palm in substantially every case (not involving the admission of Divine intervention) to the forces of positive criticism and we go forward to the future with the confidence that the labours of the Modern Period have established the fundamental facts of history and experience which are necessary to the complete vindication of the essentially scientific character of Christian adoration and faith.

If this be the case, you ask me, why is it that the negative critics do not adore the Redeemer-King? Surely, because trust in a Person is the outcome of personal intercourse and fellowship, and this is given or withholden as seems best to the Person in question. Hence no intellectual vindication will compel belief. The low spiritual life of the ages when it was death to deny a jot or a tittle of the ecclesiastical definitions should be enough to prove that. Only an ethical and spiritual response to the tender pity and loving invitations which come from the very heart of Him who died for us, only a spiritual self-surrender and identification of the individual life with the Christ of God can enable us to appreciate the spiritual significance of the truths vindicated by scientific research.

Thus, in the last analysis, we are brought back to the New Testament position—that saving faith is the gift of God; that it is "not by power, nor by might, but by My spirit"[1] that men are taught to adore Him who is set down on the right hand of God, and ever liveth to make intercession for us; that "the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned."[2]

The divergence of interpretation, therefore, resolves itself into a difference of view-point and powers. Those standing at the foot of the mountain do not see the same view as those who stand on the top. For the blind, the beauty of painting virtually does not exist; for the deaf, the genius of a Handel or a Mendelssohn is as the babbling of a brook; for the dead the glories of dawn and sunset, of town and nature, of human love and human skill are as things of naught. Similarly, those who are dead in trespasses and sins, whose eyes are holden, whose ears remain unopened, can neither see the Form, nor hear the Voice of the Son

[1] Zech. iv. 6. [2] 1 Cor. ii. 14.

of God, nor comprehend His love. All they can do is dimly to appreciate that in the First Century of our era, in an obscure corner of the earth, there happened a transcendental and wonderful Something, which has resulted in the veritable regeneration of human life—a Something which is described by those whose natures (changed by the renewing of the Holy Ghost) are able to appreciate it, as the Incarnation of the Eternal Son of God.

Thus, on the seas of the criticism and deep scepticism of the Modern Age, when the sky has been most overcast and we have rowed strongly without making any progress, when the frail bark of the Christian intellect was filled with the waves and like to sink, when, our hearts failing us for fear, we have cried, as the disciples of old, "Master, carest Thou not that we perish?"[1] there has arisen in our very bark the Figure of One who is true Man, Bone of our bone, and Flesh of our flesh, who has rebuked the sea and the winds, saying "Peace be still," and immediately there was a great calm. "What manner of man is this, that even the winds and the sea obey Him?"

[1] Mark iv. 38.

Lecture III

The Person of Christ as Revealed in History

(Sunday, 21st January, 1912)

"WE KNOW THAT THE SON OF GOD IS COME, AND HATH GIVEN US AN UNDERSTANDING, THAT WE MAY KNOW HIM THAT IS TRUE, AND WE ARE IN HIM THAT IS TRUE, EVEN IN HIS SON JESUS CHRIST."—1 JOHN v. 20.

"La manière dont Jesus revendique des pouvoirs et des privilèges spécifiquement divins n'a son explication suffisante que dans une pénétration substantielle de son humanité par la divinité; ainsi le caractêre inouï de l'intimité qui unit le Christ-Homme â Dieu ne se comprehend bien que si ce Christ-Homme est élevé au-dessus de l'humanité pure jusqu'a Dieu lui-même par une communication mystérieuse de l'Être divin."—M. LEPIN.

"The power of perpetual renewal which resides in Christianity is the personal influence of Jesus Christ. Thousands upon thousands find in Him spiritual regeneration, victory over evil, joyful confidence in the face of sorrow and death. There is no person in all history of whom this is true. When other great men die, that direct personal influence of soul upon soul passes with them. It is not so with Jesus Christ. Age follows age, empires rise and fall, vast movements of civilization and progress take place, sciences are born and new worlds are discovered, the whole aspect of human life is altered by revolutionary changes, and still that great Personal influence lives and works in the world, and wherever men's hearts are truest and their lives are purest there the power of Christ has been felt overthrowing the evil and bringing in the empire of the good."—BISHOP C. F. D'ARCY.

"We by no far-drawn reasoning, brilliant length
But fragile, hold our heaven;
For us the strength
Of demonstration
Is the Risen One still.
Our wisdom, science, all
Is at Thy feet to fall;
Our evidence of deathless bliss,
Our earnest still is this—
That Thou hast shown, from death restored,
Thy face, belovèd Lord."

BISHOP HANDLEY MOULE.

LECTURE III

The Person of Christ as Revealed in History

I.—The Self-witness and Claims of the Lord Jesus Christ [1]

It is a truism to say that, if the Christian position in respect of the Self-witness and claims of the Lord Jesus Christ cannot be made good, there is no case worthy of consideration. If He did not know and believe Himself to be a transcendental Personality, One whose relationship to the Most High God was unique, it is assuredly waste of time to try to impose a different concept upon the world; for, in the last analysis, all knowledge of His, as of any other human. Personality is derived from its Self-manifestations, Hence, while due weight must be given to other considerations and our position must be made good in several other directions, the character of our Lord's Self-consciousness is the vital fact.

[1] *AUTHORITIES*:—Theologies of the New Testament:—W. Beyschlag, J. Bovon, P. Feine, H. J. Holtzmann, G. B. Stevens, H. H. Weinel, B. Weiss; Sir R. Anderson, *The Lord from Heaven*; E. A. Abbott, *The Son of Man*; F. Barth, *Das Hauptprobleme des Lebens Jesu*; P. Battifol, *L'Enseignement de Jésus*; Cambridge Theological, and Cambridge Biblical, Essays; *Contentio Veritatis*; J. Denney, *Jesus and the Gospel*; Dalman, *The Words of Jesus*; J. C. V. Durrell, *The Self-Revelation of our Lord*; A. M. Fairbairn, *Philosophy of the Christian Religion*; D. W. Forrest, *The Christ of History and of Experience*; J. Gamble, *Christ and Criticism*; A. E. Garvie, *Studies in the Inner Life of Jesus*; F. Godet, *Defence of the Christian Faith*; A. Harnack, *Sayings of Jesus*; *Jesus or Christ?*; H. P. Liddon, *The Divinity of our Lord*; Bishop C. Gore, *The Incarnation of the Son of God*; E. Michaud, *Les Enseignements essentiels de Jésus*; *Lux Mundi*; J. Martineau, *Hours of Thought, The Seat of Authority in Religion*; C. F. Nolloth, *The Person of our Lord and Recent Thought*; R. W. Seaver, *Through Criticism to Christ*; D. Smith, *The Days of His Flesh*; Ullmann, *The Sinlessness of Jesus*; B. Weiss, *Life of Christ*; B. B. Warfield, *The Lord of Glory*; J. Weiss, *Das Älteste Evangelium*; H. H. Wendt, *The Teaching of Jesus*.

The Person of Christ

A. The Sinless Self-consciousness of the Lord Jesus Christ

Now, there are two phrases which are used to express the singularity of our Lord's moral character. Some divines, *e.g.*, Godet, speak of "the Perfect Holiness of Jesus Christ," and others, *e.g.* Ullmann, prefer to speak of His Sinlessness. The former phrase, while it has the advantage of being positive in character, is most misleading. Such language does not really leave scope for moral progression, and—let us hedge our definition with reservations as we will—it inevitably connotes the absolute and tideless holiness of the Divine Being. In a word, it destroys the reality of Christ's Manhood.

"The Sinlessness of Christ," on the other hand, while safeguarding the truth for which Godet and Ullmann alike stand, is not so open to objection. Sinlessness does not merely mean that the being of whom it is predicated has abstained from any positive ill-doing or thinking. It implies that, at all moments of his life, his character is absolutely guiltless and well-pleasing in the sight of God. Any moral weakness, any failure to attain the highest moral standard possible at any given moment is sin and, therefore, abhorrent in the sight of God. Hence to be sinless involves a perfect development as a child, as a youth, as a man, and throughout time and eternity. "Sinlessness is essentially the note of a being at once dependent and perfect; for as dependent he is under law or authority, and as perfect he must have completely obeyed. In other words, the only condition that will save an intellect from error is the knowledge of all things that have been, are, or are to be; but the one condition needed to help men to righteousness is the will to obey."[1]

[1] Fairbairn, *Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, p. 377.

The possibility of a truly scientific judgment upon the sinlessness of the Lord has often been challenged. Hence, it will be advisable briefly to discuss the three principal objections.

The first and least important objection is that derived from the consideration that a sinless man would be a physical and moral miracle and is therefore quite unthinkable. As the point in dispute is the alleged fact of the sinlessness of a given historical Character (whose Personality, we may incidentally remark, has been regarded from the earliest times as originating in a special Divine intervention and as forming a break in the entail of human heredity) this objection may safely be disregarded as a begging of the question.

The second objection is derived from the fact that we are of a sinful stock and, our moral sense being perverted, we are not in a position to pronounce a judgment of any value upon the sinlessness of a fellow-creature. It is a case, so it is said, of the blind man pronouncing upon the visual powers of one who is alleged to see. No doubt, there is a considerable element of truth in this argument. When all is said and done, our moral sense is perverted, our conscience has lost its delicacy of touch, the nerves of our spiritual manhood are impaired by the paralysis of sin. That is not to say that we are utterly blind and impotent. The mere fact that we can appreciate that there is a difference between right and wrong—no matter how erroneous our judgment as to what is right and what is wrong in any given case may be—is quite sufficient to enable us to form a judgment of some value. A patient suffering from cataract lives in a darkened world; but the very fact that the light seemed to him to be of blinding intensity would be a conclusive proof of the very high degree of the light-giving body's incandescence. Similarly, the impression of sinlessness made upon those whose moral sense has been blighted

and paralysed by sin, is a much higher proof of transcendent holiness than the same impression made upon those whose moral sensitiveness was healthy and normal.

Dr. Martineau has given very forcible expression to the third objection, based on the comparative poverty of the Gospel records.[1] He does not, however, mention that we know actually more of the Lord's life than of that of any of the great men of ancient history. The available sources are as great in extent as, and much better in quality than, those relating to any other great one of ancient times. Are we then to suspend our judgment upon the moral character of all the great ones of ancient history because we do not know every detail of their lives?

More than this, however, it may be justly said (as, indeed, Dr. Martineau said in his worthier hours)[2] that extension is not the significant thing in the experience of a spiritual being. A single moment will decide its destiny and the understanding of that spiritual being's attitude of mind in that psychological moment will be of more value for the understanding of his character and powers than the closest intimacy throughout the uneventful periods of his existence. A glance at the

[1] "It appears, therefore, that twelve-thirteenths of the ministry which they describe is left without a record; and that the three Gospels move within the limits of the remaining one-thirteenth."—*The Seat of Authority in Religion*, p. 204.

[2] "Indeed, that time is no measure of value in the deeper concerns of our humanity, is apart from a comparison, not only of different persons, but even of different parts of our own individual experience. . . . In Gethsemane itself it needed but three cries of briefest prayer, and the most pathetic crisis had passed from the sublimest of histories. . . . Still more marked are the nodal points of the spiritual history. . . . The magnitude of these moments, their real proportion to the whole story of our days, no dial-plate can show. The pendulum may beat but once, ere all be over; yet that instant may carry in it the burden of years. For the higher regions of our nature, the true measures of time are found, not, as with physical changes, in any ratio of traversed arcs, but in the relation of events to our affections; and in a focus, which is only a point, may burn a light of the spirit greater than you can find diluted through the indefinite wastes of dull and hazy life."—*Hours of Thought*, I., p. 212-215.

Gospels assures us that the narrators of the Gospel story had a rare psychological grasp upon the history of their Subject, and recorded the creative moments of His experience. Hence, His Self-witness as recorded by them may be taken as decisive proof of the character of His Self-consciousness: for it is in such moments that individual peculiarities become most accentuated and are most in evidence. The objection only applies to later generations and is largely obviated by the fact that we have at our disposal the testimony of those who lived with Him in the home at Nazareth and sojourned with Him throughout the stormy days of His public ministry.

1. *The Witness of His Intimates*

Whether St. John's Gospel is good evidence or not for what our Lord Himself thought, it is indubitable evidence for the belief of the early Church: and the merest glance at it shows that the thought of Christ's sinlessness scintillates over all the author's memories of the life of Christ. The references in the First Epistle to the life of the Redeemer in the days of His humiliation explicitly emphasize the fact of His sinlessness. "Ye know that He was manifested to take away sins; and in Him was no sin."[1]

St. Paul, a Hebrew of the Hebrews, whose whole thought was steeped as none other save Augustine and Calvin in the history of Christianity in the conception of the depravity of the human race, speaks of Him as One "who knew no sin."[2] St. Peter, who had lived on terms of intimacy with Him throughout the days of His earthly ministry, who was admitted to a greater intimacy of fellowship than, perhaps, any other disciple, again and again asserts in explicit terms the great fact in question. Thus, in his First Epistle he refers to Him "who did no sin, neither was guile found

[1] 1 John iii. 5. [2] 2 Cor. v. 21.

in His mouth."[1] Nor was this thought a late development; for, in the Petrine speeches in the Acts (the germinal Christology of which shows them to be of very early date), the Apostle again and again reproaches the people of Israel with the rejection of the Holy One of God. On the day of Pentecost, within a couple of months of the death of Christ, he publicly applies to Him the words of the Psalm—"Neither wilt Thou suffer Thy Holy One to see corruption"[2]—and infers the necessity of the resurrection from the holiness of the executed Felon! Similarly, in the porch of the Temple, he told the people that they "denied the Holy and Righteous One,"[3] and the early Church in its thanksgiving for the deliverance of its leaders from the Sanhedrin spoke of the world-powers being gathered together "against Thy Holy Child Jesus."[4] Similarly, St. Stephen, speaking before the Sanhedrin, refers to "the coming of the Righteous One."[5]

To appreciate the significance of this testimony to the sinlessness of Christ, certain facts must be given due consideration. It is quite necessary to insist with Johannes Weiss upon the forensic character of righteousness in the Gospel records: for the forensic reference of the term "righteous" precludes its application to One who was not blameless in the sight of God. Due weight must also be given to the fact that the disciples were men of their time and of their class; it is the most difficult thing in the world to induce a peasant to admit the superiority of a member of his own class. The greatest height to which they rose in our Lord's lifetime was the recognition of His Messiahship and that they conceived Judaistically. To recognize His sinlessness in view of the fact that the religious authorities of the time, their natural leaders, were denouncing Him as possessed by a

[1] ii. 22.
[2] Acts ii. 27, 31.
[3] Acts iii. 14.
[4] 27.
[5] Acts vii. 52.

devil and compassing His destruction, meant that no common impression must have been made upon them.[1]

There must have been much in His life capable of misconstruction; for, sinless, He lived in a sinful world and had to order His life among sinful people, and the human heart is always ready to believe the worst.

Further than this, it should be remembered that the impression must have been uniform over a long period of time. It was no mere case of saintship in which the occurrence of an occasional imperfection, an occasional lapse into sinful action, might well be counterbalanced by the general excellence and nobility of the life. It was a case of sinlessness—to which the most dangerous witness would necessarily be the most intimate[2]—and "one flaw or fault of temper, one symptom of moral impotence, or of moral perversion, one hasty word, one ill-considered act, would have shattered the ideal for ever."[3]

It can, therefore, only have been from their sojourn with the Lord that this overwhelming conviction of His sinlessness—a conviction which proved strong enough to form the foundation of the most stupendous and highly moralized system of redemption known to the history of religions—can have been derived by the disciples and early Christians. Nor could it have arisen from a systematic effort on His part to create

[1] The marvellous thing is not that only six or seven hundred persons were gathered into the Kingdom during our Lord's lifetime; but that a single one was found to believe in Him. Indeed, we know that there was a tradition—in the Jewish Christian circles—that some of the people went back and walked no more with Him because they were revolted by certain aspects of His teaching—aspects which must have seemed, and were, blasphemous to those who did not understand the implied premisses. That this formed a difficulty to the disciples themselves is shown by the form of St. Peter's answer—"Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life" (John vi. 68)—which clearly points to a moral dilemma and a definite suspension of judgment on the part of those who clave to Him.

[2] Compare the proverb: "No man is a hero to his valet."

[3] Liddon.

the impression.[1] Such an impression, if it was to be given at all, must be given naturally, even unconsciously; and the testimony of the disciples, therefore, leaves no doubt as to the essentially sinless character of our gracious Lord's life and walk upon earth.

2. *The Witness of the World in General*

The impression which successive generations have received from the Personality of Christ as recorded in the Gospel records very strongly confirms the apostolic conviction; for with changing centuries have come changing ethical ideals and yet each age in turn has been influenced by, and paid its tribute of unstinted admiration to, the Character of the Lord Jesus Christ.

It is no accident that one and the same Character should have impressed men, who were separated by widely different customs and ideals, as being the One sinless Character in the history of the world or, at all events, the transcendently good Character of history. If men from the fetish-worshippers of Africa to the cultured and philosophically-minded Greeks, from the degraded Indians of the pampas of South America to the conservative and thoughtful Chinese, alike agree to find the very highest type of human excellence in an historic Character of nineteen centuries ago, it can only be because that Character gives the impression of transcendent goodness.

What renders all this the more amazing, is the fact that our Lord's moral standard is entirely opposed

[1] "If we wish to realize how difficult it is to portray a blameless character convincingly, or in such manner as to enlist our sympathy, we need only turn to Tennyson's King Arthur, whose conscious goodness after a while commences to arouse the positive antagonism of the healthy-minded reader. Now the goodness of Jesus never strikes us as unnatural, artificial, in one word, as a pose; it is all part of Him, and integral to the picture. But if the writers of the Gospels succeed where a great poet very palpably failed, must not the reason be sought in the Original their pens portrayed?"—Warschauer, *Jesus: Seven Questions*, p. 137.

to all that the world holds as ethically noble and excellent. The ancient philosophers of Greece and the modern philosophers of Germany (save in so far as they have learned at His feet) have formulated systems based upon the principles of self-knowledge and self-development. Yet the very Man whose ethical standards are of all standards of morals most impracticable and most difficult of attainment, whose moral ideals are in irreconcilable antagonism to the universal theory and practice of life, is hailed as the very highest Embodiment of ethical principle and practice by the men whose standards He repudiates and whose ideals He condemns.

The character of the original witness is important in this connection. It consists of the testimony of sinful men, whose views in some cases we only have at second hand. In other words, all the evidence which has come down to us, the testimony which has compelled sixty generations of men to reverence the Holy One of God, has passed through sinful media, sometimes through several. "The beauty of holiness" must assuredly have made a profound impression upon the receivers and transmitters of the conviction that Christ was sinless to have prevented its defacement by the unconscious addition of imperfect elements, or by the elision of some of those delicate touches—that speak of nature more surely than the highest art—which go so far towards the production of the impression that a transcendently Holy Being walked this earth and developed from infancy to manhood, from birth to death and resurrection, nineteen centuries ago.[1]

[1] "Those who were ultimately responsible for the eye and ear-witness to the words, and works, and ways of Jesus, cannot have been either deceivers or deceived; for in the one case, they would have lacked the moral integrity, and in the other the moral discernment, which would have made them at all capable of conceiving the idea presented to us as a reality; here and there, notwithstanding the utmost care, they must have fallen into some error of moral judgment, which would have introduced some flaw of moral character into their portrait of Jesus." —Garvie, *Studies*, p. 285.

3. *The Witness of the Lord Himself*

The more carefully the records of our Lord's life are read, the more inevitable is the conclusion that "there was no difference between holy and profane in Jesus, but all His acting, His teaching and work, His eating and drinking, also His anger and His excitement, stood under the influence of God's work. His whole life was a Divine service."[1] His formal statements, His walk with men and with God and, especially, the glimpses of His inner life that are occasionally given all protest against the thought that evil was present in Him.

From the multiform lines of testimony, all converging towards the same goal, the unerring and certain moral judgment of our Lord, His abstinence from the confession of sin and His requirement and acceptance of moral homage may be adduced.

(1) If we could, as we cannot, bring our minds as *tabulæ rasæ* to the study of the Gospel history, the first thing that would impress us is the Lord's absolute certainty of moral judgment in all the situations of life. He never evinces that moral hesitancy and suspension of judgment that every good man in the nature of things so often experiences. Now, this hesitancy of moral decision in difficult circumstances is, as a general rule, in exact proportion to the moral depth and earnestness of its subject. Where a man of the world will have no hesitancy and will act promptly and in so doing very often act unjustly, his comprehension of the significance of all human action gives pause to the spiritual man. On those who realize the eternal significance of life, moral problems weigh heavily; for the consciousness of their moral imperfection and of the consequent impairment of their moral faculties is ever present to their minds.

When, however, we turn to the Self-consciousness of

[1] Feine: *Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, p. 104.

our Blessed Lord, no such timidity is apparent. " All these influences meet in Him the unbroken resistance of a wholly Self-controlled and assured understanding that finds its source in itself and, therefore, in its grand recklessness of the external and earthly. His joy in life is unbreathed on by any unhealthy weakness of mind and expresses itself best in the words of Matt v. 8, ' Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.' His faith in God is in no wise, as it must be in the case of so many of His followers, acquired by conflict with error or begotten amid the storms of despair ; it rests as sunshine upon a vast and peaceful sea." [1]

If the moral may be illustrated from the intellectual, it will be evident that such an attitude of mind is quite impossible in a moral being who had the consciousness of having ever diverged in the smallest degree from the straight and narrow path of duty. There is no falser proverb in the language than the saying that " we learn by making mistakes." Every mistake made must be unlearned ; and the mere fact that mistakes have had to be unlearned in no wise helps us to advance in knowledge. On the contrary, it exhausts our energy and weakens that confidence in our own powers that is an essential prerequisite to our advance in knowledge, and a long continued series of failures tends to destroy our powers and usefulness.

How much more is this the case in the realm of morality ! Every sin and every diversion from the right interpretation of duty has far-reaching effects upon character. Indeed, the better a man is, the more conscious he is of his moral incapacity. How, then, are we to account for the Lord's grand perfection of moral judgment, the absolute confidence which distinguishes His moral decisions from those of all other men ? We can only do so on the ground that

[1] H. J. Holtzmann, p. 174.

He was unconscious of a single error, or deflection from, or failure to attain the perfect standard of moral action in the whole course of His experience. If not, His moral surety and definiteness of judgment both for Himself and others are among the most morally reprehensible phenomena of human history.[1]

(2) Similarly, it is simply an historical fact that just in so far as men have been holy, as they have yearned after and striven to attain moral excellence for its own sake, they have with bitter contrition and sorrow confessed their sin. The exclamation of Bishop Hooker, when condemned to the stake — "O Lord Jesus, I am hell; Thou art heaven; draw me to Thee of Thy mercy"—rings true to the experience of the saints of all religions and of all ages. There is nothing of this, however, to be found in the Lord. Nowhere is there a hint that He ever felt Himself to be morally blameworthy. It is surely significant that He whose denunciations of sin and of unrepentant sinners are the most terrible in history, whose love for sinners has been such as to earn Him the once insulting, but now most honourable, title of "the Friend of publicans and sinners," whose character, as revealed in His sacrifice of Himself, has proved the most effectual deterrent from sin and revelation of its character which the world has ever seen, who claimed the power to forgive sins, never gives a single indication that He sorrowed for His own.

On the contrary, He holds Himself up as the Moral Ideal to His followers and to the people of His time and, while exhorting them to repent and to confess their sins, He abstains from such fellowship in their devotions as would involve Him in the personal confession of sin. Never once in the whole of the Gospel

[1] "We must deny His moral sincerity and sensibility if we admit that He had sinned, however little, in the passed years of His youth." —Garvie, p. 288.

records do we read of the Lord praying in private with His disciples. To have done so, would have involved the offering of petitions for pardon, and this He could not do. In the worship of the Synagogue and the Temple it was different. There His standing before God was not that of an Individual but of a Member of a sinful community; and, as a Sinless One who had come to satisfy the holiness and love of God by the identification of Himself with sinners even in the penalty of sin, He might well express the yearnings of His heart for the pardon of His brethren in the confessions and petitions for pardon of public worship.

He bore Himself as One who was morally upright; who was, so far as the finite can be, on terms of equality with God; whose character was such that God could and must companion with Him. The greatest hour of His mental agony—the hour of Gethsemane—found Him wrestling with His God in prayer as One who deserved well of Him and who could justly look to the Holy and Righteous One for support; and finally, the dread hour of Calvary, when He lost the consciousness of the fellowship and the sympathy of the Father—when these were withdrawn from Him—forced from His lips no cry for pardon, no expression of penitence; but only the expostulatory prayer of a Sinless Sufferer, of One who knew no personal reason why He should be blasted with the wrath of God—"My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?"

(3) Another phenomenon of the Gospel story which is quite incompatible with the existence of a consciousness of guilt on our Lord's part is His requirement and acceptance of moral homage. Perhaps, the best example of this is to be found in the very incident which is almost always cited[1] as incompatible with the Lord's sinless Self-consciousness.

"There ran one to Him, and kneeled to Him, and

[1] *e.g.*, by Pfleiderer, H. Holtzmann, A. Jülicher, P. W. Schmiedel, etc.

asked Him, Good Master, what shall I do that I may inherit eternal life? And Jesus said unto him, Why callest thou Me good? none is good save One, even God. . . . One thing thou lackest; go, sell whatsoever thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven; and come, follow Me."[1]

The young ruler kneels to the Lord Jesus, addresses Him as a mere Teacher (διδασκαλε) and yet asks Him how he may attain eternal life. In other words, He takes a posture of extreme reverence, uses a self-contradictory style of address and asks the most tremendous question—a question that no mere scribe could answer. Addressed as a Rabbi but with most improper expressions of reverence (kneeling and "good"), the Lord, as a Rabbi should do, rebukes the extravagant homage offered to a fellow-creature and gives the only possible Rabbinic answer to the young man's query. When, however, the young man plainly shows that he is dissatisfied with Rabbinic legalism and that he seeks something higher, he is met by a demand—"Follow Me"—that ought not to have been made by One who was conscious of the slightest personal demerit.[2]

Indeed, the truth of the matter is, the passage will not bear the negative interpretation. If "good" refers to sinlessness and the Lord was not sinless, His neglect clearly to repudiate its ascription to Him was morally contemptible; for His answer, as recorded, was but a lame avoidance of the honour paid Him and quite insufficient (as the history of nineteen centuries has shown) to prevent a similar error. If, on the

[1] Mark x. 18, 21.

[2] How entirely sinless our Lord's character seems, even to the negative critics, Pleiderer's description of our Lord's supposed rejection of the ascription of goodness as "noble humility" shows. Dr. Nolloth justly remarks: "Where is the humility in refusing what He had no right to. Common honesty would have sufficed in such a case."—*The Person of our Lord*, p. 225.

other hand, "good" is simply a customary honorific title, the refusal to accept it was Pecksniffian and has an unpleasant savour of the Uriah Heep type of humility.

Thus, the stock passage of the negative criticism affords an ample proof of what our Lord thought Himself to be and of the homage He was willing to accept. He conceived Himself to be One who ought to be treated with the greatest reverence, who had the right to make the most tremendous claims upon the hearts and lives of men, and whose own Person was the sufficient warranty of His claims. Are these things, however, compatible with any other Self-consciousness than a sinless one? What should we have to think of One who, all the time knowing that He himself needed salvation, nevertheless tacitly accepted the ascription of moral perfection and suggested that the inheritance of eternal life was to be won by adhesion to His Person and fortunes?[1]

Unerring and unhesitating in moral judgment, never confessing the least spot or stain of sin, and demanding and accepting unqualified moral homage from His brethren, the Lord Jesus stands before the world as One whose Self-consciousness was free from the least suspicion of moral guilt or failure to attain at every moment of His earthly existence the highest possible standard of moral holiness.

There are only three explanations possible. It must have been due either to the fact that He really "knew no sin"; to an absolute lack of conscience; or to a Pharisaic perversion of His moral faculties.

[1] A worthier and truer finding of German negative criticism than that of Pfleiderer and Holtzmann, is to be found in Beyschlag's statement: "He who with incomparable keenness has pursued sin into the inmost recesses of the heart, found no shadow of guilt, even in the most critical hours of His life, arising in His own heart to transform the countenance of His Heavenly Father into the countenance of a Judge—not in the storm which threatened His life, not in the total wreck of His earthly hopes, not even in Gethsemane or on Calvary."—*N.T. Theology*, I., p. 76.

The second hypothesis may be dismissed with scant ceremony; for it makes the Moral Ideal of the world into a moral monster. Even the Frankenstein of the novelist is an easy and natural creation in comparison with One who lived, at all events, a virtually blameless life, created a new and higher type of holiness than the world had ever seen before and yet in His personal practice did not know the difference between right and wrong.

Similarly, the very fact that the Lord's life, as judged even by our sin-perverted faculties, was that of a Good Man precludes the possibility of His lack of the consciousness of sin being a Pharisaic moral perversion.

There remains, therefore, only our third explanation of the Sinless Self-consciousness of Christ; that, as our sinful self-consciousness reflects the shameful facts of our experience, so did His Sinless Self-consciousness reflect the ineffably pure and sacred experience of a development absolutely sinless and holy in all its stages. On this, there is no necessity to dwell. The instinct of our hearts and the demand of our reason alike compel our joyous assent to the conclusion that the Sinless Self-consciousness and ineffable moral influence and leadership of the Lord of Glory is simply the necessary consequence of a perfectly holy and sinless life.[1]

From the assured historic fact—if any trust may be placed in the methods of modern scientific research with regard to the sinlessness of the Lord Jesus Christ—two things inevitably follow:

1. "Christ strikes us much more by the harmony of contrary qualities. At the same time simple and

[1] "He who has removed from the eyes of us all the bandage of self-deception, and of self-righteousness, who has taugnt us all to seek forgiveness where it is to be found, He was either the Chief of sinners, for self-righteous pride is the root and climax of all sin, or He was the only Sinless One, upon whose life the peace of God rested."—B. Weiss, *Life of Christ*, III., p. 354.

sublime, full of gentleness and of virile energy, familiar and yet clothed with a Divine majesty, He eludes the characterizations of the schools, He is above all definitions. Although there was no indecision in His rich and overflowing individuality, Jesus does not represent some isolated type, but the religious man in the perfect balance of his powers; Christ reveals in His Person the most pure spiritual life to which humanity could attain."[1]

2. Can, however, such a One be the direct and unmodified Product of a sinful stock? One of the certainties of human life is the terrible fact of heredity and its grim consequence of original sin, or, at all events, of an inherited tendency to evil; and the appearance of a sinless man is a unique event in human history.

To allow the sinlessness of Christ and yet to deny His uniqueness of kind is an untenable position. Dr. Martineau is a case in point. In his "Hours of Thought" there is a remarkable sermon which represents the nearest point to Christian belief to which he ever attained. In it he maintains the thesis of the sinlessness of Christ and, while asserting that He was mere Man, merely Bone of our bone and Flesh of our flesh and nothing more, he claims that He embodied the moral nature and character of God.[2] Nevertheless, he refuses to allow that the Lord was unique in kind, because that would mean that Christ and men were incomparable. He asserts justly enough that the scale of moral notation must be the same for God as for us; but that truism has nothing to do with the fact that His querists are pressing upon the

[1] Bovon, *Dogmatique Chrétienne*, II., p. 129.

[2] "He whose intellect overarches us in the vault of the stars, whose beauty rests on the surface of the earth and sea, embodied His affections and His will in the Person of the Son of Man. By the same Divine Mind whose gentlest glories centred in that lowly Form, was the world made in which He was."—I., p. 205.

notice of the world. They are not urging that the Lord has always hit the mark—to use Dr. Martineau's most inappropriate simile—while other men only hit the mark occasionally. They plead a very different consideration. Man has sinned and has, therefore, so impaired his moral constitution that, for constitutional reasons, he can never hit the mark. When, however, we turn to the Lord Jesus Christ, we find that He has hit the mark every time. Are we to infer from that that His nature was of a different constitution from that of sin-stricken humanity? That is the question to be answered, one way or the other. Those who choose the negative answer will inevitably tend to relapse to the much lower and less morally worthy position taken up by Martineau in his "Seat of Authority in Religion"; where, in defiance of his own unanswered and unanswerable arguments in his earlier work, in defiance of the irrefragable historical proof of the sinlessness of Christ, in defiance of the testimony of the ages, he actually asserts the sinfulness of Him in whom even Pilate, Annas and Caiaphas could find no fault!

If, then, we are prepared to adhere to the scientific method, if we are willing to establish our phenomena before drawing our conclusions, if we refuse to adopt, with Martineau and the negative critics, the principles of mediæval science and to determine our facts by our principles, the indubitable historical fact of the Sinlessness of the Lord Jesus Christ forces us to the conclusion that in Him a new force entered into the world and, by renovating the stock, made sinless development a possibility.

B. The Messianic Consciousness of the Lord Jesus Christ

It is obvious that such a Self-consciousness as our Lord's could not regard Itself as in line with other

human consciousnesses. It must have instinctively felt that Its significance for the history was too great for It to live and die unnoticed; and that it was incumbent on It to discover and fulfil the duties and offices which, in a sinful world, would naturally fall to the lot of a Sinless Being.

Now, there were virtually only four forms which this official Self-consciousness of the Lord Jesus Christ could possibly take. It must either be prophetic, priestly, regal or Messianic in character. The first three of these were historical. The fourth was the hope and aspiration of the Chosen People throughout the ages. In which form was a Sinless Self-consciousness likely to express itself? It can scarcely have been one of the first three of these forms; for men who in no wise differed in kind from their fellows had in the past filled, and very nobly filled, all those offices. Hence none of them were really adequate to the expression of the Lord's unique Self-consciousness and no mere combination of them could avail for Its expression. If It was to express itself, a unique Self-consciousness required a unique office.

This was to be found in the Messianic conception. Throughout the long and stormy days of their history, this had been the comfort and solace of the people of God. In the days when fortune smiled on them and a mighty empire grew up around them, their saints and seers had sung of the more glorious kingdom of the future when the Divine Rule, commencing at Jerusalem, should gradually radiate throughout the whole earth and the Messianic King, born of David's line, should rule all the nations of the earth. When, after the death of Solomon, the kingdom was rent in twain, the patriots and godly men of Judah found their solace in the thought of the good days to come when the hand of God should reunite the scattered fragments and an undivided Israel should once again worship

at Jerusalem. When disaster followed upon disaster, when the once mighty empire of Israel had shrunk to the narrow compass of the hill city of Jerusalem and its surrounding villages, when finally the city of David was despoiled and its people carried away captive to Babylon, the lamp of Messianic hope and confidence only burned the more brightly. Its aspiration in success, its solace in disaster, the Messianic hope was to the children of Israel what the city which hath foundations, whose Builder and Maker is God, is to tried and heartbroken believers of the present day.

The hopes of the nation set upon this glorious culmination of the future, it is not surprising to find that the prophets and saints of Israel with their vivid appreciation of the Divine holiness and sovereignty (the latter, the foundation principle of the Lord's teaching about God in His earthly relations) should have been led to an ever-increasing appreciation of the holy and transcendental character of the Messianic Kingdom. Hence it is no uncommon thing to find the Lord Himself described as dwelling in the Messianic kingdom and the Messianic King invested with Divine functions and titles.

But the people of Israel did not live up to their prophetic conceptions. As has happened in the case of the New Covenant, spiritual relapse led to the loss of most of its most precious treasure and the Messianic hope of Israel lived on in a mutilated and particularized form, to which the wide sympathies, the universalism and the profound spirituality of prophetic Messianism were alien. From the close of the canon to the days of our Lord, no advance in the Messianic conceptions and aspirations of the chosen people is perceptible.

They found expression, however, in two developments —the political and the apocalyptic—which inevitably led to the destruction of the Israelitish kingdom.

The first of these formed the expression of the frantic but earthly and unsanctified patriotism to which the prosperity of the earthly state of Israel was everything. It ignored the profounder and more spiritual aspects of prophetic Messianism and it degraded the Divine election of Israel as the people of God into the favouritism of an oriental ruler. The other conception was worthier and, as the remains of its once vast literature show, also enjoyed a very wide popularity. It arose in the dark days of the Babylonish exile and gradually developed throughout that sombre period of national trial and disaster which culminated in the destruction of Jerusalem.

As disasters thickened around Israel, the old prophetic optimism was lost and the conviction grew that the Messianic Kingdom could only come through a direct intervention of the Most High. In this it was right and only reproduced the profoundest truths of prophetic Messianism; but it clothed this truth with the strangest fantasies, banished the Most High God from His universe in the present age and looked to the future for the re-establishment of the Divine sovereignty. Thus, those earthly goods which it had ceased to expect in the course of history were projected upon the clouds.

These were, then, the two main types of Messianic thought in our Lord's time; but it would be absurd to pretend that either of them was entirely and purely accepted by the people as a whole or even by a large proportion of them. The mind of man is naturally eclectic and his basic conceptions are constantly being modified by the most contradictory influences. While political Messianism borrowed (especially the popular types) from apocalyptic conceptions, strongly marked traces of political Messianism are discernible in the various extant apocalypses. Indeed, it would not be too much to say that the Messianism of our Lord's

time was a welter of conflicting and confused ideas in which only two things were really assured—that Israel was the people of God to whom the Messianic Kingdom belonged of right and that the Messianic King would be the final and ultimate Messenger of God.

In this last respect, which was also true to prophetic Messianism, the Messianic conceptions were entirely suitable for the Embodiment and Expression of a sinless Self-consciousness. They provided a unique office, a divinely promised personal conception all ready to its hand and the confusion and contradictions in popular Messianism which prevented people knowing what they were to believe and expect, left a virtually free field for a Messianic Teacher to formulate His own convictions and secured Him an interested, if not always a friendly, hearing.

Now, it is quite obvious that the Saviour did not simply take over one or the other of these conceptions and baptize it with His genius. The mere fact that there are prolonged and sometimes angry controversies as to what His Messianic conceptions really were, is sufficient to show that in the process of passing through His mind the Messianic office has been so transformed as virtually to become a new conception. This will be apparent if, paying special attention to the Self-designations, we glance at the various Messianic titles.

1. *The Christ*

The first title, and the most natural as the starting point for such an enquiry as this, is the title which is usually associated with the name of the Lord Jesus—Christ or Messiah. Originally meaning "Anointed," it naturally connoted the idea of kingship and, in a lesser degree, that of priesthood. The thought conveyed by it is of one set apart by the anointing with oil (typical of the Divine Spirit) to the fulfilment of

a special office of kingly or priestly dignity. Its associations being those of the ancient Jewish theocracy, it laid the emphasis upon the national aspect of the Messianic King and, at the same time, upon His appointment and equipment by Divine favour.

Its use in the Synoptic Gospels throws considerable light upon the significance of the term. It has become (what it had never been in the Septuagint or, apparently, in the literature of contemporary Judaism[1]) a distinct Messianic title connoting the prophesied and expected Messianic King. Apart from its use by the narrators, it is used some fifteen times (referring to some nine distinct incidents) in the Synoptic Gospels. The principal passages are to be found in the Triple Tradition. They comprise the Messianic Confession at Cæsarea, the warning against false Christs, the question put by our Lord to the scribes as to the Davidic descent of the Christ, and the question of the High Priest. The remaining three instances are all singly attested. They are the exhortation not to be called Rabbi since " One is your Master even Christ,"[2] the assurance that a cup of cold water given in Christ's name will not lose its reward,[3] and the confession by the demons.[4]

Of the three singly attested passages, we may neglect the demonic recognition. The others point to a profound spiritualization of the conception.

The usage of the term " Christ," therefore, clearly shows that the Lord conceived Himself as the prophesied Messianic King[5] and that in two respects He

[1] " It is not till the Apocalypse of Baruch (written in the latter half of the first century of the Christian era) that we find ' the Anointed ' used absolutely, as a name, *e.g.*, xxix. 3, ' the Messiah will then begin to be revealed ' (comp. xxx. 1, ' the advent of the Messiah ')."—E. A. Abbott, p. 62.

[2] Matt. xxii. 8. [3] Mark ix. 41. [4] Luke iv. 41.

[5] " He is the human Bearer of a calling which exalts Him far above all the organs of the Old Testament theocracy, and gives Him, as contrasted with all men, a unique dignity."—B. Weiss, *N.T. Theology*, p. 83.

modified the conception. He spiritualized it to some degree and He used it as a definite title.

2. *The Son of David*

This title is used about nine times in the Synoptists—twice in the Triple Tradition and three times in singly attested passages of St. Matthew. In both the incidents in the Triple Tradition and also in Matt. xx. 30, it is used in appeals for deliverance. The disciples and multitudes on the occasion of the triumphal entry into Jerusalem also use it and the people are represented on one occasion as induced by His miracles to wonder " Is not this the Son of David ? " Mention should also be made incidentally of the passage in which the Lord Himself raises the question as to how Messiah can be David's Son. It is certainly meant by those who use it as a designation for the Messianic King; but its connotation is narrower than that of the previous title. Thus, the Lord accepted the title of "Son of David" when it was given to Him; but, owing to its narrowly national and unspiritual associations, laid little emphasis upon it.

3. *The Son of Man*

The usage of this title in the present Gospels is instructive and should go far towards destroying several of the misunderstandings which cluster round the phrase.

According to Dr. Driver, the phrase is used some sixty-nine times in the Synoptic Gospels on probably forty distinct occasions. If we may count Marcan passages, attested by one or both of the other evangelists, as belonging to the original source, there are fourteen passages belonging to the Triple Tradition. Of these, three refer to the future glory of the Son of Man, eight to His suffering and resurrection, and three to His walk and work among men. (Eight passages in any case belong to the Triple Tradition, three of

which refer to the future glory, three to the sufferings and two to the life and work of the Son of Man.) About seven passages belong to Q, three of which refer to His future glory and four to His present life-work. About seventeen are to be found in singly attested passages, nine of which refer to His future glory, three to His sufferings, and four to His life-work.

If we take the Messianic confession as the pivotal point of our Lord's career, we find that of the fifteen passages referring to His future glory, all except two, both singly attested, were uttered after Cæsarea ; the eleven references to His sufferings all belong to the post-Cæsarean history ; but only one or two of the eleven references to His life and work amongst men belong to the post-Cæsarean history.

If we glance at the pre-Cæsarean and post-Cæsarean delineations separately, we shall see that there is no essential difference in the underlying conception, and yet that there is a very distinct development in Self-expression.

(1) The Son of Man is One who takes part in the ordinary social life of men,[1] but He is a Wanderer without a resting place.[2] He is the Sower of the good seed.[3] He is, therefore, so great a Sign unto His generation[4] that it needs assurance that forgiveness is possible to anyone speaking a word against Him.[5] Nothing is said as to His sufferings and the only references to His coming are the promises to the disciples at the beginning of their missionary journey—"ye shall not have finished the cities of Israel until the Son of Man be come"[6]—and the explanation of the parable of the tares given privately to His disciples. Hence there is only a private reference to directly Messianic functions

[1] Matt. xi. 19 ; Luke vii. 34.
[2] Matt. viii. 20 ; Luke ix. 56.
[3] Matt. xiii. 37.
[4] Matt. xii. 40 ; Luke xi. 30.
[5] Matt. xii. 32 ; Luke xii. 10.
[6] Matt. x. 23.

of such a kind as must have been the indispensable preliminary to the great Confession at Cæsarea.

(2) When, however, we turn to the post-Cæsarean history, all this is changed. The present dignity and authority of the Son of Man recedes into the background and the dual lines of present sufferings and future glory are the theme of the recorded sayings. Immediately the apostles have risen to the heights of spiritual discernment that rendered the Messianic confession possible, the Lord is represented as delineating it as a suffering Messiahship. The Son of man must suffer many things.[1] He shall be delivered into the hands of men,[2] to the chief priests.[3] The purpose of this is to be found in the fact that " the Son of Man came . . . to give His life a ransom for many."[4]

He will, however, return in glory,[5] and shall be seen sitting on the right hand of God.[6] He shall come to judgment,[7] and His coming shall be sudden and unexpected.[8]

If such is the conception of the Son of Man as pourtrayed in the sources, it remains for us to determine the meaning (if any) of the phrase itself.

1. We are here met by the challenge of an important and daring school of Liberal criticism which would assure us that, so far as the Lord was concerned, the phrase Son of Man really has no meaning and that it is merely of importance as helping us to determine what the New Testament writers thought of His words about Himself. We are told that the Lord spoke

[1] Mark viii. 31 ; Luke ix. 18.
[2] Matt. xvii. 22 ; Mark ix. 8 ; Luke ix. 44.
[3] Matt. xx. 18 ; Mark x. 33 ; Luke xviii. 31.
[4] Matt. xx. 28 ; Mark x. 45.
[5] Matt. xxiv. 30 ; xiii. 20 ; xxi. 27.
[6] Matt. xxvi. 24 ; Mark xiv. 62 ; Luke xxii. 69.
[7] Matt. xxv. 41-56. [8] Matt. xxiv. 27 ; Luke xvii. 24.

Aramaic and not Greek, that there is no word or phrase in Aramaic which could possibly mean "Son of Man," and that the nearest phrase was simply the indeterminate "Man."

The importance of this, if it be true, is overwhelming; for the richest and fullest proof of the Messianic conceptions of Christ and especially of His Messianic consciousness, in the opinion of the Liberal critics in question, would be utterly dissipated—and certainly would be very gravely imperilled.[1]

At the same time, there seems to be such an overwhelming array of reasons against this view that I cannot think that it will long occupy the attention of scientific theologians.

(1) In the first place, although Lietzmann, Wellhausen and Schmidt have committed themselves to it and, with their adherents, form a band of Orientalists whose opinion cannot lightly be ignored, there is no lack of Oriental and Aramaic scholarship among those who dissent from their conclusions. Dalman especially, than whom no scholar is better qualified to speak, has expressed himself exceedingly forcibly on the subject, describing the statements of Wellhausen and Lietzmann that the title Son of Man "does not exist in Aramaic, and for linguistic reasons is an impossible term" as "a grievous error which careful observation of the Biblical Aramaic alone would have rendered impossible."[2]

(2) Even if the philological point had to be conceded, it would by no means follow that the Lord did not use some such and equivalent title. Often enough,

[1] "When it is recognised that ὁ υἱος του ανθρωπου is the translation of an Aramaic *bar-nâšā*, that this term cannot, on philological grounds, have been used as a Self-designation since it naturally conveyed only the idea of 'man' in general, and that this generic use is most suitable in all instances where there is reason to suppose that a genuine utterance is found, the opinion that Jesus regarded himself as the Messiah loses its strongest support."—Schmidt, *Encyc. Bibl.*, 4739.

[2] *The Words of Jesus*, p. 239.

a very general phrase is applied in conversation either to oneself or to another and the right reference is never in doubt for a single moment. A gesture or a word or even a look is sufficient to prevent mistake.[1]

(3) There is, however, another consideration to which I am inclined to give considerable weight. Our Lord was brought up in a little country town—not a markedly isolated town—after some part of His Childhood had been spent in Egypt. Is it likely that in an age when Greek was the *lingua franca* of the civilized world, when it was the common medium between Greek and Roman and barbarian so that the title on the Cross was written in it, that One who certainly knew Himself to have a world-message would have been entirely ignorant of it? The marked prominence that our Greek Gospels give to certain Aramaic phrases ascribed to our Lord points to a fairly good acquaintance with the κοινη on His part.[2]

(4) In any case, there are two facts often forgotten in this and similar attempts to reconstruct a document in a hypothetical original. If we allow that there was an Aramaic original, it still remains true that the translators into Greek had the original before them and we have not; and, further than this, if they deliberately translated "Man" by "Son of Man" only in those passages where it seemed to be used instead of the personal pronoun by our Lord, there was a method in their madness. It is utterly unlikely that, if the original simply connoted "Man," the phrase

[1] "With regard to the philological part, I dare to assert as a layman, that Jesus could express in this case with a *status emphaticus* בַּרְנָשָׁא just that which we mean."—J. Weiss, *Predigt Jesu*, p. 164.

[2] "No doubt our Lord, as a rule, spoke in Aramaic; but, as Prof. Sanday has remarked to the present writer, it is quite possible that He may, upon occasion, have spoken also in Greek. In this case, which is more than a mere abstract possibility, the expression ὁ υἱος του ανθροπου may actually have been sometimes heard upon His lips."—Driver in Hastings' *Bible Dictionary*, IV., p. 583.

(itself untranslatable into Greek[1]) should have been systematically used of the Lord and Him alone.

(5) It must always be borne in mind that this is one of the most distinctive phrases in the Gospels—a phrase which, if found in a fragment of Greek papyrus, would most certainly lead to the ascription of the saying to the Lord Himself. It is a phrase which is peculiarly His own and that is only once found upon the lips of another. In that single and isolated instance, Stephen uses it before the Sanhedrin, " Behold, I see the heavens open and the Son of Man standing on the right hand of God."[2] This caused an outbreak because it was recognized as an assertion that the crucified Galilean Carpenter was standing in the Messiah's place. Hence the phrase (which does not seem to have been a *Messianic* title) must have been recognised by the Sanhedrin as a Self-applied title of the Lord Jesus Christ.

(6) When we look at its usage in the Gospels, the distinctive character of the title is confirmed by its usage in the Gospels. It has no synonym. Neither Son of God, nor Christ, nor the personal pronoun will give the full sense of all the passages in which it is used.[3] It is absolutely incredible, therefore, that the title should have been invented for Him by His followers. It was by no means a favourite title with the early Church; nor, indeed, for that matter, with believers of any age. If they had been desirous of inventing a title for Him, they would have emphasized His Deity, His sovereignty, His contrast with His

[1] " The truth is that, 'in Greek' properly so called, the Gospel phrase (' the son of man ') is non-existent in any possible Gospel sense." E. A. Abbott, p. xxi.

[2] Acts vii. 56.

[3] " In none of the places cited could we substitute for that name the simple personal pronoun, or the direct name of Messiah, or that of the ' Son of God ' without losing an element of essential moment for the connection of the thought."—Wendt, II., p. 148.

fellows, and not selected a phrase which emphasizes His Manhood.

(7) Finally, we may remark that the substitute proposed by Lietzmann and Wellhausen would involve our Lord's teaching in inextricable confusion. We cannot delete a characteristic and frequent phrase—especially a favourite Self-designation (and such it is in the Greek Gospels whatever may have been the case in the hypothetical Aramaic originals)—without destroying the very warp and woof of the writer's thought. Twenty minutes with a good concordance—or, better still, with one of the Gospels—and the substitution of "Man" for "the Son of Man" wherever found should be sufficient to satisfy the most pedantic scholar that the only result of this supposed linguistic find is to introduce pandemonium into—what was otherwise—sober and coherent sense. Nor is this the case with our Greek Gospels alone. It is equally true of the supposed Aramaic originals. The indeterminate "man," even if written in Aramaic, is quite incapable of giving sense and the situation can only be saved by the scarcely scientific process of assuming that the Greek translator worked over the Aramaic originals in much the same style as Shakespeare worked over the history of Henry IV. or Henry V.[1]

2. The principal types of interpretation of this remarkable phrase are of two kinds—those conceiving

[1] "The expression is said to be due to mistranslation of an Aramaic document in which 'Son of Man' occurred in the sense of 'human being.' To say so is surely to forget that the contents of the Gospel history did not circulate in the Church merely in the form of one man's translation of an Aramaic document. Granting that Mark could make the kind of mistake which is here supposed, we must remember that the story which we know only through him, must have been known to multitudes of Christians before he wrote; and if they all knew it in the true form—which *ex hypothesi* they must have done, as the mistake originated with him—it is inconceivable that there should be no trace of the true form left, and no indication of any attempt to correct Mark." —Denney, *Jesus and the Gospel*, pp. 308-309.

it as originally and primarily Messianic in character and those regarding it essentially an assertion of representative manhood.

We owe to Schleiermacher the original statement of the "Representative Man" theory. Its essential defect is that it is a hopeless anachronism. Such an abstraction is quite foreign to all that it is known of contemporary modes of thought. It might possibly have been conceived by a Greek. It could not by a Jew. Even to the thought of St. Paul who had certainly drunk deep of the wells of Attic wisdom, even to Philo and St. John whose thought is steeped in the philosophy of Hellas, such a conception is entirely alien. Hence —were it not for the remarkable theory which forms Dr. Edwin Abbott's latest contribution to the thought of the age—we might pass on to the consideration of the Messianic interpretations of the phrase.

After an elaborate examination of the evidence for a Messianic origin of the title "Son of Man," Dr. Abbott thus states his working hypothesis; "Jesus called Himself 'Son of Adam,' and that He had in view the fact that Ezekiel was similarly called, after he had seen a vision of One like a man above the throne heaven. . . . The fundamental meaning seems to have been (according to our working hypothesis) that Jesus, though knowing Himself to be akin to the Humanity of God in heaven from whence He heard Himself hailed as Son of God, preferred to dwell on the thought that He was akin to the divinity of man on earth. In this character, He desired to make Himself loved, trusted and reverenced with an unconscious worship so deeply rooted in the hearts of His disciples that they could not eradicate it when the departure of His bodily presence in death, and the outpouring of His compensating Spirit after death, forced them to recognize Him consciously and worship Him consciously, as being still indeed

Son of Man, but of such a Man as could not be separated from God."[1]

The principal evidence on which Dr. Abbott relies in proof of this most interesting hypothesis is to be found in the fact that, while the Hebrew of Ezekiel constantly refers to the prophet as *baradam*, there is no proof that the Aramaic *bar nasa* was ever used as a designation. He justly points out the virtual breakdown of the Messianic and apocalyptic interpretation of the term and claims that his hypothesis explains the origin of the important Pauline doctrine of the Second Adam.[2] His main proof, however, is to be found in the alleged comprehensiveness of His interpretation which, like its rivals, is supposed to explain the marked contrasts connected with the title.

At the same time, it cannot be admitted that the hypothesis is either adequate or satisfactory. To say that Son of Man is equivalent to "'Adam or Man, according to God's intention,' or 'divine humanity'"[3] is really to put an abstraction upon the Lord's lips. It is to modernize Him, to bring Him up-to-date in accordance with the conceptions of Liberal and Hegelian criticism. If it means that the Lord is to be taken as using the phrase "Son of Man" in the expectation that it would clearly teach the people of His time that He claimed to be the

[1] Abbott, *The Son of Man*, p. 118.

[2] "Most important of all, however, is the indirect testimony of Paul. He habitually thinks of Christ as the spiritual Man cancelling the sin of the earthly Man. The name of Adam he never mentions without the thought of Christ as the Saviour of Adam and all his race; and on one occasion he actually calls Christ the Second Man, or Last Adam. If he could have derived such doctrine from Jewish sources this evidence might leave us doubtful as to the origin whence Paul derived it. 'Was it Gamaliel,' we might ask, 'or was it Jesus?' But it can be shown that no Pharisæan origin was possible. Not till the Middle Ages did Jewish mysticism begin to use such language. We are therefore driven to the conclusion that Paul either invented it in the course of his meditations on Christ, or else derived it from Christ's teaching."—Abbott, p. 18-19.

[3] p. 74.

Divine Humanity, the phrase must be regarded as a very grave and fatal anachronism.[1]

The usage of the phrase in Ezekiel is also radically different from the New Testament usage. In Ezekiel it only refers to the prophet not as representative man and, therefore, of unique historical importance, but as one who is utterly humble and lowly in the sight of God. Whereas the Son of Man, according to the hypothesis, would refer to representative manhood, well pleasing in the sight of God, the Ezekiel usage emphasizes his lowliness and insignificance.

Perhaps, Dr. Abbott's most effective argument is derived from the fact that it might possibly give us a *nexus* between the Lord's teaching and the Pauline doctrine of the "Second Adam." This is certainly important and would be of considerable importance to us, were it not that the context of the Pauline doctrine shows clearly in what sense the Apostle conceived the Lord to be the Second Adam. It certainly was not in the sense that He was the "divine humanity." The Apostle had too vivid a realization of the Deity of His Lord to spend thought or energy upon a mere verbal abstraction. His doctrine is derived from the fact that in virtue of the resurrection-life of its Redeemer and on the basis of His atoning death, a new humanity has been created, each member of which must be born again, of water and of the Spirit—to use a convenient Johannine phrase which expresses without essential modification the gist of St. Paul's theory of the application of the Redemptive work of Christ. As the old humanity had Adam, of the earth earthy, as its representative and head and derived from him its heritage of sin and death, so the

[1] At the same time, too much can easily be made of the argument that a given conception is an anachronism; for the fact that each successive age appreciates and emphasizes some element of the Lord's character and teaching which previous ages entirely missed is sufficient proof that very much of our Lord's teaching was anachronistic. Indeed, it would not be untrue to say that He Himself is the Anachronism of history.

new humanity has for its Representative and Head the Lord from heaven and derives from Him its heritage of acceptance before God and everlasting life. There is, therefore, no likely or possible connection between the doctrine of the Second Adam and the designation "Son of Man" or "Son of Adam." Assuming Dr. Abbott to be right, the phrase must have been prominent in St. Paul's thought. How is it, then, that neither he, nor any of his followers, nor any other early believers seem to have used it? St. Paul certainly refers on slight occasions to the example of our Lord, yet he never mentions the phrase which, on this hypothesis, connoted the representative character of the Lord's Manhood. Such facts do not accord with the hypothesis and preclude a whole-hearted acceptance of Dr. Abbott's brilliant and ingenious theory.

3. We must now glance at the most prevalent interpretation of the phrase—the Messianic. The older type of this theory derived the expression directly from Daniel vii. 13, and relied upon the futuristic and transcendental character of many of the Gospel references. The newer form of the theory, while not denying the ultimate Danielic reference of the phrase, finds its immediate source in the "Similitudes of Enoch." Its most attractive and convincing statement is to be found in the pages of Dr. Charles's "Book of Enoch."

His argument may be outlined as follows: "In Daniel the phrase seems merely symbolical of Israel, but in Enoch it denotes a supernatural person."[1] The Similitudes "furnish the first instance in which the definite personal title appears in literature."[2] "This title, with its supernatural attributes of superhuman glory, of universal dominion and supreme judicial powers, was adopted by our Lord."[3] "Yet these

[1] p. 315. [2] p. 315. [3] p. 316.

supernatural claims were to be vindicated not after the external Judaistic conceptions of the Book of Enoch, but in a revelation of the Father in a sinless and redemptive life, death and resurrection. . . . This transformed conception of the Son of Man is thus permeated throughout by the Isaiah conception of the Servant of Jehovah. . . . If then we bear in mind the inward synthesis of these two ideals of the past in an Ideal, nay in a Personality transcending them both, we shall find little difficulty in understanding the startling contrasts that present themselves in the New Testament in connection with this designation."[1] "Though the phrase was a current one, our Lord's use of it must have been an enigma, not only to the people generally, but also to His immediate disciples, so much that they shrank from using it."[2]

Attractive as the theory is, its difficulties are even greater than those which beset Dr. Abbott's theory.

(1) It seems to be established that the phrase "Son of Man," though sometimes applied to the Messiah, was not a Messianic title in New Testament times.

According to Dr. Abbott, "Son of Man"—so far as is known at present—is not to be found, as a Messianic title, in Talmuds, Targums, Midrash, or any early Jewish literature, whether Hebrew or Aramaic."[3]

This is entirely borne out by the New Testament. Its whole tenour is accordant with the belief that "Son of Man" was not recognized as a Messianic title by the Jews of the time. The phrase is only used by the Saviour Himself and, with the single exception of its use by St. Stephen, is never found on the lips of any other person. If it had been a generally recognised Messianic title, or recognized by anybody as of Messianic significance, the Lord's use (which was by no means secret or confined to the narrow circle of His most

[1] p. 316. [2] p. 317. [3] p. 265.

intimate disciples) must have published the fact of His Messiahship to the world. Yet we know that this was not the case and that, so far from our Lord publishing His Messianic claims, He straitly charged His disciples at Cæsarea that they should not make Him known.

We may also refer to the character of the High Priest's question and of our Lord's response.[1] It is evident that, while the Messianic claims of the Lord were suspected, the High Priest was not absolutely sure of his ground. If, however, the Son of Man were a definite Messianic title, the High Priest must have recognized it. Instead of that, he used two recognized Messianic phrases—" the Christ " and " the Son of the Blessed." Then the Lord answered, " I am ; and ye shall see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of Power and coming in the clouds of heaven." If Son of Man was simply a synonym for Messiah, why did the Lord use the personal pronoun to assert His Messiahship and then use what, on the Messianic interpretation, would be a pompous redundancy ? Wherein lay the offence of the statement that Messiah would be seen in His expected place ? On the other hand, the offence of the claim that He was the Messiah would certainly be heightened by the use of a known and present Self-designation.

Another consideration which goes to support this reading of the New Testament witness as to the contemporary Jewish conception (if any) of the " Son of Man " is to be found in the single instance of its usage in the apostolic records. After his speech before the Sanhedrin, St. Stephen cried, " Behold, I see the heavens opened and the Son of Man standing on the right hand of God."[2] What could have been the offence of the assertion that he saw the Messiah standing on the right hand of God ? That was the customary apocalyptic conception among the Jews and, if that belief had

[1] Mark xiv. 61-62. [2] Acts vii. 56.

been regarded as blasphemy, the Jewish race would have been more than decimated. If, however, Son of Man was not conceived as a Messianic title, but was simply a known Self-designation of the Lord, the offence and the blasphemy would naturally seem monstrous. How is that the favourite Self-designation of the Lord did not find its way into popular favour? According to the hypothesis it should have been the favourite expression in the apostolic and sub-apostolic Church.[1] Yet, at the very time when the thought of Messianic glory was most present to the hearts of Christian people, the phrase pre-eminently connected in sacred lore and current literature with the future glory seems never to have been used!

We may also incidentally remark that the judgment of successive generations of believers has confirmed the early Christian attitude towards this phrase. No title or designation of the Lord is so little used by Christian people. The supreme Messianic title "Christ" being the most widely used of all His titles both in the New Testament and in the practice of Christian people, it is quite useless to attempt to explain this neglect by reference to the Messianic associations of the "Son of Man." Even if the phrases were synonymous, it would do but little honour to the Lord to repudiate the title that He incessantly used of Himself in favour of a phrase which is never once found on His lips in immediate connection with His own Person.

Our last important source of information is to be found in the Apocalyptic writings. Here the evidence is conflicting. On the one hand, Dr. Charles insists

[1] "Again, it was partly because no words of Christ were profoundly interesting to the commoner sort of Christian in the first half of the first century unless they dealt with damnation, or the date of the Last Day, or were connected with those great and special Messianic actions in the course of which He wrought His most startling miracles, or by which He was supposed to have purchased salvation for mankind."—Abbott, pp. 9-10.

that the phrase as used in Enoch is a Messianic designation. On the other, Dr. Abbott is equally certain that the phrase is not a Self-designation and, in common with other eminent scholars, suggests that the passages in question are post-Christian.

The fact that in most apocalypses it is principally used to designate the lowliness of the person to whom it refers goes far to confute the hypothesis that it was recognised, even in apocalyptic circles, as a Messianic title. Even the "Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs," which were unquestionably influenced profoundly by the "Similitudes of Enoch," never use the phrase of the Messiah, but only in contrasting the weakness of man with the exaltation and power of God. Though the two passages in Enoch in which the phrase is used of Enoch himself are regarded as interpolations by Dr. Charles, they go to prove that, to those influenced by the Enochic literature, the phrase was not distinctively Messianic. There is, therefore, no presumption in favour of the distinctively Messianic character of the phrase in the circles most influenced by Enoch; but, on the contrary, some presumptions against Dr. Charles's interpretation of the passages in question.

When, however, we turn to them, we find it indisputable that the supernatural being "whose countenance had the appearance of a man and his face was full of graciousness, like one of the holy angels," is described as "that Son of Man" by Enoch in his question to the angel who replies, "This is the Son of Man who hath righteousness;[1]" or that "that Son of Man" is described as "named in the presence of the Lord of Spirits"[2]; or that it is said that the nations will "see that Son of Man sitting on the throne of His glory[3];" or, finally, that universal dominion is ascribed to "that Son of Man."[4]

[1] Enoch xlvi.
[2] *Ibid.* xlviii.
[3] *Ibid.* lxii.
[4] *Ibid.* lxii.

Now, it will be observed that in three of the passages cited the phrase is a simple adoption of the descriptive phrase used by Enoch himself, and in the fourth Enoch's words are only slightly modified. Hence, the actual phrase seems only to occur once; and, in all other cases, the phrase used is simply descriptive of the appearance of the Supernatural Being in question. In truth, it is scarcely more definite than the original Danielic usage.[1]

We, therefore, conclude (1) that the phrase was not a Messianic title in the time of our Lord; (2) that it is used rather as a description than as a title in the Book of Enoch; and (3) that there is room for suspension of judgment as to whether our Lord was directly influenced by the Book of Enoch.[2]

[1] This would be much more apparent if we substituted small letters for Dr. Charles's capitals. They are an interpretation rather than a translation and to readers of the New Testament connote perhaps more than the original writer meant to convey.

[2] In fairness to Dr. Charles, we must cite his note on the Messianic conception as found in Enoch, p. 128-129 :—

"The Messiah is conceived in the Similitudes as (1) the Judge of the world, (2) the Revealer of all things, (3) the Messianic Champion and Ruler of the righteous. (1) As Judge, he possesses (*a*) righteousness, (*b*) wisdom, and (*c*) power. (*a*) He is the righteous One in an extraordinary sense, he possesses righteousness, and it dwells with him, and on the ground of his essential righteousness has he been chosen no less than according to God's good pleasure. (*b*) Wisdom, which could find no dwelling-place on earth, dwells in him, and the spirit of Him who giveth knowledge, and the secrets of wisdom stream forth from his mouth, and wisdom is poured out like water before him. (*c*) In him abides the spirit of power, and he possesses universal dominion. (2) He is Revealer of all things. His appearance will be the signal for the revelation of good and the unmasking of evil; will bring to light everything that is hidden, alike the invisible world of righteousness and the hidden world of sin; and will recall to life those that have perished on land and sea, and those that are in Sheol and hell. Evil, when once unmasked, will vanish from his presence. Hence all judgment has been committed unto him, and he will sit on the throne of his glory, and all men and angels will be judged before him, and no lying utterance will be possible before him, and by the mere word of his mouth will he slay the ungodly. (3) He is the Messianic Champion and Ruler of the righteous, and has already been revealed to them. He is the avenger of their life, the preserver of their inheritance; he will vindicate the earth as their possession for ever, and establish the community of the righteous in unhindered prosperity; their faces will shine with joy, and they will be vestured with life, and be resplendent with light, and he will abide in the closest communion with them for ever, in the immediate presence

(2) The hypothesis that "Son of Man" has a distinctively Messianic meaning, current in the New Testament times, is involved in hopeless difficulties. Either the Lord published His Messianic claims by His use of the phrase—in which case His career would not have lasted three weeks; or else, in view of the consistent representation that before and after Cæsarea the Lord freely used the phrase in public and private alike, the main outlines of the Synoptic delineation of the course of events must be regarded as incorrect. The only possible method of escape would be the arbitrary and unhistorical conception of Schweitzer and the eschatologists that the Messiahship was entirely future. But the assumption, necessitated by this theory, that the Lord only used the phrase after Cæsarea is nullified by the character of His usage during the latter part of His ministry. It is so constant and excites so little remark that it is in the highest degree unlikely that He began to use it after the great confession.[1]

We conclude, then, that the Messianic-apocalyptic origin of the phrase is quite inconsistent with the available evidence; that its strength lies in the recognition of the fact that the Lord undoubtedly (as possibly others before Him) associates it with indubitable Messianic conceptions; and, finally, that the explanation of our Lord's adoption of the title "Son of Man" must be sought elsewhere than in contemporary Messianic conceptions.

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of the Lord of Spirits, and his glory is for ever and ever, and his might unto all generations. . . . . Hence he is called 'the Elect One.' His lot . . . hath surpassed everything in uprightness. . ."

[1] "Is it really credible that our Lord first used the expression of Himself, after Peter's confession at Cæsarea Philippi? Is not the familiar manner in which He used the title, if not in the question put to Peter, yet directly after it, without exciting any comment or surprise, sufficient evidence that it must have been often used by Him previously, and that it was an expression which, whatever special ideas it may have been intended to convey, was well understood to denote Himself?"—Driver in Hastings' *Bible Dictionary*, p. 586.

4. Where, then, are we to look for the source from which our Lord derived His favourite Self-designation?

A recital of the main ideas with which the use of the phrase is connected will, perhaps, assist us in our enquiry. They are, roughly speaking, statements as to the lowliness of Christ, His authority, His sufferings and His glory. Now, is there any single passage of Scripture or any Scriptural conception which (1) combines these ideas; (2) is Messianic in character; (3) but not recognised as such by the Jews of our Lord's time; (4) and known by us to have been much in our Lord's mind and definitely to have influenced His thought?

There is only one passage which fulfils all these conditions. The Isaianic prophecy of the Suffering Servant was certainly of capital importance in our Lord's eyes. It pourtrays One who will deal prudently, who will be as a Root of a dry ground, who will bear the sins of many, who will be despised and rejected of men, who will pour out His soul unto death and who, nevertheless, will see His seed, prolong His days, divide the spoil with the strong and make intercession for the transgressors.[1]

Here, then, the main thoughts, from humiliation to ultimate and super-earthly glory, associated by our Lord with the title "Son of Man" are already combined and unified in a passage of the prophetic Scriptures. Three general considerations which go to bear out this hypothesis may be given. Since the passage profoundly influenced our Lord, since, indeed (as Dr. Abbott has most justly pointed out[2]), it gave rise to one of His dominant conceptions—that of *paradosis*, of being delivered up for the sins of the people; since before His time the passage was in no sense of the term regarded as Messianic and its main thought—that of

[1] If Dr. Thirtle is right in his identification of the type of the Suffering Servant with Hezekiah, the force of this interpretation is enormously strengthened.—See his *Old Testament Problems*.

[2] See *Paradosis*.

service—constituted His chiefest original addition to the popular Messianic conception; there can be but little doubt—apart from the linguistic problem—as to the intimate relation between our Lord's conception of the Son of Man and the prophecy of the Suffering Servant.

More than this, the reference of the conception to the prophecy of the Suffering Servant of Jehovah leaves room for a natural development of our Lord's thought. It is passing difficult to understand how the thought of the Suffering Servant could be grafted on to the apocalyptico-Messianic conception of the glorious and Supernatural Sovereign and Judge; but, given the fact that there is a germinal conception in Is. liii. of an eschatological glorification of the Suffering Servant, the later conceptions of Daniel form the natural corollary to the life and labours of the Suffering Servant. Nor does our view necessarily preclude the taking over of the phrase "Son of Man" from Daniel. Indeed, it lends itself to the thought; for it emphasizes the real, underlying unity of the Old Testament conceptions of the Coming One.

This view has the advantage of recognizing and conserving what is too often ignored or minimized—the originality of our Lord's Messianic conceptions. Most modern scholars theoretically admit this and immediately proceed to attempt to explain them either in terms of Scriptural or of contemporary conceptions. Such a method is entirely wrong. It is not by the elements derived from external sources that the character of creative work is principally determined; but by its fundamental and original conceptions. Hence one of the chief advantages of this hypothesis is that it allows free play to the creative character of our Lord's thought which, having by virtue of its profound and natural originality perceived the Messianic character of the two great prophecies of

Isaiah and Daniel for the first time in the history of the world, assimilated and took up into itself the true elements contained in the popular and prevalent Messianic conceptions.

This theory is not only free from the objection which lies against the Representative Man theory (even in Dr. Abbott's presentation) of being abstract and alien to Jewish modes of thought; it also preserves the essential truth of the comprehensive character of Christ's Manhood in the form most natural and acceptable to Jewish thought. It is also free from the difficulties involved in the attempt to treat the phrase as current Messianic coinage and it explains the reason why the Lord's Messianic claims did not at once become public property. The Messiahship conceived through the prophecy of the Suffering Servant would scarcely seem a Messianic conception to those who were nurtured in the popular Messianic hopes. Hence it is not surprising that the Messianic dignity of the Lord—obscured by the thought of His sufferings, an element of His thought which even His followers never really assimilated—would not merely be doubtful but actually incredible to His contemporaries.

It is also in accordance with our Lord's habits of thought and mind as revealed in His general practice. Is it conceivable that One, to whom the traditions of men were anathema as making the Word of God of none effect, would have taken His favourite Self-designation from those very traditions which, even among the traditions of men, were distinguished by their arbitrariness, essential obscurity and baselessness and, thus, taught His disciples by example to do the very thing which by precept He unqualifiedly condemned ?[1]

[1] "Jesus, who protested against the supplanting of the law by the traditions of the Pharisees, was not likely to avail Himself largely of Enochian developments of Scripture even for the purposes of popular teaching."—E. A. Abbott, p. 55.

On the contrary, it is most conceivable that He should turn to those prophetic Scriptures, regarded by Him as Divine in origin and as testifying of Himself, and derive from them the seed-thoughts of those dominant conceptions which determined both the substance and form of His teaching.

This view is much more in accordance with our Lord's habits of mind and thought than either of the rival theories. Whereas the Representative Man theory approaches the thought of service through that of world-significance and the Messianic through that of Kingship and regal dominion either human or superhuman, it approaches the thoughts of world-significance and regal dominion through that of service. It is true in this to the presentation of the Gospels and to the thought of Him whose life was one of service and Self-sacrifice as making the phrase in question primarily denote humility and service.

Again, it explains the objection which lies against both the rival hypotheses—of not explaining the abstinence of apostolic and post-apostolic times from the use of their Lord's favourite Self-designation.[1] That others should abstain from using a phrase which primarily denoted His humility and sufferings is not only conceivable but right. The natural and right attitude, the only seemly language, for those who realize what He has done is that of humble adoration and praise. He who was obedient unto death has been given in Christian belief the Name which is above every name, and, while our all is based upon His work of Self-sacrifice and expiation, our thought of Him, of Him with whom we believe ourselves to have personal fellowship and communion, is the thought of One who is exalted at the right hand of God, in whom we also are risen and glorified.

[1] "The main point is to understand that Jesus alone called Himself 'the Son of Man,' and that no one else did so."—Dalman, *The Words of Jesus*, p. 252.

4. *The Son of God*

Our Lord's other Self-designation—the "Son of God" or "the Son"—is much less frequently recorded in the Synoptic Gospels. On the other hand, it is used of Him and in conversation with Him on several occasions. The distribution of the phrase and its equivalent ("My Son") in the Synoptic Gospels is very instructive. Altogether it is used twenty-seven times. Nine of these (in the accounts of the Baptism, the Transfiguration and the Trial) belong to the Triple Tradition (to which we may also ascribe two further instances common to St. Mark and another Synoptist—its use by the demoniac and by the centurion); it is twice found in Q—in the account of the Temptation; and ten times in a single Gospel. Of these singly attested usages, five belong to St. Matthew, three to St. Luke and two to St. Mark. In the Triple Tradition, it is twice ascribed to God on the occasions of the Baptism and the Transfiguration; to the centurion who guarded the Cross and to the demoniac at Gadara. In Q, it is ascribed to Satan on the occasion of the temptation. In the *Sondergut* of St. Mark, it is used in the superscription of the Gospel and by demoniacs; in St. Matthew's it occurs as the name of the peacemakers, as used in the great Messianic confession, and by the disciples after the walk on the sea, as used by the mockers at Golgotha and as ascribed by them to the Lord Himself. St. Matthew ascribes the equivalent phrase—"the Son"—on three occasions to the Lord Himself; St. Mark does so once; so also St. Luke. That used by St. Mark and St. Matthew probably belongs to the Triple Tradition; and the great saying in St. Matthew xi. 27, St. Luke x. 22 belongs to Q. Hence there is only one *Sondergut* usage—that of the baptismal formula, St. Matthew xxviii. 19. The best of the hypothetical sources, therefore, attests the phrase certainly three and, probably, five times;

the second best, thrice; and the *Sondergüter* eleven times. Hence the distribution in our historical sources is sufficient to establish its historical character.[1]

1. A glance at the various passages in which it is used will be sufficient to show that, when used by others than the Lord Himself, it has uniformly a Messianic significance.

(1) It is the primary meaning of the great Divine attestations on the occasions of the Baptism and the Transfiguration.[2] It is quite impossible to think (although of course, a profounder significance than the official is not thereby excluded) that the purpose of the Father was to convince either the Lord or those who waited for the Messianic salvation that the Subject of Baptism or even of the Transfiguration was ontologically affiliated to the Divine Being. To the One, to whom the fact was attested by His daily and hourly experience or not at all, it would not be necessary. The others were not ready to receive it and the attempt to reveal it to them would only have diverted their attention from the main issue then before the people of God—the recognition of the Messianic King. On the contrary, if it has an official reference, the experimental value and the intelligibility of these great attestations are obvious to the meanest intelligence. Coming to the Lord at the beginning of His ministry as Messiah, the baptismal attestation was to Him a sort of Divine seal or sacrament which attested his calling and, at the same time, formed a

[1] "If criticism can produce no valid objection against the tradition that our Lord towards the end of His ministry called Himself the Son of Man (in the sense of Daniel), so, in my opinion, there is still less ground for hesitation in accepting the genuineness of the tradition that our Lord called Himself 'the Son,' because it is absolutely impossible to imagine how He was the future Messiah without first knowing Himself as standing in an unique relationship to God."—Harnack, *The Sayings of Jesus*, p. 301.

[2] "Hence it is clear that the voice is intended to signify the Divine good pleasure, not towards the Person of Jesus as such, but towards Him as the agent of a special mission."—Dalman, p. 280.

Divine countersignature to His Messianic claims which could be appreciated by the members of the more spiritually-minded Messianic circles.

The same thing applies to the attestation at the Transfiguration. The Lord then appeared in Messianic glory to the inner circle of His followers and was revealed to it as the Messiah prophesied by Daniel. The disciples had recognized Him as the Messiah at Cæsarea; but had been utterly perplexed by His assertion of the sufferings, alien to the Messianic idea in its political form at all events, which must befall Him. The Transfiguration revealed the Lord as the transcendent and glorious Messiah of Daniel and apocalyptic imagery rather than the merely earthly Son of David. Hence, when the disciples were in such confusion of thought that St. Peter spoke, "not knowing what he said," there was a second Divine attestation of the Messianic and official Sonship of Him whom they had hailed as Messiah. As the attestation of the Baptism had declared to all who had ears to hear that the lowly Carpenter of Nazareth was indeed the Messianic King, so the attestation on the Mount of the Transfiguration confirmed the transcendental and super-earthly character of His Messiahship.

(2) Similarly, the disciples' usage of the phrase is only—at all events, historically—capable of a Messianic reference. Its use by Peter on the occasion of the great Messianic Confession, is quite sufficient to attest this.[1] It is in the highest degree unlikely that the thought of the ontological Sonship of Christ had ever entered the head of any of the disciples. There is every

[1] The criticism of Dalman and others that the phrase does not belong to the original tradition but is an editorial edition, seems to me to be beside the point. The whole point of the first three Gospels is to establish the Messiahship of Christ, and they would naturally achieve this best (as St. Mark and St. Luke) by simply emphasizing the title Christ. Why, then, should St. Matthew, admittedly the latest of the Synoptists, who wrote at a time when the Divine Sonship of Christ was a universal tenet of the Church, insert the phrase in a connection

presumption against it. If the Lord had said in unmistakeable terms, "I am the Son of God, being of one substance with the Father," He would certainly have been regarded as mad and His disciples would have fallen away from Him. If, on the other hand, they had learned to regard the Messiah, like the Israelitish King in the Old Testament, as the official Son of God, it is supremely natural that their conviction that He was the Messiah of Israel (the political Messiah who should restore the Kingdom into Israel) should find expression in the noblest title of the theocratic King.

It had been ascribed to Him on a previous occasion, before the Messianic confession, by the disciples. The occasion was when He came to them walking on the sea. Here again, granted that they meant the phrase as a Messianic title, its application is most natural; but there is as little reason to think that the Evangelist thought that the disciples thereby meant an ontological Sonship as there is to think that that was their meaning. However consonant such a Nature miracle may be with an ontological interpretation of our Lord's Sonship, it would be quite insufficient to call forth such an expression of belief from people to whom the thought was still alien. We may take it, therefore, that, on all occasions during our Lord's earthly life on which the phrase "Son of God" was applied to Him by His disciples, it connoted nothing more nor less than the Christ.

(3) While in view of the fact that no charge of ditheism was ever made against Him and of His condemnation on a Messianic charge, the suggestion that His contemporaries conceived Him to have

which would make it synonymous with the lower and less vital truth of the Messiahship of Christ? It should be observed that this is the case throughout his Gospel. In it, in the latest of the three Synoptic treatises, the phrase 'Son of God' is constantly given in instances which do not allow any other reference than a Messianic. Surely this fact is a great attestation of the historical character of the Gospel as a whole.

claimed that He was ontologically the Son of God is simply grotesque, the Jews would have had no difficulty in understanding, as soon as they realized that He claimed to be the Messiah, that He conceived Himself as possessing an official Sonship similar to that ascribed to the theocratic King in the Old Testament.

(4) Nor is the use by the centurion incompatible with the Messianic reference. Here the phrase "Son of God" only differs from that with which the Lord was taunted by the Jews, "Son of the God," in the omission—natural to a Roman soldier—of the defining article which makes it monotheistic. In other words, where the Jews had said in mockery, "a Son of God," the centurion said in all seriousness, "a Son of a God." Hence it is quite permissible to read the passage as a heathen soldier's version of the official Sonship of the Messiah and, therefore, as a confession of the superhuman character of the Lord rather than as a statement of an ontological Sonship. This latter meaning, in any but a polytheistic sense of the phrase, *υιος θεου* will not bear.

(5) Whatever may have been the origin of the strange phenomenon of "demoniac possession," it certainly could not have given its unhappy subjects any knowledge of the ontological Sonship of their Redeemer; but it might easily have quickened their perception for the abnormal and predisposed them to draw far-reaching conclusions. Hence we may accept their testimony to the Messianic character of the Lord as in no wise inconsistent with what we know of the circumstances.

(6) The whole point of the Temptation admittedly lies in its Messianic reference and yet the challenge of the Evil One to the Tempted is "If Thou be the Son of God." If the Tempter had been conceived as knowing the ontological filiation of the Son, would he have

been represented as inviting Him to fall down and worship him? The very thought that he would have attempted to seduce One whom he knew to be the Second Person of the Divine Trinity in the Form of a Servant to stray from the paths of righteousness is painfully absurd. The conclusion, therefore, is inevitable that it was as the Messiah of Israel, as the official Son of God, who possessed no essential unity of nature with God, that the Lord was challenged by Satan to prove that He was verily and indeed the Son of God.

(7) On the two occasions[1] during His earthly life in which our Lord refers to Himself as "the Son" there is a marked difference in the meaning of the phrase. Whereas on all occasions of the use of the related phrases the Messianic reference is primary and often exclusive, in neither of the incidents under discussion is it even prominent. Undoubtedly they could be so understood—at all events, to the extent that His hearers would accept them as related to the Messiah—but, nevertheless, their essential and natural meaning is quite inconsistent with a primary reference to even the highest apocalyptic conceptions of the Jews. As we must carefully discuss these phrases in another connection, we need only remark the fact that, as our Lord personally abstained from the use of the other Messianic titles, Christ and Son of David, but freely accepted them from the lips of others, so, while He Himself never used "Son of God" in a purely Messianic sense, He accepted and approved it as a Messianic title.

Hence we are driven to the conclusion that in every single instance (with the probable exception, worthless save as a testimony to the transcendental character of the Lord's Personality, of the confession of the cen-

[1] This, of course, refers to the Synoptic records. While accepting the historicity of the Fourth Gospel, I make no use of it in the present enquiry as it is not accepted by the negative critics as a genuinely historical source.

turion who stood by the Cross) that the phrase " Son of God " is applied to the Lord by others, its primary and essential significance is that of official Sonship and that it must be read as a synonym for the Messiah—a synonym, however, which, in certain cases, does not necessarily exclude the possibility of a profounder and infinitely more sacred connotation.

2. A question, however, arises which we must not forget. Was " the Son of God " really a Messianic title? To answer this, a glance at the Old Testament usage will be necessary. There the phrase has several meanings. It is freely used of angels, of the theocratic king and of Israel, the chosen people of God; but, save in a few Messianic passages, there is no reason to think that it ever connotes more than unity of sympathy and an especial place of privilege as the chosen object of Divine Love.[1]

It is, however, a most remarkable fact that there is as little evidence of the " Son of God " being conceived as a Messianic title as we saw there to be in the case of the other Self-designation, " Son of Man." One would have thought that the constant ascription of the title to the theocratic King[2] and the remarkable phrase " Thou art My Son, this day have I begotten Thee," in the Second Psalm, would have rendered such an identification inevitable.[3] On the contrary, " there is

[1] " The history of the term ' Son of God ' in the pre-Christian period, is the history of a gradual heightening and concentration of meaning in connection with the culminating point of Biblical revelation. The use of the term is at first rather poetic or rhetorical than, in the strict sense, theological. It is applied to a number of objects in such a way as to invest them with a special relation of nearness and appreciation on the part of God; but it did not denote any essential partaking in the Divine nature."—Sanday in Hastings' *Bible Dictionary*, IV., p. 570.

[2] " In view of the fact that the king of Israel was called a Son of God, it is somewhat strange that there is so little evidence of its use as a title of the coming Messiah."—Schmidt, *Enc. Bib.*, 4694.

[3] " The Messianic interpretation of the psalm is not found so frequently as might have been expected. The book of Enoch originally contained no allusion whatever to Psalm ii., which justifies an inference that a non-Messianic view of the psalm was common enough."—Dalman, p. 269.

no passage in Jewish literature that can be confidently dated as earlier than Christianity, in which this name is given to the Messiah."[1]

How, then, are we to account for the fact that this phrase is presented in the Gospels not as an ontological description of the Lord but as a definite Messianic title, and that it is represented as used by friends and opponents alike? The early Christians certainly cannot be held accountable; for, at the time when our Gospels were written, the phrase had already a primarily ontological meaning and connoted to Gentile and to Jew an eternal and essential filiation of the Son of the heavenly Father. The conclusion, therefore, is inevitable. As the Lord, passing by the traditions of His time and leaving on one side the current Messianic phrases, had found in the Scriptures of His race a title (Son of Man) fit for constant and public use and free from associations of the current Messianism, into which He could put His own meaning and by which He could convey to the mind of His age the thought of One of final authority, yet suffering and dying and ultimately to be glorified; so another unrecognized and unused Messianic title which, while clearly Scriptural and permissible (once the Messianic reference of the phrase was pointed out), was capable of mediating His experience of Divine Sonship in a form which the people of His time could understand and assimilate,[2] was found by Him in the same Divine Revelation.

[1] Schmidt, *Enc. Bibl.*, 4694.

[2] Curiously enough, the strongest evidence in favour of this hypothesis is to be found in the Fourth Gospel, which the principles of this enquiry preclude my citing as an authority. It is a most remarkable fact that there is considerable evidence in the very Gospel which alone designs to prove the Lord's essential Deity for the re-discovery of the Messianic title, "Son of God," by the Lord and that He is represented as vindicating His usage of the phrase to the Jews who challenged it by reference to the Old Testament usage.

5. *Survey of our Lord's Messianic conceptions*

Thus, our Lord's Self-consciousness clothed Itself in terms of the Messianic office and appropriated the Messianic titles of Christ and "Son of David." At the same time, His neglect to use them and His adoption of other titles to express His Messianic conceptions show that He conceived His Messiahship in more than a political sense.

Now, the keynote of His Messianism is not to be found in the transcendental character of some of His conceptions nor even in the superhuman character of the Messiah as delineated in His sayings; or else the title "Son of God" would be the natural and normal vehicle of His Self-expression.[1] On the contrary, as we have already seen, the Messianic work is conceived as one of service, of suffering, and only in an ultimate sense as one of glory. In other words, as the analysis of the concept "Son of Man" proved, the Messiah's first work is a priestly work. The basis of the kingdom is the redemption of its members by the King. Hence the new inwardness, so characteristic of the Kingdom as conceived by our Lord, follows of necessity from His fundamental principle, and all bewildering contradictions of present and future, material and spiritual, among men and yet invisible, which are utterly irreconcilable on any other interpretation of our Lord's Messiahship, find a perfect synthesis in the priestly or sacrificial Messiahship. It was present in that the King was present. It was future in that the redemptive act upon which it was based had yet to be achieved in history as in the mind of God. It was transcendent in so far as it was established by the alone power of God and yet immanent in so far as many of

[1] "This paradoxical Messianism—we must be forgiven for thus designating it—has at least the advantage of finding its place in the organic preaching of Jesus, and in the Saviour's consciousness of His Person and mission,"—Batiffol, p. 232.

the redeemed were pilgrims and strangers in this naughty world.

Such a concept as this not only gives a synthesis and an intelligible view of the Messianic Kingdom as conceived by our Lord, it also conserves all that is worth preserving in other interpretations. With the " Representative Man " theory in all its forms and especially with the " Divine Humanity " of Dr. Abbott's hypothesis, it emphasizes the universality of the Son of Man but, unlike them, it does so in a form which does no violence to historical possibilities. With the apocalyptic conceptions, it preserves the transcendental character of the Messiah and His Kingdom but without their sombre pessimism and Deistic conception of the governance of God. While, with the modern hypotheses, it emphasizes the immanental character of our Lord's conception and does justice to the transcendental character of the eschatological and apocalyptic theories, it deepens and quickens them both by its reversion to the virile and tender spirituality of the prophetic aspirations. Nor does it even stop here. It ennobles and sanctifies the whole Messianic conception by finding its basis in the most divine of all things—the sacrifice of self and the love of one's enemies—and, thus vindicating the holiness of God by way of transcendental Self-sacrifice, it opens up a way of approach unto Him through membership of the Kingdom for those to whom the highest and noblest of other conceptions has no rational and well-founded word save that of sternest rebuke and warning. Hence it is that its King finds His most honoured title in the humility of "the Son of Man" and His most characteristic defence of His regal policy in the words, " I came not to call the righteous but sinners to repentance," and hence it is that the common people heard Him gladly.

It should, however, be observed that in the

introduction of redemption and the sacrificial element into the idea of the Messianic Kingdom, in founding it upon a redemptive and sacrificial act, our Lord introduced elements which are quite foreign to Messianism of even the noblest prophetic type. In associating redemption with membership of the Kingdom—and, above all, associating the work of the Redeemer with the Messianic King—He made it impossible to interpret the Kingdom in terms of historic Messianism, or to read the King in terms of the Messiah of Israel. Hence we find, as we might expect,[1] that the connotation of the official consciousness of the Redeemer is so vast that it points to—nay, demands—a profounder Self-consciousness than would be possible even in One who knew Himself to be the the filial Revelation of God, the Founder of God's Kingdom and nothing more.

C. The Filial Consciousness of the Lord Jesus Christ

This, then, is the sufficient answer to the question so often posed: Did the Filial consciousness of the Lord arise from His Messianic consciousness? or Did His Messianic consciousness spring from His Filial? Since it is evident that pure Messianism utterly fails to account for His thought and activity; that, while He claimed to be the Messiah, the Bringer in of God's Kingdom and the Ultimate Revelation of God, He transformed the conception so that it was practically unrecognizable in the eyes of those around Him and added to it elements which had never before been associated with the Messiah or with any other than God Himself; since these things are so, the official Sonship

[1] "Into the innermost recesses of His Spirit we cannot penetrate. Even if our sources were more fruitful and less heavily overlaid by tradition than they are, there would still remain the unfathomed depth of an experience colouring every characteristic thought and deed, the indefinable quality of rich inner life, the mystery of a great and fruitful genius."—Schmidt, *Enc. Bibl.*, 4697.

of the Messiah cannot have exhausted the Lord's consciousness of affiliation to the Divine. To say that it did is to argue that the less contained the greater and to persist in the vital and fundamental error of striving to interpret the transcendental Personality of history in terms of the forms in which His consciousness had necessarily to express itself. Among many others, Schürer[1] Jülicher[2] and Wernle[3] freely recognize this; but while rightly deducing the Messianic and official consciousness of the Lord from His filial consciousness, they attempt to interpret the filial consciousness of the Lord as merely ethical. Their ship, therefore, is wrecked on precisely the same rock as the Messianic interpretation of Loisy[4] and his adherents. They cannot come to terms with our Lord's transcendental claims. Above all, they have no rational solution of His indubitable claim to forgive sins, and all their critical ingenuity is exhausted in the vain endeavour to expunge from the Gospel records the very element which renders them intelligible.

Now, there is no doubt whatsoever that the significant thing for human history in the Self-consciousness of the Lord Jesus is not His Messianic office and claims; but the fact that "in His case the movement of the Higher Life had grown strong enough in a human consciousness to be recognized as Itself."[5]

Holtzmann and Schmidt are clearly right when they say that the character of our Lord's filial consciousness

[1] "He is sure on the ground of His inner fellowship with God that He possesses a new inner life, and to have, therefore, the mission to communicate this new life to His people and to mankind."—Schürer, *Das Messiasbewusstsein Jesus Christi.*

[2] See Lecture II. [3] See Lecture II. [4] See Lecture II.

[5] H. J. Holtzmann, p. 347. Compare J. Weiss: "Between Him and His Father there is a relation of mutual intimacy and exchange of thoughts which He Himself perceives to be unique. . . In this purely religious form it is the source of all His activity, the keynote of His whole character. The Messianic consciousness of Jesus was a faith based upon an entirely Personal religious experience. . ."—*Die Predigt Jesu,* pp. 158-166.

is not a thing to be determined merely by the examination of a few proof texts but that the evidences of His general teaching must be given their due weight. The only pity is that neither of them attempted to carry out his own principle consistently. If they had, they would inevitably have come to a very different result; and there would have been more agreement with respect to what the Lord really conceived His Divine filiation to be, between these critics who have done so much for the study of the Gospel teaching and those who confess the faith of Christ crucified.

1. The first thing that would naturally impress one who brought the ideal *tabula rasa* of scientific study to this enquiry would be the fact that our Lord never identifies His Divine filiation with that of other men and that He clearly shows that to Him it is the primary fact of His experience. Thus, as has been remarked by negative scholar after negative scholar,[1] He never speaks to His disciples of " Our Father " but always of " My Father " and " Your Father." Nor does the Lord's Prayer constitute an exception to the rule. It is a prayer for the disciples—not a prayer for His own use—and is given as such. We never find Him either using it by Himself, with His disciples, or, for that matter, joining with them in the prayer. It is their prayer, not His. His prayer, like Himself, is solitary and alone.

2. Still more significant is the character of the sonship which He ascribed to His disciples. Nowhere in His teaching nor in the Holy Scriptures is there any trace of what may be called the theory of the natural sonship of humanity. That is a Nineteenth Century conception and is entirely foreign to the writings and thought of the First. On the contrary, the only conception of Divine Sonship to be found in the teaching

[1] See Lecture II.

of the Lord is the Old Testament conception of the sonship of the Covenanted People.

A study of His words, however, reveals a profound difference and a surprising fact. The profound difference is that the filial relationship of men to God is no longer a result of their membership of the Israelitish nation. The conception has been moralized and spiritually deepened. Men are sons of God only in virtue of their membership of the Kingdom, of their participation in the redemptive act of the priestly Messiah. In other words, Divine filiation is dependent upon the relation of the individual to Himself. While we search the Gospels in vain to find a single hint of an appeal to sinners to turn to their Heavenly Father on the ground of their filial duty or of His Fatherly love, we learn that the all-important thing is whether the Lord will confess them before "My Father." Thus, the very thing which is generally asserted as the primary element in the Gospel of Christ, and which certainly changes the whole outlook upon life for those who receive it, is, in the Gospels, entirely dependent upon His mission, on the accomplishment of His work and on individual submission to His will.

3. Hence it is scarcely surprising that He prepared the way for a profounder ontological conception of His Person by His famous quotation of Psalm cx. The argument—"If David called Him Lord, how is He then his Son?"[1]—can scarcely be an avoidance of the Davidic Sonship of the Messiah. It is much too indirect for that, and is quite inconsistent with His acceptance of the title "Son of David" and with the universal belief of apostolic times in His Davidic descent. The meaning is rather to be found in the suggestion which lies on the surface of the story and is accordant with every detail of the incident that, since David calls the Messiah Lord, the Messiah must be One

[1] Matt. xxii. 45.

ontologically greater than David and not merely descended of His line. Such a view would explain the perplexity of His opponents and their abstinence from questioning Him ; and it cannot be said, in view of the admitted fact of His unique consciousness, to be either a forced or an unnatural interpretation.

4. This consciousness of a unique relationship to God also appears in the well-known passage—" Whosoever speaketh a word against the Son of Man it shall be forgiven him ; but whosoever speaketh a word against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world nor in the world to come."[1] Putting aside the question as to the authenticity of the expression (and surely P. W. Schmiedel is right when he asserts that, in view of its implication that a sin against Him was not equivalent to a sin against God, no one would have thought of inventing this phrase for the Lord) it is almost inconceivable that Any One conceiving Himself as mere Man should have actually thought it necessary to explain that an offence against Himself could be forgiven.

5. The same note is struck in the parable of the Wicked Husbandmen. The Owner of the Vineyard (whom the kindred and related parable in Isaiah would render evident to any Jew as God Himself) is represented as sending His Son in the hope that " they will reverence My Son." Now, the whole point of the parable is to be found in the unique and incomparable relation of the Son to the Owner of the vineyard. He had sent servant after servant in vain and He now sends His Son in the hope that His unique character will enable Him to achieve the end in view. There can be no doubt of the fact that the parable was taken as Messianic ; but what are we to make of the consciousness of the Man who told a parable in which the principal Character was unmistakably Jehovah and

[1] Matt. xii. 32.

which referred to the final Messenger, whom He equally certainly meant to be Himself, as having a title to acceptance and obedience on the ground that He was the only Son?

6. We now pass to one of the highest expressions of our Lord's filial consciousness recorded in the Synoptists. It is the difficult and certainly authentic saying:[1] "Of that day and that hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father."[2] Despite the repudiation of a very definite and important kind of knowledge on our Lord's part, its testimony to the character of His Self-consciousness is amazing. It actually represents a Man, walking this earth, as rating Himself higher than the angels and next to the Father in point of knowledge, and as taking His place in the economy of the Infinite as next to the Cause of all causes.

7. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that in another passage the Lord claims to be on terms of equality of knowledge with the Father. "All things have been delivered unto Me of My Father: and no one knoweth the Son save the Father; neither doth any know the Father save the Son; and He to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal Him."[3]

The authenticity of the passage is impugned by the extremer Liberals, *e.g.* by Jülicher, Pfleiderer and Brandt, on the ground that it forms part of a rhythmical passage and is, therefore, unlikely to have been spoken by the Lord. Pfleiderer quotes Brandt to the following effect: "Since the historic Christ is not likely in one hymn to have first thanked the Father, then asserted His peculiar relation to God, and finally called the afflicted to Himself, this hymn can only have been put into His mouth later. And as for those who have given

[1] No early Christian, no believer in Christ's Deity, would be likely to invent a saying that ascribed ignorance to Him.

[2] Mark xiii.; Matt. xxiv. 36. [3] Matt. xi. 27.

up the Gospel of John as an unhistorical source, the assumption of the unique God-consciousness of Jesus must stand or fall with the genuineness of this logion."[1]

Harnack has, however, met this kind of criticism with its own weapons and has shown, as conclusively as literary criticism can, that there is no earthly reason for the denial of the authenticity of the passage on critical grounds.[2] A metrical and rhythmical form is no uncommon phenomenon among the sayings of our Lord; nor is it surprising in One who was hailed as a true Poet by the greatest literary genius of the Victorian era;[3] and the association of the three great thoughts of thanksgiving to God, of unique filiation and of rest for the weary is scarcely of a nature to create surprise. Hence the real trouble is to be found in the fact, indicated in the last sentence of Pfleiderer's quotation from Brandt, that the spurious character of the saying would be very convenient for negative criticism.[4]

If, however, we dislike Pfleiderer's criticism, we have no reason to object to his exegesis. He most justly points out that, after the passage has been whittled down to the last possible point consistent with its historical basis, " the relation of Christ to God as His Father would remain something quite unique and exclusive, such as is, self-evidently, appropriate in the case of the Supernatural Being of the Church's

[1] Pfleiderer, *Primitive Christianity*, II., p. 471-472.

[2] See Harnack, *Sayings of Jesus*, and Plummer, *St. Matt.*, *in loc.*

[3] O. Wilde: *De Profundis*.

[4] It is, however, comical when Pfleiderer gravely charges the defence of the authenticity of the passage, and the unhealthy conservatism of criticism thereby apparent, to the account of the value of the passage as a proof-text! Considering the fact that very many of its defenders and of those who find in the passages the key to the interpretation of our Lord's Self-consciousness are as unbelieving as Pfleiderer himself, and that the negative critics have had everything their own way for more than two generations, it is laughable to find the charge of excessive subjectivity brought against those who have hitherto shown some respect for the principles of historical criticism.

Christ."[1] This is about the least that can be said in the circumstances; for it is quite impossible that a merely created Being should know His God as He is known by Him. To do so, would mean that He had penetrated into the depths not merely of the Divine mind but also of the Divine heart and that He had comprehended the Divine springs of action.

Nor is it either true or permissible to say with Brandt and Pfleiderer that the deletion of the passage would destroy the only evidence in the Synoptists for the "unique God consciousness" of the Lord Jesus Christ.[2] The whole of the Gospels are resonant with it. When we sound that note upon our flute, the great bells of our Lord's life and walk among men and of His thought hanging far above our reach in the temple of time respond with deepest and sweetest music—in tones that have echoed and are echoing throughout the centuries. To all other notes they are irresponsive and hang silent above our heads.

Why is it, then, that the direct evidence of the Synoptists for the ontological filiation of the Son is comparatively slight? The explanation is to be found in their purpose. Their aim is to set forth the Messianic claims and character of the Redeemer. All other things are secondary to this. Hence they describe our Lord as He walked among men and as He taught them in the days of His pilgrimage. They tell us of the beginning of His ministry as a true Teacher

[1] p. 473.

[2] How little justification there is for this remark is evident from the testimony of Dalman that no beginning to the filial consciousness of our Lord is indicated in the Gospels: "It can only be said that the passages just cited appear to imply that Jesus had shown no cognizance of any beginning in this relationship. It seems to be an innate property of His Personality, seeing that He, as distinct from all others, holds for His own the claim to the sovereignty of the world, and the immediate knowledge of God, just as a son by right of birth becomes a heir, and by upbringing from childhood in undivided fellowship with the father enters into that spiritual relationship with the father which is natural for the child" (p. 285). This is what we should expect in the case of an ontological rather than an ethical relationship.

and Prophet, of the gradually increasing conviction in the minds of His disciples that He was the Messiah of Israel, of the rude shock that He gave to all their most cherished Messianic ideals by pointing out that the Messiah must suffer and die, of His revelation of the transcendental character of His Messiahship on the Mount of Transfiguration, of His great Messianic sacrificial act of suffering and death on the Cross-altar of Calvary and of His final vindication by the resurrection from the dead.

They represent Him as a Man among men and fairly represent His general teaching which could scarcely have been more ontological in tone.[1]

If it had been recognized as such by those around Him, one of two things must have happened. Either He must have been accepted as the ontological Son of God, in which case He could not possibly have lived a true human life—or else He must have been at once arrested and stoned for blasphemy. Hence the principal means at His disposal for the revelation of His ontological Sonship were simply those which lie to our hand as the media of our self-revelation—the character of His life and walk among men. This has, indeed, throughout the ages been the principal means of commending faith in the ontological Sonship to the minds and hearts of men and has never found more than an auxiliary confirmation of the truth of the fact to which it testifies in the direct evidence that can be deduced from His words.[2]

[1] St. John's Gospel really forms no exception to the rule. The conception of our Lord's ontological Sonship is never represented as occurring in it either to Jews or disciples. The most that can be said is that on one or two occasions He was thought to have claimed an unhuman equality with God.

[2] How utterly untrue such a statement as that of Brandt, that the elimination of Matt. xi. 27 would remove the only evidence of our Lord's " unique God-consciousness " from the Synoptists is evidenced by the testimony of Johannes Weiss that " the Christology of Mark is much nearer that of John than is generally allowed . . the ' Jesus Christ ' who is now enthroned in heaven is the Subject of all the deeds

We conclude, then, from our review of the evidence at our disposal that, from the merely human point of view, our Lord's Self-consciousness differed from those of all other men in that It was sinless; that, from the historical point of view, He read His destiny in terms of the Messianic conception which, however, He transformed and spiritualized at every point; and, finally, that, from the point of view of His essential character and Being, He conceived Himself to be the ontological Son of the Most High God, as "being of one substance with the Father."

II.—Some Subsidiary Evidence

Because we justly insist that the final Court of Appeal on the issue before us must necessarily be the Self-consciousness of the Lord Jesus Christ, it is not because there is no other and sufficient proof of the Deity of the Lord Jesus Christ. A large and useful volume might easily be filled with the elaboration of such important considerations as those derived from certain phenomena of our Lord's Consciousness, the originality and Personal character of His teaching,[1] the character of the apostolic witness and of the effects of His Personality upon human history in general and on the individual experience in particular; but our elaboration of the Self-consciousness of our Lord compels us to confine

and speeches recorded in St. Mark as in St. John. . ." Of course Weiss does not mean to suggest that the presentation of the Lord in the two Gospels is the same—that it is not, is a self-evident fact; but "Mark from a theological point of view is not remote from the Fourth Evangelist . . . at the most there is only a difference of degree between St. Mark and St. John."—*Das Älteste Evangelium*, pp. 97-99.

[1] "There is a certain spirit and glow about the teaching of Jesus which you either appreciate or fail to appreciate. You cannot recognize or do justice to it by saying, 'The teaching of Jesus comprises the following maxims and injunctions. Of these some are borrowed from the Old Testament, some are paralleled by the Talmud, and a few are impracticable.' The teaching of Jesus, which has had such gigantic effects upon the world. is more and other than a dissected list of injunctions. It is not merely the sum of its parts: it is a whole, a spirit."—Montefiore, *The Synoptic Gospels*, I., pp. 104-10.

our attention to the evidence for the Super-human Personality of our Lord implicit in His Self-assertion, in the miracles ascribed to Him and in the three great Personal miracles involved in the historic presentation of His Person.

A. The Self-assertion of Christ

Now, from the beginning to the end of our Lord's ministry and in the one brief glimpse we get of His Childhood, a uniform and definite Self-assertion of a kind unequalled in the whole of the world's history is observable.

(1) Thus, in the incident of the Temple, "Wist ye not that I must be about My Father's business?"[1] was no ordinary answer. It was a defence, based upon the peculiar character of His Personality, of His action in remaining in Jerusalem. It was an assertion that He was not as other boys and, therefore, could not be judged by exactly the same rules.

(2) This peculiar Self-assertion is equally evident in the account of His baptism. He does not repudiate John the Baptist's protest—"I have need to be baptized of Thee and comest Thou to me?"[2]—but proceeds to the baptism of repentance on the plea: "Suffer it to be so now, for thus it becometh Me to fulfil all righteousness."

(3) It is also evident in the story of the Temptation. He is presented as challenged on certain definite transcendental grounds and, while accepting the implications of transcendental character, triumphing over the subtlest and severest temptations that could possibly come to man.

(4) It is to the fore in all His dealings with men. He speaks with the intensest authoritativeness. He makes claims and demands upon the faith and obedience of all men that would simply be grotesque

[1] Luke ii. 49. [2] Matt. iii. 14.

in the mouth of another.[1] His demand is not that men should follow God, but that they should follow Him. That His own Person formed one of the poles of all His thinking must have been evident to the meanest intelligence that listened to His words: for He presented Himself to the world as the Sum and Embodiment of what He had to say.

(5) The records of His teaching are simply pregnant with the evidence of this extraordinary Self-assertiveness. He opposes the weight of His single word to the whole tradition and authority of the Church of His time. Nor is it in dependence on any external authority —as Luther, for example, relied on God's written Word in his contests with the tyrannies of the mediæval Church. The keynote of His public teaching on matters of morals and religion (in which directions He sometimes supplements God's written Word) is "But I say unto you." By general admission He conceives Himself as the Final Messenger of God after whom can come none other, and He carries Himself as such.

(6) It is equally prominent in the presentment of His attitude towards sin and sinners. As He stood to the Law, so He regards Himself as standing towards sinners—as One who came not to destroy the defective but to fulfil all righteousness. Regardless of the

[1] "We cannot suppose that utterances such as these, so numerous, so various, and yet so harmonious, are the invention of this or that Evangelist. They are beyond the invention of any Evangelist, and few of them are anticipated in the Old Testament predictions of a second coming of the Messiah; it cannot, therefore, be maintained that either Jesus or the Evangelists derived the idea of His coming again from type or prophecy. And what makes the hypothesis of invention all the more incredible is the combination in Jesus of this consciousness of Divine powers with a character of deep humility, reticence, and restraint. While uttering these amazing claims with a serenity which implies that they are indisputable, He is still meek and lowly of heart, always charging those who in some measure know who He is that they shall not make Him known, bidding those whom He has healed not to spread abroad His fame, declaring that He came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and in His ministering quite ready to be stigmatized as the Friend of tax-collectors and sinners."—Plummer, *St. Matthew*, p. xxxi.

indignant protests of the Pharisees, He takes it upon Himself to forgive sins authoritatively ;[1] and He even conceives Himself as the Sacrifice for the sins of the many. Thus, His Person is always well in view. Whether it is in relation to men or to God or to the powers of evil, He depends upon the strength and character of His own Personality and, when the validity of His procedure is challenged, He asserts it as a sufficient and final vindication.

(7) Nor when we study the closing scenes of His life do we find any abatement of this Self-assertion. On the contrary, it increases as the days pass by and the shadows close in. Disaster and suffering only serve to bring it out in stronger relief. Nowhere is it more evident than in the records of " the night that He was betrayed." At the very time when He must have known that irretrievable disaster was inevitable, He calmly ordains a special rite for the purpose of commemorating His death. In Gethsemane, there is the same quiet Self-assertion. Before the judges of His nation, gathered together to compass His destruction, He gives the most formal assertion of the dignity not of His office but of His Person, recorded in the whole Gospel history. Before Pilate His bearing is such as to impress upon His judge the unique character of His personality. On the Cross, He continues the Self-assertion that was the characteristic of His ministry. He promises the penitent thief—" To-day shalt thou be with Me in Paradise." " *With Me.*" To Him as He hangs crucified and dying, deserted of God and mocked of man, His Person is still the Centre of all things.

Yet this Self-assertion is conjoined with the greatest humility that the world has ever seen. " The meek and lowly Jesus " has passed into a proverb constantly on

[1] " Further Jesus forgives sins, and this not in the name of God, but from His own perfect authority, which He emphatically asserts before the Pharisees and proves it by healing the man sick of the palsy." —Barth, p. 256.

the lips of those who deny His name. In fact, as Liddon has pointed out, this Man whose Self-assertion is the most stupendous that the world has ever seen, is the Creator of the virtue of humility. Before His time, it was condemned as a slave-virtue, almost as a vice ; but His example has exalted and sanctified it so that it is now among the most esteemed of Christian graces.

It is also indissolubly linked with the greatest Self-denial, with a Self-abnegation so great that it has proved the wellspring of the self-sacrifice and heroism of the Christian centuries. He who thus asserts Himself is One who never works a miracle on His own behalf or asserts His rights as against His neighbours, who is content to wander up and down the country dependent upon the good will of its inhabitants, not having where to lay His head, who chooses not His own glory but that of His Father and who finally gives His life a ransom for many.

Similarly, it is yoke-fellow not with Self-ignorance but with a profounder Self-knowledge than the ancient philosophers, who looked on the latter as the *summum bonum* of human knowledge, ever even dreamed of. Among the sons of men, none ever had the Self-knowledge, the legitimate and verified Self-confidence that this Asserter of Himself evinces in every incident of His life. None other has ever walked this world without those stumblings and fears and moral hesitancies, of which there are no traces in the story of His life. Alone among men, He has passed on the strength of His own Self-assertion through death to the immortality of history and, without the accomplishment of a single mighty deed, won for Himself an imperishable place in history.

What, perhaps, is more remarkable, is the fact that this stupendous Self-assertion is not condemned as a defect, nor forgiven in consideration of other good qualities with a smile. On the contrary, this Self-

assertiveness that would be grotesque if not justified as the necessary outcome of an absolutely holy and transcendental Personality, is felt by all men who read the records to be absolutely right and fitting in the Carpenter of Nazareth. The crucified Galilean Peasant is allowed a Self-assertiveness that would be justly ridiculed in a Cæsar, an Alexander, or a Napoleon. So entirely consonant is it with the general impression that He makes, that, if it were missed from a single incident in the records, a want would be felt. Believer and unbeliever alike feel the consonance and by their distinctive methods mark it as pre-eminently right and fitting in the Saviour of the world. The former emphasizes it and declaims about it as a triumphant proof of the holiness and essentially Divine Self-consciousness of Him "who spake as never man spake"[1]; and the latter, as feeling that he has no explanation of it, consistent with his humanistic principles, passes it by in silence.

B. The Testimony of His Works[2]

1. We must now pass on to the consideration of the available evidence for the exercise of miraculous powers by our gracious Lord and Saviour. Two books, both modern and both markedly able, embody the divergent verdicts of modern men. The one—Mr. Lamb's "Miracle and Science" (1909)—is an application of the known and established rules of legal science for dealing with evidence to the Scriptural miracle-stories and ends with a most positive verdict in favour of their historical character. The other—Mr. Thompson's "Miracles in the New Testament" (1911)—is an equally exhaustive application of the

[1] John vii., 46.

[2] Authorities: Sir Robert Anderson, *The Silence of God;* K. Beth, *Das Wunder;* E. A. Edghill, *The Revelation of the Son of God;* F. J. Lamb, *Miracle and Science;* P. Saintyves, *Le Discernement du Miracle;* J. M. Thompson, *Miracles in the New Testament;* G. Traub, *Das Wunder im Neuen Testament.*

methods of modern Biblical criticism to the same subject matter and is equally positive in its negation of any mighty works save cures. Mr. Lamb's application of the rules of evidence to the subject matter is profoundly suggestive and, without a most careful and detailed examination of his treatment, it would be simply dishonest to pronounce against the validity of the evidence. At the same time, his case suffers from overstatement and his whole method is too legal to be attractive to the pure historian who must necessarily consider other things than strictly legal evidence.

Mr. Thompson undoubtedly has an enormous advantage—so far as his appeal to the modern mind is concerned—in his elaborate and advanced critical paraphernalia; but his treatment is too academic to commend itself to those whose lives have been lived in a more work-a-day world and is much less adequate in its comprehension of the problem.

We shall scarcely get a better estimate of the strength of the evidence for the miraculous element in our Lord's ministry than by observing the defects of this able negative treatment of the problem.

Since the essential value of the evidence for an alleged miracle is largely, indeed, primarily, dependent upon the character of the personality involved, it is quite impossible and would be quite improper to attempt to form a judgment *in vacuo*. Ideally, the mind should come to such an enquiry as a *tabula rasa*; but that does not mean that it is to remain in that state as regards the personality alleged to have performed the miracle in question. Its first duty is to establish that fact; its next is the critical examination of the evidence in the light of its established fact of personality; and its last is to form its verdict. Now, Mr. Thompson's treatment of the whole problem is such that, if it were not known who the Lord was, it might be thought that the question at issue was

whether an ordinary artizan of Nazareth had performed the alleged miracles. Even if no word of protest against his free use of hypotheses and his inferences from inferences were necessary, this defect would call for a drastic revision of his conclusions.

In addition to this, however, he proceeds to treat the Gospels as though they were simply Hagiographa. It is not to the point to say that miraculous stories relative to St. Thomas of Canterbury sprang up within five years (as a matter of fact, cures of various kinds took place almost at once) and, therefore, the forty years between our Lord's death and the compilation of our present Gospels would have given an ample time for the growth of such miraculous tales. The circumstances were profoundly different. The Hagiographa are the production of an age which profoundly believed in miracle and was destitute of criticism. They are the production of a time when there was no hostility to be overcome by the narrators of the miraculous tales in question. In the case of the Gospel miracles on the other hand, testimony could only be borne at the cost of much unpleasantness, if not actual peril; for the early Church grew up in the midst of a hostile religious and social atmosphere and was long regarded as a Jewish heretical sect.

Then, the character of the Gospel stories should be taken into account. There is a complete absence of the grotesque element which disfigures the miracle accounts of the mediæval hagiographers, and bewrays the influence of the mythopœic faculty. The tone of the records is remarkably sober and restrained. Even allowing Mr. Thompson's analysis of the evidence (in which he too often permits himself the somewhat expensive luxury, from the historical point of view, of reading in motives in accordance with his general and unproved thesis—thus using his thesis to prove his thesis), the evidence of an increased love of the mar-

vellous is very slight. In the alleged cases in which the later Evangelists "polish up" the accounts of St. Mark, they really take no further liberties with the incidents than any modern historian—if he would give a coherent and clear account of any series of events as he understands it—must allow himself. There may be a little polishing, a little clearing up of obscure details, a little increased emphasis upon the point of the incident as the writer conceived it; but there is no essential or fundamental addition discernible. Similarly, with regard to the *Sondergut* miracles of St. Matthew and St. Luke, it cannot be said that there is any appreciable advance in the marvellousness of their tales. They all approximate closely in character to the miracle stories of the main sources and there, save that they form an addition to the number of the miracle stories, their importance ends.

Besides this, even on our author's own showing, the original source of the Gospel history is permeated through and through with the miraculous, and the very fact which he alleges in proof of his negative thesis—the fact that the principal miracles are to be found in the record of the earlier part of our Lord's ministry—is a strong evidence in favour of a positive construction. The earlier part of our Lord's ministry was the time when He was establishing Himself in the hearts and minds of His followers as the Messiah of Israel; it was the time when miracle had a positive evidential function, which (as Sir Robert Anderson has well shown) it ceased to have when once the Gospel was taken to the Gentiles and came into conflict with other miraculous religions;[1] it was the time when He had to

[1] See *The Silence of God*. "It is plain that the evidential value of a miracle is primarily for those who either witnessed it or experienced it themselves. . . . It is surely incredible that, had miracles been viewed as either the infallible signs, or even as the sources, of revelation, no sort of hint that this was the case should have found its way into the whole collection of Apostolic literature."—Edghill, *The Revelation of the Son of God*, pp. 58-59.

win the confidence of His followers and to impress them with the conviction of His transcendental Messiahship. It is natural, therefore, that miracle should abound at that period. How is it on any mythopœic hypothesis that the latter portion of the Lord's ministry, when the disciples had come to believe on Him, is the portion most free from the record of miracle? It was the portion of His career which the myth-making propensities of the early Church might naturally be expected to have adorned with a wealth of the miraculous and yet it is comparatively free from the miraculous element. It was, in fact, as the innumerable mythical adornments of the non-canonical crucifixion stories show, far too free from it to please later generations.

There is one other fact to which due weight must be given—a fact hinted at but not worked out by Dr. Bernard,[1] the present Bishop of Ossory—the miracles in the Gospel records form a system.[2] This system cannot be extracted from the miracles recorded in any single Gospel. It is implicit in the records of the Four Evangelists. As they are quite unconscious of the fact that such a systematic revelation of the Lord by His deeds[3] was hidden in their memories

[1] Art. "Miracles" in Hastings' *Bible Dictionary*.

[2] "The notices of the miracles are scattered up and down over the Gospels. But, when they are considered in relation to each other, we discover in them an undesigned unity. Together they cover the whole ground of our Lord's work as the Saviour, renewing each element in man's complex being and restoring peace in the physical order. They are not presented in the Gospels as primarily designed to enhance His dignity and His power. If they had been the invention of pious fancy yearning to illustrate by imposing stories His greatness and His glory, it is a moral impossibility that this subtle unity of purpose should have been so consistently and so unobtrusively observed."—Bishop Chase, *Cambridge Theological Essays*, pp. 404-405.

[3] "The miraculous acts which are ascribed to Jesus have qualities which curiously correspond to His character, or, in other words, they so duplicate and reflect it that the moral attributes which are most distinctive of Him reappear in His acts. Where they seem most supernatural they most completely externalize His nature. The common quality which distinguishes them all may be described as sanity or sobriety."—A. M. Fairbairn, *Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, p. 332.

and traditions of the days of His humiliation, considerable weight should be given to it in estimating the probabilities of legendary influence.

It will be well to summarize the actual and positive facts in this connection.

They are (1) the restrained and sober character of the narratives themselves; (2) the numerous incidental touches in the records of miracles which speak of nature, or of a higher literary art than is to be found in the history of literature before the days of the great English novelists; (3) the system of Self-revelation by deed implicit in the Gospel records; and (4) the supremely vital and decisive fact that the Worker of these miracles is admittedly the transcendental Personality of human history.

2. What precisely is the evidential value of miracle in relation to our Lord's Personality? If miracle cannot prove the truth of a religious system, it is naturally much less adequate as a proof of the Deity of Christ. Indeed, it should never be cited as such and the attempt to utilize it for that purpose is bound to lead to disappointment. All miracle can do is to prove unique powers over nature, such as we might reasonably expect to find in God Incarnate, and to reveal the character of the Person who possesses them.[1] Now, in this respect there is a marked difference between our Lord's use of miraculous powers and those recorded in the Old Testament. His exercises of power are almost all redemptive in character and manifestly proceed from a principle of love. An overwhelming proportion of them are cures or other beneficent and extraordinary acts of power performed on men, and the remainder, generally speaking, are the outcome of efforts to help

[1] "A miracle might, of course, throw considerable light on the character of the person professing to reveal some heavenly claim to divine command. It might make men marvel at his possession of new and unsuspected powers; but it would in no way prove the truth of his statement, or the reality of his alleged revelation."—Edghill, p. 42s.

His followers. There are only two miracles of destruction recorded in the Gospel history. They are the cursing of the fig tree—a symbolic act performed on inanimate nature—and the sending of the demons into the herd of swine. In both cases, the destruction was slight in extent and profound in symbolic teaching; the latter case was well within His competence as God and as a distinct difficulty, may reasonably be regarded as equivalent in evidential significance to the great sayings in Matthew xi. 27.

There is, however, a very important piece of indirect evidence to be derived from the miraculous powers of the Lord Jesus Christ. They are entirely consonant with what we know of His Person from other sources. It would have been difficult for Napoleon, apart from his great campaigns, to have won the recognition that he deservedly did win. Apart from his deeds, his personality must have been small in public esteem. Indeed, great powers, apart from their use, are virtually non-existent. The same thing may be said of great personalities. They must find adequate expression or else their greatness is lost to the world. It disappears in unfulfilled promise. Apart, then, from the manifestation of Himself in mighty works, a transcendental Personality, such as our Lord undoubtedly asserted Himself to be, could not have expressed Himself to the world. The transcendental Personality who never expresses Himself is practically a human Mediocrity. His world-value as a transcendental Being is precisely *nil*.

Hence it is that we find the ascription of remarkable faith-healing powers to the Lord on the part of virtually all modern critics. Whatever else they may disagree about, Wernle, P. W. Schmeidel, O. Holtzmann and J. M. Thompson are agreed on that; and they never hint that miraculous powers are inconsistent with the Personality of the Lord. Even when His claims are

repudiated, the possibility of His possessing such powers is never impugned from the standpoint of His Person, but only on the *à priori* ground that miracle does not happen. This is an unconscious testimony to the fact that transcendental powers are the natural property of the transcendental Person. The miraculous is the natural and inevitable accompaniment of such a Personality—so natural that its absence would constitute a much severer strain upon faith than its presence could possibly be. It cannot prove His Deity; but it is Its natural accompaniment and outcome. Incarnate Deity without miracle would be almost unthinkable.

C. The Personal Miracles

The consonance between the brief and simple series of the Personal miracles of the Gospels and the transcendental character of the Personality involved should be observed. If it, indeed, be the case that the Lord was sinless, the Messiah of Israel and the ontological Son of God, the presumption is that the inception of His Personality, His triumph over death and His glorification should be of a kind to confirm the hearts and minds of His followers in the estimate of His Personality and its significance. Indeed, the mere fact of His sinlessness presupposes and involves a unique physical constitution. Sin has so profoundly affected the human constitution on even its physical side that the appearance of a sinless Man in the course of the world's history is quite as great a physical miracle as it is a moral. Hence, the Body of our Lord was, in some sense, a unique Creation of God. The presumption is, then, that His entry into the world was unique in character; that, if the experience of death should have to be undergone, the specially created earthly Tabernacle should not "be cast as rubbish to the void"; and that, in the event of the Personality

being representative in character, the special treatment and ultimate glorification accorded to His Body should be made manifest to those who had perceived the unique and transcendental character of His Personality. Hence it is not unnatural—but, on the contrary, most natural—that the accounts of our Lord's life and walk upon the earth should begin and close with the stories of His miraculous conception, resurrection and ascension.

(1) *The Virgin Birth*[1]

1. The alleged grounds for the rejection of the Gospel presentation of the beginning of our Lord's Manhood may be roughly stated as the scientific and the historical. The first of these need not detain us. No doubt, it is true that the Virgin Birth is unique in the history of mankind ; but to say so is not to say that it is grotesque and, therefore, unthinkable. On the contrary, analogous phenomena are fairly common in the lower ranks of nature and, according to some eminent biologists,[2] not at all impossible in the human family. If Romanes is right in this contention, the so-called unnatural character of the conception is destroyed and the stories are, therefore, made negatively more easy to comprehend. In any case, the fact that the phenomenon is to be found in nature goes far to rob the objection of its force.

The attack from the historical side is more serious. It marshals a whole series of arguments, constructed with great ingenuity but partaking of the nature of special pleading, which, apart from the consideration of the original authorities, seems an overwhelming indictment. When, however, it is closely examined, the objections do not amount to very much more than

[1] Authorities:—R. H. Grützmacher, *Die Jungfrauengeburt;* E. Griffith-Jones, *The Ascent through Christ;* P. Lobstein, *The Virgin Birth;* J. Orr, *The Virgin Birth of Christ;* Soltau, *The Birth of Jesus.*

[2] See Griffith-Jones, *The Ascent through Christ.*

the assumptions that the miraculous cannot be historical and that the Virgin Birth, if it be a fact, ought to figure more prominently in the New Testament records.

The most serious points in the indictment seem to be the objection that, if the Virgin Birth were a fact, our Lord's family would have acted differently and that it finds an obvious motive in the need of explaining the origin of the supposed Supernatural Personality. With regard to the latter, it may be remarked that no sign of any such apologetic or dogmatic motive is discernible in the records; and the absolute impossibility of finding a mythical source for so unique and delicate a portraiture of a miraculous conception as both the accounts of the Virgin Birth are seen at a glance to be, quite precludes their creation by the mythopœic faculty.

The other objection is more serious. Our Lord's brethren did not believe on Him during the days of His humiliation and, at the beginning of His ministry, His mother and His brethren purposed to take Him away by force " for they said, He is beside Himself."[1] This, it is urged, would be quite inconceivable in view of their knowledge of the Virgin Birth. Is this necessarily so? Such a story is only credible in the light of subsequent historical events; and the Jews had their own discreditable explanation of the miraculous conception, which, even in Mary's own family, would be found more easy of acceptation than the wondrous truth. We may take it that our Lord's brethren certainly knew nothing of the Virgin Birth. If they had been told of it, they would not have believed it. Further than this, Christians cannot conceive how the Lord's conception of His Messiahship must have appeared to the people of His day. If His Mother regarded Him as the Messiah of Israel, her expectations

[1] Mark iii. 21.

must have been sadly disappointed. Instead of organizing a holy war and seating Himself upon His ancestral throne, He became a Rabbi and went about teaching the simplest moral doctrines, contending with the religious leaders of the nation and effecting cures and miracles. In His whole mode of life, there was nothing corresponding to the Messianic conceptions underlying the Birth stories. There is not the slightest hint that Mary was more discerning than her neighbours. Indeed, the recorded incidents reveal her as quite as un-understanding as her neighbours could wish. When, therefore, the pressure of her unbelieving sons and the dire peril that her Firstborn incurred from the hostility of the leaders of His Church and nation impelled her, illogical love would easily induce her to try to seize Him by force and thus protect Him from Himself.

2. There is nothing more remarkable about the positive evidence than its sober and restrained character. There is no hint of undue excitement,[1] of sensationalism nor of that unnatural tone which always bewrays legend. On the contrary, it has every incidental mark which, if it was not concerned with the miraculous, would incline us to give it absolute credence. It is certainly Jewish in origin; it has equally certainly not passed through many polishing hands and is resonant of simplicity and truth.

Besides this, the accounts are indubitably independent. No one has as yet ventured to derive one from the other. Many, on the contrary, have ventured to assert their lack of historicity on the ground of their alleged incompatibility. No doubt, a case can be made out for such an hypothesis. It is work to which every police court attorney and every criminal lawyer

[1] The only apparent exception to this rule is to be found in the greeting of Elizabeth; but it is the utterance of a woman well advanced in a late and remarkable pregnancy whose natural excitement would be intensified by her Messianic expectations.

is accustomed. The true historian, however, being accustomed to look for the coherences and the natural dovetailing of true but independent accounts, will find that there is no necessary contradiction between the accounts, but that they confirm and establish one another.[1]

3. What, then, about the silence of the other New Testament writers? Surely the fact that the overwhelming majority of the New Testament writers make no mention of the Virgin Birth is in itself quite sufficient to brand the stories as unhistorical? If it were shown that the writers rejected the stories of the Virgin Birth or that they had any impellent reason for mentioning them, an almost unanswerable objection might be based upon these considerations. Neither of these things, however, can be done. Excellent reasons, on the contrary, can be shown for the silence of those writers, whose works are sufficiently voluminous and of a character to justify even the consideration of an argument from silence.

They are really only three in number—St. Paul, St. Mark and St. John. The second of these proposes simply to give an account of the good news of Jesus Christ our Lord. With His antecedents he is not concerned and he, therefore, begins his account of our Lord's mission with the Baptism of St. John; and he himself never alludes either directly or indirectly to the Christian conception of our gracious Lord's paternity.

Neither does St. Paul, the paucity of whose allusions to the earthly life of the Lord is one of the problems of the New Testament Scriptures. Here, again, the failure to mention directly the Virgin Birth of our gracious Lord can be explained by the habits of the writer. St. Paul's mind moved in an ellipse (as did all apostolic

[1] For the best critical treatment of the evidence for the Virgin Birth, see Orr, *Virgin Birth*. A brief summary of the evidence may be found in my *Christian Certitude*, Chapter IV.

thought after Pentecost), whose poles were the Lord's atoning death and risen glory. The surprising thing would be if there were any mention of the Virgin Birth; for the humble ministry and earthly circumstances of the Lord were too little present to the apostle's mind to be prominent in the occasional letters and brief philosophical treatises which are all that remain to us of a once voluminous correspondence and literary activity.

Nor with regard to St. John's Gospel is the case any different. The Fourth Gospel is avowedly history written with a purpose—the demonstration of the essential Deity of the Lord Jesus. It is dominated not merely by the thought of edification but by a supreme central idea to which all other things are subordinated. It is intended as an historical proof of the philosophical and religious interpretation of the Supreme Personality of history.

Is there no hint, then, that these writers presupposed the fact of the Virgin Birth? There is. Whether we turn to the pages of the Fourth Gospel or to those of the Apostle of the Gentiles, we find doctrine after doctrine which implies a miraculous conception of our Lord.

Take, for example, the doctrine of our Lord's preexistence which is asserted both by St. Paul and the writer of the Fourth Gospel. Is it really conceivable that a Being who had existed as a fully conscious—not to say, transcendent—Personality before becoming Man could have been regarded as born in the natural process of human generation? The real miracle is resident in the Person of the Lord Jesus Christ. To those who conceived of His Personality as preexistent, nothing could well be more unnatural, more artificial and more absurd than the attempt to confine the conditions of His birth to the normal experience of humanity.

Similarly, the doctrine of the New Birth, implied in St. Paul and finding its fullest expression in the Fourth Gospel, points in the same direction. To one who thought that " that which is born of the flesh is flesh "[1] and that, therefore, all men, with the exception of Christ Himself, needed to be born again, the attempt to confine the origin of our Lord's Manhood within the limits of our experience would have been bizarre. Thus, to the mind of both the writers in question, the origin of the Lord's Manhood was mysterious and sacred and transcendental beyond words; and this accords well with the profound truth, attested by the First and Third Evangelists, that the conception of the Lord did not take place in the ordinary course of nature, but that it was a direct consequence of the immediate operation of God.

4. As historical criticism[2] cannot veto the acceptance of the Virgin Birth, it follows that its acceptance or rejection will really be decided by its consistency with our interpretation of the Person of the Lord. And how excellently and naturally the Virgin Birth accords with the positive interpretation ! Be it remembered that in the initiation of a new humanity, Virgin Birth, a phenomenon that lies behind all of us in the early stages of the evolutionary process, is conceived as the process whereby a new humanity is initiated ! In other words, a reversion to the methods of the early days of the fulfilment of God's purpose and not a violent and arbitrary interference with the laws of nature is given as the method by which the Father introduced new life into the decadent human stock.

Thus, the Virgin Birth is accordant with what we know of our Lord's Personality from other sources and,

[1] John iii. 6.

[2] " The possibility is, therefore, established that, from the standpoint of a pure and unprejudiced historian, the New Testament sources relative to the Virgin Birth may be based upon historical fact."—Grützmacher, *Die Jungfrauengeburt*, p. 43.

as we might expect of the manifestation of the God of nature in the realm of human experience, it is in accordance with all that we know of the normal methods of the Divine activity.

(2) *The Resurrection*[1]

Unlike the Virgin Birth, the Resurrection lies in the full glare of apostolic history and is attested by the unanimous witness of primitive Christianity. Hence the attitude of wholesale negation, assumed in relation to the Virgin Birth, cannot be taken up with regard to it. The facts that belief in the Resurrection was the source and inspiration of the faith of the Early Church and that that belief was founded upon the conviction of the apostles and others that they had seen the Risen Lord, are almost universally accepted. The empty tomb and the relative values of the witnesses are also fairly well established.

1. It must not, however, be imagined that there is in the present day any more disposition to admit the historical fact of the miraculous in this regard than there was seventy years ago. On the contrary, the history of the criticism of the Resurrection narratives is one long record of attempts to impugn their trustworthiness and to formulate hypotheses at once naturalistic and historical.

Only two of the numerous attempts in the latter direction now command the serious attention of scholars. They are the Vision Hypothesis of Strauss (1835) and the Telegram Theory of Keim (1871). Whereas Strauss and the majority of modern negative critics only allow a subjective character to the visual experiences of the Apostles and eyewitnesses of the

[1] AUTHORITIES:—R. McCheyne Edgar, *The Gospel of the Risen Saviour;* F. Loofs, *Die Auferstehungsberichte;* P. Le Breton, *Le Résurrection de Jésus;* A. Meyer, *Die Auferstehung;* J. Orr, *The Resurrection of Jesus:* T. J. Thorburn; *The Resurrection Narratives and Modern Criticism.*

Resurrection, Keim, Wernle[1] and the few adherents of this half-way house theory of the Resurrection allow an actual and objective validity to the alleged phenomena. The older and more consistent theory only allows real experiences which proceeded purely and alone from the psychological condition of the subject. The later interpretation allows the experiences to be the consequence of impressions received from without.

It cannot, however, be doubted that the majority of negative scholars have only been true to their fundamental principles in their rejection of the famous Telegram-theory. It necessitates a most arbitrary treatment of the evidence. It does not even eliminate the Supernatural from the arena; and nothing is to be gained by restricting the operation of the Supernatural to the mental plane. It does not, even, like the old theory of a resuscitated and transformed body, give us an intelligible and reasonable presentation of the operation of the Supernatural. It represents the Lord as sending messages that He was yet alive to His disciples in a way that was bound to mislead them! What else could they think, when they saw Him in Resurrection life and power than that He was risen from the dead? Such a theory has no conceivable advantage over the prosaic Christian conception and is open to all the cogent historical objections relative to the more general form of the Vision-hypothesis. Certainly, if it were the only alternative, it would be hard to deny that the Twentieth Century belonged to the Vision-hypothesis.[2]

[1] "The new faith rests upon the appearances alone. . . A Christian, therefore, has no difficulty in accepting, as the ground of his belief in the Resurrection, the real projection of Jesus into this world of sense by means of a vision."—Wernle, I., p. 115.

[2] "If the conservative theology would save in some extent its standpoint, nothing remains to it but to maintain with Keim an objective vision. But Arnold Meyer and those who think with him will certainly be held right by the men of the Twentieth Century."—O. Schmiedel, pp. 80-81.

Even this theory can scarcely be said to be the most satisfactory and adequate conceivable. Plausible and ingenious as it appears at first sight, a closer examination reveals its fundamental inadequacy. Quite apart from the facts that it does the grossest violence to the sources, that it necessitates a violent and arbitrary treatment of evidence such would not be tolerated for five minutes in any other field of historical enquiry,[1] its inherent disproportion to the effects produced demand its rejection. What were the effects of the Resurrection? It reinspired the disciples with confidence and hope. It raised them to such a high level of spiritual experience that they succeeded in doing in the Master's absence what they had utterly failed to achieve in His lifetime and under His teaching—in comprehending the spiritual significance of His labours and in understanding that beside the spiritual content, which He had first given to the Messianic idea, the national aspirations of their training which had first attached them to His person were of but little account. It gave them courage and strength to go forth to the conquest of the world in His name. It gave them the balance of mind and character to make moral and spiritual contributions which have ever since been the standard and inspiration of the highest and holiest lives and efforts in the annals of history. It gave the men who forsook the Lord in Gethsemane the courage to give themselves up to almost incredible labours and privations, to surrender home and religion and fatherland—all that life holds

[1] A reference to Pfleiderer, Weizsäcker, or P. W. Schmiedel will sufficiently attest this remark, Dr. Orr's verdict may be cited here: "It will be seen, to begin with, that to gain for this visional theory any semblance of plausibility, every fact in the Gospel history has to be changed—time, place, nature of the events, mood of the disciples, etc., while scenes, conditions and experiences are invented of which the Gospels know nothing. It is not the facts on record that are explained, but a different (imaginary) set of facts altogether." —pp. 222-223.

dear—to become a mocking and a detestation to the world at large and, finally, by their persistence in the proclamation of a crucified and risen Lord, to win the martyr's crown. And all this, according to the hypothesis before us, was the outcome of a few hallucinations! It was the consequence of an "heroic defect!"[1] Strained and at every point in violent antagonism to the protesting sources, the Vision-hypothesis does as much credit to the ingenuity of its authors as it outrages every historical probability.

2. The more carefully the records of the Resurrection are studied, the more evident it becomes that the Cross, not the Resurrection, formed the key to the explanation of our Lord's ministry and Incarnation in the eyes of the primitive Churches. The amount of space devoted to the history of the Passion is, relatively speaking, enormous—about a fourth of the whole Gospel narratives—and that devoted to the Resurrection is relatively small. St. Matthew gives it twenty verses in his Gospel of about a thousand and seventy-one verses; St. Mark proper, eight out of six hundred and sixty-six—but this Gospel is incomplete; St. Luke, fifty-three out of eleven hundred and fifty-one verses; St. John, fifty-six out of eight hundred and seventy-nine.

It is quite inconceivable that, if the Evangelists had been inspired by any apologetic motive and not merely by the didactic motive of instructing the Christian community, this should be the case. When men are marshalling their proofs of an alleged decisive crisis of a historical career, they do not compress their summary into a small fraction of their general survey. Imagine an apologetic writer of the Eighteenth Century, to whom the whole issue turned upon the Resurrection of our gracious Lord, who was given three articles in one of the great reviews (about the same amount of space

[1] "*Eine heroische Krankheit.*" O. Schmiedel, p. 80.

as one of the longer Gospels), only allotting it a fifty-first part of his space with St. Matthew, a twenty-first part with St. Luke, or even a seventeenth part with St. John ! The mere fact that so little space is allotted to the Resurrection by the Evangelists should be regarded as conclusive evidence that nothing was further from their minds than to establish the truth of the Resurrection for the outside world.

More than this, if the purpose of the Evangelists had been apologetic, the evidence would have been given with some degree of fulness (as in the case of the Pauline summary) and would have been organized and marshalled. There is not a hint of this, however, save in the brief and sub-apostolic summary in the last twelve verses of St. Mark's Gospel. On the contrary, the accounts are so brief and fragmentary that the difficulties of the problem arise from their imperfect character. If, however, the purpose of the Evangelists was merely didactic, their selection and detailed accounts of special incidents, sufficient to satisfy the minds of believers that the Risen Lord was indeed the crucified Carpenter of Nazareth, is not only intelligible but natural.

Unless 1 Cor. xv. is to be considered as such, we possess no primitive apologetic or polemical statement of the evidence for the Resurrection. All that has come down to us from apostolic times are brief fragmentary records of an occasional character recorded for purposes of comfort and edification. The apologetic motive is as entirely absent from them as it is from Matthew Henry's "Commentary." We have only a few fragments of the great store of experiences of converse and fellowship with the Risen Lord from which the apostles and early Christians derived the weapons wherewith they overcame the hostility of the cultured and uncultured world and bowed it at the feet of Christ.

A further fact which, taken with the occasional and fragmentary character of the accounts, amounts to a demonstration of their historical character, is their essential coherence. Of course, this statement is challenged and bitterly challenged by negative critics and, certainly, if we are to forsake the methods of historical science for the patent methods necessary (as Schweitzer confesses)[1] to bring the Gospel history into line with the presuppositions of negative criticism, it is impossible to deny the charge. If, however, we are content to apply honestly and stringently the ordinary methods of historical science, to what, in so far as it is a question of evidence, is a purely historical problem, it is impossible to deny their essential coherence.[2]

Imagine five writers independently working at a confused mass of semi-legendary matter and, as a general rule, selecting independent data for their records, and yet their accounts, so divergent at first sight as to appear almost contradictory, falling into a coherent unity without the aid of aught else than scissors and paste and a little common sense.[3] The absurdity of such a conception absolutely precludes any other conclusion than the recognition of the exact historical, albeit fragmentary, presentation of their original sources by the Evangelists and the essential

[1] "Every ordinary method of historical investigation proves inadequate to the complexity of the conditions. The standards of ordinary historical science are here inadequate, its methods not immediately applicable. The historical study of the life of Jesus has had to create its own methods for itself."—Schweitzer, p. 6.

[2] Here, however, our attempt to exclude the witness of the Fourth Gospel breaks down. Its records of the Resurrection, taken with the Pauline summary, give us the key to the actual course of events and enable us not only to assert the essential historicity of the accounts, but to vindicate the adequacy of the evidence on setting it forth as a coherent whole.

[3] For the most scientific treatment of the evidence, see Orr's *Resurrection of Jesus* and Dr. McCheyne Edgar's vigorous and valuable book *The Gospel of a Risen Saviour*. There is a brief reconstruction of the course of events in my *Christian Certitude*, chapter V.

historicity of the Resurrection of the Lord Jesus Christ.

No matter what drastic tests are applied to the evidence, three facts emerge from any historical enquiry. They are the unexpectancy and hopelessness of the apostles after the death of Christ, the empty grave and the appearances of the Risen Lord. The unexpectancy of the disciples who, when told that the Lord had risen, laughed their informants to scorn;[1] who, as a consequence of the death of Christ, had ceased to think of the Lord as even the Messiah of Israel and had begun to conceive Him simply as a Prophet mighty in word and deed[2] was a poor and barren soil for the development of the ecstatic experiences and vision seeing of the negative hypothesis. Similarly, the empty grave is a most important piece of circumstantial evidence, quite incompatible with the Vision-hypothesis.[3] Indeed, its cogency is so felt by the principal exponents of that theory that, just as they tell us on the strength of the exclusively possessed historical sources to be found in their fertile imaginations that the apostles were in a state of expectancy and hope, they inform us that the accounts of the empty grave are to be rejected.[4]

[1] Luke. xxiv. 11. [2] Luke. xxiv. 19.

[3] Denney says most justly that "the empty tomb comes before us only as a fact, not as an argument. . . The empty grave is not the product of a naïve apologetic spirit, a spirit not content with the evidence for the Resurrection contained in the fact that the Lord had appeared to His own and had quickened them into new victorious life; it is not the first stage in a process which aims unconsciously as much as voluntarily at making the evidence palpable, and independent, as far as may be, of the moral qualifications, to which we have already adverted; it is an original, independent and unmotived part of the apostolic testimony."—pp. 144-145. Yet Wernle can say: "The belief in mere visions would never have made any impression upon Jews. An objective proof must be furnished. The story of the empty grave was circulated at a very early period with the object of providing this desideratum."—I., p. 141.

[4] "As, however, the discovery of the empty grave is so inseparably connected with these events that they stand or fall together, it follows, finally that, along with the appearances at the sepulchre, the opened

But St. Paul, we are told, knew nothing and cared less about the empty tomb.[1] On what ground is this assertion made? Simply on the ground that he does not mention it. Why should he have mentioned it? He was writing to Christians who denied the resurrection of the dead and he defends the belief on the ground that "now is Christ risen from the dead, and become the first fruits of them that sleep."[2] He gives a summary of the official witness to the Resurrection in barest outline without a hint of detail and, forsooth, because he does not mention a subsidiary and, apart from the appearances, quite inconclusive piece of indirect evidence, he knows nothing about it! Of a surety "this method of criticism is practically nothing else than making our own ignorance the measure of a writer's reasons for such an omission."[3]

3. Yet how natural and how coherent with our Lord's transcendental Personality is the Evangelic presentation of His Resurrection! It is no mere revivification to a renewed life such as the miracles of resurrection had familiarized to the disciples, and it is

grave is to be credited to the legend, which has been freely moulded by an apologetic interest; and this is also probable on the further ground that the accounts of the solemn interment of Jesus are subject to the gravest doubt."—Pfleiderer, *Primitive Christianity*, I., p. 5.

[1] "Now, the circumstance that he passes over the events at the grave is striking, if only because he has just mentioned the burial, but chiefly because they would have served his purpose best. In the proof which he undertakes so earnestly and carries out with such precision the absence of the first and most important link is in the highest degree suspicious. The only possible explanation is that the Apostle was ignorant of its existence. And this is important. For Paul's knowledge of these things must have come from the heads of the primitive Church. Therefore it is the primitive Church itself that was ignorant of any such tradition."—Weizsäcker, *The Apostolic Age*, I., p. 5.

[2] 1 Cor. xv. 20.

[3] Thorburn, p. 13. Nor it is even true to say that St. Paul regarded the resurrection body as entirely dissociated from the earthly body. On the contrary, in the very passage on which these critics rely, he expressly connects the resurrection body with the earthly body as a seed is connected with the full grown plant and speaks of the transmutation of the quick. All that can be said with regard to such treatment of evidence is that it is magnificent but it is not history.

no mere visionary impression received in a moment of intensest excitement. It is a case of this mortal putting on immortality, of the transmutation of an earthly Body into a glorified, of a Body terrestrial into a Body celestial. It was material enough to verify itself to the senses of the disciples in every possible way. Its presence was attested by their sight, their hearing and their touch—He even ate in their presence—and yet It was free from the trammels which had limited His Self-expression in the days of His flesh.

The antithesis, to which Pfleiderer[1] objects so strongly, is in itself a guarantee of the historicity of the Resurrection. No illusion would have led to so unique a conception : and it is equally certain that the writers of the Gospels can have found no attraction in the association of such apparently contradictory ideas The unique character of the Resurrection is, to the historian, an excellent guarantee of its authenticity.

Once the old Manichæan prejudice, which seems ingrained in human nature, of the essential unworthiness, not to say baseness, of matter is eliminated from our minds, the New Testament conception of our Lord's Resurrection Body becomes profoundly harmonious with all that we know of God's working in nature.

In the last analysis, it is impossible to doubt that the principal function of matter is to be thought's medium of expression. It is by means of the material mechanism of the brain that personality expresses itself and it is by the reduction of the material universe under its sway that it achieves its triumphs

[1] "It is impossible completely to realize the representation of a Body of the risen Jesus which is at one time wholly material, and, like an ordinary earthly body, can be handled and can take food, but at another time seems to be of Supernatural character, since it passes through closed doors, suddenly appears and disappears, and is taken up into heaven."—I., p. 2.

and learns its strength. Hence the sanctity of the material is only transcended by that of personality.

More than this, it is only by the assimilation of extern matter to the organism of expression that man can maintain his place and influence in the world of human activity. All life is one long struggle between life striving to reduce and assimilate matter, and matter resisting its reduction and assimilation. While the struggle continues, we live. When it flags, our self-expression becomes weakened and limited and our life-work is impeded. When it ceases, we go hence and are no more seen. Hence, if it is once conceded that in the future life we continue to be men and that our spirits shall have some organism of self-expression, it is not surprising that the imperfect organs of expression, which now impede and hinder as much as help our self-expression, shall be done away; and our limited personalities clothed upon with organisms adequate to their full expression. In that case, it is not an unreasonable idea that matter (which has been beautifully described by Dr. Hutchison Stirling as "crystallized thought") should be brought so perfectly under the sway of personality as to form a perfect organ of self-expression. This is the Scriptural conception in the case of those who shall be alive at the coming of the Lord and it is the underlying thought of the whole New Testament doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. No doubt, in the latter case St. Paul meets the objection—"How are the dead raised up," and "with what body do they come?"—with the retort, "Thou fool that which thou sowest is not quickened except it die; and that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body which shall be, but bare grain, it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain,"[1] and proceeds to show that the resurrection body will be something transcending and

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 36.

incalculably more glorious than this mortal body; but he also teaches that those who are alive at the coming of the Lord will all be changed. Thus, the conception is that the material organ of expression will be given an infinitely higher form—one that is related to it as the oak is to the acorn.

How natural and worthy a conception this is! How in accordance with all that is known of God's way of working it is that the presentation of the Lord's Resurrection Body should be triumphant over material limitations! How worthy a thought it is that the Body of His humiliation should have formed the ever-sacred Seed, the Acorn, of His glorified Body and that the Representative Man in the days of His glorification should take unto Himself and glorify the once humble Organ of His Self-expression. Changed, transfigured, glorified, that Body once scourged and spat upon, pierced and nailed to the tree on man's behalf, was manifested to the disciples as glorified and transmuted into the perfect Organ for the Self-expression of the Representative Man, who is glorified for men.

(3) *The Ascension*

The last of the three great personal miracles of the Evangelic history assuredly does not need a long discussion. It is admittedly the inevitable corollary of the physical Resurrection[1] and is amply attested by the constant references to it in the various apostolic writings. The resurrection is the keystone of the series of personal miracles and, so long as the Ascension is buttressed by the irrefragable evidence for the primary miracle, it cannot be effectually assailed.

Nor is it either reasonable or true to urge that the conception is grossly geo-centric and incompatible

[1] "The fact is that some account of an ascension became a necessity as soon as the corporeal resurrection from the dead was accepted." —Gardner, p. 260.

with a profounder interpretation of the universe. If the Incarnation had taken place forty years ago; if the Lord had been crucified six weeks ago; if He had risen from the dead and was about to leave us finally and in such a manner that we could make no mistake about the finality of His departure; what other form than that of an ascension could it take ? Would it be better for Him to vanish into thin air, or to disappear into the ground ? If it be once granted that the Creator does take an interest in the affairs of this world and that He is capable and willing to reveal Himself to sinful humanity, He must use such methods as will render His goodwill comprehensible to the average man. In other words, if the Divine Being would reveal Himself to geo-centrically minded and constituted beings, He must use geo-centric methods. Surely it is not to be thought that the nailing to the Cross of the Sinless Son of God is the atoning element in the sacrifice of Calvary ? It is rather the infinite and Divine Self-sacrifice of the Self-identification of God the Son with sinful humanity in submission to the Holy Law of Love. Can, however, any other way of making it comprehensible to men living in space and time be imagined than by the Incarnation and by the consummation of the sacrifice in space and time ? Similarly, the Ascension was the necessary complement of the Resurrection of the Lord and stands in relation to the end of His incarnate and earthly activity as the Virgin Birth does to its beginning—as the manifestation of the special activity of the Divine Being. The manifest absurdity of all alternatives reduces the objection simply to a complaint that the glorified Lord did not leave the scene of His sufferings with the privacy of a defaulting clerk flying the country.

We conclude, then, that the main testimony of the filial consciousness of the Lord Jesus Christ is

supported and attested by the indirect evidence to be derived from the character of His public and private carriage, from the Self-revelation embodied in His mighty works and by the accordance of the three great personal (and well attested) miracles of the Virgin Birth at the beginning and the Resurrection and Ascension at the close of His earthly activities.

III.—The Apostolic Witness[1]

There can be no reasonable doubt of the fact that the thought of the apostolic Church in its earlier stages was at once a continuation of and a retrogression from the Christology of the Lord as recorded in the Synoptic Gospels. It could scarcely be expected that the events of six weeks should make such an impression upon the disciples that, passing at a bound from the narrowest political Messianism to the highest cosmical conceptions, they should appreciate the transcendence of our Lord's Personality in all its significance. On the other hand, it is not unnatural that the triumph of their Lord over shame and death as revealed by His glorious resurrection to eternal life should have enabled them, with the aid of definite teaching on His part, to appreciate the true character of His Messianic claims and to cast off the more narrowly national elements of the Messianic hope. Hence it is only to be expected that an examination of the New Testament literature will reveal a steady and continuous advance in the comprehension of the universal significance of our Lord's Person and, at the same time, indicate the limitations of such a development.

[1] Authorities:—M. Goguel, *L'Apôtre Paul et Jésus Christ;* J. Kaftan, *Jesus und Paulus;* R. J. Knowling, *The Witness of St. Paul to Christ;* A. Meyer, *Jesus or Paul?;* Sir W. Ramsay, *Pauline and other Studies; The Cities of St. Paul; St. Paul the Traveller and Roman Citizen,* etc.; J. Weiss, *Paul and Jesus;* W. Wrede, *Paulus;* H. H. Weinel, *St. Paul: The Man and his Work.*

The Person of Christ

A. THE PETRINE CYCLE

Κυριον και Χριστον Αυτον ὁ Θεος ἐποιησε

The writings composing this first and least developed of the three great Christological cycles are the speeches of St. Peter recorded in the Acts of the Apostles, the Petrine group of Epistles and the Epistle of St. James.

1. The Christology of these records of the primitive community is largely a continuation of the Self-witness of the Lord. The events of the Passion and Easter had enabled the disciples to surrender for the time being their old carnal conception of the Messiahship and to read that national office in terms of the spiritual and transcendental conception of their gracious Lord. Hence the disciples emphasize the sufferings of Christ and speak of Him both to the world and in their social worship as the Servant (Παις) of God.[1] In other words, having at last realized that the Messiahship must be read through redemption by representative suffering, the concept of the redeeming Lord tended to fill (as it still does in the first days of Christian experience) the whole mental horizon. Hence the Lord of the early community was a redeeming and a national Messiah. Nevertheless, it ascribed other titles than Παις to its Messiah. It declared that God had made Him both "Lord (Κυριος—almost equivalent in the Septuagint to Jehovah), and Christ."[2] It assigned Him a unique place and one of universal significance in the purpose of God; for He was "delivered up by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God."[3] He had received the promise of the Spirit and He, therefore, poured forth the Holy Ghost.[4] In Him alone is salvation.[5] He is "the

[1] Acts iii. 13, iv. 27. [2] Acts ii. 36.
[3] ii. 23. [4] ii. 33. [5] iv. 12.

Prince (Ἀρχηγός) of life."[1] Such a Christology, while its simplicity assures the authenticity of the reports, is by no means poor. It ascribes some of the very highest Divine powers to Christ, a place of universal importance and significance to His death and sufferings and, by investing Him with the sole power of salvation, transfers to Him a unique prerogative of the Old Testament Jehovah.

2. The prevailing type of thought in 1 Peter, as in the Acts, is national-redemptive. Redemption is through "the precious blood of Christ," which is contrasted with corruptible things.[2] The Saviour is Lord in such a sense that Old Testament passages relating to Jehovah are applicable to Him.[3] Above all, His activities are not limited to the immediate past or to the present and future; for He it was who gave His Spirit to the prophets and so prepared the way for His earthly activity.[4]

The Christology of the First Epistle, therefore, differs in no essential respect from that of the Petrine speeches. In some respects, there may be a slight development of thought—thus, the redemptive work of the Lord is conceived in terms of sacrifice and the implied pre-existence of the "determinate counsel of God" finds a fuller expression in the ascription of a pre-incarnate activity—but there is nothing to justify the assertion that the author had modified his Christological position in any important respect.

[1] iii. 15: "Christ is the Source of life, a life in which others share through Him; in this very place where St. Peter was speaking our Lord had spoken of Himself as the Giver of eternal life (John x. 28), although, doubtless, the expression may include the thought that in Him was life in its fullest and widest sense—physical, intellectual, moral, spiritual."—Knowling, *Expositor's Greek Testament*, II., p. 112. It is worth while noticing that elsewhere in the New Testament ἀρχηγος always means author. Its basic thought is that of an originative cause.

[2] i. 19. [3] ii. 3 compared with i. 3.

[4] i. 11. "Our author attributes to the Son of God, even before His earthly existence, a preparative activity in reference to the accomplishment of salvation."—Bovon, *Théologie du Nouveau Testament*, II., p. 430.

3. Whether Mayor and Zahn are right or wrong in their defence of the traditional authorship of the Epistle of St. James, there can be no doubt that the Epistle came from the pen of a Judaistic Christian, and was addressed to Jews. There is comparatively little reference to the Lord by name, but the character of the reference, direct and indirect, is such as amply to compensate for the paucity of direct reference. The writer speaks of the Lord as "the Glory,"[1] freely refers to Him as "the Lord"[2] and speaks of "the Name" in contexts which necessitate that of His Step-brother[3] and which, nevertheless, give it the place of honour and significance ascribed in the Old Testament to that of the covenant-keeping God of Israel. When we add to this the fact that the author is opposing an outburst of Antinomianism, based upon the misconception of justification by faith—so common in every age of the world's history, and that he, therefore, implies the full scheme of redemption by substitution, it becomes clear that the slightness of his expressed Christology is not due to its poverty, but rather to the immediate necessity of emphasizing other aspects of truth.

4. What, then, is the essential character of the Christology of the Petrine cycle? It is, no doubt, soteriological rather than ontological; but in essentials it is in no wise behind the more fully developed Christologies of the Pauline and Johannine cycles. The Covenant name of God, Κυριος, and related Old Testament passages are referred to the Saviour in all three sources. Other Divine titles, powers and offices and, above all, the attribute of pre-existence are freely ascribed to the Lord who is conceived as the Author of

[1] Jas. i. 2. [2] Jas. ii. 7.

[3] v. 14: "The name intended is clearly that of Jesus, which is thus in Christian usage substituted for that of Jehovah."—Warfield, *The Lord of Glory*, p. 242.

salvation as well as the Messiah of Israel. In other, words, the earliest community, starting from its primary conception of the Messianic office of the Lord, learned to read it in terms of redemption and, therefore, to appreciate His ontological Sonship and to imply more of it than it actually did appreciate. Thus, the Petrine Christology, beginning in the Messianic and culminating in the soteriological interest, naturally leads up to the Christology of the Pauline cycle of apostolic thought and only differs from it in degree of development and in methods of expression.[1]

B. THE PAULINIST CYCLE

Ος ἐστιν Εἰκων του Θεου του Ἀορατου

It would be difficult to deny that the Christology of the second cycle is of a more advanced and modern type. Nor is this surprising. St. Paul approached the problem of the Person of Christ by a very different avenue from that used by the first disciples. They approached the Lord as Jews of His time along the line of the Messianic hopes and aspirations fulfilled in Him and, after they had hailed Him as the Messiah, found Him to be the Saviour of their souls. St. Paul, on the contrary, as is the case with modern Jewish-Christians and, indeed, Christians generally, approached the Lord by the avenue of His redemptive activity. Bitterly hostile as he had been to the Messianic claims of Christ, the Apostle could not be won by the Redemptive Messiah ; but he could be, and was, subdued by the Messianic Redeemer. The Pauline Christology, while very genuinely Messianic, consequently begins where the more primitive Christology leaves off—at the

[1] "There is, in fact, no theological difference of any moment between the Peter of the Epistle and the Peter of the Acts nor, on the other hand between St. Peter and St. Paul."—Bigg, *St. Peter and St. Jude*, International Critical Commentary, p. 36.

conception of the Lord Jesus Christ as personal Saviour and Redeemer.[1]

Hence it is that, with the exception of the Epistles to the Thessalonians which are themselves pregnant with a very high Christology of a redemptive character,[2] the Messianic conceptions, though profoundly influencing the main current of thought, are quite subordinated to the profounder and deeper truths of the redemptive activity of Christ and the character of His Personality. This is also the reason why the great central group of Pauline Epistles is not primarily Messianic or even Christological, but is chiefly concerned with the problems of the character of that redemptive activity and of the circles to which its results are applicable. Not that it can be said that the Christology of the four indubitable Epistles is a low, or, in any way, a poor or a slight Christology. On the contrary, it is exceedingly high and contains all the fundamental thoughts of the Christology of the later Epistles. There is, however, no attempt to work them out in detail. They are there rather in solution and in isolated crystals than in a fully consolidated form; but there they are and in so definite a form that the transition to the fully developed Christology of the Ephesians group is easy and natural.

As there is no particular point in considering the Christology of the various groups of St. Paul's Epistles

[1] "Jesus was for Him the Lord because He was the Saviour. . . The doctrine of Christ's Person in these Epistles is no mere theological speculation; it is the outgrowth of religious experience, the offspring of the consciousness of personal redemption."—A. B. Bruce, *St. Paul's Conception of Christianity*, p. 328.

[2] "Nothing indeed can exceed the exalted place assigned to the Person of Christ even in these markedly Monotheistic writings. . . In this connection, as constantly elsewhere throughout the Epistle, He is described as ὁ Κυριος, a title which was the common term for God amongst the Jews of the time, but which is here apparently confined to the Person of the glorified Lord, while the identical expressions, which the Hebrew prophets were in the habit of using of God, are directly transferred to Him."—Milligan, *The Epistles to the Thessalonians*, pp. lxvi.-lxvii.

separately, it will be simplest to quote the most striking Christological passage in his Epistles and to indicate the presence of its fundamental conceptions in our author's earlier writings.

The passage in question is Col. i. 13 ff., where the Apostle speaks of " the Son of His love ; in whom we have our redemption, the forgiveness of our sins ; who is the Image of the invisible God, the Firstborn of all creation ; for in Him were all things created, in the heavens and upon the earth, things visible and things invisible, whether thrones or dominions or principalities or powers ; all things have been created through Him, and unto Him ; and He is before all things, and in Him all things consist. And He is the Head of the Body, the Church ; who is the Beginning, the Firstborn from the dead ; that in all things He might have the pre-eminence. For it was the good pleasure of the Father that in Him should all the fulness dwell ; and through Him to reconcile all things unto Himself, having made peace through the blood of His cross ; through Him, I say, whether things upon the earth, or things in the heavens."

Thus, the Apostle discusses the character of our Lord's relationship to (1) the Father, (2) to the old creation and (3) to the new creation.

(1) He is described as the " Son of His love "—a relationship which is entirely unique and which finds no parallel among the purely human sons of God. How could any other than One who partook of the Divine nature be spoken of as " the Son of His love," as the comprehensive Object of Divine love in whom the heart of the Infinite found absolute and ample satisfaction and fellowship ? Nowhere in Pauline thought is any other than the Lord conceived as filially related to the Divine by nature. Divine Sonship belongs to His human brethren by adoption, not by nature. Indeed, as St. Paul clearly shows in Romans i. 4, the

Lord's own Manhood finds its real filial relationship to God manifested and established at the Resurrection, when " He was declared to be the Son of God with power."[1] It is, then, obviously in an ontological and unique sense alone that such phraseology as the " Son of His love "[2] can be applied to the Redeemer; in union with whom we have redemption, even the forgiveness of sins. He is the Image of the invisible God (Εικων του Θεου του Αορατου), that is, He is the visible Representative who mediates the knowledge of the invisible and incommunicable God to sinful men.[3]

(2) In relation to the creation, He stands as its Mediator (through, δια, Him were all things created); its Final Cause (unto, εις, Him); its unifying principle or force (in Him all things consist, συνεστηκε, hold together or cohere); and, therefore, all things were created in Him (εν Αυτω). He is prior to all creation, whether in heaven or in earth. He is the Firstborn of all creation.

(3) In relation to the Church, the Lord is the Redeemer, through the agency of (δια) whose blood the Father has made peace and reconciled all things unto Himself. He is the Beginning (Αρχη) the Head of the Church, the Firstbegotten from among those who, like Himself, were dead. Thus, the note of priority is preserved in the parallel; but the significant

[1] Rom. i., 4.

[2] " The simplest interpretation is, the Son who is the Object of His love. It corresponds exactly with Eph. i. 6, εν τω ηγαπημενω εν ω εχομεν κ. τ. λ., only that it gives more prominence to the attribute. Love is not merely bestowed upon Him, but makes Him its own. . . Lightfoot thinks this interpretation destroys the whole force of the expression; but it is not so. It is because Christ is the central Object of God's love that those who have been translated into His kingdom are assured of the promised blessings thereof."—T. K. Abbott, International Critical Commentary, *in loc.* p. 208; so also Alford and Peake.

[3] " So that while αορατος includes in it not only the invisibility, but the incommunicability of God, εικων also must not be restricted to Christ corporeally visible in the Incarnation, but understood of Him as the Manifestation of God in His whole Person and work—pre-existent and incarnate."—Alford, III. p. 202.

difference that the Son of His love was not One of the created things is made clear by the phraseology used by the Apostle.[1]

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Apostle should freely have referred to the pre-existence of the Lord in his other Epistles; that he should have paralleled the First and Second Adams as the respective Heads of the old and new creations with the significant difference that the first man was of the earth earthy, but the second Man is the Lord from (ἐκ) heaven[2]; that, taking up the Petrine thought of the pre-incarnate activity of our gracious Lord, he should have spoken of the Lord as the spiritual Rock which followed Israel in its wanderings;[3] or that he should have appealed to Christians to remember the example of Him, who for our sakes became poor,[4] and to imitate the humility of Him who thought it not a prize to be on an equality with God, but made Himself of no reputation and took upon Himself the form of a servant.[5]

Nor is it surprising that the Apostle constantly associates the name of the Lord as on equal terms with that of God[6] and even uses the Divine Name on several

[1] The phrase, Πρωτοτοκος πασης της κτισεως, when compared with the parallel phrase Πρωτοτοκος ἐκ των νεκρων, shows that the distinction between a timeless and eternal priority to created things and a merely temporal priority among created things was deliberately made by St. Paul. The Πρωτοτοκος ἐκ των νεκρων, while preserving the thought of priority, distinctly states the solidarity of the Πρωτοτοκος with the remainder of the dead. He is conceived as the First of the family of the Father to be begotten from among the dead. The omission of the ἐκ in the previous phrase, therefore, compels the conviction that the Apostle did not conceive of any solidarity of nature between the Πρωτοτοκος and created things and, therefore, entirely precludes Beyschlag's unnatural and forced conception of a merely ideal pre-existence.

[2] 1. Cor. xv 47. [3] 1 Cor. x. 4. [4] 2 Cor. viii. 9. [5] Phil. ii. 7.

[6] "To Paul Jesus is an Object not only of belief, but also of *religious veneration*. A man who asks for 'grace and peace,' not only 'from God our Father,' but also 'from our Lord Jesus Christ,' must regard Christ as co-equal with God; however carefully the formula distinguishing His unique nature from that of God may be worded, the practical faith of Paul and his congregations expects no less from Christ than from God—guidance, help and blessing."—J. Weiss, *Paul and Jesus*, p. 4.

occasions as identical with that of Christ. Thus, He speaks of our great God and Saviour Jesus Christ,[1] of Christ as "God blessed for ever,"[2] and even in 1 Thess. iv. 13-18 ("them which sleep in Jesus shall God bring with Him. Then the Lord Himself shall descend from heaven") seems to conceive of the coming of Christ as synonymous with that of God. Hence it is difficult to dissent from the statement of H. J. Holtzmann that "the Christ of these letters is, in a word, the Central-Being of the Universe, His relation to God none other than that of the Johannine Logos-Christ. Only the name Logos is not yet used; but its substance is here."[3]

C. THE JOHANNINE CYCLE

Θεος ἠν ὁ Λογος

All that remained for the latest cycle of apostolic thought, as it could not transcend the magnitude of these claims, was to find an adequate and convenient phraseology. This it found in the expression Logos, which (whether it is derived from the Alexandrian-Jewish Logos doctrine or, as seems more probable, from the *Memrah* of the Palestinian Rabbis)[4] is certainly

[1] "As the Johannine Christology tries to balance the Divine and the human in the Logos conception, so according to the author of the Epistles to Timothy and Titus both sides would still confront each other unmediated; if Tit. ii. 13 should, owing to the lack of an article, mean by 'great God' Christ—and if the doxology in 2 Tim. iv. 18, is ascribed to Him as the 'Lord.' . ."—H. J. Holtzmann, II., pp. 301-302.

[2] Rom. ix. 5. [3] H. J. Holtzmann, II., p. 288.

[4] "The Logos of St. John has been connected with the Logos of the Alexandrian Jewish thinker Philo. But Philo's Logos is rather the divine inner Reason (the alternative meaning of the word λογος) than the forthcoming Word, God's utterance of Himself. A truer antecedent to St. John's inspired use is the Aramaic word *Memrah* (Word, root, *amar, dixit*), employed by the Palestinian Rabbis to convey the thought of God in intercourse. It was this 'Word' which the Apostle seems to have been led to adopt, or explain, as the title of Him (not It) who is the supreme Revealer of the Father, and the living Way of union and communion between God and the creature.'—Bishop H. C. G. Moule, *Outlines of Christian Doctrine*, pp. 59-60. Compare Beyschlag: "He could hardly be led to this choice by the Alexandrian Philo, whose Hellenized Logos, half Stoical reason and half Biblical word, forming the world moreover, out of matter, not calling it forth from nothing, has little in common with the Johannine."—II., p. 422.

both a convenient and a philosophical expression for the whole series of cosmical relations ascribed to the Lord by St. Paul, St. John and the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews[1] alike.

It may be, it certainly is true that the second of these writers lays a much greater stress upon the cosmical functions of the Lord than either of the others. Their doctrine is primarily soteriological. His is cosmical. In other words, all their thought was overshadowed by the fact of their redemption. He stood far enough away from that experience to find his pressing problems in the cosmical relations of the Lord rather than the redemptive and he could, therefore, give the latter independent consideration.

According to St. John, the Word's existence was timeless and, as befitted One whose essential nature was Divine, spent in endless and " active communion with God." [2] He was in the eternal counsels of God as regards, and the active Agent in, creation. He is the Quickening Presence, apart from whom nothing whatsoever that is made was made. " John wishes to declare Jesus Christ God ; but not God, in such a sense that there is no other God but He. Therefore he calls Him ' the Word '—' the Word ' who is indeed God, but also alongside of God, that is to say God as Revealer ; and he adds that He is ' God only begotten,' the idea conveyed by which is not derivation of essence, but uniqueness of relation, so that what is declared is that beside Jesus Christ there is no other—He is the sole complete Representation of God on earth." [3]

[1] " But the Christology of our Epistle is specially remarkable from the fact that it emphasizes the true humanity of Christ more clearly and consciously than any other New Testament writing, and yet on the basis of this assertion builds up superhuman declarations which go beyond those of any other New Testament teacher."—Beyschlag, II., pp. 304-305.

[2] Westcott *in loc.*

[3] B. B. Warfield, *The Lord of Glory*, pp. 162-163.

D. DEVELOPMENT AND UNITY OF APOSTOLIC THOUGHT

There can be no reasonable doubt of the facts that, when compared with those of the Petrine cycle, the writings of the Paulinists represent a very considerable advance in comprehension of the transcendental character of the Lord's Person and that the Johannine interpretation is a more articulate presentation of the same truth than the Pauline. The earliest cycle of Christian thought is the concomitant of the first believers' emergence from the chrysalis-like Jewish Messianism into the wider and fuller life of the redemptive Messianism of our Lord Himself. The second and Paulinist cycle of Christian thought has given us the first attempt to express the implications of Redemptive-Messianism; and the final and adequate expression of the great truths to which the Christian consciousness so slowly, but so inevitably, won its way is to be found in the Johannine writings.

If there is anything certain in the whole controversy, it is that the apostolic Christologies are not artificial growths. They are not ingeniously constructed theories. On the contrary, they are natural developments. They form the inevitable outcome (as so many negative critics testify), of the impression left upon the apostolic circle by contact with the Lord's Personality and by the belief that He was, indeed, the Messiah of Israel and, still more, the Messiah of the apocalypses. Hence the proper question is not so much as to whether a given idea, prominent in a later cycle, finds expression—still less, proportionate expression—in an earlier; but whether it is consistent with the general system of thought embodied in the earlier cycle. In other words, the problem is biological, not anatomical.

Is there, then, a true biological development discernible in the apostolic testimony? Some things seem to demand the assumption. (*a*) There is no violent or unnatural break between the conceptions of the Petrine

writings and the Paulinist, or Johannine. On the contrary, the testimony of innumerable generations of believers is that they pass from one to the other without the slightest difficulty. If challenged, they might, perhaps, find to their surprise that their favourite proof-texts were principally derived from the Johannine cycle. Similarly, they might find themselves using the later cycles of epistles in their devotions rather than the earlier as being more really helpful to their spiritual lives and tending more freely to deepen their experience; but such a preference would scarcely be conscious. The thought of an actual difference in the respective Christologies would never occur to them, and nothing would surprise them more than to draw their attention to the fuller character of the later Christologies.

(*b*) Nor is the instinct of the plain man, the experience of the humble and uncritical Christian, at fault in this regard. A closer and more critical examination of the phenomena of the apostolic interpretation of the Christ reveals the surprising fact that there is really very little in the higher Christologies which is not inchoate in the Petrine cycle. No doubt, there are some differences in the usage of titles; but even that is exaggerated. The favourite titles of all the New Testament writers and of the Christians of all succeeding ages are neither God nor the Word (which are very seldom found in ordinary Christian usage), but Christ, Saviour and Lord. The Apostles and primitive Christians, as we (Christians, born in a Christian land) do to this day, experienced the Eternal Son first as Christ, or spiritual Ruler, who ought to be obeyed and exalted; then, as Saviour, or personal Redeemer from sin; and finally as Lord, or the covenant making and covenant-keeping God, slow to anger, and of great goodness.

Besides this, the distribution of the various titles

shows that they were rather a spontaneous development of the primitive community than a consciously and artificially formed product of the schools. In other words, they are a language rather than a scientific vocabulary. Thus, the striking title Ἀρχηγος finds its place in the Petrine and Pauline cycles, and its context in the former, "the Prince" or "Author of life," is curiously suggestive of the Johannine conception of the Lord as the Giver of Life. Πρωτοτοκος is found in the Revelation as well as in the Paulinist group; and the great Pauline concept of the Lord of Glory is paralleled in the Johannine cycle by the statement that "we beheld His glory, the glory as of the Only-begotten of the Father" and in the simplest Christology to be found in the writings of the Petrine group—that of St. James—in which the Lord is actually described as "the Glory."

What is, however, of infinitely more importance than any identity of titles is the identity of function and place and essential being underlying the various presentations. It is unnecessary, but by no means idle, to urge the unanimity of all groups of apostolic testimony to the transcendental character of the Risen and Exalted Lord, and to the universal ascription to Him of the offices of Saviour and Judge. The fact that the great Pauline and Johannine doctrine of the pre-existent Lord finds inchoate expression in the Petrine group is much more likely to be overlooked; and the fundamentally important ascription to the Lord of such a Divine prerogative as the giving of the Holy Ghost in the Petrine group is in no danger of receiving too much consideration.

We can scarcely, in view of such facts as these, venture to assert that there is any serious advance—or, indeed, any advance at all—as regards the substance of Christology discernible in the development of apostolic thought. The most, we may justly say, is

that there has been an advance not from the acorn to the oak, but from the sapling to the full-grown tree whose wide-spreading branches are the glory of the park.

E. APOSTOLIC CHRISTOLOGY, THE CHRISTOLOGY OF CHRIST.

It would be most unfair to demand that every detail and every expression of the later apostolic Christology should be paralleled by an explicit saying of our Lord's; for He came not so much as a Teacher whose mission was to reveal the character of His Personality as a Worker whose deeds should exhibit and reveal to sinful eyes the wonderful pardoning and redemptive love of God.[1] What we may reasonably demand is that there should be a fundamental and esssential compatibility between the Christology of Christ and that of the Apostles, a compatibility of such a kind as to make it evident that there has been a natural development and growth not from the seed but from the blade to the full-grown plant. In other words, all that may be legitimately expected is that the Christology of Christ should be in direct and causal connection with the first beginnings of apostolic Christology. The Christology of Christ is exhibitionary. The apostolic Christology is interpretative.

Whether we approach our subject from the point of view of the apostolic Christology or of that of Christ (and the fact that we must look at the latter through the atmosphere created by the former, renders

[1] "It was only after His death that the full truth could be told because only then did the full truth exist, because His death was its creation. Only in the completion of the cross did Christ become the Object of Gospel preaching, because only there was He perfected and final as Redeemer. It was not till then that His disciples came to worship Him. And what one observes is this, that those who have found themselves in His death cannot hear enough about His life; but those who find their account only in His life are soon satiated with interpretations of His death."—Forsyth, *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*, p. 120.

the former point of view the most natural to us), the principal points which would present themselves for enquiry are five in number. They are (1) His place in His Gospel, (2) the character of His work, (3) His alleged glorification after death, (4) the character of His personality, and (5) His alleged pre-existence.

(1) Quite apart from the marshalling in this present lecture of the positive evidence for the centrality of our gracious Lord in the Gospel as conceived by Himself, the unanimous testimony of the negative criticism of all schools of thought[1] renders it impossible to dispute the fact. "It seems certain to us, that Jesus gives Himself a central position in His Gospel."[2] This is in full accord with the apostolic conception. To the apostles the Lord was the Centre of their Gospel, the Norm of their experience and the Pole of their thought. Attached to His Person by the indissoluble bonds of redemption, their thought revolved around His Person as the planets around the sun. In their conviction, the redemption, the grace, mercy and truth of God the Father were to be found in Christ who was, therefore, the Centre of the Gospel of Redeeming Love.

(2) The supposed contrast between our Lord's conception of His work and the apostolic interpretation thereof will not bear examination. It is indisputable that the Lord conceived His work in terms of the Messianic conception of the Suffering Servant of Jehovah and that His assimilation of that conception with the Messianic constituted His creative addition to the Messianic idea; and it is also undeniable that the Isaianic conception is that of a substitutionary sacrifice, of a sinless man yielding up his life as a ransom for the forfeit lives of a guilty people. It is equally indisputable, if any credence may be given to the Synoptic Gospels, that our Lord conceived His work to centre in His sufferings and that He "came not to

[1] See Lecture II.

[2] Goguel, p. 207.

be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many."[1] How much further does even the Pauline presentation of the doctrine of redemption go than this? Simply in its avowed attempt to relate the stupendous fact of our Lord's death (regarded by the Lord Himself as the decisive fact in His mission and career) to the great fact of human sin which separates man from God. In other words, the sole difference between the Pauline interpretation of the Lord's work, and the Lord's verbally expressed conception of it is a difference not in kind, but in degree. The former is simply the logical deduction of the conclusion from the premises supplied by the latter.

3. The universal recognition of the fact that the Lord did expect His return in glory to judge both the quick and the dead, makes it quite unnecessary to discuss the relationship of the apostolic conception of His glorification to His own conception.

4. Similarly, there is no appreciable difference between the apostolic conception of the Deity of Christ and the Lord's filial Self-consciousness. If they adore Him as Lord and God, He knows Himself to be on terms of perfect equality with the Father, and *vice versa*.[2]

5. The sharpest apparent distinction between the apostolic Christology and that of our gracious Lord and Saviour is to be found in the fact that His pre-existence, so constantly in the thoughts of the apostolic circles, is nowhere (in the Synoptic records) directly mentioned by Him. If it be conceded that the conditions of His humiliation may have meant that His knowledge of His essential Being was as

[1] Mark x. 45.

[2] "Absolute liberty, reciprocal love, limitless confidence distinguish Jesus' relations with God. It may be said that by Jesus and God everything is held in common. The work of God is the work of Christ and *vice versa*."—Goguel, p. 109.

hidden from Him as ours is from ourselves, the entire absence of what is, after all, a corollary of His essential Deity would not afford any foundation for the elaborate structure of an essential difference between the Christology of Christ and that of the apostles. Pre-existence is but an outwork of the Christological citadel. Essential Deity is the Keep and, until it is taken, it is quite impossible for the assailants of the faith to claim the victory.

It is not conceded, however, that there are no indications of our Lord's pre-existence in the Synoptic Gospels. The absolutely unbroken filial consciousness of the Lord is timeless, it is eternal, in character. Nowhere is there the slightest intimation that it was conceived to have begun in time. On the contrary, the whole carriage of our Lord as of One who possessed an essential equality of nature with the Father is consonant with it and asserts it. Pre-existence may not be the expression of Synoptic Christology. It is certainly the underlying thought.

How is it, then, that the Lord did not present Himself to His followers as an Object of worship? Considering the fact that, *ex hypothesi*, He came as Man to dwell among men, to develop perfect Manhood by living the life of Man, how could it have been possible for Him to present Himself explicitly as an Object of worship to His followers?[1] Imagine the Apostles walking and conversing and eating with One whom they adored as the Eternal God! How natural, how normal their relations with Him as Man would have been! How easily they would have escaped falling into the errors of polytheism!

It is almost amusing to observe how the negative

[1] It must not be forgotten that if our Lord did not present Himself as an Object of worship, He made demands (*e.g.* the absolute surrender of the heart and soul to Himself) which, unless He considered that He was a fit Object for worship, were an insult to human intelligence and an outrage and a blasphemy against the Divine majesty.

critics, who are never weary of exalting the divinity of man, find in the very fact of our Lord's laying aside the prerogatives of Divine Majesty a ground of stumbling and a rock of offence. Repudiating anything and everything that even looks like a claim to Divine honours on our Lord's part as inconsistent with His true humanity, they complain that He abstained from making claims and assertions which would have precluded even the simulation of a true humanity for a single instant; but, in doing so, they relapse into the Deistic conception of an unbridgeable chasm between God and Man.

We conclude, then, that the attempt to drive a wedge between apostolic Christianity and the Christianity of Christ is historically illegitimate[1] and that there is no essential difference between the two Christologies.

IV.—Conclusion: Very God of Very God

Hence it is not surprising that the general consensus of modern critics should fully recognize that our Lord conceived Himself to have a unique function in the history of the race—that of the Final Messenger of God, to whom the whole course of revelation led up; nor is it a matter for wonder that the Saviour conceived Himself to have a unique ontological relationship to God, that He conceived Himself to be the Eternal Son Incarnate. Neither is it a matter for surprise that the Apostles and saints of the early Church, illumined by the revelation of the one Perfect Life, should have fallen in adoring worship at the feet of Him who died and rose again, and hailed Him as Lord—as Jehovah,

[1] "It is demonstrated as quite unhistorical. Not only because it estranges the Gospel of Jesus from its historical connection, so as to interpret it by modern presuppositions; and suffocates Paul the Apostle of Christianity in the theologian. It is also especially unhistorical in that it reveals itself as a reaction from the old unhistorical interpretation of the New Testament connected with the ecclesiastical tradition."—J. Kaftan, *Jesus und Paulus*, pp. 68-69.

the covenant-keeping God of Israel—and seen in Him the Brightness of the Father's glory, the express Image of His Person by whom the incommunicable essence of the Eternal God was mediated to sin-stricken humanity.

It should, however, be observed that the inspiration of the Apostles and saints of the early Church was not, as Ritschl would have us believe, the inspiration derived from the contemplation of an all-conquering Life lived in the past, but the inspiration and joy of the fellowship and sympathy of their Risen and ever-present Lord. It was the indwelling presence of the Lord Jesus Christ, tempted and tried in all points like as we are, yet without sin, that alone could nerve the saints and heroes of the early Church to endure the shames and tortures of unutterable persecutions and enable them to meet the last enemy, whether amid the agonies of the rack, the arena or the stake, with

> "The shout of them that triumph,
> The song of them that feast."

Thus, the ever-present and unanswerable vindication of the sinlessness of the Christ of God and of His Deity is our ever-renewed experience of His fellowship, of His love and tender pity, of His Personality nerving to victory over the sin that doth so easily beset us. The stern martyr conquering himself ere he gives his body to be burned, the unpretentious heroism of the mission-field, the sweet saintliness of many a Christian mother, which is as a wall of fire around her sons amid the enticements and lusts of young manhood, the heroic endurance of many a sufferer—happier in his sufferings because he has found Christ than ever he had been in the days of Christless health and prosperity—are living testimonies to Him whom, having not seen, they love.

This, then, is the experimental proof of Christianity

which, if we are to pronounce an opinion on the great question of the Deity of the Son of God, must have entered into our experience. It is the experience of all who have surrendered their hearts to their Redeeming Lord ; it is the experience which He, in His risen glory, yearns to mediate to us at the present moment ; it is the blessed experience that " Christ and His saints smile and sigh together "[1] ; it is the experience of the sorrow-burdened soul, upon whom failure and disaster press heavily, that the Saviour who stands by it and strengthens it is One who had His own heart broken by the burdens and sorrows of life and, above all, by the burden of sin, and can, therefore, bind up the broken-hearted and bring liberty to the captives and the opening of the prison to them that are bound ; that the Saviour in whose presence the terrors of death fly away, whose reassuring Hand is laid upon us as we shrink back in coward fear from the cold waters of death, is One over whose Head the billows of death have surged; who, having entered upon His High-Priestly functions, stands in the midst of the river (as the priests of old, bearing the Ark of the Covenant, stood in the midst of the earthly Jordan) and enables His people to pass over dryshod into " the City which hath foundations, whose Builder and Maker is God."[2]

It is because we know that the Son of God has come, because He hath given us an understanding that we may know Him that is true, because we are in Him that is true, even in His Son Jesus Christ, that we who know the Lord can join with a fervent certainty and with hearts full of an ecstasy which those who know Him not can never even imagine in the glorious hymn of praise,

" For Thou only art holy, Thou only art the Lord, Thou only, O Christ, with the Holy Ghost, art most high in the glory of God the Father."

[1] John Flavel the Puritan. [2] Hebrews xi. 10.

Lecture IV

The Unity of Person

(Sunday, January 28th, 1912)

"TAKE MY YOKE UPON YOU AND LEARN OF ME; FOR I AM MEEK AND LOWLY IN HEART; AND YE SHALL FIND REST UNTO YOUR SOULS."

ST. MATT. xi. 29.

"We believe and confess that our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God and Man; God, of the Substance of the Father, begotten before the worlds: and Man of the Substance of His Mother, born in the world; Perfect God and perfect Man: of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting; equal to the Father, as touching His Godhead: and inferior to the Father, as touching His Manhood. Who, although He be God and Man: yet He is not two, but one Christ; One, not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh: but by taking of the Manhood into God; One altogether; not by confusion of Substance: but by unity of Person."

THE ATHANASIAN CREED.

"In a word, if we do not choose to deny that Christ was made a real Man, we ought not to be ashamed to acknowledge that He voluntarily took upon Him everything that is inseparable from human nature."—JOHN CALVIN.

"The most cautious, the most worshipping theology may hold that He consented, in His humanity, to limitations of His conscious knowledge and to silence outside those bounds."

BISHOP HANDLEY MOULE.

"And yet, for all the puzzle of the lines,
All the discordant copies stained with age,
A more miraculous lore it intertwines,
A grander Christ looks radiant from its page.

"For all the stammering of those simple men,
A fourfold unity of truth they reach;
Drops as of light fall from their trembling pen,
And Christ speaks through them with a tender speech.

"And through all time our father's faith shall speed,
And the old utterance be still found right,
And eastward chanted rise the changeless creed—
O very God from God, O Light from Light."

ARCHBISHOP ALEXANDER,
Primate of all Ireland, 1897-1911.

LECTURE IV

The Unity of Person [1]

I.—Our Lord's Manhood Normal

1. Although an examination of the Scriptural and historical testimony as to the character of our Lord's Person inevitably leads to the conclusion that He was verily and indeed "God of God, Light from Light, Very God from very God," it equally leaves no room for doubt as to the natural and normal character of His Manhood. It presents Him as undergoing a true development,[2] as experiencing temptation in every sense in which a sinless Man, living in the conditions of sinful humanity, could

[1] *AUTHORITIES* :—A. B. Bruce, *The Humiliation of Christ*; J. A. Dorner, *History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ; System of Christian Doctrine;* G. P. Fisher, *History of Christian Doctrine;* A. A. Hodge, *Outlines of Theology;* C. Hodge, *Systematic Theology;* J. Kaftan, *Dogmatik;* M. Kähler, *Die Wissenschaft der Christlichen Lehre;* E. H. Litton, *Introduction to Dogmatic Theology;* J. Macpherson, *Christian Dogmatics;* Bishop H. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics;* Bishop H. C. G. Moule, *Outlines of Christian Doctrine;* J. Orr, *Progress of Dogma; The Christian View of God and the World;* R. L. Ottley, *History of the Doctrine of the Incarnation;* A. Seeberg, *Christi Person und Werk;* R. Seeberg, *Lehrbuch der Dogmensgeschichte;* W. G. T. Shedd, *History of Christian Doctrine; Systematic Theology;* A. H. Strong, *System of Christian Doctrine;* T. B. Strong, *System of Christian Doctrine;* Bishop F. Weston, *The One Christ.*

[2] "The endowment of His mind grew with His age. Hence we infer that this progress, or advancement, relates to His human nature; for the Divine nature could receive no increase.

If it takes nothing from His glory, that He was altogether "emptied" (ἐκένωσε, Phil. ii. 6), neither does it degrade Him, that He chose not only to grow in body, but to make progress in mind. And certainly when the Apostle declares that "in all things He was made like unto His brethren," (Heb. ii. 17) and "was in all points tempted like as we are, sin excepted," (Heb. iv. 15) he no doubt includes that His soul was subject to ignorance. There is only this difference between us and Him, that the weaknesses which press upon us by a necessity which we cannot avoid, were undertaken by Him voluntarily, and of His own accord."—Calvin on Luke ii. 40-47, p. 166.

possibly experience it,[1] and as developing in knowledge and in moral character by the experiences of life and above all by the experience of suffering. Thus, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Lord is presented as acquiring the sympathy and understanding requisite for the work of a perfect and final High Priest by the experiences of suffering and temptation and as being enabled by them to succour them that are tempted.[2]

2. How, then, are we to conceive of the union of the human and the Divine in one person so as

[1] "It was necessary that the mediating God should exist and live as a Creature; that He should be found in fashion as a Man and act as a Man; that He should acquire a living and practical experience of the various phases of human existence, in order that He might be able fully to sympathize with our needs and weaknesses."—Martensen, pp. 255-266.

[2] Rom. viii. 3. Dr. Du Bose holds that the flesh which our Lord took upon Him in the Incarnation was "sinful flesh," *i.e.*, the σαρξ. He bases his theory upon the phrase "sending His Son in the likeness of sinful flesh" in Rom. viii. 3, and argues that to redeem us out of sinful nature it was necessary for the Lord to take our sinful nature upon Him. There are, however, several considerations which must be given due weight: (*a*) the Scriptures nowhere say that Christ was made in sinful flesh but in "the likeness (ὁμοιωμα) of sinful flesh." Now, although it does sometimes almost connote identity, the primary meaning of ὁμοιωμα is appearance and, wherever the word is used in the New Testament Scriptures, this appears to be its natural meaning. When St. Paul uses it in the great Kenotic passage (Phil. ii. 5-10), he certainly means that the Lord, having emptied Himself of His pre-earthly glory, was made in the appearance of a Man, *i.e.* that His Personality expressed itself in the humble conditions of manhood instead of in the majesty of Divine glory. If we sin after the similitude (ὁμοιωμα) of Adam's transgression, if heathen make to themselves gods after the similitude (ὁμοιωμα) of men, the thought of similarity gives a much better sense than that of identity. (*b*) There are such things in Scripture as the covenants and the Pauline conception is that the Second Adam lived and triumphed in the conditions of nature in which the first Adam had failed. Dr. Du Bose's theory, then, is quite inconsistent with the presentation of Scripture which regards Christ as taking our guilt, not our corruptions, upon Him and as freely offering a full and complete sacrifice for sin. Nor is it consistent with the facts of our Lord's life. We have already seen that the phenomenon of the divided self was absent from His Personality and this theory (which is closely akin to that of Edward Irving) really implies that the struggle was such a struggle as sinners have to endure—the struggle of a divided self in which evil was present—and involves the presence of sin in the field of Christ's Manhood. Hence it strikes at the very roots of the reality of the Incarnation; for there is something very repulsive in the conception that the eternal God should take not manhood as He created it but manhood as corrupted and debased by sin into Himself, and that a vital union should take place between sinful flesh and Divine holiness.

to give, on the one hand, full scope for the Personal Revelation of the eternal God and, on the other hand, for the existence and development of a truly human experience? The modern attempts to solve this problem have been characterized by great spiritual earnestness and great ingenuity; but they have not won a very general acceptance. They may be classified as (1) Kenotic theories; (2) theories of Gradual, or Progressive Incarnation; (3) Ritschlian theories and (4) Dr. Sanday's remarkable theory of the Godhead as a *Donum Superadditum*. Before closing this study of "The Person of Christ in Modern Thought" with a restatement of the main lines of Chalcedonian and ecclesiastical presentation of the relations of our Lord's human and divine natures and with a tentative suggestion as to the probable lines along which a satisfactory solution will be ultimately found, it will be advisable to examine some representative presentations of these different types of Christological speculation.

II.—Kenotic Christology[1]

1. The Kenotic Divines will have nothing to do with the humanistic standpoints beloved of the modern age. They rightly perceive that they have to do with a Divine Christ, with One who, however we may explain the relations of the Human and the Divine in Him, is essentially God and who must be contemplated as such. Their question, therefore, is

[1] Authorities:—A. B. Bruce, *The Humiliation of Christ;* W. Newton Clarke, *An Outline of Christian Theology;* F. Delitzsch, *Biblical Psychology;* A. M. Fairbairn, *Christ in Modern Theology;* D. W. Forrest, *The Authority of Christ;* W. Gifford, *The Incarnation;* F. Godet, *Commentary on St. John's Gospel;* Bishop C. Gore, *Lux Mundi; Bampton Lecture; Dissertations;* A. Gretillat, *Dogmatique Chrétienne;* F. J. Hall, *The Kenotic Theories;* Bishop H. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics;* A. J. Mason, *The Conditions of our Lord's Life on Earth;* Bishop Moorhouse, *The Teaching of Christ;* R. L. Ottley, *The Doctrine of the Incarnation;* W. Powell, *The Principle of the Incarnation;* Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk.*

not as to whether we should regard the Lord Jesus Christ as God, but in what way we are to think of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity as entering into the conditions of manhood. The standpoint is essentially believing; and the theories formulated by those who occupy it should be respected as earnest and sincerely Christian attempts to solve a most difficult problem.

2. If these theories approach the subject from the right standpoint, their aims are also irreproachable; for they strive to do justice to (1) the Divine Self-sacrifice and (2) the Manhood of Christ.

(1) There can be no doubt that the older Christological thought of the Nicene type tended to obscure the greatness of the Self-sacrifice involved in the Incarnation by reading it as Divine condescension instead of Divine Self-sacrifice. It approached the question too exclusively from a metaphysical standpoint and did not do justice to the ethical grandeur of the Incarnation. (Not that the great doctrine of the unchangeablenesss of God, to which the Nicene Christology sought to do justice, conflicts with the interpretation of the Incarnation as Divine Self-sacrifice. To assert the unchangeableness of God in any sense which would preclude acts of infinite Self-sacrifice is to endow Him with the unchangeableness of death.) The Kenoticists perceived the failure of the older Christologians to appreciate this and sought to establish the reality of Divine Self-sacrifice by representing the accomplishment of the ends of redemption as the consequence of the love of the Eternal God, which found expression in the more or less complete Self-paralysis or Self-mutilation of the Eternal Son.

(2) The other end to which the Kenoticists sought to do justice was the due recognition of the Manhood of Christ. This fact, as the religious literature of the last age and, to a considerable extent, the popular

religious literature of the present time shows, was obscured by the almost exclusive emphasis laid upon the Deity of the Saviour.[1] In other words, the Incarnation, as conceived by the older type of Christology, partook of the defects of the thought of the last age, steeped as it was in the thought of Divine transcendence, and was a Logophany rather than a true manifestation in the flesh of the Divine Being. This latter fact the Kenoticists sought to express and guard by the theory of Divine Self-mutilation. Indeed, their recognition of the fact that our Lord's Self-consciousness as Incarnate differs in some sense from the Self-consciousness of the Pre-existent Word constitutes their chief positive contribution to Christology.[2]

3. If the Kenotic theories are agreed as to their ends and in the standpoint they occupy, they are also agreed as to the method by which those ends are to be attained. This method is Divine Self-depotentiation in such a sense that the Logos ceases to possess either all His powers and Self-consciousness as One of the Persons of the Godhead—save in the sense that a human being could become conscious of His essential

[1] A good example of this is afforded by the works of a distinguished Dublin lay graduate whose works, richer in their suggestiveness than many more technical treatises, have never been adequately recognized by the theologians who are now adopting his conceptions of miracle and other difficult phenomena of Holy Scriptures as commonplaces of modern Christian Theology. Sir Robert Anderson lays just and true emphasis upon the fact of our Lord's Deity and rightly strives with all the skill that a long life of controversy has given him against the theories which seem to vitiate this central truth of the Gospel; but he so conceives the Deity of Christ that the living of a true human life on our Lord's part is almost inconceivable. See, however, his *Hebrews Epistle* which to a very great extent blunts the edge of this criticism.

[2] "And at the outset it should be noticed how much indebted the Church is in fact to the Kenotists for the thought that the Subject of Manhood must be sought for in the Logos conceived as Self-limited. These writers have made it a commonplace of Christology that there is a permanent Ego of the Manhood whose Self-consciousness is of different content from that of the Divine Son in His freedom and glory; and yet He is One and the Same in essence. That is to say, they have made us familiar with the thought that the Self-limitation of the Son is real and permanent."—Bishop Weston, p. 114.

ontological unity with the Divine Being (Absolute Metamorphism), or of a portion of those powers (Absolute Dualism), or within a certain restricted field of His Being (Real-but-Relativism).

1. Absolute Dualism. Incarnation by Paralysis of the Divine Activities

This form of the Kenotic theory was first formulated by the eminent Erlangen divine, Thomasius, and includes among its exponents such theologians as the late Franz Delitzsch and Principal A. M. Fairbairn. It distinguishes between the moral and ethical attributes of God and argues that the latter alone are essential to Godhead; and, therefore, the Second Person of the Trinity could not merely dispense with the exercise of the former, but could actually so divest Himself of them that they ceased to enter into the sphere of His potentiality. Thus, the theory, while reducing His powers in all other respects to those of a human soul, leaves the Logos in full possession of the ethical attributes of God. Principal Fairbairn's statement is both judicious and representative. Kenosis, he says, "is precisely the kind of term we should expect to be used if the Incarnation was a reality. It must have involved surrender, humiliation; there could be no real assumption of the nature, the form and the status of the created Son, if those of the Uncreated were in all their integrity retained. These two things, the surrender and the assumption, are equal and coincident; but it is through the former that the latter must be understood. We may express what it means by saying that the Incarnation, while it was not of the whole Godhead, only of the Son, yet concerned the Godhead as a whole. And this carries with it an important consequence:—Physical attributes are essential to God, but ethical terms and relations to the Godhead. In other words, the external attributes

of God are omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence; but the internal are truth and love. But the external are under the command of the internal; God acts as the Godhead is. The external alone might constitute a Creator, but not a Deity; the internal would make out of a Deity the Creator. Whatever, then, could be surrendered, the ethical attributes and qualities could not; but God may only seem the more Godlike if, in obedience to the ethical, He limit or restrain or veil the physical. . . . And this surrender the Son made when He emptied Himself and assumed the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of man. The determinative Divine qualities were obeyed, and the determined limited; yet it was, as it were, the renunciation of the less in order to the realization of the more Godlike qualities. 'The Word became flesh, and dwelt among us'; but we only the more 'beheld His glory, glory as of the Only Begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth.'[1]"

Thus, it will be seen that this type of Kenotic theology is (1) decidedly partial in character as extending only to the physical attributes of God, and (2) depends for its validity upon a sharp distinction between the ethical and physical attributes of God.

2. Absolute Metamorphism. Incarnation by Divine Suicide

This type of Kenotic thought is, beyond all doubt, the most consistent and the most popular of the Kenotic theories. Originally advocated by Gess, its later exponents include the eminent French divines, E. de Pressensé, Godet and Gretillat of Neuchâtel, and the well-known American, Dr. Newton Clarke. According to it the Logos so depotentiated Himself of all His Divine attributes that He literally ceased from

[1] *Christ in Modern Theology*, p. 476-477.

His cosmic functions and His eternal consciousness throughout the years of His earthly life. In other words, He so depotentiated Himself that His consciousness became purely that of a human soul. Hence He could and did take the place of the human soul in the Christ. By this means the true Manhood of Christ, even to the extent of His peccability, is secured.

The late Professor Gretillat, of Neuchâtel, has given a very careful restatement of this type of Kenotic theory in his "Théologie Systematique," IV. (Dogmatique II.). "We conclude that the Deity of Christ resides in the identity of the Divine pre-existent Ego with the historic Personality."[1] "The end of our actual decisions is to establish by Scriptural witnesses that the attributes essential to a Divine Person, which we have shown in the Pure Theology, did not belong to the Son in His earthly state."[2] He then goes on to show that our Lord did not exert the physical attributes of God in the days of His humiliation. What about the moral attributes? "The Son of God in the earthly state possessed none of the moral attributes essential to the Divine Person in the Divine state; but was subject to the law of this world."[3] "Thus, the mystery of the Incarnation consists in the fact that a Divine Person was separated from the Divine mode of existence to appropriate to Himself the human mode of existence." "In truth we ask how it could be otherwise expressed than to say that the Son of God is effectively stripped of the Divine nature so as to put on effective human nature at the moment of His Incarnation." "Certainly the mystery of piety is great; God manifested in the flesh! the Eternal Word eclipsed from the bosom of the Trinity! He who had created and governed the world, He whom the heavens and even the heaven of heavens could not contain, enclosed in the swaddling clothes of a little infant! He

[1] p. 179. [2] p. 181 [3] p. 184.

who had said, Let there be light! become unconscious of the world and of Himself."

Thus, the depotentiated Word (1) takes the place of the human soul in the Christ, and (2) entirely ceases from all His divine functions.

3. Real but Relative. Divine Life from two Non-communicating Centres

This theory, originally formulated by Bishop Martensen and popularized in Anglican circles by Bishop Gore, tries to escape the difficulties of the purer Kenotic theories by postulating the existence of a double life from two non-communicating life-centres of the Logos during the humiliation. As God living in the bosom of God, He continued His Trinitarian function as the Object of Divine Love and also His cosmic functions as the Creator and Sustainer of the universe. As depotentiated Logos, indissolubly united with creaturehood, He knew nothing whatsoever of His cosmic and Trinitarian functions and only knew Himself to be God in such a sense as that knowledge is possible to the faculties of manhood. "In His revelation as Logos, the Son proceeded forth from the Father as God (ἐν μορφῇ Θεου); in His revelation in Christ, on the contrary, He returns back to the Father as God-Man. This, His return, is richer than His outgoing, for He comes back with an entire kingdom of children of God ("Behold, I and the children Thou hast given me," Hebrews ii. 13). Without the revelation in Christ, the leading of the world back to God would have been a leading back merely in idea, and not in fact; and created individuals would seek in vain the way and the door by which to enter into the fellowship of redemption and perfection with the Father. Still there are not two Sons of God, but one Son; Christ did not add a new second Son to the Trinity; the entire movement takes place within

the circle of the Trinity itself. At the same time, it must be allowed that the Son of God leads in the economy of the Father a two-fold existence; that He lives a double life in His world-creating and in His world-completing activity. As the pure Logos of Deity, He works through the kingdom of nature by His all-pervading presence, creates the pre-suppositions and conditions of the revelation of His all-completing love. As the Christ, He works through the kingdom of Grace, of Redemption, and Perfection, and points back to His pre-existence. . . . He is very God; but in the revelation in Christ the very Godhead is never separated from the very Manhood; the Divine and human natures were never separated from each other, and never neutralized each other. We are to see in Christ, not the naked God, but the fulness of Deity framed in the ring of humanity; not the attributes of the Divine nature in their unbounded infinitude, but the Divine attributes embodied in the attributes of human nature (*communicatio idiomatum*)."[1]

Thus, the Trinitarian and cosmic functions of the Word are preserved by the postulate that "the personal life of the Word should have been lived as it were from more than one centre—that He who knows and does all things in the Father and in the universe, should (reverently be it said) have begun to live from a new centre when He assumed manhood, and under new and restricted conditions of power and knowledge."[2]

4. Estimate and Criticism

1. It is a curious thing that both the texts on which the Kenoticists rely are to be found not in a formal and definitely doctrinal passage, such as the great Christological passage in Col. i. 9-13, but in moral and practical contexts. They are, therefore, of the nature of incidental references. They are, in fact, *obiter dicta*.

[1] Bishop Martensen, pp. 266-267.

[2] Bishop Gore: *Dissertations*, p. 215.

(1) The first of these passages is 2 Cor. viii. 9. "For ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that, though He was rich, yet for your sake He became poor, that ye through His poverty might be rich."[1] The argument as it stands is very beautiful and cogent. "Give of your substance to the needs of the poor saints which are at Jerusalem. No doubt, it means some self-denial and the absence of some of the enjoyments which you otherwise would have; but you know the grace of our Lord Jesus, who for your sakes became poor and deprived Himself of the legitimate enjoyments which He possessed in His pre-existent state." Taken as a parallelism of the free surrender of what was theirs by right, the passage is beautiful in its compelling appeal to Christian love and generosity. Taken as a reference to the supposed Self-depotentiation of the Logos, it is simply a complication of an obvious Christian duty with an important, but obscure, element of Pauline Christology and could only avail to divert attention from the immediate and practical duty, which the Apostle was urging upon the attention of the Corinthian Christians.

(2) The other passage, Phil. ii. 5-11, "Have this mind in you which was also in Christ Jesus; who, being in the form of God, counted it not a prize to be on an equality with God, but emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men; and being found in fashion as Man, He humbled Himself, becoming obedient even unto death, yea, the death of the Cross. Wherefore also God highly exalted Him, and gave unto Him the name which is above every name; that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven and things on earth, and things under the earth, and that every tongue

[1] R.V. "The reference is not to the mere hardships and penury of His outward lot, but to the state which He assumed in becoming Man." Bishop Bernard in *Expositor's Greek Testament in loc.*

should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father." Here again the context renders any reference of the Kenosis to the supposed Self-depotentiation of the Logos quite impossible. The Apostle's purpose is hortatory, not didactic. It is ethical, not doctrinal. He is exhorting the Philippians to abstain from the self-centred emulation and self-esteem which is the bane of young and fervent communities. " Not to your own interests look each circle of you, but each circle to those of others also. Have this mind (φρονεῖτε) in you, this moral attitude in each soul, which was and is also in Christ Jesus . . . who in God's manifested Being subsisting, seeming divine, because He was divine, in the full sense of Deity, in that eternal world, reckoned it no plunderer's prize to be on an equality with God. . . . He rather (ἀλλα) made Himself void by His own act, void of the manifestation and exercise of Deity as it was His on the throne, taking Bondservant's (δουλου) manifested being (μορφη), that is to say, the veritable human nature which, as a creaturely nature, is essentially bound to the service of the Creator, the bondservice of the Father ; coming to be, becoming in men's similitude. . . . And then, further, being found as He offered Himself to view, in respect of guise (σχηματι), in respect of outward shape, and habit, and address, as Man, . . . He humbled Himself in becoming obedient, obedient to Him whose Bond-servant He now was as Man, to the length of death, aye (δε) death of Cross. . . . Wherefore also God, His God (ὁ θεος) supremely exalted Him in His Resurrection and Ascension, and conferred upon Him as a gift of infinite love and approval (εχαρισατο) the Name which is above every name ; THE NAME, unique and glorious ; the Name Supreme, the I AM ; to be His Name now, not only as He is from eternity, the everlasting Son of the Father, but as He became also

in time, the suffering and risen Saviour of sinners . . . so that in the Name of Jesus, in presence of the revealed majesty of Him who bears, as Man, the human personal Name, Jesus, every knee should bow . . . of things celestial, and terrestrial, and subterranean, . . . all bowing, each in their way, to the *imperium* of the exalted Jesus, JEHOVAH-JESUS; and that every tongue should confess, with the confessing of adoring, praising, worship (ἐξομολογησηται) that Jesus Christ is nothing less than Lord, in the supreme and ultimate sense of that mighty word, to God the Father's glory."[1]

Such an interpretation gives an easy and natural meaning of the passage and is in full accord with the conditions and purpose of the writer. On the other hand, the alternatives that have been put forward, in which ἐκενωσε is interpreted as "made Himself void" not merely in the sense of ceasing from the exercise of His pre-existent powers but of denuding Himself of them so that they no longer pertained to Him, introduce a jarring note into the Apostle's argument and divert attention from the main thought of the passage which assuredly is anything but the thought of a mutilation or surrender of essential nature and is explicitly stated to be the humility manifested by the Lord in taking human nature upon Him.

If the passage is, indeed, an exact Christological statement, Dr. Gifford[2] was fully justified in assuming that so fine a scholar and philosopher as St. Paul was accurate in his terminology and his treatment, irrefragable on that assumption and generally supported by the opinions of such eminent scholars as Bishops Lightfoot and Moule, must be regarded as final.[3]

[1] Bishop H. C. G. Moule, *Philippian Studies*, pp. 92-96.

[2] In *The Incarnation.*

[3] "The elaborate theories reared on this passage and designated "kenotic" would probably have surprised the apostle." H. A. A. Kennedy, *Expositor's Greek Testament in loc.*

The most that can be said, therefore, is that, even in the case of the two principal passages upon which Kenoticism must rely, if it were once shown to be a necessary consequence of other passages of Holy Writ, they would not constitute grave obstacles to its acceptance.[1]

2. The whole point of the theory of Gess, Godet, Gretillat and Newton Clarke is that the depotentiated Logos actually reduced Himself to the dimensions of a human soul in such a sense that He was fallible and peccable and was, therefore, nothing more or less in reality than a human soul. According to the earlier Thomasian form, the Logos, it is true, only divested Himself of the so-called physical attributes of Deity and retained the ethical; but His activities and powers are so circumscribed that the *raison d'être* of His co-existence with the human soul in Christ is not clear. If, however, the Logos is so reduced as only to know His identity in the sense in which a creature could comprehend the fact, either the depotentiated Logos or the human soul is reduced to a shadowy and purposeless existence. In other words, one or other is virtually non-existent.[2] Similarly in the case of "the Real but Relative" Kenosis of Bishops Martensen and Gore, the depotentiated Logos seems to be tacitly assumed to have taken the place of the human soul in Christ.[3]

[1] "But the general objection to building a formal theory on such foundations is that they are not really qualified to sustain it. The most expressive passages are largely incidental and metaphorical. It is a mistake to seek to harden them into dogma. . . . So far as I can see, the formal theory of *kenosis* rests upon an altogether insufficient basis, both Biblical and historical." (Sanday: *Christology and Personality*, p. 73.)

[2] According to the Schaffs' Art. "Christology" in *New Schaff Herzog III.* p. 60, Thomasius "and Liebner held, first, that the Logos actually became a rational human soul, but afterwards they assumed a truly human soul along with the Kenosis of the Logos, and thereby they lost the chief benefit of the Kenosis theory."

[3] " . . . . though it is nowhere said, it seems to be tacitly implied that the incarnate Logos took in Christ the place of a human soul." —Bruce, *Humiliation*, p. 162.

Hence these theories inevitably fall into the pitfall of Monophysitism. Their great aim is to solve the problem of the double consciousness of our Lord and this they seek to do by the reduction of the Eternal Word to the dimensions of a human soul! Even if it were possible, two very serious results would certainly follow. In the first place the Manhood of Christ would be destroyed by the formal or practical, as the case may be, elimination of the human soul. No amount of depotentiation will ever make God less God. It might possibly be necessary to enable an Incarnation; but the nature of God will remain the nature of God throughout. God cannot become a creature. Besides this, if the Logos is so reduced (as Gess and his adherents argue) as to make Him subject to all the weakness of a human soul, He becomes *ipso facto* quite impotent to reveal the Eternal God in a final and authoritative manner.

3. And what a Monophysitism is involved in these theories! They avowedly operate by the actual withdrawal of the Son, either in respect of His physical, or of all His attributes, or in respect of a field of His consciousness, from the Trinitarian fellowship. If one of the Persons of the Blessed Trinity can be temporarily withdrawn from the intercommunion of the Deity either in respect of the whole or of any portion of His being, Monotheism can scarcely be preserved. The distinction between the Persons or the Godhead becomes at least as sharply individualistic as that between finite personalities. Thus we have no longer one God but three Gods.

4. There is another consideration which is quite fatal to any or all of these theories. They all depend upon the assumption that the validity of Christ's Manhood depends upon the depotentiation of the Logos. Did His Manhood cease to be true Manhood on His glorification? If not, is the Logos eternally depoten-

tiated? The acceptance of either alternative involves insuperable difficulties. If, however, the dilemma is refused and the hypothesis of a change from Self-depotentiation to Self-limitation is advanced, the question arises as to the way in which the Logos recovered the μορφη Θεου. If He did it in His own strength, or even if it were done for Him, it goes far to prove that the alleged depotentiation never took place. To ascribe depotentiation to a Being who retains sufficient power or capacity for recovery is to say depotentiation and to mean Self-limitation.

5. There is another cogent objection to the theory advocated by Thomasius and Fairbairn. It may be perfectly permissible and even necessary for the sake of clearness of thought to distinguish between the physical and ethical attributes of God; but it is unwise in the extreme to base any argument upon such a classification. The so-called physical attributes are just as essential as the ethical to the constitution of Deity. An unomniscient God is quite as inconceivable as a morally imperfect God and an omniscient being who is not ethically perfect is quite unthinkable. "An Almighty Devil"[1] is a contradiction in terms. Similarly, the statement that "the annihilation so easy to His omnipotence is made impossible by His love,"[2] is an entirely false antithesis. It is no more possible to conceive of omnipotence apart from love than it would be to conceive of an inside apart from an outside. We think in conditions of finitude and, therefore, in conditions which familiarize us with the conception of forces external to our own personalities. Nothing, however, could be further from the truth than to think of omnipotence as external to personality, Force and potency reside in, not outside, personality and the thought of God is the thought of a Being of infinite Personality. "We materialize our conception

[1] Fairbairn *ut supra.* [2] *Ibid.*

of God and His love if we differentiate the moral from the physical attributes of our Father except for the purpose of classifying our thoughts of Him and His activities. And any theory of Kenosis that is based upon this distinction is, I think, doomed to rejection. The movement of loving apprehension of God's Fatherhood which has marked the last two or three generations will not be stayed until it has adequately vindicated for God the essentially moral and fatherly character of His omnipotence and omniscience. This done, the advanced Kenotic theories will be as houses without foundations." [1]

6. Does the Martensen type of Kenotic theory really give us much assistance in conceiving the life of the Logos in the conditions of the humiliation? Is it so very much easier to conceive the existence of two non-communicating centres of personal activity in the one perfect Personality than to conceive of the co-existence of a higher and a lower consciousness?

7. How, then, is the indubitable popularity of these theories (although, as Professor Orr very justly says,[2] their influence in the upper reaches of thought is rapidly decaying) to be explained? How is it that, despite the fact that no adequate answer to these objections (which have been before the world almost as long as the theories themselves) has been forthcoming, earnest and spiritually minded men have eagerly held to theories which, while reducing the character of Christ's

[1] Bishop Weston, p. 122.

[2] "If I do not enter into the details of the modern Kenotic theories, it is because, as I take it, the influence of most of these is already a thing of the past. The Self-obliteration of the Logos to the point of the surrender of His conscious life in the Godhead (which is their salient feature), is more than "Self-emptying"—it is practically Self-extinction; while the Person that results is in no way distinguishable from ordinary man save in His undeveloped potencies. Thus, by a curious reversal of standpoint, Kenoticism works round to a species of Ebionitism. Accordingly, the tendency of the newer Christological theories has been to dispense with the pre-existent Logos altogether as a metaphysical figment."—*The Progress of Dogma*, p. 337.

oral revelation to a Socinian level,[1] almost certainly imperil the verity of Christ's Manhood? The explanation is to be found in the fact that the later interest in the Kenotic problem is not purely scientific. In other words, the predominant interest is not to be sought in the conditions of the union of the human and Divine in Christ Jesus our Lord, but in the purely subsidiary problem of the limitations of His knowledge. The desire to secure the compatibility of the acceptance of the conclusions of the Graf-Wellhausen school of Old Testament criticism with the recognition of the essential Deity of the Saviour has compelled a renewed interest in the conditions of our Lord's Manhood. Hence, many minds have turned to the Kenotic theories, as drowning men catch at a straw, so as to preserve personal faith in the Redeemer, while accepting what are believed to be the inevitable findings of the scientific consciousness of the age. All that we need now observe is that the present influence of the Kenotic theories is due not to their intrinsic merit, but to religious and practical reasons consequent upon the free acceptance of the results of Biblical criticism of a particular kind.

III.—Theories of Progressive Incarnation.[2]

While the two great ends for which the Kenoticists strove were appreciated as facts of which any satisfactory Christology must afford an adequate explanation, the fatal defects of the Kenotic theories were immediately perceived by the Evangelical theologians. At the same time, their rejection

[1] "The historical phenomenon may be to a large extent the same in either system, but the normal and theological significance of the phenomenon is *toto coelo* different. The Christ of the *kenosis* is God Self-humbled to man's level; the Socinian Christ is man exalted to the highest human level."—*Bruce*, pp. 166-167.

[2] Authorities:—J. Bovon, *Dogmatique Chrétienne;* J. A. Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine. History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ.*

demanded the provision of an alternative theory which, while escaping the errors of Kenoticism, should do justice to the verity of our Lord's Manhood. This problem, Dorner, one of the first and greatest of the opponents of the Kenotic theories, thought to solve by the theory of a progressive or gradual Incarnation. He regarded the Incarnation not as an act consummated at the moment of our Lord's conception, but as a gradual process by which the Word was ever more and more joined to the unique and representative Man until, at last, the perfect life enabled a complete and indissoluble union. This theory has enjoyed a considerable popularity. Rothe and Bovon are found among its advocates, and it has been very suggestively and skilfully restated by the Neuchâtel theologian.

" To say that God incarnates Himself in Jesus is then to affirm that He realizes His perfection in a truly human life ; but the love and holiness of the Most High are communicated not according to the laws of physical transmission, but as spiritual forces, in the possession of which one progresses by the free action of the will. Since we have shown that God being a Person in virtue of His religious or moral qualities and not of His ontological predicates, this revelation of His perfect life in Jesus is a Personal manifestation, the definitive and supreme expression of our knowledge of God our Saviour."[1]

" Jesus seized the gift which manifested itself in Him by a progressive labour of obedience ; in other words, He only became conscious of His Personal Being in the realization of the divine life which is a power of holiness and love. Thus understood, the Incarnation of God is no wise magical, achieved at a stroke ; it is rather moral and substantial at the same time ; for that which we make ourselves we are, act and being uniting in the evangelic fact of life. God-Man by nature, Christ

[1] Bovon : *Dogmatique*, II., pp. 132-133.

became it thus by His willing consecration. In Him God descends to man at the same time as man rises and ascends, and this by a gradual penetration which is not the less real since in giving Himself to His Father Jesus shares in His life and is transformed from glory to glory to the very image of God."[1] "Christ,. let us say then, is the Son of God that the Father has given to us to communicate His life to us; but He is also the Son of Man in whom, responsive to this call of grace, humanity is consecrated to its God. . . . In so far as He went forth from the Father to accomplish salvation, Jesus is Son of God by nature (that is the religious idea, represented especially by the traditional dogma); but (here is the moral point of view, that of modern theology) He freely appropriated this privilege in the realization, in a perfect human life, of the Divine personal Life, the Love and Holiness of God."[2] "Son of God by birth, Christ freely possessed Himself of this Divine right; thus His triumph is that of humanity which He delivers from the bonds of sin, and that by a power the continuity of which it remains for us to show from age to age."[3]

2. Although they attempt to interpret the fact from the ethical rather than the metaphysical standpoint, the theories of gradual Incarnation agree with the Kenotic in the recognition of the fact that the Deity of Christ cannot be read in terms of His humanity and that it must, therefore, be treated from a transcendental quite as much as from an immanental point of view. While both types are also agreed as to the essential verity of the Lord's Manhood, the theories of gradual Incarnation exhibit the ethical value of the Incarnation even more fully than the Kenotic by making the permanence and the ultimate achievement of an indissoluble union between the Deity and Manhood

[1] pp. 135-136. [2] p. 151. [3] p. 152.

of Christ depend upon the fulfilment of the moral and ethical demands of life by the Man Christ Jesus.

3. These theories undoubtedly escape the worst difficulties of Kenoticism. Those who accept them have not to conceive of a depotentiated. Logos who, by a supreme effort of Self-sacrifice, has paralysed His activities and even His consciousness. They have not to solve the problem with the Absolute Metamorphicists and (probably) the Real-but-Relativists as to how God could make Himself to be not-God, but a Creature, in respect of the whole or of a portion of His existence or His consciousness. They also preserve the verity of the Manhood of Christ more satisfactorily. Kenoticism, with its inherent defect of the substitution of the depotentiated Logos for the human soul in the Divine-Human Personality of Christ, sought to preserve the verity of Christ's human experience by the sacrifice of His essential humanity. The Gradual Incarnationist, on the other hand, fully comprehends that to tamper with the complete humanity of our Lord is to destroy His solidarity with ourselves, and lays great emphasis on the identity of His Manhood with our own. In both these respects, the latter theory is more satisfying both intellectually and experimentally than the former.

4. It is scarcely necessary, however, to remark upon the incurably Nestorian and dualistic character of the conception. Although Dorner, for example, tries to defend himself from this objection by the statement that the proper method of approach is by way of the natures and not of the Person, he conceives the Ego of our Lord's humanity as being as entirely distinct as any other human Ego from That of the Logos. Hence he really conceives the human and Divine natures of our Lord as two distinct Persons, united by non-essential bonds. Such a conception is destructive of the very conception of Incarnation. If Incarnation means anything whatsoever, it means that

the Incarnate Deity lives in the conditions of human life and experiences its phenomena. Such an experience is quite impossible to a Logos whose union with humanity is mystical rather than essential and ontological. No union of human and divine which is less than ontological is, properly speaking, an Incarnation, and no such union can possibly mediate the experience of humanity to the Logos in any other than a sympathetic sense. Hence the instinct which led the fathers of the primitive Church strenuously to oppose Nestorianism, protests against the subtle and dangerous form of the theory formulated by Dorner and now, thanks to the decay of Kenoticism, gaining an ever-increasing popularity.

5. If there was but little evidence to be adduced in favour of the Kenotic theories, there is still less available with regard to the theory of a gradual Incarnation. For an immense superstructure, deep and broad foundations are essential. These, however, are not procurable. The conception is too radical and too intimate with respect to the constitution of our Lord's Personality to be a justifiable inference from certain alleged hints and suggestions (largely turning upon the character of certain tenses) supposed to be contained in Holy Scripture. Besides this, there are whole series of texts and expressions in the New Testament which are quite inconsistent with, and form insuperable objections to, any such theorizings. St. Luke's statement that "that Holy Thing which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God,"[1] and St Paul's reference to "God sending His own Son born of a woman"[2] certainly precludes any conception of the Personality of Christ which would deny the indissoluble connection of our Lord's Manhood with the Eternal Word.

6. Further than this, the whole conception is

[1] Luke i. 35. [2] Galatians iv. 4.

quite inconsistent with that fundamental presupposition of all apostolic thought—the pre-existence of our Lord. The conception of the Logos entering into a temporary union with a human nature or person is, to say the least, difficult to conceive.[1] One of two things must be given up. Either the real pre-existence of our Lord's Ego (which alone renders a true Incarnation thinkable) must be rejected, or else the theories of gradual Incarnation must be surrendered as incompatible with the essential Deity of Christ.

7. Our Lord's development was of such a kind that it could be truly said of Him that He "increased in wisdom and stature and in favour with God and man;"[2] but that is a very different thing from saying that He was in any sense more God at twelve years old than in His infancy, or on the Cross than at His Baptism. On the contrary, the whole Scriptural presentation acts and is only explicable on the assumption that that is not the case. Nor are there any evidences of a duality of personalities in the Scriptural presentation of His Person. There are evidences of a double consciousness, of a vivid and truly human consciousness co-existing side by side with the unique consciousness of a Superhuman origin and destiny; but there is not a single hint that there was any consciousness of such a process as a gradual Incarnation taking place within the limits of His Person. Hence we are forced to conclude that there is not only no serious evidence in Scripture in favour of such an hypothesis, that not merely is there considerable Biblical evidence against it, but that it is

[1] Bovon's explanation of the Lord's references to His pre-existent state by an adaptation of Beyschlag's Ideal Pre-existence theory is sufficient proof of the difficulty of conceiving the entrance of the Logos into a possibly temporary and non-essential union with a human person or nature.

[2] Luke ii. 52.

quite inconsistent with the facts of our Lord's development and experience as recorded in the pages of Holy Scripture.

8. If it is difficult to conceive the double consciousness required by the Creed of Chalcedon, it is very much harder to conceive a dual Personality and the task is not lightened by the assumption of a gradually increasing interpenetration of the human personality by the Divine. No doubt, personality should be conceived as an inclusive rather than an exclusive term; but the recognition of that fact does not make it easier to conceive a human Personality growing up from Youth to Manhood and, as each successive experience strengthens and hardens it, finding itself ever more and more penetrated by the Divine so that not only is its will decisively surrendered to the Divine Will but it is so interpenetrated by the Logos that, for ever bound together with indissoluble links, they henceforth form " not two but One Christ." We may conclude our consideration of these theories, therefore, by asking the question (more difficult than any they profess to solve) which they involve: How were two distinct personalities, one human and one Divine, fused into a single and complete Personality, truly human and truly Divine ?

IV.—The Ritschlian Christology[1]

1. The next creative Christological movement, which it is necessary to notice, is the Ritschlian. Including men of such widely different tendencies as Professors Kähler and Kaftan on the one hand,

[1] Authorities: J. Denney, *Studies in Theology;* E. A. Edghill, *Faith and Fact;* A. E. Garvie, *The Ritschlian Theology;* A. Harnack, *History of Christian Dogma;* W. Herrmann, *Communion with God, Faith and Morals;* J. Kaftan, *The Truth of the Christian Religion, Dogmatik;* M. Kähler, *Die Wissenschaft der Christlichen Lehre;* J. K. Mozley, *Ritschlianism;* J. Orr, *Ritschlianism and Evangelical Theology; Ritschlianism: Essays Expository and Critical;* A. Ritschl, *Critical History of Justification and Reconciliation; Justification and Reconciliation;* L. Stählin, *Kant, Lotze and Ritschl.*

and Ritschl himself, Herrmann and Harnack on the other, it is exceedingly difficult to find a scholar who will be accepted by all parties as fairly representative of the movement as a whole. Hence it would scarcely be fair to select any of the later Ritschlians as representative of the school, and an examination of the Christology of the founder of the school must suffice. Ritschl was the originator of this type of thought, and however his disciples may differ from him in detail, they all derive their inspiration from his teaching. He is still and will continue to be the most nearly representative divine of this school of thought, and his Christology may fairly be regarded as the most representative.

2. Its substance is contained in the following passages. "It is also a false assumption that a uniform doctrine of the Godhead of Christ can be exegetically constructed from the New Testament. . . . . For the thought of Christ's Godhead is never other than the expression of that unique acknowledgment and appreciation which the Christian community yields to its Founder. . . . . On the one hand, the majority of the apostles connect the name Κύριος, which in Jewish usage is equivalent to God, with the lordship over the world on which Christ has entered by His exaltation to the right hand of God."[1] When the pre-existence of our Lord is spoken of in the New Testament, the reference must be taken to be to the exalted Christ. "The temporal priority of Christ before the world cannot be the point at issue; that would be a barren thought."[2] When we pass to the consideration of the Johannine doctrine of the Word, "it must be laid down clearly that the attribute of Godhead thus ascribed to Christ is based on the personal experience of His disciples."[3] "Thus the two lines of thought which meet us in the New

[1] *Justification and Reconciliation*, p. 400. [2] p. 402. [3] p. 404.

Testament are wholly independent of each other and find their explanation in considerations of a very different order. The Johannine conception regards the historical manifestation of Christ from the point of view of the conjoint moral impression made upon the community of the disciples—an impression which agrees with the known nature of God ; the Godhead of Christ as thus established is not directly associated with the Divine attribute of exaltation over the world ; rather is the underlying assumption the creation of the world through the Word of God, the Divine worth of Jesus being embodied in the formula that the Word, which is the universal form of Divine revelation, has in Jesus become a human Personality."[1] " As Bearer of the perfect revelation, Christ is given us that we may believe on Him. When we do believe on Him, we find Him to be the Revealer of God. But the correlation of Christ with God His Father is not a scientific explanation. And as a theologian one ought to know that the fruitless clutching after such explanations only serves to obscure the recognition of Christ as the perfect Revelation of God."[2] " In so far as the Divine Revelation or Word of God is active in this Personality, or is to be conceived as the form of its activity, the point at issue is clearly the definition of God's Being. Since the Being of God is spirit, and will, and above all love, it can therefore become effective in a human life, for human nature as such is laid on the lines of spirit, will, and love."[3] " Christ's patience under suffering . . . is the real test . . . of His unique power over the world."[4] " Our present line of thought makes it clear that only in the sphere of the ethico-religious life, viewed from the standpoint of the Kingdom of God, does the God-man find His place, because that Kingdom, and nothing else, is the direct correlate of the Divine Self-end. It

[1] pp. 404-405. [2] p. 452. [3] p. 454. [4] p. 460.

follows, therefore, that, as the historical Author of this communion with God and with each other, Christ *is necessarily unique in His own order.* For if a second could be produced who, really, was on a level with Christ in grace and truth, in world-conquering patience, in scope alike of purpose and of achievement, he would yet stand in historical dependence upon Christ, and therefore, logically, would be subordinate to Him."[1] "As Founder and Lord of the Kingdom of God . . . not only in time but in the eternity of the Divine knowledge and will, Christ precedes His community."[2] "In so far as the speech and conduct and patience under suffering, which make up the life of Christ, arise out of His vocation to exercise the moral lordship of God and realize God's kingdom, and are the perfect fulfilment of this vocation, even to the extent of His willingly and patiently enduring the pains of death, it follows from the relation of this purpose of Christ to the essential will of God, that Christ as the kingly Prophet is the perfect Revelation of God; that, in virtue of the motive which inspired Him, namely, love, and the lordship which in His estimate of Himself and His patience He exercised over the world, He is equal to God; and that He is the eternal Object of the Divine love, and as such also the Ground of the eternal election of the community of the Kingdom of God."[3]

3. It cannot be denied that this Christology has many excellencies of a high order. Its emphasis upon the historical and ethical character of the Christian Revelation; its stress upon the facts that our Lord's Deity is permanently to be apprehended through our experience of His Person and Work as revealed in history and that the Personality of God is mediated to us by a human life chiefly in respect of Its moral attributes; its emphasis upon the revelation of the

[1] p. 465. [2] p. 469. [3] pp. 483-484.

Saviour's Lordship by His sufferings and upon the necessity of membership of the Christian community to a due appreciation of His Person, have re-opened the apostolic avenue of approaching the problem and compelled the modern mind to allow, in theory at all events, that the Revelation of God is primarily Personal and, as such, is only to be apprehended by means of personal fellowship and sympathy.

4. Nevertheless, it is very doubtful whether the Ritschlian solution can be regarded as Christian in the strict sense of the word. Ritschl only allows the pre-existence of Christ in an ideal sense, and denies (or contemptuously ignores) the Virgin Birth, the Resurrection and our Lord's continued personal activity in any real sense of the term.[1] There can, therefore, be little doubt of the substantial truth of Professor Denney's verdict that theologians of this type have at bottom "' a positive disbelief of everything which gives to Christ's Godhead an objective character."[2]

5. Principal Garvie, the ablest English-speaking representative of Ritschlianism, indignantly denies the truth of this statement. He says that "the suggestion that the value judgment by which the predicate of Divinity is assigned to Christ is a merely pious fancy, shows that the critic has not come to understand what the Ritschlian 'value-judgments' are. . . . What demands our immediate scrutiny

[1] See Orr: *Ritschlian Theology*, p. 133-135. Ritschl's own words may be cited: "Unless the conception of His present lordship receives its content from the definite characteristics of His historical activity, then it is either a meaningless formula or the occasion for all kinds of extravagance. If, on the other hand, we are to hold fast our faith that Christ is at this moment Lord over the community of the Kingdom of God, and is working toward the gradual subjection of the world to this its true end, then lordship over the world must be recognizable as already a conspicuous feature of Christ's historical life" (p. 406).

[2] Denney: *Studies in Theology*, p. 14. Dr. Denney's statement need not necessarily be taken as referring to all the Ritschlian divines. It is surely, as the context shows, rather of the nature of a statement as to the logical results of the Ritschlian premises.

is the assertion that 'the supernatural birth,' 'the pre-existence taught by St. Paul,' 'the Incarnation of the Logos at least as taught by St. John,' are the things which give 'an objective character' to 'Christ's Godhead.'"[1] These things "make the least direct and potent appeal to our personal experience," and other lines of evidence are "more convincing" in their appeal.[2] But Dr. Garvie only succeds in opening up the vital question as to what is ultimately to be regarded as possessing objective value. A good deal of ambiguity resides in the word "appeal." An appeal to our personal experience may have an emotional or a rational basis, and Dr. Garvie seems content to argue that what is last in reflection because it is preceded by other, presumably more attractive, considerations, is on that account alone to be regarded as "less objective." But if "pre-existence as taught by St. Paul," and the Logos doctrine as taught by St. John are the only permissible rational deductions, once the impression of Deity is forced upon the mind, it is idle to deny their objective character. The ultimate conclusions even of physical science can be shown to have an appeal less direct and potent than that embodied in the ordinary phenomenal appearances; but these conclusions are, nevertheless, more objective in the true sense as being penetrated more thoroughly by rational conceptions.

How does Dr. Garvie arrive at the conclusion that the Johannine doctrine of the Logos and the Pauline doctrine of pre-existence, "were not part of the common teaching in the apostolic circles, but were individual interpretations of their Christian consciousness?" Simply by deleting from the extant records the whole of the Johannine and Pauline witness—the greater part of the available evidence for the beliefs of the early Church—by shutting his eyes to the amply sufficient testimony in the Petrine group of writings to

[1] *The Ritschlian Theology*, p. 287. [2] *Ibid*, p. 288.

the Christian consciousness of our Lord's pre-existence,[1] and by refusing to hearken to the testimony of the sub-apostolic Church upon the subject.[2] Hence, if it were only for the fact that it forms an integral part of the only available evidence for the Church's thought of the Person of the Redeemer in apostolic times, it is positively absurd to assert that the Pauline doctrine of pre-existence was no part of the common teaching of the Church.

Again, is Dr. Garvie justified in asserting that an objective value, in the true sense, attaches to the Ritschlian value-judgments? If the term "objective" is not to be taken as bringing such value-judgments into relation with the whole of our knowledge, scientific as well as practical, Dr. Denney's statement holds good. For the Ritschlians to allow this would simply mean that they abandoned their basal positions. St. Paul, indeed, asserts that spiritual things are spiritually discerned;[3] but, unlike the Ritschlians, he recognizes that, to be real, spiritual things must be capable of being discerned, and insists upon the necessity of an opening of the understanding as well as of the heart. In the last analysis, the intellectually incomprehensible or untrue has no moral significance.[4] There is only a step between saying "Jesus Christ appears as Divine," and "Jesus Christ, a Man, is all the Divine that appears." The moral and the religious in man's nature

[1] See Lecture III.

[2] See Dorner: *History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ.*

[3] 1 Cor. ii. 14.

[4] "Nothing is more certain than that the contents of Revelation are never anti-intellectual, never irrational. If it were so, the very belief that our nature, including its strictly reasoning faculty, was the work of God would throw grave doubt upon propositions offered to faith which should even seem to the best of an earnest and impartial attention, reverent and general, to be properly irrational. Once grant that we know in part, but that nevertheless in part we *know*, and it is vital to the full development of the faith that its intellectual relations should be examined and explained." Bishop H. C. G. Moule, in his Preface to *Christian Certitude*, p. 8.

have their own canons ; but they enter into a complete experience mingling with empirical facts. To destroy the inter-relations between knowledge and morality, is to break up the unit of the self. As items of knowledge, moral facts must yield allegiance to the ordinary canons of experience, and any failure of attestation in that region renders their lofty claims untenable.

6. It must, however, be admitted that the number of Ritschlian divines, including Dr. Garvie, who accept the Godhead of Christ in a more real form than their Master, shows that in some respects the system does promise relief to the Christological thinker. Ritschlianism is a double-headed movement, partly a somewhat cowardly attempt to dissociate the religious from the scientific or intellectual consciousness and partly a daring, if unsatisfactory, effort to interpret the revelation of God in Christ solely in terms of the moral and religious elements in man's nature. Thus, it makes the Deity of Christ to reside in His Will rather than in His Nature, and pronounces the latter to be beyond our knowledge.

Its advantages are so real and so obvious that they obscure its defects. A theory which justly lays profound stress upon the moral aspects of our Lord's life, which justly acclaims in Him the perfect Revelation of God, which justly asserts His conscious identity of will and Self-end with that of God, cannot fail to be attractive to a generation weary of the difficulties besetting orthodox Christology and nauseated with Christological experiments. Nevertheless, the attempt to establish the connection of God and man solely through the conscience and the moral sensibilities is doomed to failure. If the ethically perfect man is the complete revelation of God, and there is no such thing as original sin, it is difficult to see any reason why there should not be recurrent revelations of God in successive ages. Ritschl's argument that, even if such

should occur, it would not affect the finality of Christ's revelation as they would be historically and logically dependent upon the Person of the Redeemer, is only a reduction of the Godhead of Christ to a merely accidental temporal priority.

7. If, however, the strength of Ritschlianism is to be found in its recognition of the moral character of the revelation of God in Christ, its weakness is to be found in the fact that it would restrict the *nexus* between our Lord's Deity and Manhood to an identity of will Its adherents do not, perceive that the Christ who is the Perfect Revelation of God is the Christ whose life and words appeal to every human faculty. They refuse to recognize that the moral is but the avenue by which the spirit finds its highest expression, that the will is but the nature's means of expression. Hence they will not draw the inevitable and only logical deduction from the facts (justly claimed as revelation from God) that the Man who has lived in perfect holiness and who has manifestly and consciously conceived His life-purpose as identical with that of God is ontologically the Son of God, and that the problem of the relations of the finite and the infinite, of the union of the Creator and the creature, of the human and the Divine in a single Person inevitably arises and constitutes an insistent intellectual problem, which can only be put aside permanently at the cost of paralysing the spiritual and intellectual faculties alike.

V.—Dr. Sanday and the Subconscious. Deity as a *Donum Superadditum*.[1]

1. The latest and, perhaps, the most extraordinary theory as to the relations of our Lord's human and

[1] Authorities:—Bishop C. F. D'Arcy, Articles in the *Hibbert Journal*, Jan. 1911, Jan. 1912; T. C. Hammond, *Consciousness and the Subconscious* (printed in Appendix); H. L. Mackintosh, Articles in the *Expository Times*; W. Sanday, *Christology and Personality*; C. C. J. Webb, Article in the *Oxford Magazine*.

divine natures is that formulated by Professor Sanday, in his " Christologies : Ancient and Modern." In that work the famous Oxford scholar advances the theory that the seat of the Deity in the Lord Jesus Christ is to be sought in His sub-consciousness,[1] and lays great emphasis upon the superiority of the sub-consciousness to consciousness. As he describes our conscious life as the dial plate upon which the index of action and thought and will record the deeper movements of human personality which take place below the level of consciousness,[2] it is not surprising that the philosophical divines who have criticized the book found it necessary to record an emphatic protest.

2. It is too much to say that the sub-conscious self is a stronghold of precisely the lightest and most trivial things that enter into consciousness. It is rather the reserve of our being. When we receive an impression, or perform an act, no matter how trivial and how soon forgotten, that act or impression is not lost to our personalities. On the contrary, it is registered in the inmost recesses of our being and (although, so far as consciousness is concerned, it may pass out of sight for ever) it has made its mark upon the whole course of our future development and modified the character of our personality. In fact, personality as completed is largely moulded by forgotten actions.

[1] "The first, retrospective, proposition is :—that the proper seat or *locus* of all Divine indwellings or Divine action upon the human soul, is the subliminal consciousness.

"And the other, anticipatory, proposition that I shall try to work out is :—that the same, or the corresponding, subliminal consciousness is the proper seat or *locus* of the Deity of the incarnate Christ."—*Ancient and Modern Christologies*, pp. 157 and 158.

[2] "Impulses towards good and impulses towards evil come flickering up from below. Very often they come lightly and go lightly. They do not themselves amount to any solid basement of character. They are only an index of the real basement. And the index is but light and flickering, like the finely poised needle on the face of a dial. The really important thing is not the index, but the weight or the pressure that moves the index. And that, in the case of moral character and religious motive, is out of sight, down in the lowest depths of personality." —*Ibid*, p. 159.

The difference between a well-trained and an ill-trained memory serves to show how very little of our potential knowledge is ever really present to our consciousness. Potential knowledge is very largely actualized by the memory. Behind this disciplined area of our hinterlands, there are other and unsubdued areas. These are the habitat of that overwhelming proportion of our experiences over which memory exercises no power. Some of them, however, occasionally percolate through to consciousness. Whether they do or not, they certainly form the background of life and, owing to their past moulding influence upon personality, influence and condition all present action.

3. It is, however, by no means so certain as Dr. Sanday and his guides seem to think, that this area of personal life is the decisive area. On the contrary, it is the source of those extraordinary combinations of fleeting impressions, received in our waking hours, which are experienced in dreams and which, as a general rule, are so slight and trivial in character. As my learned and able friend, the Reverend T. C. Hammond, of Dublin, has shown in an exhaustive and valuable note, printed as an Appendix, the value of our sub-conscious labours is entirely dependent upon the character of our conscious lives. "There are," he justly says, "no instances of the knowledge which the careless undergraduate permitted to pass in through one ear and out through the other returning with an irresistible incursion on the day of an examination, but there are many instances of the patient student, whose mind has trained itself to reflection, getting what seemed to be almost inspirations when confronted with intricate problems."

4. The sub-conscious is, however, by no means valueless. Far from this, it is the very reserve of our being in which all our experiences are preserved. It

is the storehouse of our past life, upon which, as the present demands, we draw drafts. This is the explanation of those experiences, common to most of us, of some difficult line of thought, or, perhaps, a mathematical problem, to which we have devoted many of our waking hours without apparent success, suddenly becoming clear and lucid after a period of rest, without apparent effort on our part. Thus, as Dr. D'Arcy says, the sub-conscious is an excellent servant.[1] It is, however, only a good servant within definite limits and is quite incapable of originating anything of any value. To take an illustration from clerical life, a clergyman with a highly developed sub-consciousness, will find, so long as he is not severely worked in other directions, that the selection of a text on Monday will, without any very serious conscious effort, be almost sufficient to ensure a passably good sermon for the next Sunday. If, however, the strength of his mind goes into other work, a satisfactory result is most unlikely and, to do his best, the full strength and power of his conscious life is absolutely necessary.

What is more, an abnormal development of the sub-conscious life cannot be encouraged save at the cost of weakening our full and normal control over the realm of personality. The experience of those who are accustomed to rely upon the sub-consciousness is that it is an exceedingly bad master. Indeed, it can scarcely be developed to any serious extent without imperilling the mental balance. This seems to be the explanation of the fact that eccentricity and genius go hand in hand, and that the latter is so closely allied to madness.

5. Another marked defect from the philosophical standpoint of Dr. Sanday's presentation of the theory, is his insistence, in spite of Bishop D'Arcy's conclusive criticism in the "Hibbert Journal," upon the extraordinary conception that personality is in space. When

[1] *Hibbert Journal.*

he urges that we are in space and, on that ground, vindicates the conception of our personalities as divided into actual regions, separated by as mathematically exact a boundary line as divides France from Germany, he is taking up an untenable position.[1]

6. The whole course of modern philosophy is in the direction of emphasizing the Kantian criticism of space and time. If they are, indeed, simply modes of our intuition, the attempt to place our mental and spiritual experiences in space is as absurd as it would be to attempt to deny that our bodies are in space. Personality is the co-ordinating principle of the thought world which it builds up. Hence, being spiritual, not material, eternal, not temporal—personality is not and never can be legitimately described as being in space and time. Because they are the modes of its intuition, it manifests itself in conditions of space and time; but that does not affect the fact that it would be just as legitimate to attempt to subsume personality under the category of a great toe, as under the categories of space and time.

[1] "Dr. D'Arcy presents this objection in what I cannot but think is a rather extreme form. His net includes, as will be seen, not only me but many others beside me—and notably Professor James.

"He writes as follows:—'Mental facts of all kinds, feelings, thoughts, impulses, volitions, are not in space. They are in time only. The stream of consciousness, as we call it, has no *place*, no *locus*. If the subconscious be mental in its nature, how, then, does it exist?

"'It is startling to reflect that all the language which psychologists have allowed themselves to use in connection with this subject, is daringly, almost outrageously, spacial and material. The same statement may be made of their account of normal psychical experiences. They speak of the *field* of consciousness, of the *centre* and of the *margin*. But there is no field, no centre, no margin in consciousness. These images are all spacial and, in relation to consciousness, there is nothing so important about them as their utter unfitness to express the facts.' (*Hibbert Journal*, p. 242.)

"This is sweeping indeed. But how far is it true? Mental facts of all kinds, feelings, thoughts, impulses, volitions, are not in space. But surely they are *ours*, and *we* are in space; we carry them about with us; they are where we are, and they are not where we are not. How then can they help being in space?"—*Personality in Christ and in Ourselves*, pp. 65, 66. (The *Hibbert Journal*, from which Dr. Sanday quotes, is the number for January, 1911.)

7. There is another respect in which Dr. Sanday's theory is open to criticism: his attempt to establish the sub-consciousness as the *locus* of the working of the Divine Spirit of God, almost to the exclusion of His working in the sphere of man's consciousness. Our truest experiences of the knowledge and love of God do not take their rise from any hinterland of personality, about which we know as much, or as little, as was known about the hinterlands of Africa in the days of Mungo Park. On the contrary, as far as man can tell, the means whereby the Spirit of God influences the human soul are precisely analogous to the means whereby any other personality influences it. It is by the reading of God's Word that the Spirit makes His appeal to the souls of men. Nor, indeed, can anything be achieved by relegating the Holy Spirit's working to the sub-consciousness, unless it be the giving of some ground for the taunt that religion is an indication of an ill-balanced mind. Of course the operation of the Holy Ghost cannot be excluded from the sub-consciousness. Too little is known of the premises to allow of the deduction of a dogmatic conclusion. All that can be said is that the means whereby the Holy Ghost operates in the sub-conscious realm seem to be analogous to those by which any other personality can work in it —by means of impressions which have been received through the consciousness.[1]

8. This theory seems to conceive the relationship of the Eternal Son to the Manhood of Christ simply as an intensification of that which exists between the Word and ordinary human individuals. If there is no necessary and essential connection between the human and Divine natures, can the Word be truly described as Incarnate? The conception of the Deity of Christ as

[1] The fact that there is such a thing as the new birth, or change of nature, would, however, point to a special operation of the Holy Ghost, to use the old Puritan phrase, beyond consciousness.

located in His sub-consciousness and only occasionally winning through to consciousness is merely a *château en Espagne*; for Deity which was in such a relation to manhood would be a mere appanage of manhood. Thus Deity becomes a mere *Donum Superadditum*, which can be taken away without fundamentally affecting the character of His personality. "But the evidence that in Christ manhood was united to Godhead more closely than in other men, must surely be sought in what passed not below, but above the threshold of His consciousness; in His consciousness of knowing the Father as no others did; in that pre-eminence which the old writers assigned to Moses—that the Lord spake to him not in a dream, but face to face—belonged truly and in a higher degree to the Prophet like unto Moses, that His was actually that full spiritual stature to which His followers are by His grace to be enabled to grow."[1] Hence it is that this theory—which, were it not for the respect due to the eminent critical labours and earnestness of Dr. Sanday, would have been justly characterised as bizarre by modern Christologians as well as incompetent to relieve the difficulties which beset the Athanasian and Cyrilline Christologies—must be rejected in the interests of truth.

VI.—The Most Probable Solution[2]

1. It will be well, before proceeding to outline what seems to be the most probable solution of the problem, to state clearly the facts with which we have to do. They are the facts that, on the one hand, our Lord was certainly conscious of His Deity and, on the other, that He seems to have been only conscious of it within the limitations of manhood. Since He certainly

[1] Mr. Webb in the *Oxford Magazine*.

[2] Authorities:—See list at beginning of Lecture. I am especially indebted to Bishop Weston's *The One Christ*, Bishop Moule's *Outlines of Christian Doctrine* and Professor Orr's invaluable *Christian View of God and the World*.

experienced in a thoroughly natural human way all the experiences that usually fall to the lot of men, the problem arises as to how we are to conceive of a Being who, regarded from one point of view, is strictly limited and, from another aspect, is absolutely unlimited.

2. Now, Incarnation is not mere Immanence, no matter how intensified. To conceive of the Deity of Christ as a merely unique presence of an immanental character of the Supreme Being in the Man Christ Jesus, is in reality to deny any real Incarnation. No doubt (just as it is the necessary pre-requisite of all creaturely life whatsoever) the Immanence of God in the human heart and soul is the necessary pre-requisite to the thought of an Incarnation; but an intensified Immanence could only mean a difference in degree, not in kind, between the Saviour and His brethren and, at the very best, would involve the co-existence of two persons rather than of two natures in one Person.

3. Since an Incarnation in which the Divine Person is not the Subject of the Manhood is beset with overwhelming difficulties, the much abused theory of the impersonal Manhood of the Lord Jesus Christ is the only intelligible assumption, once His Deity is conceded.

How is manhood which is not personal to be conceived? Is it not a contradiction in terms? On the contrary, manhood as such is not personality. If it is to be realized, no doubt personality is necessary; but the advocates of the impersonal Manhood of Christ will not deny the fact. They insist, just as strongly as the strongest adherent of the more prevalent theories, that Manhood as found in Christ Jesus our Lord is perfect and completed Manhood. They would urge, however, that human personality, being a copy, an image, a representation of Divine, can only achieve

its destiny when completely subordinated to the divine. Human personality is most truly human when most truly divine.

4. Since the Divine image in man consists in human personality—in those things which are common to man and God—personality may be described as the greatest common measure of the human and divine natures. Therefore, in so far as the Personality of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity took the form of an ordinary human personality, His Manhood would suffer no loss, but would rather gain in dignity, in reality and in power.[1]

5. Can, however, the Eternal and Infinite Word of God become the Ego of Manhood? Limitation is the necessary and ever persistent characteristic of human personality in comparison with Divine, and the question as to whether such Self-limitation on the part of the Eternal God is possible is answered by the indubitable fact of the Divine Self-limitation which is involved in the fact of finite existences. God has created and, in so far as He respects the limitations and constitution of His creation, He limits the Self-expression of His powers. Hence the question as to whether the Divine Being will voluntarily undergo a further limitation of His powers is a question that can

[1] "When it is objected that the Divine Logos, even though entering into the nature and conditions and limitations of humanity, is not truly a human Person, the question is to be asked, is the relation between Personality in the Logos and that in man one of contrariety, or is not Personality in the Logos rather the truth of that which we find in humanity? Is man's personality in every case not grounded in that of the Logos? Is He not the light and life of all men, even in a natural respect—the light of intelligence, of conscience, of spirit? But if man's personality is thus grounded in the Logos, is there a difference of kind between them, or not rather one of condition? Is there not a human side in the Logos, and a Divine side in man? And is not this the truth we have to conserve in such theories as Beyschlag's and Hegel's? There is no denial, therefore, in the doctrine of the Incarnation, rightly understood, of a true human Personality in Christ. What is denied is that the Personality of the Divine Son cannot also become in the incarnate condition a truly human one."—J. Orr, *Christian View of God and the World*, p. 246.

only be decided by the facts. The facts that the Lord did develop in the days of His Manhood, that He did increase in knowledge as in stature, that He was truly tempted in all points like as we are, prove that, as a mere matter of history, the Eternal Word was and is still so limited in respect of His Manhood.

6. How could the Eternal Word live a truly human life? Here we enter upon those regions of enquiry in which, as we have already seen, speculation is very largely without a positive Scriptural basis. Nevertheless, the assumption of a continuous act of Self-limitation on the part of the Word meets all the demands of Scripture, and gives us considerable assistance in conceiving the character of the Incarnation of the Eternal Son. We have in such an act of Self-restraint on the part of the Logos no depotentiation of His powers, no Self-paralysis, no ceasing of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity from His Trinitarian functions; but, on the contrary, a profound manifestation of His essential Deity in a continuous act of Self-sacrifice which is carried over into His glorified existence and which, therefore, eternally secures the verity of His Manhood. It is no act which robs His Divine Personality of its powers during His earthly life and renders it compulsory for Him to undergo the humiliations and trials of human life, and the burden of sin-bearing. It involves an act of continuous Divine Self-sacrifice which culminated in His supreme agony, even in that loss of the fellowship of God which was the inevitable result of His identification of Himself with sinful humanity in the penalty of sin.

7. Analogies, imperfect as they necessarily are, make it easier to conceive the possibility of such an act of continuous Self-restraint. The humiliation of Christ, as conceived in the classical Kenotic passage, is presented as a slavery. Now, slavery does not involve the loss of powers or nature, but of the right to

their exercise.[1] This, as a rule, is compulsory. Occasionally, it is voluntary. When, for example, some American slaves were released, a certain number sternly refused to accept their freedom and, tearing up their letters of freedom, insisted upon remaining the slaves of their much-loved masters. Henceforth, their slavery was the consequence of their own volition. If it were conceived as a continuous free choice, such slavery would be analogous to the humiliation of Christ.

Again, if a man knows very little of a foreign language and yet, by an act of will, not merely chooses to express himself, but compels himself to think in its terms, his thought is profoundly limited and he loses the enjoyment of a great proportion of his powers; but he does not destroy his mental powers.

A still more helpful analogy may be found in that effort to comprehend the feminine outlook upon life which, sooner or later, every man must make. Here, owing to the fundamentally different, although complementary, functions and characters of the sexes, the differences of nature are such that the power really to comprehend and sympathize with the view point of the other sex very largely partakes of the power to assume a different type of thought and feeling and, we might almost say, of nature.

Imperfect as these and all other analogies admittedly are, they help us to picture to ourselves the method adopted by the Logos in taking our nature upon Him by their exhibition of the fact that even human beings to a very large extent can and, if they are to live

[1] "Now slavery is a purely negative state. It is the state of a man who is by right possessed of all human qualities, but by the accident of his state, is prevented from the exercise of them, either in part, or altogether. He is at the mercy of his master, whose will may change from day to day, and who may at any moment free his slave from his limitations. Were he to do so, the slave would be found to possess all the proper attributes of manhood. Thus slavery is based, as a state, not on the absence of human rights and powers, but on the absence of the actual liberty to exercise them. Limitation, therefore, and not abandonment, is the keynote of slavery."—Bishop Weston, *The One Christ*, p. 117.

in the world as it is, must divest themselves of their own natures to such a degree as will enable them to enter into the view points and feelings of closely related and less fully developed natures.

8. It must be conceded that the powers of the Deity must be greater, not less, than those of His creatures. Hence it is the fact that He is, indeed, the Eternal Son of God that makes such a perfect Self-restraint of our Lord's powers and activities in respect of His Manhood as the facts demand, not only possible, but comparatively easy to conceive. Omnipotence surely means that all things which are not forbidden by the inner necessity of perfection of nature are possible to God. Christ is the Eternal Son and, therefore, we cannot deny Him the power to limit or sacrifice Himself as He sees fit. The atoning work of Christ as revealing Divine Self-sacrifice in the abnegation of the Divine prerogatives and glory is a vindication of the moral character of the Eternal and Ever-living God. It is in Divine Self-limitation that Divine omnipotence finds its highest expression.

9. While preserving and fully emphasizing the great excellence of the Kenotic Christologies—the fact that the Subject of our Lord's Manhood was not the unlimited Logos, the theory of a continuous Self-restraint escapes their errors of postulating or involving a composite nature and the degradation of Deity involved in the hypothesis of Divine Suicide or Self-paralysis. While preserving the indubitable truth of the continuously developing revelation of the Godhead in the Man Christ Jesus to which the theories of Gradual Incarnation try to do justice, it escapes the error of conceiving the Deity of our Lord as at any time less than the Subject of His Manhood, or as less than vitally connected with it! While doing fullest justice to the great truth that God is revealed in Christ Jesus Our Lord in respect of His character as Holy Love, to

which the Ritschlian divines strive to give adequate prominence, it evades the insuperable difficulty of virtually conceiving God in Christ Jesus as begun in time, or as aught else than the Sovereign Ruler of the universe—to be recognized as such by the scientific as much as the religious consciousness. Finally, while recognizing the great truth of the Manhood of Christ as knowing itself to be Divine in the conditions of human knowledge and as being truly analogous in respect of its conscious relations to God with that of other men, to which Professor Sanday has striven to do justice, it escapes the philosophical impossibility and theological error of conceiving Godhead, even in Incarnation, as a mere Appanage of creaturehood. Hence the theory under discussion seems to be more consonant with all the known facts than any other theory yet propounded.

VII.—Some Related Problems

The chief problems which are connected with the relations of the human and divine natures in our Lord's Person are those of His liability to temptation and suffering, and of His character as a Teacher. How could One, the Subject of whose Manhood is the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity, suffer or be tempted ? Regarded as a Teacher, is He infallible, or must He be regarded simply as One among many great and wise teachers of mankind ?

(1) how could He be tempted ?

Were it not for the fact that those who deny the essential Deity of our most blessed Lord infer His mere Manhood from His sufferings and struggles with temptation, it would almost be sufficient to urge with regard to these difficulties that the facts are abundantly clear and that they decide the possibility of His temptation beyond dispute. The force of this objection to our Lord's Deity is, however, broken by

the facts that we know as little of the How ? and Why ? of the temptations of ordinary men, as we do of those relating to our Lord's, and that the whole question is wrapped in impenetrable mystery. If we cannot explain the possibility of our own temptations, it is surely absurd to demand that our Lord's temptations should be adequately explained by us. The question—Can the Eternal Son suffer and be tempted with evil ?—ultimately resolves itself into the same question as the problem of the Incarnation. Those who believe in the moral omnipotence of God will always answer: If the Supreme Being wills an Incarnation and, therefore, that He should suffer, the experiences of Incarnation, passibility and temptation will be His. Those whose Theism is really of a negative type will, with equal confidence, deny to the Divine Being—at the cost of establishing an impassable gulf between man and God—the possibility of such experiences.

It is surely the wisest as well as the most scientific procedure for those who admittedly know little or nothing of the inner mysteries of the Divine Nature, to be content to have the matter decided by the available facts and to repudiate the most unscientific procedure of ruling out whole series of established facts simply because they are not consistent with *â priori* notions.

(2) IS HE AN INFALLIBLE TEACHER ?

1. The practical question is the extremely important and difficult problem of our Lord's character as a Teacher. Now, in this regard all believers, from the conservative divines of all ages to Kenoticists of the type of Bishop Gore, are agreed as to the infallible character of our Lord's teaching in respect of those things which vitally concern His mission. Nor is this surprising. Once our Lord's infallibility in respect of the eternal and spiritual world is denied, the

finality of His authority as binding upon the consciences of all men must be surrendered and He must simply be regarded as a spiritual Expert who only differs from His fellow experts in point of degree.[1]

2. It will, however, be best for us to approach this question from the side of our Lord's Manhood. Now, the outstanding facts of that Manhood are a truly human moral and intellectual development allied with essential sinlessness.

Such a development involves limitation of knowledge and any chapter of the Gospels will afford sufficient evidence of the fact that the knowledge of the Carpenter of Nazareth was not the intuitive knowledge of the Eternal and Ever-living God. This is not, however, to say that He made mistakes. To say that a man knows nothing of the Higher Mathematics, is not to say that he is incapable of adding two and two together, or even that he ever made the mistake of finding that two *plus* two made anything else than four. "The most cautious, the most worshipping theology," says Bishop Handley Moule, "may hold that He consented in His humanity to limitations of His conscious knowledge"[2]: and, as far as I am aware, no intelligent Christian and, certainly, no educated theologian will have the slightest desire to challenge the statement.

[1] Bishop Weston's statement of the facts from the believing point of view may be quoted here: "But nothing will ever make it legitimate to say that a matter was related to the Son as Incarnate as being a truth which at the same moment was related to the Son as unlimited Logos as being a lie. The unity of the Person of the Word is the pledge of the infallible truth of every word He spoke. The Mind of Jesus was only Jewish in so far as the Jewish mind of His age reflected the truth. Every word that He uttered is for ever true. Human the Mind was and is to this day; human, truly and completely; but whatever Its limitations, whatever the measure of Its ignorance, whatever the medium of Its self-expression, It was and is infallibly true. We have no guarantee for the truth of the revelation of God to the saints in Heaven through the glorified Christ, which is not equally valid as a guarantee for the Truth of every word He spoke on earth. The guarantee lies in the fact that He who speaks is God the Son."—*The One Christ*, p. 209.

[2] In Preface to Sir Robert Anderson's *The Bible and Modern Criticism*.

3. Now, it is necessary, for the sake of clearness of thought, to distinguish between the moral and the intellectual sides of our beings ; but it is a grave error to treat the distinction as other than formal. Conscience and the intellect do not form two water-tight compartments. They are not related as the hand and the foot, but as the eyeball and the optic nerve. What injures the one, injures the other. The painfully common experience that violent prejudice impairs our judgment of another's actions and misleads us as to our own, illustrates this fact. Thus, sin inevitably leads to the perversion of the intellect. It is to this that St. Paul refers when he describes those without the covenant as "having the understanding darkened, being alienated from the life of God."[1]

If, however, the soul is the life of the intellect, the intellect is, in a very real sense, the eye of the soul. Whatsoever impairs its perfection imperils our moral life. It is, therefore, exceedingly difficult to conceive a sinless man, no matter how crassly ignorant He may be, as actually falling into error ; and the question as to our Lord's finality as a Teacher must, in the last resort, be decided by the evidence at our disposal and, above all, by the character of His Self-consciousness in this regard.

4. The unimportance of our Lord's being in error in respect of matters which did not vitally concern His Mission is often asserted. What does it matter, it is urged, whether he accepted the Ptolemaic theory of astronomy or not ? Is it so certain, however, that we are in a position to decide what was, or was not, vital to the success of His mission ? Is our knowledge of spiritual things so profound that we can presume to say what was, or was not, fundamental to our Lord's teaching ? One would think that the experience of the last two centuries would give pause

[1] Eph. iv. 18.

to this kind of argument. If anything is inscribed in indelible letters upon the records of modern theology, it is the story of the influence of scientific conceptions. The whole thought of the Eighteenth Century was determined by the discovery of the Newtonian Law of Gravitation and theology spent a century in adapting itself to the changed habits of thought. Similarly, the thought of the later Nineteenth Century was enslaved by the materialistic type of evolutionary theory and is now only freeing itself from that tyranny by the recognition and assimilation of a spiritual evolution.[1] If any further proof of the futility of this argument were needed, Professor Percy Gardner's attempt in his " Exploratio Evangelica " to reject the Ascension because, forsooth, it presupposes, in his opinion, a Ptolemaic universe, ought to silence those who hold even astronomical error on our Lord's part to be of small moment.

5. Hence the problem, in the last analysis, resolves itself into a question as to what is the witness of our Lord's consciousness and of such subsidiary evidence as is available.

Now, an examination of the evidence contained in the Gospels certainly establishes the facts that our Lord conceived His knowledge to be profoundly limited and that He nowhere shows the slightest consciousness of being in error on any single point. His absolute certainty in teaching and His sovereign demands upon the human soul are quite incompatible, in a good man, with a consciousness of ever having fallen into error. Besides this, as Romanes has most justly pointed out in his " Thoughts on Religion," one of the strongest pieces of objective evidence in favour of the truth of

[1] The coming of the evolutionary concept has, however, destroyed for ever the older presentation of Christian evidence. Even Liddon's Bampton Lecture, because written before the great new thought of evolution had had time to permeate the thought of the age, is largely ineffective to the modern mind.

Christianity is to be found in the absence of gross or necessary error of any kind in respect of the findings of the modern sciences from the Lord's teachings.

(*a*) *His Use of Phenomenal Language*

What are we to say, then, about our Lord's use of phenomenal language, and His acceptance of the prevalent beliefs as to demoniac possession and the Old Testament?

The first objection is really very pettifogging. All language is phenomenal to a greater or less extent and, as we live in a phenomenal universe, all our transactions, so far as they enter into consciousness, are of that character. Hence, if the Eternal God were to reveal Himself to man, as He has done in Christ Jesus our Lord, He must avail Himself of phenomenal language and utilize such phraseology as sunrise and sunset which could not, one would think, mislead even a sin-perverted intellect.

(*b*) *Demoniac Possession*

As regards the second objection, Harnack in his "Mission and Expansion of Christianity during the First Two Centuries," waxes eloquent over the fact that the phenomena of Demonism are those of double personality. He also shows that such phenomena are common in Eastern communities, that they continually recur in times of religious excitement and that certain individuals can still produce similar phenomena in others. This looks as though the phenomena of demonism were explicable in terms of a hypnotic control of personality by another finite personality. In that case, the question of demonic possession is resolved into that of the credibility of the witness and, since a negative demonstration (as Huxley freely admits[1]) is quite impossible, it is scarcely necessary to show that there is no valid reason to

[1] See his *Science and Christian Tradition.*

disbelieve not merely the testimony which may be derived from the consent of all nations, but the witness of Him who, if ever man was supremely spiritual and supremely sane, and, therefore, worthy of credit, was the best fitted of all men to pronounce an authoritative decision in the matter.

(*c*) *The Old Testament*

(*a*) There remains the exceedingly difficult question of our Lord's authority in regard to the Old Testament —a problem which explains the Kenotic vagaries of Bishop Gore and a whole host of modern theologians.

Only a gross misapprehension of the facts of the case could inspire the statement, so often made, that the criticism of the Old Testament holds, and can hold, no vital relation to our Lord's work and mission. It must surely be remembered that the prevalent theories entirely reverse all that our Lord held as to the fortunes and history of God's dealing with the race. Not only are they based upon anti-supernaturalistic, and, therefore, unscientific principles; but they entirely destroy that whole theory of God's dealings with man which inspired our Lord's thoughts and from which He, like the humblest traditionalist Christian, drew His spiritual sustenance and comfort. There is no doubt in anybody's mind but that the Lord learned the character of His mission from, and formed His spiritual ideals to a very large extent upon, the teaching of the Old Testament and that He and His apostles fearlessly appealed to the Old Testament in proof of His Messianic claims. Similarly, there is no doubt whatsoever but that the acceptance of our Lord as Messiah and Redeemer by the Jew first and afterwards by the Gentile was largely, even principally, determined by the witness of the Septuagint version of the Old Testament.

Now, a glance, not at the works of the unbelieving scholars from whose pens almost every creative

contribution has come, but at the work of an eminently believing scholar—at Mr. Edghill's "Evidential Value of Prophecy"—is sufficient to show the cost of the acceptance of dominant theories. Our Lord's use of the Old Testament must be repudiated. His inferences and those of His apostles from its didactic passages and historic incidents must be condemned. Their historical philosophy of God's dealings with the race must be regarded as based upon wholly erroneous premises and the argument by which Christianity won acceptance must be given up. It cannot, therefore, be too often repeated that it is no question of dates or authorship, no question of sources or incidentals that is at stake, but the fundamental facts of God's dealings with sinful men as recorded in the sacred history.

(β) At the same time, a word of warning is necessary. The authority of the Lord does not cover all that it is popularly supposed to do. The effort which most unfortunately has been made to extend the buckler of our Lord's authority over every jot and tittle of the traditional theories must be adjudged a failure—a failure which has disastrous consequences for many minds—and a sharp distinction must be drawn between traditional theories and the facts of tradition. The latter will stand and are countersigned by the Son of God. The former, which, save in so far as they affect authentiticity, include such questions as those of date and authorship, cannot be said to be covered by the authority of our Lord Jesus Christ. That Moses wrote of Him is, and should be, an indisputable fact to those who bow to His authority. That Moses wrote every line of the Pentateuch is quite another matter with which, be it a fact or not, our Lord's statement has nothing to do.

Ought there to be any real difficulty in bowing to our Lord's authority regarding the past course of revelation

to those who have yielded their hearts to Him; who have laid the promise of their lives at His feet; who have found in Him peace from the accusing tongues of conscience, grace and power (beyond their wildest imaginings) to conquer the sin which so easily besets them, joy as they look into the dark unknown future and who have committed themselves and their loved ones to His tender keeping? Surely it is the very height of folly to reject the testimony of Him to whom we have committed our all in favour of the testimony of the dominant school of Old Testament critics of an age decadent in criticism, in religious fervour and in moral earnestness.

(γ) It is not upon the result of exhaustive enquiries on our part as to the accuracy or otherwise of His teaching in the few recorded incidents and sayings of His Ministry that our Lord bases His claims to our allegiance. It is upon His character and, while there is much, very much, in respect of which, content to leave it in His hands, we must live and die in ignorance, one thing remains sure and certain: Our sinless, although tempted, Lord is ours; He is experienced as most sacred and intimate of friends in our daily lives and, because He is experienced as meek and lowly in heart, we may learn of Him with safety in the realm of the intellect as of the heart. And, casting all our care upon Him, we shall find rest unto our souls amid the trials and joys, the successes and the failures, the temptations and the few poor moral triumphs of our lives. As we gather together in the morning of manhood, the voice of Him who once taught on the hillsides of Galilee is audible to each of us in the familiar and well loved words, pregnant with the joy of perfect manhood and of the glory of the invisible God, "Take My yoke upon you, and learn of Me; for I am meek and lowly in heart; and ye shall find rest unto your souls."

Appendix

"Consciousness and the Sub-conscious"

Appendix

"CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE SUB-CONSCIOUS"

BY THE REV. THOMAS CHATTERTON HAMMOND, M.A.,
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THE question of sub-conscious activity has been much before the minds of students of psychology in recent times. The Gifford Lectures of Professor James on "The Varieties of Religious Experience" suggested to preachers and theologians that in this aspect of psychological enquiry there might be found a rich field in which to prosecute research and develop speculation.

It must be admitted, however, that the speculation has been largely in excess of the research. Comparatively little is known as to the sub-conscious life, and this fact warns us to treat with caution any suggestion or conclusion that depends for support upon a theory of sub-conscious activity.

The more acute and philosophical psychologists persistently warn us that in the sub-conscious we are dealing with negative conceptions, yet that has not hindered even eminent divines from making very positive assertions.

The suspicion inevitably arises that the attractiveness of this particular element in psychology is not wholly detached from the vagueness and inconclusiveness of the data furnished. There is a charm associated with the idea of wandering in limitless space, and there is a similar fascination in wandering with thought unchecked over the reaches of infinity. But there is danger associated with both types of excursion. Psychologists are sharply divided as to the existence of any region of thought that is wholly unconnected with consciousness. By a strange irony Professor James has given an impetus to the study of this problem from the point which assumes a wholly unconscious field of experience while he himself denies the existence of any such field in thought preferring to distinguish between different strata in consciousness.

Much of the discussion from this particular aspect is due to the varying meanings of the word *consciousness*, which is sometimes identified with deliberate reflection and attention, and at other times extended to include any transient sensation which even for a moment "made itself felt." The latter extension brings prominently into view strata in consciousness, varying degrees of intensity determined for the most part by the immediate interest of the individual. The story of the professor who, in a moment of concentration, swallowed the ink in mistake for water may serve to point the moral that sensations may register themselves unnoticed by, if not unknown to, the subject, although subsequently there may be acute and distressing manifestations of their presence. It seems almost a contradiction in terms to speak of an element in consciousness which is unobserved by the subject but Professor James avoids the difficulty by postulating a fleeting recognition so ephemeral in character as to appear to be non-existent in relation to the developed train of ideas. In such cases "we remember to forget." It is useless to struggle about terminology. The explanation offered will appear as a *deus ex machina* or a profound solution just as the student is impressed with it. In dealing with the sub-conscious it is possible to draw large drafts on "The Will to believe."

But, at any rate, whether we call experiences like that of the professor, extra-marginal, subliminal, unconscious, or sub-conscious, they bear witness to the necessity of revising the older view that our conscious life exhibited in any moment, by the analysis of our direct mental activity, the whole trend and characteristic of our personality.

The existence of strata in consciousness, the dominance of interest in the arrangement of sensations otherwise indeterminate, the interaction between the forgotten past and the living present, invest the problem of our personal life with a great degree of complexity.

It is, perhaps, unfortunate that investigation into the operations that take place below the threshold of consciousness, should be so largely concerned with the phenomenon of multiplex personality. The researches of Janet, Binet and a host of psychologists and alienists have focussed attention

upon certain startling and bizarre manifestations, discoverable in the experience of neurasthenics, epileptics and clairvoyants. Wide inferences have been based upon evidences afforded by such subjects of dual and triple personalities. Myers' interesting book teems with illustrations designed to enforce his theory of a many-souled as well as a many-celled organism.

Without entering into a detailed criticism of Myers' theory, or attempting to disparage the undoubted value of the experiments conducted by investigators in this mysterious region, it may be worth while to draw attention to the fact that in multitudes of cases there is abundant evidence that nervous instability is accompanied with lack of coherence in the mental world.

The fact that the patients who afforded the most striking instances of dual and triple personality, so-called, were neurotic would justify the caution that we have to take into account, when dealing with such experiences, the possibility that imperfect powers of co-ordination accompanied by a lowered mentality give fantastic shapes to experiences more readily recognized as normal in well-balanced individuals.

A poor woman living in Dublin was unfortunately the victim of great cruelty at the hands of a husband, who, when sober, repented bitterly of his excesses and displayed unusual consideration and sympathy towards the object of his fury when drunk.

A continuous experience of alternating kindness and cruelty ultimately affected the poor woman's mind. Her delusion took the remarkable form of a persistent theory that she had two husbands—one kind, the other cruel. In all other particulars the poor woman acted quite rationally, and preserved further the coherent conception of each characteristic of her husband, failing only in the power to co-ordinate these characteristics. It is at least possible that in many cases where there is nervous instability the emergence of conflicting emotions and varying moods without sufficient centralizing energy to subordinate one emotion or mood to the other may lead to at first a distressing sense of alternation, and, finally, a partial co-ordination through association of one set of emotions with one mood and another set with another, the

changing impulses creating thus the idea of obsession owing to the imperfectness in the co-ordination itself. It is at least obvious as far as present research has gone that the " multiplex personalities " exhibit only mere fragmentary areas of conscious life and do not display such complete independence as to justify any theory of distinct personal sources for each conflicting phase in the divided experience of the individual.

However the problem presented by such phenomena will ultimately be solved, at present their immediate effect is to give the sub-conscious a bad name. By a too exclusive regard to the nature of the incursions into the higher region of consciousness proceeding from such instances, the sub-conscious has been regarded as the home of impulse and emotion, a dark cavern swarming with foul flying things, the uncontrolled lusts of the baser man. Education, ethics, law, philosophy, convention have marshalled their forces and driven from the field of consciousness these pestiferous creatures, penning them in the gloomy recesses of the underworld, and it is only where control fails that their sudden uprising and issuing into light takes place, proving that, though confined, they are not wholly destroyed. On this view, and also on many modifications of it, rests the theory that only our lower faculties or our baser instincts come from the sub-conscious sphere.

A controversy seems likely to arise similar to the now famous ape *versus* angel controversy immortalized by Disraeli. One school of advocates holds to the view that there is in the hither side of sub-conscious life an impulse to higher things and on the farther side God—while other advocates will have it that on the hither side of sub-consciousness there is an impulse to the ape and tiger and on the further side the Devil.

A mediating view may be offered, *viz.*, that the sub-conscious is somewhat similar to the conscious and expresses like it phases of a true human personality. It is essentially prosaic, but it is possibly true.

If we take up sub-conscious thought as it exists not in the abnormal manifestations of multiplex personalities but in the ordinary experience of the individual, its continuity with actual consciousness becomes apparent. Aristotle gave an example when he directed attention to the potentiality of the sleeping artist and Haering carries us into deeper aspects of

the question with his theory of unconscious memory in germ-cells. It is tempting, indeed, but scarcely profitable to ignore the broader and better established fact of continuity between conscious and sub-conscious thought, for the more bizarre developments which occasionally display themselves.

Memory, while it is the great feature of self-consciousness, is the connecting link which binds the whole of thought together. The possibility of its exercise demands something more than the immediate content in present experience. In the most elementary exercise of memory there is the fusion of the present and past. But not only is this the case, there are also recurrences of groups of association and re-adjustment of particulars in the groups in accordance with the temperament of the subject. There are aptitudes in memory, and habitudes in mind which can only be accounted for by a reference to the past history of the individual. The value of training and education largely consists in the power of welding the present and the past of experience into a uniform whole of character.

Such facts as these give a vast importance to the subliminal region. Much that once was conscious and attained only through laborious toil is now resident potentially in the individual waiting the call of circumstance again to take its place, but now with perfect ease, in the conscious and even self-conscious area of the personality. What we are is never wholly expressed in our conscious activity, what we may be lies yet deeper within the possibilities of the subliminal self.

If our habits and character, although formed by conscious activities, remain ours and yet lie outside the consciousness of the moment, it seems impossible to hold that only the lower or baser elements in our nature belong to the unconscious region.

Yet, on the other hand, the elevation of the sub-conscious over the conscious, which is a marked tendency in some quarters, ignores the patent fact that the best contributions from the sub-conscious are those which originally entered the individual life in consciousness. The habit, for example, which is most potent for good or evil is not a vague hereditary pre-disposition but the crystallized result of numberless activities. Those departments of memory which are associated with the continual interests and pursuits of the in-

dividual produce closer concatenations and manifest greater coherence than the dim recollections of events and circumstances not so connected with the daily conscious endeavour.

Consciousness, then, has a formative and controlling part in determining what shall be the nature of a vast amount of our sub-conscious activity. The more strenuous and orderly is the mental life of the individual the more useful and the better controlled are the impulses which connect with that life from the subliminal region. There is a good deal more romance than reality about the popular notion of sudden incursions uninvited and unrecognized into the orderly development of man's rational existence.

In periods of great tension, no doubt, such incursions appear to come uninvited, but an examination of them serves to show that they are not wholly disconnected with former modes of thought.

There are no instances of the knowledge which the careless undergraduate permitted to pass in through one ear and out through the other returning with an irresistible incursion on the day of an examination, but there are many instances of the patient student, whose mind has trained itself to reflection getting what seemed to be almost inspirations when confronted with intricate problems.

No doubt impulses and feelings as having a greater element of suggestiveness through their closer connection with the physical organism, and also having a more restricted range, and being therefore less liable to modification, recur with greater frequency and obtrude themselves apparently uninvited more readily than do ideas, but even here the law holds good that the habitudes of the individual ultimately affect even the " incursion " of impulses.

By the particular direction of its thought consciousness forms a mould into which certain features fit more readily than others.

Again the sub-conscious remains a wholly negative conception, and becomes operative only when the threshold of consciousness is lowered. This practically amounts to saying that potentiality is resident in sub-consciousness, but becomes actual only when brought into relation to our conscious life. However much value is placed upon the possibility of " in-

cursions " from the subliminal life, it is the appropriation and acceptance of such incursions by the self-conscious subject that give them their moral or intellectual significance. It is perfectly true that the whole personality is never expressed by any particular decision at any given moment, but such decision in the region of self-consciousness is the expression of the personality and we know no other. Consciousness must then be still regarded as the supreme power and as exhibiting the highest moral characteristics. Impulse, feeling, character, itself are intelligible only when translated into the terms of our conscious life.

But when we speak of the expression of the personality we are confronted with the question, What is the relation of personality to the conscious and sub-conscious psychological elements ? Does the existence of the sub-conscious throw any light on the nature of personality ? With pardonable eagerness the fresh information afforded by recent investigation in this region has been seized upon and employed to set at rest various conflicts in philosophy and theology. The phenomenon of conversion has been thereby accounted for but many students have lamentably failed to notice that a psychological explanation, even if true, is by no means an ultimate one. Valuable light upon the complexity of volition has no doubt been afforded and the materials with which volition works have been laid bare but volition itself remains as great a mystery as ever. The long standing controversies concerning the relation of motives to choice are not a whit nearer solution if we call in motives from the extra-marginal field. Psychology is not metaphysics and the problems of one science are not the problems of another. The immediate effect of the new psychology has been to increase the difficulties of any satisfactory account of personality by enlarging the field of inquiry. It is a very tempting solution to regard the subliminal region as the property of " the larger man " and the conscious life as a mere fragment, the limitation of the personality which ever struggles to break through the inexorable barriers that remain standing through the inabilities of consciousness. But unless we are prepared to deny the validity of severe discipline, to overthrow the proud structures of science and to take refuge in a universal suicide, we must

maintain that the flower of endeavour is attained in conscious effort. Facts lend support to the view that the more noticeable irruptions from the subliminal self, where there is a contrast with the normal stream of consciousness, are both puerile in themselves, and most frequent in cases where mentality is below par. It is idle to urge against this conclusion the obsessions of men of genius such as Bunyan or Luther, for they serve very aptly to illustrate what has been previously urged that such obsessions are closely connected with former modes of thought. Luther would never have flung his ink-pot at the devil had not his conscious thought been grievously harassed with the problem of sin ; and, in any case, with great submission to the psychologists, it was quite a different employment of Luther's ink-pot that shook the world. Obsessions of this character are intense realizations of the conflict of inclination of which a normal example is furnished by Tennyson's " Two Voices." The genius and the whole-heartedness of the individual give the added intensity in view of the extremity of the crisis. The personality stands outside the processes of the conscious and the sub-conscious life, bringing them both into the unity of the self. This unity is deeper than its conscious expression and is the final verdict of the individual determining the character. But again it needs to be insisted on that the unity finds expression only in consciousness, although some of the elements which go towards its formation lie in the sub-conscious sphere until called again into activity by the synthesis of the imagination. This reproduction of the past and its fusion with the present in conscious volition, is what attests the fact that we are not mere incidents but living persons. Not, as Kant puts it, " in time " but with " time in us." If this be so, however, the possession of the sub-conscious is a necessity for the conscious life. It is only by such means that the past can permanently influence conduct and that character can be slowly formed under the influences of environment and education. Now forasmuch as it is demonstrable that in certain respects the sub-conscious has been formed by influences anterior to the life of the individual that in point of fact the child awakens to consciousness adapted by the powers of nature to its environment ; that not the least important instances of these adaptations are con-

cerned with social habitudes and intellectual conditions; that, as consciousness develops, more and more of these latent aptitudes are taken up into consciousness and appropriated as proper elements in the individual life with no sense of discord but, on the contrary, with a full recognition of the individual's moral responsibility in connection with them; these facts are a sure indication that the range of personality is wider than the empirical realm, and exhibits a racial as well as an individualistic side. But indeed much the same conclusion might be arrived at by an examination of the more restricted area of consciousness where the universal and the individualistic lie together and are inextricable. The fact that the individual is constrained by the inner force of reason to admit certain positions and adopt certain universal postulates witnesses to the comprehensive character of the personality. Beyond this general inference it does not seem possible to go, at least with our present knowledge, inasmuch as the sub-conscious exhibits as strong individualistic features as the conscious. It is impossible to rule out of consideration such a large portion of the sub-conscious as consists in the latent faculties of the individual. The sleeping artist is of course the classical illustration. It is equally impossible to regard such potentialities, having their origin in the conscious and volitional activity of the individual, as furnishing any base for theories of a larger self in which individualism is lost. They are distinctively individualistic. As it has been well expressed by Miss Oldham in "An Introduction to Philosophy," "No abnormal personality has the skill to play the violin, to speak a foreign language, or to mend boots, if the normal personality cannot do these things, though the abnormal often cannot do such things when the normal can." Various illustrations of "conversion" in recent psychological literature indicate the intensely individualistic character of the subliminal self: "Away down in the bottom of my heart, I believe I was always more or less sceptical about 'God'; scepticism grew as an undercurrent all through my early youth" is the testimony of Jouffroy concerning the conditions precedent to his counter-conversion. They were obviously peculiar to the mental constitution of Jouffroy and by no means universal. Upon these grounds it seems inadvisable

to employ certain features of the sub-conscious towards the elucidation of problems in ontology.

The inferences are exceedingly precarious and there is grave danger that the significance of certain facts may be overlooked.

The conceit, for it can scarcely be dignified by a higher title, that in the sub-conscious region there are to be found possibilities of moral endeavour and vast intellectual resources, which need but a magic touch to spring into actuality, eclipsing the long labours of conscious toil, is too absurd to need serious refutation.

Granting that there are hereditary instincts and racial characteristics resident in this region, it is nevertheless true that, as in biology, the influence of environment is a dominant factor in variation, " natural selection may explain the survival of the fittest, but it cannot explain the arrival of the fittest," so in the mental life the dominant factor is the control and direction given to these latent instincts by the discipline and training of the conscious personality. If this were not so, education would be a much less important element in morality than it is. The truth seems to be that the effort towards progress consists in extending the control of the will over the impulses and feelings that tend to rise unbidden and disturb the moral equilibrium. As the conscious life develops, the sub-conscious area, instead of being an inchoate mass of vague tendencies, reflects in itself the coherence of consciousness, and the bent and tendency of the character becomes more and more definite through this cohesive controlling agency. But if this be so it is through the operations of consciousness that the sub-conscious attains to any degree of unification and it is this which alone gives it value. The more marked and decisive is the continuity between the conscious and the subliminal self, the less noticeable are the relations of the two, and the better are the results obtained. The ideal would be a complete homogeneity in which inclination was entirely subordinate to reason, the handmaid rather than the hinderer of moral endeavour. In the Sinless One we have the absolute unity of all volition when He said, " I do always those things that please Him," and the parallel subordination of every inclination in the other saying, " My

meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me and to finish His work." For our Lord Jesus Christ there existed no " antilogy of the will." But in so far as our Lord's consciousness was truly human, expressing itself by the temporal method incidental to all human consciousness, there must have existed for Him the same extra-marginal human field that exists for us. His Personality, so far as it found human expression, must have displayed Itself in momentary glimpses, and particular volitions, never wholly and at once. There was the fusion of past and present in the synthesis of the imagination and the storehouse of human experience below consciousness upon which the imagination drew. There must have been the acquired aptitude of the carpenter's craft lying dormant during the period of His great mission. To substitute for the truly human sub-consciousness a Divine deposition, occasionally bursting into the upper reaches of the mind, is to render unreal our Lord's human thought rather than to solve the problem of the Incarnation. If this were an age of heresy-hunting, it were possible to conceive a grave council of Bishops condemning the theory of a resident Divine sub-consciousness as being a subtle variation of the ancient error that denied to our Lord the possession of a rational human soul. We can imagine the creation of a new heresy called semi-Apollinarianism. But while there is a cardinal defect in the assumption of a resident Divinity replacing the human form of consciousness in the sub-conscious region, an analogy is afforded in the relation of the two necessary elements in consciousness that may help towards a better understanding of the problem of our Lord's dual consciousness. Because there is continuity between past and present due to the unifying activity of the personality, the sub-conscious, at the bidding of a particular interest of will, or in response to a stimulus of the imagination, yields its contribution and enriches the consciousness. Interest is the determinant motive that directs the selection of one element rather than another and the possibility of inhibition is well established. Where there is a well-disposed purpose, an all-absorbing interest, the various elements are taken up and pressed into service, and the call to the sub-conscious is for those necessary constituents that make the will effective. The trend of the personality would ultimately explain both

remembrance and forgetfulness if only we could conceive a complete unification. Now if the elements of our conscious and sub-conscious being are thus regarded as servants of the personality and their relative vividness and faintness are in themselves evidence of the particular interest which is associated with the personal endeavour, it is possible to conceive that the Divine and human consciousness of our Lord stood in a similar relation to His supreme Personality and that "*kenosis*" was a form of inhibition, profoundly voluntary, by which He hindered from entrance into His human consciousness those Divine elements which would have checked His eternal purpose of Self-abnegation. Such inhibition was not in the nature of an external necessity and it was possible for Him, in the transcendental unity of His Divine Person, to admit into His life of humiliation any Divine element which was requisite for the furtherance of His holy will. This partial analogy may be forthcoming as a result of recent research, but it leaves untouched many problems connected with the relation of the Divine to the human, still we may be the more readily reconciled to having the problem so left "abrupt" when we reflect that the relation of human personality to the conscious and sub-conscious elements by which it builds character is as yet far from clear.

Note

Since the foregoing was written, Professor Iverach's article on "Consciousnesss" in Hastings's "Dictionary of Religion and Ethics," has come to hand. His main contention that "the unconscious and sub-conscious are store-houses of products manufactured by consciousness, and kept *in retentis* until they are needed," follows the line of thought suggested in this article. He is of opinion, however, that James changed his attitude between the publication of his "Principles of Psychology" and "The Varieties of Religious Experience," while the present writer is of opinion that the two works may be harmonized, allowing to the latter a more popular form of expression in the passages which speak of "the self," in accordance with James's own words "When I say 'Soul,' you need not take me in the ontological sense unless you

prefer to" ("Varieties of Religious Experience," p. 195). The truth is that James's idea of a stream of consciousness with each element "appropriative" is a monstrosity and he was unable to maintain it when lecturing on experience, and so jauntily substituted the terms "Soul," "Self," "Subject," with a passing apology.

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